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## VSEBINA / INDICE GENERALE / CONTENTS

<b>Wolfgang Göderle:</b> Postwar: The Social Transformation of Empire in 19 <sup>th</sup> Century Europe. Scientific Knowledge, Hybridity and the Legitimacy of Imperial Rule .....	511
<i>Postwar: trasformazione sociale dell'Impero nell'Europa del XIX secolo.</i>	
<i>Conoscenza scientifica, ibridismo e legittimità del potere imperiale</i>	
<i>Povojna socialna transformacija Habsburške monarhije v 19. stoletju.</i>	
<i>Znanost, hibridnost in zakonitost cesarskih zakonov</i>	
<b>Francesco Toncich:</b> Istria between Purity and Hybridity: The Creation of the Istrian Region through Scientific Research in the 19 <sup>th</sup> Century .....	541
<i>L'Istria tra purezza e ibridismo: la creazione della regione istriana</i>	
<i>attraverso l'attività scientifica nel XIX secolo</i>	
<i>Istra med čistočo in hibridnostjo: ustvarjanje istrske regije skozi</i>	
<i>znanstvene raziskave 19. stoletja</i>	
<b>Daniela Simon:</b> The “hybrids” and the Re-ordering of Istria, 1870–1914 .....	577
<i>Gli «ibridi» e il riordino dell'Istria, 1870–1914</i>	
<i>»Hibridi« in reorganizacija Istre, 1870–1914</i>	
<b>Bojan Baskar:</b> A Mixture without Mixing: Fears of Linguistic and Cultural Hybridity in the Slovenian-Italian Borderland .....	605
<i>Una mescolanza non mescolata: paure dell'ibridismo</i>	
<i>linguistico e culturale al confine italo-sloveno</i>	
<i>Mešanice brez mešanja: bojazni pred jezikovno in kulturno</i>	
<i>hibridnostjo na slovensko-italijanskem mejnem območju</i>	
<b>Marijan Premović:</b> Politički odnosi komuna Budve i Dubrovnika od 1358. do kraja XIV. stoljeća .....	623
<i>Le relazioni politiche tra il comune di Budva e il comune di Ragusa</i>	
<i>dal 1358 alla fine del secolo XIV</i>	
<i>Political Relations of Budva and Dubrovnik Communes</i>	
<i>from 1358 until the End of the 14<sup>th</sup> Century</i>	

<b>Jurij Perovšek:</b> O Dr. Milanu Jakliču in prvem prevodu <i>Komunističnega manifesta</i> v slovenski jezik.....	645
<i>Dr. Milan Jaklič e la prima traduzione in sloveno del Manifesto comunista</i>	
<i>Dr. Milan Jaklič and the First Translation of the Communist Manifesto into the Slovene Language</i>	
<b>Aleš Maver:</b> Med cesarjem in kraljem: lavantinski knezoškof Mihael Napotnik v letu 1918 in po njem .....	661
<i>Tra l'imperatore e il re: l'arcivescovo di Maribor</i>	
<i>Mihael Napotnik dal 1918 in poi</i>	
<i>Between an Emperor and a King: The Prince-bishop</i>	
<i>Mihael Napotnik of Lavant in the Year 1918 and Afterwards</i>	
<b>Darjan Lorenčič &amp; Andrej Hozjan:</b> Respublika Mörnska – Murska Republika, 1919 .....	679
<i>Respublika Mörnska – la Repubblica di Mura, 1919</i>	
<i>Respublika Mörnska – The Republic of Mura, 1919</i>	
<b>Gorazd Bajc, Mateja Matjašič Friš, Janez Osojnik &amp; Darko Friš:</b> L'intervento italiano in Carinzia dopo la Prima guerra mondiale e i britannici .....	711
<i>The Italian Intervention in Carinthia after the First World War and the British</i>	
<i>Italijanska intervencija na Koroškem po prvi svetovni vojni in Britanci</i>	

POSTWAR: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF EMPIRE IN 19<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY EUROPE.  
 SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE, HYBRIDITY AND THE LEGITIMACY OF IMPERIAL RULE

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*ABSTRACT*

*The Napoleonic post-war era is considered a period of restoration, yet recent works have delivered fresh insights, which suggest to fundamentally re-evaluate and reconsider the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century in Europe. Particularly the role and the agency of members of the rising middle-classes in the rebuilding of imperial rule all over Europe appear to necessitate an update in the light of newer research. When a quarter century of war destroyed centuries-old social fabrics, securities and certainties, it was particularly well educated members of the middle-classes, who became the most valuable allies of imperial rulers in their project to rebuild their empires. However, what was sold as a “restoration” to contemporaries and subjects frequently realized large-scale, knowledge-driven modernization projects, which centralized administrations, put rulers into stronger positions and marginalized older social elites. Yet, with the middle-classes and their education, ideas of enlightenment and emancipation entered the centers of calculation of imperial rule, which triggered an ongoing process of negotiation between rulers and their new, bourgeois imperial intermediaries.*

*Keywords:* *New Imperial History, Central Europe, Habsburg Empire, Social History, History of Knowledge, Middle Classes, Cartography, History of Administration, History of Science*

POSTWAR: TRASFORMAZIONE SOCIALE DELL'IMPERO NELL'EUROPA  
 DEL XIX SECOLO.  
 CONOSCENZA SCIENTIFICA, IBRIDISMO E LEGITTIMITÀ  
 DEL POTERE IMPERIALE

*SINTESI*

*L'era che seguì le guerre napoleoniche è considerata come un periodo di “restaurazione”. Tuttavia, studi più recenti hanno gettato nuova luce su questo periodo e hanno iniziato a riconsiderare profondamente l'Europa della prima metà dell'800. In particolare, l'operato degli esponenti della nascente classe media, impegnati nella ristruttura-*

*zione del ruolo degli imperi europei, sembra necessitare di un aggiornamento. Dopo un quarto di secolo di guerre, che aveva spazzato via strutture sociali secolari, sicurezze e certezze, furono proprio i membri della classe media intellettuale che divennero i più valenti alleati dei sovrani nei loro progetti di ricostruzione dei loro imperi. Tuttavia, ciò che fu presentato ai contemporanei e ai sudditi come una “restaurazione” fu in realtà un modo per realizzare progetti di modernizzazione basati sulla conoscenza attraverso un’amministrazione centralizzata, che rafforzava la posizione dei sovrani e marginalizzava le vecchie élite sociali. Inoltre, grazie a questa classe media e alla sua educazione, le idee illuministe ed emancipatrici influenzarono i centri di pianificazione del potere imperiale, e innescarono un continuo processo di negoziazione tra i governanti e il loro nuovi intermediari borghesi imperiali.*

*Parole chiave: New Imperial History, Europa Centrale, Impero Asburgico, Storia Sociale, Storia della Conoscenza, Classe Media, Cartografia, Storia dell’Amministrazione, Storia della Scienza*

Decades before *ibridismo* became a buzzword in bourgeois salons during the late Habsburg Monarchy (cf. the articles in this book by Francesco Toncich and Daniela Simon), a civil servant in charge of the statistical office of the then Austrian Empire set out to create a comprehensive knowledge base which was supposed to serve a multitude of different purposes: to gather and to display information on the ethnographic composition of the “state,” to provide a fundamentally renewed, expanded and purportedly more centralized imperial administration with means for informed decision-making, and to contribute to the social integration of an empire on its way to modernization. The *Ethnographic Map of the Austrian Empire* was supposed to form the material basis for a modernized notion of the Central European Habsburg Empire, a representation of its political body, while reflecting and representing its social and cultural diversity. It was designed to provide administrators with an enormous amount of information, highly compressed on a large and colorful sheet of paper. It should deliver, to political stakeholders from in- and outside the empire alike, an image of a great power featuring natural and cultural harmony, not in spite of but through the immense degree of diversity it bore and it was designed to offer to its subjects – or, as Czoernig dared to state – citizens – a chance to identify themselves with the power and glory of an institution that was soon to receive more participation and identification from their side (Anderson, 1998, 29).

The following article aims to explore the origins of a knowledge that later provided for the observation of *ibridismo*.<sup>1</sup> It will illustrate the different aspects and backdrops which played decisive roles in the production and the arrangement of information, forming the image of an intrinsically diverse population. By focusing on Karl von Czoernig, a top-official in charge, his fellow colleagues and his role in early 19<sup>th</sup>-century information and knowledge generation between administration and science, I will provide the background for a more profound understanding of the discourse on hybridity which became so important in later decades of the century. I will argue that the immense importance of knowledge to imperial rule in the decades after the Napoleonic Wars strengthened the position of social climbers from the middle classes. Many of these polymaths, who had enjoyed a comprehensive education in the spirit of the late Enlightenment, were able to climb the career ladder in rapidly growing imperial administrations (Martus, 2015, 17 ff.). As polyglot men, often with considerable travelling experience, they built and made use of trans-imperial networks of fellow middle-class agents, who rose at the expense of a considerable class of *ancien régime* aristocracy (Godsey, 2004, 141 ff.). Czoernig and his peers provided fundamental support to imperial rulers by creating a new source of legitimacy to imperial rule, a vast amount of knowledge that processed an immense amount of information. This resource not only provided for improvements to be made in taxation and recruiting but also in socially integrating complex empires and – in the long run – in paving the way to more political participation for larger parts of the population.

1 Czoernig’s *Ethnographic Map* appears to have been by far the best-known and most influential map stating the “ethnographic” diversity of the Habsburg Empire’s population. I would not say here that his map was the sole source of later discourses on *ibridismo*.

Proceeding on the assumption that imperial rule and the versatile postwar middle classes actually acted as resources for each other (Ash, 2002), I will show how a) certain knowledge, particularly in its scientific manifestation, became a key requisite to modernized imperial rule, b) how spaces for strategic action opened up in the margins of this process and c) how and under which conditions the roots, made up of the social fabric of Habsburg Central Europe, underwent fundamental changes in the course of this development.

### THE ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP OF HABSBURG CENTRAL EUROPE IN THE 1850s

The *Ethnographic Map* was among the first very powerful and influential maps to become available in Europe after the Napoleonic Wars and the breakdown of the *ancien régimes* all over the continent. It rendered information and knowledge – that had long been restricted exclusively to the eyes of rulers and their counselors (Zeller, 1979, 20 ff.) – accessible to a larger part of the population, a process to be observed also elsewhere in Europe in the course of the 1840s and 1850s (Labbé, 2011, 152). The map, produced by Karl von Czoernig and a large number of colleagues – among others the renowned cartographer Joseph von Scheda – stood out in terms of quality, both in its cartographic and its ethnographic dimension (Hansen, 2015, 56). Yet, what distinguished it from similar maps in other parts of Europe was its approach: Czoernig's *Ethnographic Map* did not aim at the representation of similarity in terms of ethnic belonging, legal status or social standing, instead he proceeded on the assumption that the true character of Habsburg Central Europe was built on a fundamental harmony emanating from the century-long co-habitation of a vast number of different *tribes* in a zone where three major natural spaces – the inner-Asian plain, the rolling hills and the Alpine mountains – met (Czoernig, 1857, V–XVIII). Instead of looking for national unity, Czoernig declared that no such thing could ever be thought of in a zone that for centuries had been one of encounters and exchange, deeply influenced by the arrival of ever new groups of people (Labbé, 2004, 72 f.).<sup>2</sup>

In a first step, I suggest exploring the production of the *Ethnographic Map*, its widespread distribution and its reception in the course of the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The main argument that I would like to present is that neither this map nor later discourses on *ibridismo* can be fully understood outside the context of a social transformation – middle-class emancipation – that gained momentum all over Europe in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars. The breakdown of *ancien régimes* during the revolutionary wars and the partial elimination of century-old social elites in Central Europe opened spaces for social mobility to many newcomers, who frequently came from the ranks of what used to be the lower nobility and the middle classes (Godsey, 2004). The re-building of empires in Europe and the subsequent re-definition of an imperial sphere opened up new channels of communication between different social groups. The massive social transformation that European empires underwent in the course of the

2 Further work by Morgane Labbé on the issue of ethnographic and linguistic maps deserves attention, as it displays a panoramic, learned and comparative insight into the subject.




Fig. 1: The Ethnographie der österreichischen Monarchie / Ethnographic map of Austrian Monarchy, Karl von Czörnig, 1855 (Wikimedia Commons).

19<sup>th</sup> century saw the re-negotiation of power relations between rulers, former subjects, new citizens and those members of social elites, who had to deal with a relative loss of importance and influence (Evans, 2016).

Another aspect that this article is not going to deal with, although it is intrinsically linked with the process of social transformation under scrutiny here, is the subsequent territorialization of imperial rule in Central Europe, mediatised and catalyzed by the knowledge generated in this context (Göderle, 2016a, 77 ff.).

I argue that the production and circulation of knowledge in the form of maps, illustrated books and journals, played a major role in the emancipation of a rising middle-class, which made use of these media to increase its representation in the political process and to expand its influence on decision-making. The remains of an older *république des lettres* (Hotson & Wallnig, 2019; Martus, 2015, 92 ff.) and newer networks in parts amalgamated into a transimperial (Schär, 2015, 12–14) public sphere, a communication space run and populated by a European middle-class, open to its members yet restricted and opaque to those outside (Moretti, 2013, 3 ff.; Csáky, 2010, 101 ff.). By disseminating supposedly scientifically produced knowledge (Raj, 2016, 258), members of the new administrative elites – well-educated, increasingly university-trained men from what used to be the lower aristocracy and the middle-classes in the *ancien régime* – successfully established new

certainties, categories and perspectives. Statisticians, cartographers, writers, illustrators, scholars, many of whom occupied positions in the quickly expanding imperial bureaucracies, pushed existing or created new boundaries by developing and refining their role as experts and their specialist skills (Göderle, 2018). However, what science meant and how scientific standards could be attained and assured was still very much subject to ongoing debate.<sup>3</sup> This is especially relevant for the field of statistics, a subject which moved from being an administrative craft to a scientific discipline in the course of half a century (Göderle, 2016a, 113 ff.; Porter, 1995; Behrisch, 2016).

Research literature still tends to treat these processes as part of the larger and far-reaching emergence of (nation-)statehood (Ganzenmüller & Tönsmeyer, 2016, 7 ff.). This perspective develops an understanding of the phenomenon in retrospective, the present result – contemporary statehood – limits and restricts the view on contingencies and alternative paths of development that were at least conceivable in the historical context (Fillafer, 2016). I therefore chose a different point of departure and conceptualized the larger part of the 19<sup>th</sup> century in the European context as a world of empires.<sup>4</sup> Thus, this article tries to understand the emergence of administrations and certain knowledge configurations rather from the logics and pragmatics already at work in the 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> century than from a retrospective teleological questioning of what might have led up to the current state of things. The degree to which the nation-state as a norm of social organization has distorted perceptions of, and views on, the 19<sup>th</sup> century is disturbing. This becomes particularly visible when looking at some of the older standard textbooks on this issue (Okey, 2002; Vöcelka, 2000). Especially diversity on many different layers has been seen rather as a specific Central European obstacle than as a social, political and legal reality that could be encountered practically all over Europe (Ingrao, 2000 [1994], 6–22).

The problem is further aggravated by the dominance of a historiography, which considers the case of Germany as the most valid model for the application to Habsburg Central Europe. Recent works have repeatedly emphasized the particularities and individualities distinguishing Habsburg from German Central Europe (Göderle & Wallnig, 2019, 70–71). It is only lately that a fundamental revision has taken place, which has called the standard path of European nation-state genesis into question and led to some sort of rehabilitation of Central European history toward the backdrop of the more general development on the continent (Judson, 2016; Deak, 2015; Mazohl, 2015a; Mazohl, 2015b; Coen, 2018; Clark, 2012).

## TERMINOLOGY AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

So-called *new imperial history* has proved useful in describing, analyzing and understanding empires and the complex processes these established, maintained and nourished (Fillafer, 2018; Ghosh, 2012; von Hirschhausen, 2015). *New imperial his-*

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3 A vast body of literature gives evidence of the knowledge produced and circulated by members of this class, ranging from Baldacci to Scheda and beyond. Much of the written material, particularly from the very first decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, was published only decades later, yet its existence displays the degree to which this class appropriated the sphere of the written, tying in with the heritage of the *république des lettres*.

4 Among many others, Moritz Csáky, Johannes Feichtinger and Christopher Clark have repeatedly suggested such approaches with regard to Central Europe. Among the few complex approaches to break up the common narrative: cf. Gammerl, 2010.

tory comes with a limited yet powerful set of terms that allows particularly well for the description and comparison of imperial structures, specifically beyond the European/Western context, which is still a rare quality to be found (Cooper, 2005). I will operate primarily with the vocabulary and the toolkit provided by Burbank and Cooper as I consider their work among the most open and compatible with many adjoining fields of (yet not exclusively) historical scholarship (Burbank & Cooper, 2010). The following key terms will be put to use here: In *new imperial history* “empire” is used analytically and refers to a structure, featuring particular, clearly defined, qualities. In this text, “empire” must not be confused with “Empire” such as in “Austrian Empire”, which is the most common English term for the *Kaiserthum Oesterreich*. Empire with a capital “e” will thus always refer to the specific context of the Habsburg (or another) Empire, whereas empire with a small “e” will be used as an analytical expression in order to be able to describe a particular form of the exercise of power. The same applies to the adjective “Imperial” respectively “imperial.”

According to Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, empires and imperial rule evolve around five basic and recurring themes, three of which are important here: politics of difference, imperial agents and repertoires of power (Burbank & Cooper, 2010, 11 ff.).

With *new imperial history* being one point of departure for this article, I would like to present another observation as the second aspect that helped to identify the main hypothesis and the elaboration of the conclusions: *history of knowledge*. Unlike *new imperial history*, history of knowledge has so far not been turned into a relatively homogenous field of interest of historians, et al. A broad array of different approaches, methodologies, imaginations and theories of what this could be, dominate the scholarly discourse (Burke, 2012; Göderle & Pfaffenthaler, 2018; Landwehr, 2007; Müller-Wille, Reinhardt & Sommer, 2017; Sarasin, 2011; Speich Chassé & Gugerli, 2012; Vogel, 2004). The fact that history of knowledge developed slightly different notions in adjoining academic spaces – for instance the French, German-speaking and Anglophone worlds – does not particularly facilitate things. There appears to be very little common ground.

I suggest understanding knowledge as an important resource in the organization and maintenance of social ties, hierarchies and political rule; and as a product of a process of knowledge fabrication. It can be materialized, stored, reproduced; put to use in the context of the exercise of power or suppressed and destroyed (Raj, 2016). Rule without knowledge can prove near to impossible, a number of recent studies for the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries have made this very clear (Collin & Horstmann, 2004; Drobisch, 2009; Jesner, 2019; Scott, 1998; Tantner, 2007). In many cases, knowledge requires actualization and maintenance in order to remain effective; in any case, it commands a certain infrastructure in order to subsist.<sup>5</sup> In the context of a long 19<sup>th</sup> century, we have to deal with two further terms: information (Bayly, 1996; Castells, 1989; Schaffer,

5 I am well aware that this definition is vague and of limited use to many other cases and in conflict with some of the definitions provided by current literature, though it should suffice the requirements of this article. I do consider particularly the material component as important here, as this is a point little stressed by many other studies. So is the aspect of infrastructure. Cf. Latour, 1999.

2009) – particularly well established in German academia with regard to Early Modern History –, and data – an expression that has gained some relevance and importance lately in the description and analysis of late 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century knowledge-production (Brendecke, Friedrich & Friedrich, 2008; von Oertzen, 2017). Both terms, information and data, refer to fragments of what is covered by the expression knowledge. All three terms will be used analytically – thus not as terminology to be found in the sources but to describe and analyze certain sets of facts and circumstances in a clearly defined way – though each term refers to something slightly different. Knowledge is a final product, a resource that is usually generated in standardized procedures which can be reproduced and diffused, in most cases it includes either information or data or both. Information is an important resource for the production of knowledge particularly (though not only) in the context of administrative procedures, it is of a more limited scope and refers to very specific context. Data, becoming important in the course of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, refers to the most finely refined entity here, to (mass produced) fragmented pieces of information that require further processing in order to become either information or knowledge (or both) (von Oertzen, 2017, 5f.; Raj, 2016, 259–261).

Last but not least, this article takes up and adapts observations, analyses and assertive conclusions presented lately by Christopher Clark in his work on time and power in Prussia and strives to develop his argument further, so that it fits the specific conditions and configuration found for Habsburg Central Europe (Clark, 2019). Clark particularly emphasizes the role of different notions, imaginations and perceptions of temporality in Prussia and later Nazi Germany between the 17<sup>th</sup> and the 20<sup>th</sup> century. A few very sharp and lucid studies have opened this field of observation for the Habsburg case in the course of the past few years, yet much remains to be done here (Fillafer & Wallnig, 2016; Siemann, 2016). With the end of the *ancien régime*, a regime of temporality ended, with severe consequences for members of many different social groups. Aristocratic elites not only lost their status but very often their possessions and henceforth they lacked the immense degree of predictability that had allowed them to build dynasties and careers in the course of a century and more (Siemann, 2016, 31–57). Common people had been given a foretaste of what was to come already under Joseph II, who drastically reduced the holidays that had structured rural lifecycles for centuries (Duindam, 2003, 143). Yet, rulers were hoping to be able to successfully re-establish their claims to rule. Restoring the legitimacy of imperial rule required new narratives, the re-arrangement of existing narratives and the production of new knowledge capable of integrating old and new groups into the social order of empires (Schneider, 2015, 41 f.).

## A SHORT RETROSPECTIVE: POSTWAR EUROPE AFTER 1815

When the Vienna Congress put an end to a quarter century of war and instability all over Europe and beyond, it claimed to restore the order of the *ancien régime*. Yet the restoration it delivered resembled the *ancien régime* only on the surface, the main outcome – the international system the congress created – was supposed to establish conditions and structures that could not only resist but also deal with any situation that resembled a major menace like the French Revolution. Historians and contemporary observers alike have

frequently failed to recognize the degree to which changes, innovations and reforms that became effective in the 25 years between the late 1780s and 1815 persisted in the post-1815 world, and to what extent the world had changed for many members of the century-old system of social elites, for instance for what used to be the Holy Roman Empire of German Nation (Planert, 2017). Yet, similar observations can be made in many places all over Europe, where substantial territorial changes had taken place. Some significant literature has been published lately, which explores in detail the impact hegemonic political narratives have had on Central European historiography and on its research questions, methodologies and boundary making (Filler & Wallnig, 2016, 11 ff.).

Not only had an era of revolutionary wars produced deep and far-reaching changes to the old Imperial world of the time before 1789, the new age beginning with 1815 required another substantial overhaul and modification of what was left of the structures and institutions safeguarding the power of European rulers. In the course of the Napoleonic Wars, many arrangements and social contracts of the *ancien régime* had either crumbled or proved hardly effective and had subsequently been replaced by more efficient systems and institutions. The integration and stabilization of proven solutions found and established during wartime did not take place before the aftermath of the war era in most cases. Ute Planert suggests analyzing and interpreting the decades after 1815 as a postwar era, thus focusing on the rebuilding of Empires, on the reconstruction and repair of social systems and networks and on the slow emergence of the new Imperial societies to crystallize in the course of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>6</sup>

This reconfiguration of imperial rule in the Austrian Empire provides the backdrop for the process under scrutiny, the production of the *Ethnographic Map* in the 1850s. What claimed to be the restoration of the *ancien régime* in Habsburg Central Europe turned out to become a large-scale modernization, overhaul and redefinition of imperial rule. There is a persistent tendency in Central European historiography to interpret the era still known as *Biedermeier* or *Vormärz* as a prolongation of the semi-millennium of well-established Habsburg dominance in the region and thus to consider it the long finale of an old order (Löffler, 2017, 123 f.). Yet, more recent research suggests considering this almost 35 year period neither a prolongation of a pre-French Revolution *ancien régime* nor a lengthy prelude to modern statehood in the region but rather a key period for the understanding of both the entire 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries in Central Europe (Heindl, 2014, 145; Deak, 2015, 19–64; Godsey, 2004, 11 ff.; Judson, 2016, 51–102).

In many ways, Josephinist reforms (and reformers) lived on under the surface of what is frequently regarded as the reactionary rule of Francis II/I (Heindl, 1990, 200 ff.). Large operations considered to centralize more power and control in the hands of the sovereign, for instance the huge and expensive surveying and mapping procedures, continued or were renewed, administrative bodies installed by Joseph II remained in place, well qualified social risers pushed into the imperial administration, while at the same time members of the pre-1789 elites could not make it back to their former positions (Godsey, 2004, 2 ff.; Göderle, 2017, 168 ff.; Grečenková, 2004).

6 I refer to a lecture here, held at Graz University on 21 June 2018.

The first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century did not only see an expansion of centralized administration, slow at first yet quickly gaining momentum towards the end of the 1840s, it also saw a rapid social transformation and the establishment of highly qualified, bourgeois or lower aristocratic experts in many key positions of the rebuilt imperial bureaucracy (Deak, 2015, 19–64; Brandt, 2014).

## INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE: LUBRICANTS OF RULE

The insight that more direct and efficient rule required better information and new forms of knowledge was in no way new to Habsburg rulers in the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. On the contrary, since Maria Theresia more or less all rulers of the Habsburg Lands had participated in an ongoing effort to improve the knowledge base of their administrations (Stollberg-Rilinger, 2017, 178 ff.; Godsey, 2018). Their pursuits aimed at a better understanding and exploitation of information that was primarily at the disposal of manorial lords and estates who had little interest in sharing these resources.

Among the many imperial initiatives to improve the production and exploitation of knowledge, two particularly stood out: Land surveys and conscriptions, both started in the early second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, promised valuable information and actual yields in terms of taxation and recruiting (Anderson, 2006 [1983], 167 ff.; Göderle, 2016a, 86 ff.; Scott, 1998, 11 ff.). Thus, both processes were considered central to the modernization of imperial rule, yet both operations turned out to be expensive, difficult to manage and took up immense manpower. Neither the administrative infrastructure nor the educational levels of the personnel at hand proved sufficient; reliable results could not be delivered any time soon and the structural limitations presented by an empire of this age and size turned out to be a real challenge (Göderle, 2019, 103 ff.; Tantner, 2007, 109 ff.). It remains to be researched more thoroughly to what degree war actually helped the ruler's efforts. In many cases, one might get the impression that the practical constraints it presented could have helped to overcome legal and factual obstacles. Yet on the other hand, it put further pressure on limited resources (Siemann, 2016, 358 ff.; Vick, 2014, 233 ff.).

However, what turned out to be a most substantial problem to a stronger centralization of rule was the diversity of the individual entities of the empire, the vast array of different degrees of autonomy, and the manifold legal individualities (Schneider, 2015). The Habsburg Lands were hardly comparable among each other, there was no single language to describe and relate the different social realities they featured. The rise of Prussia in the first half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century had set new standards in terms of administrative efficiency and standardization, a benchmark that no other European power could attain. Prussia soon became an example and a model for innovation, yet, established and historically grown European empires faced severe challenges when it came to modernization according to this ideal (Hochedlinger, 2009, 73; Mazohl-Wallnig, 2005, 183–216). Implementing new administrative structures proved difficult, as these inevitably collided with well-founded older rights and privileges. Financing new building infrastructure and personnel turned out to be extremely challenging. The huge empires of the *ancien régime*, and this applied particularly to the Habsburg case, owed their

resilience to its immense flexibility and adaptability. The Habsburg rule stretched over a large bundle of different territories, the degrees to which these were directly controlled by the respective rulers, varied largely and so did the degree of integration among these. It was only under Charles VI at the very beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century that a consolidation process had been launched, culminating in the construction of a basic road infrastructure. Maria Theresia drew on these fundamentals of centralization and launched a building program, which was supposed to create hosting for services of the central administration in the provinces.

These milestones – road and canal construction, erection of administrative buildings – are well known among historians, though not excessively well researched. Common and popular textbooks mention them, yet little reference is made to the fact that the 18<sup>th</sup> century only saw the launch of the construction of infrastructure that more often than not turned out to be a never-ending story (Helmedach, 2002; van Laak, 2018). Roads and buildings not only took decades to complete but also required permanent upkeep and expansion. The time lapse between the beginning of a building project and its entry into service was enormous. Thus, an event-based historiographical approach to these issues is conceivably unsuitable. Roads and official buildings were soon to form part of what was to become the backbone for the collection, transmission, distribution and processing of information and knowledge.

The aspect of time has to be kept in mind when it comes to the analysis of the transformation of imperial rule in the course of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, particularly with regard to the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century appropriated by Czoernig and his peers.<sup>7</sup> Although Czoernig is unquestionably the key figure in this article, I would like to emphasize that this text is not about him as a person but about what he represented. He was a fairly representative member of a social class that rose from the ashes of the *ancien régime*, as it could provide empires in a profound state of crisis with a resource central to the re-establishment, re-organization and re-definition of imperial rule: knowledge. Men like Czoernig could generate, administrate and update enormous configurations of this most valuable matter – allowing for the exercise of power and the upkeep of imperial authority and legitimacy. Czoernig and his peers were responsible for the large-scale production of a highly effective form of knowledge and for putting it down on paper. Paper was supposed to be more patient, resilient and obedient than the huge apparatus serving indirect rule, with several layers of lords pursuing respective individual interests and tiresome negotiations where no imperial ruler could ever have full access to the valuable information and data his rule was based upon.

Already before 1815, the rebuilding of empires flushed larger numbers of men, who would not have had prospects of more remarkable careers in imperial administrations in the *ancien régime*, into the ranks of authorities and institutions grappling with the survival of the enormous political structures they were supposed to serve (Godsey,

7 A second aspect of time should be considered here, spatial time: More or less distinct lags occurred between the introduction of certain technologies and innovations respectively the emergence of certain debates and discourses between different communication spaces, as for instance Prussia and the non-Habsburg German-speaking lands, or France and Habsburg Central Europe (Twellmann, 2014, 113; Göderle & Wallnig, 2019, 67 ff.; Coen, 2018, 7 ff.).

2009; Grečenková, 2004; Karstens, 2011). In the course of a quarter of a century, the availability of the resource these men formed for the empire, and its capacity to hire and to integrate them into its ranks, appears to have been a crucial factor in its renewal and redefinition.

## THE RENEWAL OF AN EMPIRE

As Czoernig himself stated in his publication *Oesterreichs Neugestaltung*, the Austrian Empire (in German: *Kaiserthum Oesterreich*) had undergone more severe and far-reaching changes in the ten years between 1848 and 1858 than in the century between 1848 and 1758 (Czoernig, 1858, IV). His assessment is remarkable, given that the empire had seen almost a quarter of a century of war in the latter period, and undergone tremendous change. It had felt the consequences of the French Revolution, the Holy Roman Empire of German Nation had disintegrated after almost a millennium of existence and the loose confederation of lands, controlled by the Habsburg, had become something more resembling of a state, at least in the eyes of high-ranking officials such as Czoernig. Last but not least: ancient social institutions, such as the imperial aristocracy, had lost much of their standing, power and influence and it was their stepping down that finally allowed men like Czoernig to advance into positions that would have been all but attainable only one hundred years earlier.

Czoernig's depiction thus represents a fine rhetorical masterpiece. He boldly explains to his readership that true progress and reform in Central Europe had only been achieved in the decade of neoabsolutist rule that started in 1848 with a regime that finally ended the *Alte Reich*, menaced by a *tremendous movement* ("gewaltige Bewegung"), which *shattered it in its existence* ("welche das Reich erschütterte [...] [und] seinen Bestand bedrohte [...]") (Czoernig, 1858, IV). According to Czoernig, it was the *protection of providence* and its *own spirit* ("unter dem Schutze der Vorsehung mit Hilfe der eigenen Thatkraft") that led to *the restoration of law and order and to the establishment of a new life of the state with an equalization of all citizens* ("zu der Wiederherstellung des Rechtes und der Ordnung, zu der Begründung eines neuen staatlichen Lebens mit der Gleichstellung aller Staatsbürger [...] [führte]") (Czoernig, 1858, IV). This daring assessment of the situation is further continued in the next paragraph when Czoernig declares that *new circumstances were created by mastering the movement* (thus the 1848 Revolution), *and outdated conditions, not in line with present requirements, fell victim to these* ("Neue Verhältnisse waren durch die Bewältigung der Bewegung entstanden, und veraltete Zustände, mit den Anforderungen der Gegenwart unvereinbar, waren ihr zum Opfer gefallen") (Czoernig, 1858, V). As striking as Czoernig's euphemistic phrasing of the 1848 Revolution appears, his appraisal of the situation in the late 1850s is optimistic: *The new conditions required a new regulation of the constitution, the legislation and the administration. [...] [N]one of the public circumstances remained untouched by reform* ("Die neuen Zustände erforderten eine neue Regelung der Verfassung, der Gesetzgebung und der Verwaltung. [...] [K]eines der öffentlichen Verhältnisse [blieb] von der Reform unberührt [...]") (Czoernig, 1858, V). He continued: *Nine years of successful work were sufficient, to create a building which – if not yet completed in all details – reached a scope that otherwise centuries could not accomplish* ("Neun

Jahre erfolgreicher Thätigkeit reichten hin, ein Gebäude zu errichten, welches, wenn auch noch nicht in allen seinen Einzelheiten vollendet, zu einem Umfange gediehen ist, den sonst Jahrhunderte nicht zustandebrachten.”) (Czoernig, 1858, V). Given much of the standard textbook literature on Habsburg Central Europe published in the later 19<sup>th</sup> and over most of the 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, one might start to believe that Czoernig was a keen propagator of what has come to be known as “alternative facts.” Yet things are more complicated than that, not only was Czoernig a renowned and much respected civil servant, scholar and maybe politician, his work earned him a lot of acknowledgement and until the end of the Habsburg Monarchy, elite bureaucrats and politicians believed his ethnographic studies – and *Oesterreichs Neugestaltung* merely expanded and extended his *Ethnographische Karte*, building on much of the same material – to be the finest work to have been ever undertaken on the linguistic and ethnographic composition of the empire as late as in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century (Brix, 1982, 71). Czoernig’s work thus represented not only a fresh and somewhat radical interpretation of the imperial redefinition that was effected during the neo-absolutist era; it also exemplified the perspective of a new perspective on Central Europe. It was the perspective of the growing (bourgeois) middle-class, disproportionately represented in the inflated apparatus of the imperial central administration, the group that Czoernig actually addressed with his works (Göderle, 2016b, 63 ff.; Judson, 2016, 155 ff.).

Skillfully, Czoernig tried to reconcile two practically irreconcilable interests: He first and foremost legitimized the imperial rule as was exercised by Francis Joseph, praising it as a rule of wisdom, backed by the law and confirmed by the order it brought about. Yet in the same paragraph, he wrote about constitution, equalization and citizens, instead of subjects. He intrinsically linked two taboos: The legitimacy of Habsburg imperial rule and constitutionalism, including civil rights. These were two arguments that were not supposed to be emphasized in one book.

## REDEFINING LEGITIMATE IMPERIAL RULE

Czoernig’s work stated the legitimacy of Habsburg imperial rule when most other stakeholders of what used to be the Central European empire – particularly members of the old social elites, of the aristocracy – had to grapple with comprehensive adaptations of their respective roles (Godsey, 2004; Labb  , 2011). Redefining empire and maintaining order meant abandoning institutions and discontinuing relations going back centuries and replacing both with new organizations and with new social ties. One could expect this massive intervention into a centuries-old social fabric to meet fierce resistance. Yet, whatever resistance there was against the large-scale administrative and political transformation of the empire that Czoernig stated in very clear and unambiguous words, it did not address the key operations and the major processes which provided for shifting the power balance. Why was this so?

Czoernig’s argument was clear and built on evidence which was provided by an immense body of knowledge, gathered mainly by himself and fellow colleagues of similar backgrounds, employed in the imperial administration (Kamusella, 2012 [2008]). The evidence collected and presented had been put together and scrutinized according to contemporary scholarly and scientific standards. The knowledge gener-

ated by these men – the new administrative elites of the empire – owed its credibility, value and practicability to the outstanding standards of quality it complied with. Neither the maps nor the statistic tables on Central Europe, that became more widely distributed from the beginning of the 1840s onward, could easily be criticized (Hansen, 2015). They rendered social facts visible to those privileged to be granted access to the material and they allowed for interpretation. According to recent literature, maps materialized claims, rule and political order (Krämer, 2008, 302).<sup>8</sup>

If one takes a closer look at *Oesterreich's Neugestaltung*, the tightly knit connection between the material evidence on Central European populations gathered, processed and put on display by Czoernig and his colleagues, the interpretation chosen by these men becomes visible. Whereas this interpretation might well have offered space for critique, the material base alone did not, for several reasons. First, very little information was actually accessible concerning the details on the compilation of the data. Second, few people would have been sufficiently qualified to call into question what elite administrators all over Europe produced: The few well qualified men in the dynamic and quickly growing field, developing rapidly from what used to be *Staatswissenschaften* only a few decades earlier, were hardly to be found outside the bourgeois circles of high-ranking civil-servants. Many well-qualified men from the ranks of the lower aristocracy of the *ancien régime* chose the ranks of the new and growing middle-classes over being the third wheel on the wagon of an aristocracy currently in free fall. Thus, those who were supposedly most affected by the consequences of *Oesterreich's Neugestaltung* were in no good position to counter the attack launched by the imperial administration directly on the field. One might even raise the question if the degree of menace that emanated from maps and tables was even realized by an aristocratic class still dealing with the consequences of the Napoleonic Wars (Godsey, 2004, 141 ff.).

The emperor himself on the other hand was deeply involved with this enterprise. None of the Habsburg rulers of the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century had a remotely untroubled relationship with science and scholarship – a deep-rooted aversion to Josephinist reforms played a role here – yet all of them displayed hesitant tolerance at one point or another. Long-serving civil-servants frequently knew very well to what degree they could proceed with their advances and when it was necessary to stop (Heindl, 1990).

A convolute of maps and tables thus generated a new material reality in the offices and bureaus of the central administration of the Habsburg Monarchy after 1848. It created new and iconic images of what the state (as this is the expression Czoernig chose to use in most of his works) looked like and it consolidated this picture as intrinsically diverse (Labbé, 2004, 71 f.).

## INTERPRETING MATERIAL, MAKING CHOICES: HOW TO FIND DIVERSITY

The 1830s and 1840s had seen rapid and massive advances in the generation and representation of population-related data. Long-range mapping operations that had been

8 Some work by Bruno Latour appears to be particularly useful in describing and scrutinizing the details of this materialization (Latour, 1999; further Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Latour, 1987).

(re)launched in many places all over Europe towards the end of the Napoleonic Wars had amassed sufficient material, which provided for first assemblages of high-quality topographic and administrative maps (Göderle, 2017, 178 ff.). At the same time, the ongoing collection of information that could be processed into statistically presentable and exploitable data yielded respectable results. Unlike the cartographic material that was mostly funded by, and associated with, official mapping activities, statistical undertakings usually referred to “private” initiatives and collected information that was only loosely connected with the central domains of imperial rule (Bourguet, 1988; Desrosières, 2010 [1993]).<sup>9</sup>

The (predominantly) men involved with the collection of information and the generation of data in the 1830s and 1840s were often part of larger, loose, informal transimperial networks (Schär, 2015, 12–14). They communicated among each other and adhered to certain quality standards. As will be shown, most of these men shared a certain socio-cultural background. Standardization and normalization of the procedures put to use in mapping came with the travelling of key innovations across imperial borders, a process that had already begun much earlier though not at the rate that could be observed toward the end of the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Harley, 2001). Issues remained more open with regard to statistical knowledge, as different administrations had diverging and often hesitant strategies when it came to the support they were willing to grant the collection and exploitation of statistical information (Zeller, 1979, 20 ff.). Despite these difficulties, the quality levels of maps and statistics produced in the European imperial arena on, below and beyond the official activities around 1850 were surprisingly high. The same applies to the compatibility of the materials produced, on some level, most of the resources were complementary (Anderson, 1998, 29).

Yet, and this is an important point, the consensus did not stretch so far that it covered the interpretation of the data produced. Whatever material and evidence was produced by agents like Czoernig and his peers, what these representations were supposed to mean required interpretation, and the common people – that is all who were no experts – relied on specialist guidance. Whereas military personnel, many civil-servants, politicians, many aristocrats and rulers had made themselves familiar with the predominant media of the scientific-administrative discourse of the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century – predominantly maps and statistical tables – in the course of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, many others were swamped with the imposition these new matters represented (Göderle, 2016a, 258 ff.; Tantner, 2007).

The immense density of information, these media contained, and the enormous degree of complexity, were thus countered by the compulsion to reduce these to dimensions which made the material at least readable. Careful selection of the information to be displayed, purification and processing of the raw data, and a careful choice of the means of illustration at the disposal of the people responsible; maps and statistical tables were extremely complex tools of knowledge conveyance. Its use required an enormous degree of expertise and know-how, in no way were its contents

9 I put “private” in quotation marks here, as I will show in one following chapter how difficult it actually is to reconstruct a clear frontier between private and public for those agents who were mainly concerned with such operations of knowledge generation.

arbitrarily, self-arranging or self-explanatory (Wood, 1992, 70–88). Czoernig and his colleagues, who were to take over the roles of very powerful knowledge-brokers, carefully selected their data and made well-considered choices, in order to evoke the desired images and to produce certain impressions.

In the 1840s and 1850s, this aspect of the generation of knowledge was not yet considered part of the normalized and standardized process of data gathering and processing. The interpretation of the generated and arranged mass-data remained in the competence of respective administrations and in many cases – particularly when it came to the large private statistical endeavors – of private or semi-private scholars. The 1840s and 1850s provide ample opportunity to observe how similarly structured convolutes of data were put to use to stress much different interpretations of the material. Czoernig chose – for reasons that will have to be discussed here – to stress the point of natural diversity and heterogeneity (Coen, 2018, 12–13). Many of his colleagues all over Europe opted to emphasize homogeneity and national unity when dealing with similarly structured data (Hansen, 2015).

#### TRUTH-TO-NATURE AND WHAT IT COULD MEAN

In a magisterial study, Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison exemplified the establishment of common standards of scientific objectivity in a European context from the 18<sup>th</sup> century on (Daston & Galison, 2007).<sup>10</sup> Although their work remains limited in scope – it focusses exclusively on questions of objectivity in illustrations in atlases – *truth-to-nature* can easily be identified as the standard of objectivity the entire field of early 19<sup>th</sup>-century-mapmaking adhered to. The major questions to be asked in this context kept popping up in the entire process surrounding the production of the *Ethnographic Map* and in order to enable readers of the publication to comprehend the problems Czoernig saw himself confronted with, considerable space was given to these issues.

While Czoernig displayed an open attitude toward the information and data that provided the basis of the knowledge that he generated on the *Kaiserstaat* (inadequately translated as “Austrian Empire”), he chose a more authoritarian style of exhibition when it came to the presentation of his conclusions and inferences. The entire laboriously collected evidence formed the basis of one major and dominant narrative: Czoernig used the ethnographic material to prove a new historical narrative, elaborately interweaving the very old and traditional imperial historiography with a massive convolute of social and settlement history (Coen, 2018, 17–18; Twellmann, 2014, 113). By (frequently arbitrarily) connecting mythic and half-mythic strands of the glorious Habsburg family history with a broad array of quite recent findings and discoveries from a range of neighboring scientific disciplines, he outlined a broader historical narrative which fully included older and official versions of the ruler’s respective self-understanding. He also offered a space for

10 It has to be mentioned here that the process under scrutiny should be dealt with from a global perspective: The most impressive and relevant work on shared standards in knowledge production outside Europe and probably the most important contribution to our understanding of this comes from Kapil Raj (Raj, 2007), further scholars added to his work (Sivasundaram, 2010).

those not present in historiography so far, to identify themselves with a *Kaiserstaat* that reached – at least in Czoernig's imagination – far deeper into the past, beyond its official foundation in 1804.

The *Ethnographic Map* formed an uncontested piece of material evidence, which proved that the Austrian Empire was composed of a large number of different *tribes*. This part was sound scientific fact, according to the respective contemporary standards in statistics, ethnography and cartography. Yet, in his interpretation of the rich material he had collected, Czoernig went one step further, by connecting this evidence with one much older and distinctly unscientific knowledge base, the Habsburg family version of its own history and another relatively recent and sparsely documented chunk of knowledge, the entire backdrop of a popular history in the making.<sup>11</sup>

Czoernig's mission statement, opening his *Ethnographic Map*, already leaves little doubt about the direction of his major argument:

*All main tribes of the European population meet inside the empire's borders, here they form compact groups, permeate each other in most diverse national coloration, and build ethnographic groups and islands, which, in most colorful mixture, express the nowhere else to be found uniqueness of the populace of Austria. Yet, it is not this mélange of peoples alone, which establishes this peculiarity; this is effected rather by the formidable proportions in which the main tribes are represented, so that they equal each other in number and in the inner force of the respective peoples, further the nuances of the different degrees of civilization balance each other; in their alliance, not in their subordination they form the foundation, on which rests the building that is the state* (Czoernig, 1857, V).<sup>12</sup>

This passage from the introduction to the *Ethnographic Map* makes it difficult to comprehend how Czoernig's work could be considered a scientific standard even 20 and more years after its publication. Yet, it holds the key to a more profound understanding of science in the 1840s and 1850s as one field of action beside others, in the professional lives of men such as Czoernig. As will be shown in the next chapter, Czoernig stood out as a politician, as a writer, as a statistician (which is what made him a scientist in the perspective of his contemporaries), as a top official, and as a private scholar. However, none of his many different roles allowed him to remove himself completely from the fact that he was, above all, a subject of his emperor, or a citizen of the state.

11 Deborah Coen states that the “vitality of Renaissance cosmologies” was maintained in the Habsburg lands (Coen, 2018, 18), a most learned observation.

12 The original text states: “Alle Hauptstämme der Bevölkerung Europa's begegnen sich in dem Umfange des Reiches, bilden hier compacte Massen, durchdringen dort in verschiedenster nationaler Färbung einander, und gestalten sich zu ethnographischen Gruppen und Inseln, welche in buntester Mischung die nirgend anderswo wieder zu findende Eigenthümlichkeit des Völkerbestandes von Oesterreich ausdrücken. Aber nicht allein die Völkermischung ist es, welche diese Eigenthümlichkeit begründet; es geschieht dieses hauptsächlich durch die grossartigen Verhältnisse, in denen die Hauptvölkerstämme auftreten, so dass sie einander durch Zahl und innere Kraft der einzelnen Völker, sowie durch die Abstufungen der Civilisation das Gleichgewicht halten, und in ihrer Vereinigung, nicht in ihrer Unterordnung, die Gründfesten bilden, auf denen das Staatsgebäude ruht.”

## KARL VON CZOERNIG: AN EXCEPTIONAL CIVIL SERVANT?

Who was Karl von Czoernig? He served as a *Sections-Chef* at the time when his most important work was published. He was thus a head of department in the Ministry of Trade and Commerce which was a relatively high function in the new Central Administration, directly below the minister. Czoernig appears in many ways well representative of the administrative elite featured in Habsburg Central Europe in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars: born in 1804 into a middle-class family in Černousy (then Bohemia, today the Czech Republic), he was the son of an administrator himself. His father was in charge of an estate of the Clam-Gallas family. His mother was the daughter of a textile fabricant. After finishing grammar school, Czoernig studied *Rechts- und Staatswissenschaften* (law, governance and public policy) at the universities of Prague and Vienna where he soon stood out as an excellent student with a broad interest in a range of different subjects related to his curriculum. Due to the study and examination regulations of the time, studying law covered a much broader field, including contemporary political economy, political science but also statistical reasoning and knowledge representation. It was the latter fields that kindled Czoernig's interest which earned him the distinction of being considered "Austria's future Dupin" by his academic teacher Joseph Ritter von Kudler (Göbl, 2008; Göderle, 2018, 199 ff.; Rumpler, 2010).

In 1828, Czoernig started a career as a civil-servant to the Habsburg Empire in Trieste, an employment that seems to have allowed him ample liberties to develop some comprehensive part-time work. His *Topographisch-historisch-statistische Beschreibung von Reichenberg. Nebst einem Anhange: Die Beschreibung von Gablonz enthaltend*, which was considered literature at the time of publication, already contained many of those elements, connections and underlying thoughts that were to characterize Czoernig's later and better-known books. Over a total of 200 pages, Czoernig developed his argument building on an extensive collection of information and data on trade and economic activities. This was then connected with profound knowledge on the topography of the region by a historical account and reasoning on the demography and population of the Bohemian town of Reichenberg, not far from where he was born and raised. The book was published in 1829 and it was to be followed by a number of similarly structured publications in the years to come.

Meanwhile, his career continued: After only two years in Trieste, he moved on to Milan, where he was quickly appointed the secretary of the governor Count Hartig. Czoernig smoothly blended into the intellectual life of the Lombardian capital, soon developing a large circle of contacts and friends with whom he communicated quick-wittedly and casually in several languages. Although he was already a high-ranking member of the provincial administration and had an active social life, he seems to have found sufficient time to continue his secondary business as an author, scholar, statistician and topographer. He was a highly productive publisher of books in the style that has already been presented here: his mélange of geographic, economic and demographic information, presented in picturesque topographic images and statistical tables, accompanied by learned texts illustrating historical and social connections, contributed to the stream of new knowledge that slowly became available to the larger

middle-class of Central Europe and beyond in the course of the 1830s and 1840s. It was a quality of knowledge that shifted well-established ideas and firm beliefs regarding the fundamentals of the social and political constitution of imperial Europe, in a post-war era, when larger parts of a growing literate public slowly realized that the past half-century constituted the beginning of a lasting caesura.

In 1841, Czoernig was called back to Vienna, the capital, though not the only center of the recovering Empire, where he took over the Department of Administrative Statistics.<sup>13</sup> Although other candidates for the job might have been better qualified, Czoernig had plenty of practical experience and knew the administrative service well. He grew close to his superior, Karl Friedrich Kübeck, Freiherr von Kübau, which turned out helpful in the years to come. Czoernig, an experienced knowledge engineer by that time, well-practiced in the collection, processing and arrangement of knowledge, produced from data and information gathered from a large number of different sources, then had access not only to the most intimate and secret knowledge that the Austrian Empire then had at its disposal with regard to its topography and statistics, he also came in closer contact with the larger group of other officials occupied with the production and representation of the knowledge that was considered crucial in the modernization of the state.

For the years to come, Czoernig was well occupied with re-dimensioning and reorganizing the official statistics of the Austrian Empire, an institution that had so far only been allowed to produce little information for a very small public consisting mainly of top-ranking civil-servants and political decision-makers. Concurrently he entered new fields of activity beginning with his involvement with the *niederösterreichischen Gewerbeverein* (trade association of Lower-Austria), then the *Capitalien- und Rentenversicherungsanstalt* (capital and pension insurance institution), and the Vienna-Gloggnitz-Railway but especially with the administration of the *Donau-Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft* (Danube steamship company). The latter started to thrive at that time. This put Czoernig right in the middle of a mild economic boom, which started to transform the economic and social structures of Central Europe in the long run.

Besides his involvement with the economic development of what now turned out to be the new commercial and industrial heartland of the Empire – parts of Bohemia and Lower Austria, including Vienna, plus a part of Styria – Czoernig further climbed the ranks of imperial administration and was appointed “Hofrath” (court advisor, a honorary title for high ranking civil servants in Habsburg central Europe) in 1846. Moreover, on top of all this, Czoernig was elected to the Frankfurt Parliament in 1848 by his Bohemian electoral circle, a position he had not applied for. Frankfurt turned out to be only a short interlude in his career – he joined the Café Milani fraction and took a mildly conservative position, yet upon returning to Vienna, he was to take on a responsible task in rebuilding, reordering and expanding the new post-1848 central administration.

13 Milan, for instance, was a self-confident and proud rival of Vienna at that time, at least this assumption appears to be admissible given the fact that the center of mapmaking in the Habsburg Empire was there and it further represented one of the most important trade capitals of Europe.

Not only was his department moved and became part of the newly founded *Ministerium für Handel, Gewerbe und öffentliche Bauten* (Ministry of Trade, Commerce and Public Buildings), which supposedly meant a repositioning of statistics in the imperial hierarchy: Statistics was moved much closer to political decision-making, being part of a ministry that was to take a crucial role in decisively developing the economic capacities of an Austrian Empire which was, at least on the level of its political leadership, more and more considered a single economic sphere. The knowledge produced and provided by statisticians was considered a resource to that end – ongoing economic integration and development. Czoernig was promoted again, to Sections-Chef, yet more importantly, he appears to have established himself as a troubleshooter of great class by the early 1850s.

Between 1850 and 1852, he was sent to Trieste to take charge of the establishment of a new authority, the *Central-Seebehörde* (Central Sea Authority). Furthermore, he held the responsibility for the *Zolldepartment* (Customs Department) and the *Bauarchiv* (building archive). The latter function included full responsibility for the further development of the railway and canal network. Given that this was the time when Czoernig was also completing his comprehensive *Ethnographie*, the question arises as to how he was able to cope with such sets of responsibilities and duties.

Towards the end of the 1850s, when the spirit of *neoabsolutism* slowly receded, Czoernig's career took a slow turn in another direction. Although there is still much to be researched in detail – so far, no extensive biography of Czoernig has been written – there is good reason to assume that Czoernig's proactive role in the establishment and advancement of what was later to be coined the neo-absolutist experiment turned out to be fatal towards the final years of his civil service employment. He retired in 1865, officially due to his weak state of health, and moved into his Gorizia mansion where he continued to publish and devoted much of his time and energy to the study of Istria, particularly its languages and linguistic diversity. He died in 1889, aged 85.

## THE SOCIAL FABRIC OF RENEWED EMPIRE: A PROSOPOGRAPHY

Recent studies and research support the assumption that Czoernig was less a stellar and outstanding example of an exceptional civil servant of the early and mid-19<sup>th</sup> century Habsburg Monarchy than it might appear at first view. On the contrary, he seems to have been a somehow classic representative of a group that seized a unique opportunity to raise its profile and to take up a new position in an empire on the verge of redefinition.

The members of this large and mixed group all had certain distinctive features; they shared assets that made them indispensable to imperial rule under circumstances of modernization. At the same time, they came upon particularly favorable conditions. I am going to explore these two points in the following chapter.

Karl von Czoernig was just one of a large number of men who shared distinctive traits and qualities. Although generalization does not appear to be a good way here, it is striking that the overwhelming majority of Czoernig's contemporaries who were highflyers in the imperial civil service, had received an excellent education. In many cases they had either attended the well-known Viennese *Theresianum* – a renowned

public grammar school – or one of the well-recognized provincial grammar schools – to be found in most smaller towns – and this paved the way either directly into the ranks of administration or into university education.

Both public grammar schools and universities at the time offered study and education programs that provided particularly the sons of bourgeois and petit-bourgeois families with much requested and highly standardized knowledge. The afore-mentioned study cycle *Rechts- und Staatswissenschaften* presents us with an excellent example of this: Its graduates were familiarized with an enormous range of relevant intellectual tendencies. Study curricula invited students to ask broader questions. Polymaths such as Czoernig seem to have been actively encouraged to pursue different paths.

The slow demise of the *ancien régime*, which forced rulers to replace the established imperial agents with new ones, opened up opportunities to well qualified middle-class social climbers. In an age of disorder and chaos, they offered stability and continuity to rulers and due to the wartime, the middle-classes could access positions in the administration that would have formerly been inaccessible to them.

Yet, education is not the only important factor here. The family background appears to have played a role, and a certain geographic denomination. I will deal with the family background first. Like Czoernig, who was the son of a man who had been in the service of the noble Clam-Gallas family, many of the young men who entered the expanding imperial administration in the early decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century had a history with *ancien régime* social elites. With the demise of the centuries-old order, many among those who had been working with, and for the aristocracy of the *Alte Reich*, lost their jobs. Many went over to employment with the emperor, taking with them most valuable informal and practical knowledge. Although such careers seem to have worked best with the sons of former landlords' servants and employees, there were a few cases where careers actually could be continued under a new master, although this was neither the rule nor does it seem to have been very easy. Nevertheless, many sons of former administrative elites of the *Stände* (estates) combined an intimate inherited knowledge of the social rules and conventions of imperial rule with state-of-the-art education, and thus became highly employable for imperial rulers trying to reset their regimes. With the number of (in most cases: badly paid) job-openings in imperial administrations soaring, a huge set of fresh minds, fueled by moderately new ideas, yet aware of the old, strict and mostly unwritten social rules, took charge of the development.

In terms of geography, two aspects stand out: First, a considerable number of catholic emigres, particularly from the Rhineland, though from other parts of the non-Habsburg Central European lands as well, moved to Vienna and in many cases managed to rebuild their lives there (Godsey, 2004, 141 ff.). A closer look at the knowledge, innovations, perspectives and forms of sociability they imported could be promising. Second, the enormous role of new social elites originating from Bohemia can hardly be overestimated. I refer to Christine Lebeau here, who recently observed that Bohemia took up a new and important role under Maria Theresia (whereas her father Charles VI had devoted many resources and much attention to

the Mediterranean). It would be interesting to scrutinize in more detail what this quantitative “Bohemianization” of the Habsburg Empire meant in the long run in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

An important though little analyzed aspect is the more general background of bourgeois life in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, more precisely in the post-war decades of the Napoleonic Wars. The lives of men like Czoernig, his contemporary Hügel, but also of men of an aristocratic background such as Andrian-Werburg, seem to have been determined by conditions that were in general favorable to those who were not completely depleted of financial means. Little information is available on Czoernig, though he spent the last quarter century of his life in his estate in Gorizia. Carl von Hügel, born in 1795, joined the Habsburg army aged only 16 and retreated into private life after the war. He built himself a remarkable home in the Hietzing outskirts of Vienna, although there does not appear to have been considerable wealth. Both men, Czoernig and Hügel, spent most of their professional careers in the imperial service, which was not supposed to make anyone rich. Slightly different is the case of Andrian-Werburg: he kept complaining about his regrettable financial situation in his diaries, yet a closer look at his lifestyle and particularly his travelling habits allows us to conclude that he by no means led a life of material poverty.<sup>14</sup>

I suggest sticking to a working hypothesis that simply states that it appears to have been relatively easy for members of the bourgeois middle-classes in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century to satisfy their primary needs and to pay for a simple livelihood. Members of this group even appear to have been privileged when it comes to the acquisition of real estate.<sup>15</sup>

## IMPERIAL AGENTS, BROKERS OF KNOWLEDGE

Men like Czoernig were often considered early pioneers of modern science in research literature. I would like to propose a different interpretation, by pointing to the versatility, multi-faceted and professional flexibility that he and many of his contemporaries displayed in the era between c. 1820 and c. 1860. The majority of these men were neither professional scientists nor full-time administrators – even if their rotas might have suggested otherwise. They were no full-time artists, writers or statisticians, as modern historiography in retrospective often concluded.

Czoernig and his peers and contemporaries benefited greatly from those liberties in personal life that the cultural remains of the *ancien régime* granted them, a singular professional denomination or “identity” was not required. Characters like Czoernig or Hügel illustrate this in a most impressive manner: Czoernig was a private scholar, a scientist, a politician, a civil-servant, a writer, he successfully combined several of these roles at a time and given his productivity and output, we have to assume that it did not take him a lot

14 This does of course, not mean that Andrian-Werburg led the life his peers would have expected him to lead. The point I am trying to make here is that it seems to have been relatively easy, at least for members of the middle-classes, to secure a subsistence minimum. Thus, many were able to fare better. At least the prosopographical analysis prompts this conclusion and it suggests one can suppose that this might have to do with an array of different qualifications and competences.

15 See for instance the Hügel-family and its members, especially Carl Alexander von Hügel.

of time to change between roles. The same applies to Hügel who was a traveler, a scholar, a soldier, a spy, a diplomat, an author. What is more important here: There is no evidence that these men did a lot of thinking on different roles in different endeavors, they appear to have combined the multitude of businesses they pursued tirelessly, although there seems to have been some fine understanding concerning the advantages and chances of arguing from a scientific point of view in one situation and from an administrative viewpoint in another – this is particularly the case with Czoernig.

Yet, and this is my argument here, when members of an emerging middle-class spread life-risks by going into different businesses at the same time, even when they were pursuing two or three different professional tracks at a time, this was not automatically considered a problem. Some, like Czoernig, got themselves into positions of some power by skillfully managing expert knowledge in a broad range of different fields. He, particularly, seems to have made use of his advantage when he managed to mobilize imperial support for his research agenda and granted the emperor scientific support for his political agenda.

Whereas Czoernig and his contemporaries successfully expanded middle-class participation in several fields, politics, economy and social standing for instance, this window of opportunity, when administrators and the emperor acted as resources for each other, soon closed (Göderle, 2016b, 87 f.). Czoernig's successors in the statistical authority already had less say and authority, and when in the 1880s a full-scale scientist took charge of the office, the development was completely in line with an international trend of professionalization and particularization. It is, however, important to keep in mind that this is a trend that does not become visible in the evidence much before the 1880s, at least in the Habsburg Empire (Judson, 2016, 9 f.).

At this point, *ibridismo* comes back: Middle-class agents in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, many of whom were involved with the language conflicts that began to erupt in the course of the 1880s, considered Czoernig's *Ethnographie* a better and scientific more sound source concerning the *authentic* – whatever this means in this context – distribution of different language groups in the Habsburg Monarchy than anything official statistics had produced later. In retrospective, Czoernig was made a full-scale scientist in the idealized conception of the 1880s, a pioneer of a standard of objectivity he never adhered to: *mechanical objectivity*.

When Czoernig and his fellow statisticians and cartographers rebuilt imperial Europe in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars from the debris of an *ancien régime*, they set up new and powerful knowledge configurations that were to construct helpful narratives and to restructure social orders. The newly formed alliance between imperial rule and middle-class go-betweens proved so effective that its reverberations had a lasting impact on the developments in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Yet, what turned out to be even more striking was the establishment of a common way of representing, reading and interpreting fundamental knowledge on the composition and order of social, cultural, and in the long-term political correlations by means of maps that moved *ethnography* into the foreground. Although it does not become quite clear with Czoernig what he understands by this term, he participates in the joint transimperial effort of officials, scholars, writers, proto-scientists to establish the primary category of difference between people along the language lines. Unlike what the ethnographic maps of the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century suggest, and Czoernig remarks

upon this, things were not remotely as clear; sorting, regrouping and ordering the complex heritage of imperial rule under conditions of modernization was a complex and, to a certain degree, pointless task.

Very much like the ideal representative of modern science, Czoernig and his contemporaries thus reduced complexity and heightened contrasts; they consolidated groups and re-drew boundaries. Yet in the end, when clear decisions had to be made and arguments required a final touch, comparable material evidence led to different results, due to fundamentally divergent lines of interpretation: Whereas Czoernig stressed diversity and anticipated the discourse on *ibridismo*, to come decades later, most of his colleagues, particularly in Prussia, went with one or another idea of unity based on nation. A new field of controversy opened up, and the powerful and colorful representations put forward by the representatives of the opposing adversaries, crept into the minds of a quickly growing literate public.

POVOJNA SOCIALNA TRANSFORMACIJA HABSBURŠKE MONARHIJE V  
19. STOLETJU.

ZNANOST, HIBRIDNOST IN ZAKONITOST CESARSKIH ZAKONOV

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*POVZETEK*

*Napoleonova povojna doba označuje priložnost socialnih vzhodnikov meščanskega, nižjega srednjega sloja in nižjega plemiškega porekla. To je veljalo zlasti, ko so bile izpolnjene določene izobraževalne zahteve. Obnovno cesarske vladavine je vodila nova upravna elita, ki je bila popolnoma pripravljena izkoristiti družbena izkrivljanja, ki jih je povzročila vojna. Številni od teh posameznikov so bili člani večjih, čez-imperialnih mrež, ki so posnemale starejše oblike aristokratske družabnosti in pomagale širiti znanje ter se pogajati o strategijah. Srednji razredni administratorji bi lahko sodelovali pri preoblikovanju in konfiguraciji cesarske politike v dobi modernega imperija (kar postavlja pod vprašaj idejo moderne države kot prevladajoče politične strukture v Evropi 19. stoletja). Proizvodnja, kroženje in izkoriščanje različnih kategorij znanja – administrativnega in znanstvenega – je bilo najpomembnejše področje delovanja tega posebnega družbenega razreda. Bolj natančen pogled na posameznike iz te skupine kaže, da so ti moški zlasti v prvi polovici 19. stoletja uporabljali strategije za obvladovanje tveganj, povezanih s kariero v carskih upravah. Večina jih ni mogla uporabiti struktur in posesti, kakršne so imeli njihovi plemiški predhodniki.*

*Ključne besede: nova cesarska zgodovina, Srednja Evropa, Habsburško cesarstvo, družbena zgodovina, zgodovina znanja, srednji razred, kartografija, zgodovina uprave, zgodovina znanosti*

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## ISTRIA BETWEEN PURITY AND HYBRIDITY: THE CREATION OF THE ISTRIAN REGION THROUGH SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN THE 19<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY

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### *ABSTRACT*

*This article investigates the application of a repertoire of terms used by both Austrian imperial and Istrian-Triestine scientists to categorise forms of cultural diversity and hybridity on the Istrian peninsula. The study spans most of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (mostly from the 1840s and the First World War), when such a range of categorising terms was established in scientific works in Istria, Trieste/Trst/Triest and the whole Habsburg Monarchy. The development and use of these terms formed the foundations for the process of building a new regional order on the Upper-Adriatic coast (Istria) within the general re-ordering of the Habsburg Empire.*

*Keywords:* *region building, Habsburg Empire, cultural diversity, cultural hybridity, history of science, ethnicization of Istria*

## L'ISTRIA TRA PUREZZA E IBRIDISMO: LA CREAZIONE DELLA REGIONE ISTRIANA ATTRAVERSO L'ATTIVITÀ SCIENTIFICA NEL XIX SECOLO

### *SINTESI*

*Il presente articolo analizza l'uso di un repertorio di termini che furono utilizzati per categorizzare realtà socioculturali della penisola istriana come forme di diversità e ibridismo culturali. In particolare, il presente studio analizza il periodo compreso tra gli anni '40 dell'800 e lo scoppio della Prima guerra mondiale, quando questi termini di categorizzazione apparvero e si consolidarono in studi scientifici pubblicati in Istria, Trieste e nell'intera Monarchia asburgica. Tali termini scientifici fornirono le fondamenta del nuovo ordine regionale istriano, che fu sviluppato sulle coste dell'alto Adriatico all'interno del processo di trasformazione generale dell'Impero asburgico.*

*Parole chiave:* *costruzione regionale, Monarchia asburgica, diversità culturale, ibridismo culturale, storia della scienza, etnicizzazione dell'Istria*

## INTRODUCTION

This article aims to investigate the strong relationship between the parallel creation of a new regional political-administrative order (Istria), the general re-ordering of the Austrian imperial structure post-1848 and the very first modern scientific structure in the Austrian Littoral from 1840 to the First World War. The main aim is to understand the influence of political processes on the re-organisation of local Istrian society through a vocabulary of terms about forms of socio-cultural “diversity”, “mixing” and “hybridity” after the “threat” of the March Revolution 1848/49.<sup>1</sup>

These terms do not represent analytical categories for this essay: the aim is not to prove the actual existence of culturally diverse or mixed realities, nor even to support either positive or negative value judgments about them. These terms are considered as objects of this study used under cultural and historical circumstances. The aim is to understand a plausible beginning of the “long-standing purity-hybridity dialectic”, as Pamela Ballinger claims to be the basis of the organisation of society in modern and contemporary Istria (Ballinger, 2003, 249). The co-presence of terms like “purity” and “mixing” will not be seen as a contradictory co-existence of two conflicting poles. On the contrary, “mixing” (equally considered as a threat, a transgression or a resource) will be theoretically considered on the same level of “purity”, as two pivotal parts of the same discourse by creating a new socio-cultural order (Douglas, 2002, 5). Hybridity should be considered as a constitutive concept for defining and establishing homogeneities like the several “nationalities” in the Central European area. In the Habsburg Kingdom this bijective dialogic was used as a basis for the re-ordering after the “March Revolution” of 1848/49 by the Central State itself and the imperial scientific society (Bhatti, 2014).

Categories like “nation” or “nationalism” will not be considered as essentialist, fixed and objective realities: regimented and dusty interpretations of the “national struggle” between two or three national groups (such as the so-called Italian “*storia patria*”) can no longer help us to understand historical changes in such a multilingual space like Istria and the Austrian Littoral in their complexity. Instead of a simplified, teleological history of nationalisms or nations in Istria, categories like “empire” and “region” will be considered as the main unities of meaning, in which different processes of identification had their development. The “region”, above all the idea of a “border-region”, will be taken into account as the main “living space” (“*espace vécu*”, Frémont, 1976), which was mostly debated by cultural elites and scholars in Istria during the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

The challenge of strict ethnocentric and hierarchical interpretations could only be reached through a reconsideration of the term “culture” (Verginella, 2008, 791–792). Instead of monolithic entities (e.g. the absolute categories “to be Italian”, “to be

1 This research was developed within the Collaborative Research Centre 923 “Threatened Orders” at the Eberhard Karls University Tübingen and is part of the project G03 “Istria as ‘Experimental Station’ – Hybridity as (Threatened) Order”.

Slovenian”, “to be Croat”), the term “culture” points rather to a shared “space of communication” in precise socio-historical contexts with its own mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion (Csáky, 2014; Suppanz, 2003). In such a never-ending process boarderlines between socio-cultural groups lose their precision (Bhabha, 1994, 1996; Reckwitz, 2008, 15–45). Consequently, terms like “diversity”, “mixing” and “hybridism” acquire a renewed meaning as historically based forms for marking notable mutations in socio-cultural realities.

In this sense, after an initial introduction explaining the use of this dialectic in and on Istria, the text will focus on the ways through which it arose and on the agents who established it in structured discourses in the process of creating a new regional identity: the scientists. On the cultural and scientific level, these terms were developed by both imperial and local scholars in strong connection with the imperial re-ordering after 1848. Referring to the development of science in Western Europe in the last four centuries, Bruno Latour writes about the existence of a “Gordian knot” between “Science”, “Society” and “Politics” (Latour, 1993, 3–5). Due to the lack of a coherent history of science on the Upper Adriatic area, several kinds of sources and literature were used.<sup>2</sup>

## “DIVERSITY” AND “MIXING”: ISTRIA AS A CULTURAL LABORATORY FOR RE-ORDERING THE IMPERIAL ORDER

The historical development of modern Istria is based on an interesting paradox: Istria in itself represented a small peripheral region within the Habsburg Empire with endemic, continuous deficits like economic and agricultural backwardness, or sanitarian and hygienic problems during the whole 19<sup>th</sup> century (Brodman, 1821, 29; Hugues, 1889; Del Bello, 1890; Apollonio, 1896). Nevertheless, Istria’s visibility intensified considerably in the cultural and scientific milieu through an incredible concentration of discourses about “culture” in the sense of diversity and amalgamation/mixing during the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Nikočević, 2006; Johler, 2012a). Terms like “diversity” (“*Vielfalt*”, “*Mannigfaltigkeit*”, “*diversità*”) “mixture” (“*Vermischung*”, “*mescolanza*”) and “*ibridismo*” or “*Hibridismus*” were used mostly in German and Italian to refer to the Istrian populations with such a high frequency that they became the basis for the development of new forms of identification (Johler, 2012a). Proof for the use of these terms in Slavic languages (Slovenian or Croatian) has never been found (cf. Bojan Baskar’s text in this same volume about this absence in the Slovenian language).

2 The research is based on materials collected from archives as well as from libraries in Trieste/Trst, Istria, Graz and Vienna: the Triestine State Archive (AST), the Archive of the Triestine Civic Museum of Natural History (CMSN), the Archives under the Triestine Civic Museum of History and Art (CMSA: including the Archive of the Museum itself, the Archive of Society of “Minerva”, the estates of some of the most important scholars of the Littoral), the Diplomatic Archive of the Triestine Civic Library (ADT), the Municipal Archive in Piran (SI PAK PI), the Archive of the Viennese Museum of Natural History (ANHM), the Archive of the Austrian Academy of Sciences (ÖAW), the estate of Hugo Schuchardt in the Archive of the University in Graz (HSA).

As a first step in this analysis, it is necessary to render a brief overview of the results of the research into the use of such terms. An initial distinction has to be made between the use of terms about "diversity" ("Vielfalt", "Mannigfaltigkeit", "diversità") and "mixture" ("Vermischung", "mescolanza") and the specific term "hybridism" ("ibridismo", "Hibridismus").

The first group of terms was used primarily in scientific and classification works by the official imperial scientific society from the 1850s. This first discourse about cultural diversity and mixture was part of a bigger project for the imperial re-ordering after the threat of the European Revolution 1848/49, in order to develop a new political-administrative and social structure on the basis of the re-organising paradigm of the "Multinational State" ("Vielfölkigerstaat"), "state of contrasts" ("Staat der Contraste") or "Unity in the Diversity" ("Einheit in der Vielfalt") during the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Such vocabulary about "diversity" hid the tremendous strategic shift in the political legitimacy of the Austrian Empire after the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 and the dawn of new forms of political organisation based on the idea of "Nation" above all after 1848/49 (Kann, 1950, 15–16).

During the 1850s/60s the many states in the Kingdom and their local populations were put under stress by the first ethnic categorizing studies and representations of the Austrian imperial Science and State, when precise demarcations between clear ethnic groups were established. The most exemplifying figure of this important period of ethnic "unmixing" was Karl von Czörnig, president of the Central Office for Administrative Statistics in Vienna and founder of the Ethnology in Austria (Grieshofer, 1999). In his initial studies from the mid-1850s (especially in his *Ethnographie der österreichischen Monarchie* of 1857), Czörnig (along with other colleagues and scholars) diagnosed an incredible amount of cultural-linguistic diversity and even mixtures in some particular regions of the Habsburg Kingdom: Istria, Vojvodina and Galicia became "miniatures" of such a "typical" Central European diversity and hybridity (Czörnig, 1857). Categorizing practice meant not only a simplified act of diagnosing but it was rather an act of impressing a direct change on the social realities on the local level through a new administrative system. In this sense, state administration should be supported by scientific knowledge (Göderle, 2016, 101). It is no wonder that these categorising studies took place exactly after the quashing of the March Revolution which was the biggest threat the Habsburg imperial order had experienced in the modern time. The decade of the 1850s was indeed a time of utmost "rapid and energetic" change, when the "reorganisation" ("Neugestaltung") of the Monarchy coincided exactly with the restoration of the imperial order itself (Czörnig, 1958).

In such a small "miniature"-region like Istria, Czörnig counted and arranged in such taxonomic representations an incredible cultural diversity of smaller sub-groups, mostly divided and gathered in the three major groups of "Italians," "Serbs and Croatians" and "Slovenians". Furthermore, between these three groups some other tiny ones were interposed: ethnic minorities




Fig. 1: Detail of the *Ethnographie der österreichischen Monarchie* / Ethnographic map of Austrian Monarchy, Karl von Czörnig, 1855 (Wikimedia Commons).

(like the “Montenegrins” in Peroj and “*Tschitschen/Čiči/Cicci*”) or different enclaves of “mixed populations” (Czörnig, 1857, V). The latter, small, local non-categorizable groups of the Istrian population, were collected under a new all-inclusive umbrella definition like “*Vermischung(en)*” (as well as synonyms like “*Mischung*”, “*Gemisch*” etc.).

Categories of “mixing” were put together with “diversity” in a dialogic relationship between purity and hybridity. They were used by the imperial “Habsburg Society” mostly as a positive or neutral analytical term and acquired in general an official scientific status (Kappus, 2002, 324; Johler, 2012, 18). This palette of terms became: 1) pillars for the new system of self-legitimacy for the Habsburg dynasty and Kingdom as a “*Vielvölkerstaat*”, as a “multinational Empire” (Kann, 1950); 2) the basis for the practice of the science of statistics and more systematic censuses; 3) a public domain also in different languages which was spread around the Kingdom through a long list of official scientific works and representations (cf.: Umlaft, 1876, 1–2).

The concentration of this vocabulary on such a small region showed the status of Istria as a “laboratory” for testing new categories and tools for the re-ordering of itself. Primarily, the concept of “*Einheit in der Vielfalt*” (“Unity in the Diversity”) and its deriving managing diversity through the so-called “Ethnicizing” of the Empire (Stourzh, 2011). Secondly, regarding the “*Vermischung*”-term, this vocabulary was crucial for the development of an anti-nationalistic, self-legitimising strategy, which could work as a mechanism against centrifugal forces in the following crisis moments in the post-1848/49 period (Kappus, 2002; Johler, 2012).

#### A PARALLEL DEVELOPMENT ON THE REGIONAL LEVEL: “HYBRIDISM” AS A SYMPTOM OF A CRISIS

A parallel development in finding new categories for a reinterpretation of populations in a political and socio-cultural context, which had been changing even faster since 1848, was represented by the emergence and repeated use of the term “hybridism” on the local level in the Austrian Littoral. The first hint of the use of the term “hybridism” can be dated exactly at the most threatening period for the unity of the Empire in the midst of the revolution in 1848. On 13<sup>th</sup> September 1848 a discussion took place within the City Council of Piran/Pirano about the incorporation of the former Venetian Istria into the German Confederation (Stenographischer Bericht, 1848, 1, 528; Stenographischer Bericht, 1848, 2, 720, 1569–1570) and the preservation of its own local autonomy. The German historian and deputy in the *Paulskirche*, Friedrich von Raumer, proposed the embodiment of the entire Istrian peninsula into the German Confederation between the 4<sup>th</sup> July and the 14<sup>th</sup> August 1848. It stood in direct connection with the first expansion projects towards the Adriatic Sea by an extended Germany (*Großdeutschland*).<sup>3</sup> Apparently, in this local space of political and socio-cultural representation in Frankfurt, the term “*ibridismo di popolo*” (“hybridism of the people”) was used concerning Raumer’s report for the first time. The term “hybridism” signalled an external and offensive definition. According to the stenographic protocol of the Council in Piran/Pirano, the word arose during discussions about the Istrian coastal part in the *Paulskirche* in Frankfurt am Main in order to discredit the Istrian autonomy of the local elites:<sup>4</sup>

*It is indeed curious to see them [the German deputies in Paulskirche] with their furious exclamations and without any regard of the effect that their words can have. They hurl themselves against us and give us the most beautiful praises, by calling our deputies [in the Viennese Parliament] illegitimate and men without brains. They consider us Istrians as a ludicrous jumble of people thrown randomly*

3 Supplemento al N. 105 dell’Osservatore triestino, 1. 10. 1848: I. E. Beck, *Sulla flotta germanica in avvenire*, 797–798.

4 Any direct proof of this use in Frankfurt could not be found in the protocols from the German Confederation.

*onto the Istrian coast, and the entire Province as a monstrous Babel of different descents, idioms and customs, as a hybridism of the people, and other similar gallantries. In this way and with this knowledge these foreigners speak about us, who want us to join Germany* (SI PAK PI - UT 1, UA, 31).<sup>5</sup>

Meanwhile, during the summer of 1848, other terms regarding hybridity, like “*ein zusammengewürfelter Gemisch*” (“a random conglomerate”), were used by German-speaking journalists in Vienna or Trieste/Trst/Triest in order to attack the legitimacy of such political-cultural autonomy.<sup>6</sup> Since its first use, such a particular term showed its negative meaning: “hybridism” began to stand for an attack, an external threat against the integrity of the autonomist control on the local administration and society by the sub-regional, municipal elite.

Looking at one of the main local newspapers (*La Favilla*) and several publications about the Littoral and Istria during the decades before 1848, up until this moment the regional elites had seemed to be reluctant to take position and make a clear declaration of either regional or national identification. Connected to this, thematisation of cultural diversity and mixture in Istria was almost absent in works by local scholars in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>7</sup> In 1848 Istrian elites seemed to experience this “hybrid”-attack as a shock, that seemed to trigger the first attempt to define themselves regionally and nationally. It was apparently a sign that the times were changing even faster, in the sense of paradigms of political legitimacy being subjected to radical mutations. The new emerging paradigm was the West-European bourgeoisie concept of “nation”.

According to this research, after this curious but vivid appearance of the term “hybridism” in Istria, no other evidence of its use could be found in reference to Istria until 1893. In any case, the first use of this hybridity-concept on the local level in 1848 seems to have acquired an enormous importance for the Istrian elites. After this first brief appearance in 1848, the regional elites were organising themselves as “Italians in Istria” following the general trend of the so-called “ethnicizing of politics” in the entire Austrian Monarchy (Stourzh, 2011). It meant that the local elites had to adapt themselves to the newly demanded paradigm of cultural-national purity/homogeneity, to which even the Austrian State was adapting itself as a “multinational Empire” in order to safeguard the newly restored imperial order (Kappus, 2002, 324).

On the local level, the shock of 1848 seemed to remain vividly in the minds of the Istrian elite for decades and showed its pervasive influence on the re-ordering of the regional society and politics. The label of “hybridism” could condemn them to political isolation and inactivity, particularly after the opening of the “multinational” Austrian

5 Quotations of sources in Italian were translated into English by the author of this article.

6 Cf.: *Journal des österreichischen Lloyd*, 27. 7. 1848: *Aus Istrien*, 556–557; Salata, 1915, 233–235.

7 Cf.: *La Favilla*, 11. 6. 1837: G., *Impressioni di viaggio. Viaggetto a Pirano*, 3–4; *La Favilla*, 25. 6. 1837: A. Madonizza, *Polemica*, 2–3 (also in: 8. 10. 1837, 49–50).

Parliament, organised on the basis of unmixed and well defined national groups. In the time of the ethnicisation of the empire, the first generation of Istrian opinion-makers had to decide which kind of national purity they belonged to.

On the other hand, after 1848 forms of cultural diversity in Istria (the non-Italian speaking rural “otherness”) could no longer be ignored by the local elites themselves. The empire itself had now provided the distinctive features of such previously “invisible” social groups through its ethnicising categorization works. The new cultural and scientific activities of the “Italians of Istria” served as a tool for self-definition and consolidation as a homogeneous leading group by separating themselves from other “diverse” and “mixed” groups, now designated “Slavs”.

Additionally, since the 1850s when the imperial official vocabulary was established by the imperial statistics, those terms started to appear in parallel with works by local Istrian Italian-speaking authors. Throughout the entire second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century local scholars and scientists (for instance Carlo Combi, Antonio Coiz, Carlo De Franceschi, Giovanni Rosa, as well as later Paolo Tedeschi and Bernardo Benussi) started to use a repertoire of Italian terms, such as “mescolanza” and “diversità”, which were their own Italian versions for the contemporary official German terms from Czöning’s works. The local Italian-speaking opinion-makers accepted quite entirely and immediately the imperial official narration about diversity and mixture in Istria (cf.: Combi, 1858, 39; Rosa, 1860, 11–13). They could not negate the presence of “others” on the peninsula anymore. Furthermore, they also placed the diversity and even the mixed populations in the very same areas where Czöring and the imperial scientists had placed them (Combi, 1858, 25–26).

However, the thematisation of cultural hybridity of the “others” clearly aimed to strengthen the construction of the Istrian Italians’ own purity. The old offensive and threatening definition “to be hybrid” in 1848 was removed dialogically by the local Italian-speaking bourgeoisie by claiming to be socio-politically unique and a culturally pure group. Consequently, instead of rejecting the idea of the existence of hybrid populations in Istria at all, Istrian Italian speaking agents transposed the definition of hybridity to socio-cultural otherness, the rural “Slavs”. So, the old accusation “to be hybrid”, referring to the Istrian elite, became a cultural-political tool for their own supremacy. Due to this re-interpretation of the purity-hybridity dialectic (established by the scholar and journalist Carlo Combi from Capodistria/Koper; Combi, 1858; Combi, 1860), the claim of their own homogeneity was based even more on the definition of hybridity referring to the “others” rather than that of their own purity. It was a declaration of purity “*ex negativo*”:

*For this time, let’s put an end to it, but not without reminding the reader once again of the fact that the Slavic peoples of Istria are so varied and extraneous not only to their foreigners but also to each other. On the contrary, there is only one Italian population, with all its towns, villages and lands, where all elements of acculturation can be found. Therefore, Istria is also ethnographically an integral part of Italy* (Combi, 1860, 397–398).

After a long dormant phase of this purity-hybridity dialectic among local scholars and scientists, terms like “*ibridismo*”, “*ibrido*”, “*Hybridismus*” (both in Italian and in German) experienced a “renaissance” between 1893 and 1914. They were used again regularly by several authors in studies and publications about the cultural and historical aspects of Istria and Trieste/Trst/Triest.

A first phase of this renaissance can be observed in the 1890s, above all between 1893 and 1903. In a text about the *Slavic Liturgy in Istria* (*La liturgia slava nell'Istria*) in the *Atti e memorie della Società istriana di archeologia e storia patria* in 1893, the Istrian-Triestine professor and historian Bernardo Benussi from Rovigno/Rovinj started with the words “*ibridismo etnografico*” (“ethnographic hybridism”) referring to the mixing category “Serb-Croat” introduced in the Austrian Statistics from 1880.<sup>8</sup> The rise of this particular term took place in one of the most passionate nationalistic fights between the Istrian parties of the “Italians” and “Croats” in the regional parliament, as well as in the newspapers, when the Croatian speaking priest and deputy Franjo Josip Volarić demanded the state recognition of Slavic as one of the official languages in Istria (Wörsdörfer, 2003, 149–150).

The word “hybridism” by Benussi seemed to have a larger resonance not only in Istria through several articles in the local press<sup>9</sup> but also in other parts of the Monarchy. In 1897 and in 1903 the journalist and writer Josef Stradner from Graz paraphrased the “hybridism”-paragraph from Benussi’s essay in two different German texts, published in Vienna and Graz (Stradner, 1897, 101; 1903, 12). Basically, the first text acquired a decent visibility within the imperial scientific society since it was published in the prestigious *Zeitschrift für österreichische Volkskunde*, led by the founder of the first Society and Museum for Austrian Folklore, Michael Haberlandt. Both authors, Benussi and Stradner, used this term in a negative manner, even with clear anti-Slavic aims against the formation of southern pan-Slavic movements and parties in the Austrian Littoral: this reiterated the status of the term as a marker for a general crisis or a threat. Otherwise, with such a strong negative connotation, “hybridism” also seemed to experience a kind of circumscribed but intense spread in the local journalism in Istria mainly concerning political or educational questions between the late 1890s and the first decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (above all in Parenzo/Poreč by the liberal-national

8 The Italians always lived within the biggest walled cities, which were less affected by the plague [...]. In the smaller villages and in the countryside, all the southern Slavic races seemed to have gathered together: Serbs, Croats, Albanians, Montenegrins were overlapped, mixed, crossed there with each other and with Romanic families coming from the Turkish lands as well as with others from the Morea and the Greek Islands or with Greeks from Monenvasia, Naples, Crete and Cyprus. This conglomeration of different races had to be so varied and disordered that, after more than 200 years when in 1880 the official census was carried out, the absurd term of Serb-Croatian was established (as if it could be possible to name all of them together) in order to express this ethnographic hybridism that still exists in Istria, in particular in the south of Mirna river (Benussi, 1893, 204).

9 Cf.: L’Istria, b, 25. 11. 1893: *La liturgia slava nell’Istria*, 2.

newspaper *L'Istria*<sup>10</sup>, as well as in Pola/Pula by the two irredentist *La Fiamma*<sup>11</sup> and *L'Eco dell'Adriatico*<sup>12</sup> and the socialist *Il Proletario*<sup>13</sup>).

A second phase of this “hybridism”-renaissance took place from 1909 until 1914. The conditions of the usage of the term seemed quite different than in the previous phase. “Hybridism” partially lost its strict negative connotation in favour of a more neutral use, sometimes even in scientific and literary analyses. This intense but short phase of a more evenhanded use was led by some of the most influential Italian-speaking scholars from the Austrian Littoral, among them the Triestine writer Scipio Slataper in 1909<sup>14</sup>, the lawyer, socialist activist and historian Angelo Vivante in 1912<sup>15</sup>, and the Istrian physician and scientists Bernardo Schiavuzzi in 1914<sup>16</sup>.

In general, “ibridismo”/“Hibridismus” was used as a label for the perception of different crisis situations. As during the March Revolution, the period between the 1890s and the First World War was a time of radical and dramatic changes in Istria, as well as in the whole Upper Adriatic area. The dramatic explosion and spread of

10 L'Istria, b, 1. 1. 1898: Ancora del professore italianofobo alle Magistrali di Capodistria, 2; L'Istria, b, 29. 10. 1898: L'istituto magistrale femminile di Gorizia, 3; L'Istria, b, 31. 12. 1898: Comizio di Parenzo, 3.

11 La Fiamma, 27. 5. 1911: Un paragone che non regge, 1; La Fiamma, 13. 7. 1911: Per fatti personali, ma politici, 7; La Fiamma, 12. 8. 1911: Musa d'Agosto, 3.

12 L'eco dell'Adriatico, 1. 12. 1906: Vita cittadina, 2; L'eco dell'Adriatico, 21. 3. 1907: Fuori dall'equivoco, 1.

13 Il Proletario, 20. 10. 1900: Abbasso il nazionalismo, 1; Il Proletario, 21. 5. 1904: Una scarrettata d'immondizie, 2; Il Proletario, 30. 7. 1904: Il Proletario che ride, 3; Il Proletario, 3. 8. 1904: Appunti di cronistoria cittadina (1869–1904), 3; Il Proletario, 24. 8. 1904: Il nostro commento, 2; Il Proletario, 7. 9. 1904: Le basi e le ragioni del nostro accordo, 2; Il Proletario, 12. 10. 1904: Ancora il “solismo”, 2; Il Proletario, 19. 11. 1904: Il pseudo-giornalismo locale, 2.

14 Since the city joyfully encouraged, in every way, its hybrid development, Trieste did not hesitate to accept new citizens, as Maria Theresia wanted: therefore, the city became a real asylum for criminals. I know that the citizens of Trieste had old Rome as a model!: however it is amusing to observe that in some citizenship applications, published by Giuseppe Caprin, the proof of being in trouble with foreign police was a sufficient reference (Slataper, 1988, 9).

15 Since a vast swallowing urban centre is lacking in Istria, the Istrian Slavs, that are mostly the peasant inhabitants of the countryside, have always been less subjected to the urban influence than those in Trieste: the Italianizing process in Istria has had an absorbing effect on the individuals within the small nearby walled cities or villages. The other ones, which live outside from urban spaces, even a few steps away, have taken a superficial Italian veneer, varying in strength depending on the place. In this way rustic hybridism arose, that is a much more tenacious phenomenon than urban hybridism, which until recently rapidly led to definitive Italianization. Normally, the hybrid is a historically and dialectologically Slav peasant, which understands and speaks the Italian dialect of the nearest centre and usually uses it in service and business relations. Such a hybridism often invades the private sphere too, with bizarre nuances: Slavic language could be spoken among and with old people or between spouses, but they do not always use it with their children, etc...: therefore, it is a form of drowsiness which should lead to the final Italianization, although it does not happen very often (Vivante, 1984, 180–182).

16 In this region, as in all countries on a linguistic border, the four ethnic races constantly stayed in contact over the centuries, largely melted together and produced hybrids. They kept the family name as witness of their race but adopted the language of the other and changed the old nationality in order to assume a new one; however, they kept the physical characteristics and sometimes the stigma of the old race. So, we see Slavs with purely Italian surnames who are convinced that they are Slavs, and, on the other hand, Italians with definite Slavic surnames with very pure national feelings. Likewise, the same can be said for the Germans, not to mention the Romanians, who have not been so since a long time (Schiavuzzi, 1914, 1–2).

plant-diseases (like phylloxera and downy mildew) worsened the already precarious agricultural, economic and health situation in numerous parts of the hinterland of the peninsula (Visintin, 2015). No wonder that in the same 1890s some local scientists mobilised themselves through studies of the dramatic situation, like the agronomist Carlo Hugues, the scholar Nicolò Del Bello and the physician Carlo Apollonio (Hugues, 1889; Del Bello, 1890; Apollonio, 1896). Above all, Apollonio declared in his report about the health and hygienic situation of the countryside in the Istrian hinterland in 1896 that “the municipalities have no money, the order is collapsing” (*I Comuni non hanno denaro: l'ordine crolla.*., Apollonio, 1896, 23). Meanwhile, the end of the Free Port in Trieste/Trst/Triest in 1891 and its transformation into an industrial hotspot led to a massive emigration of a high percentage of the Istrian rural population to the big Upper Adriatic port-city (Cattaruzza, 1979; Cattaruzza, 2012; Breschi, Kalc & Navarra, 2001).

## THE “PURITY-HYBRIDITY DIALECTIC”: A CASE OF “SHARED KNOWLEDGE” BETWEEN LOCAL AND IMPERIAL

The parallel establishment of the “purity-hybridity dialectic” between local and imperial level since the 1850s, is an interesting example of what the historian Ulrike Hirschhausen calls “shared imperial knowledge” (Hirschhausen, 2015, 720, 743). Moreover, this vocabulary for the re-ordering can be observed as a highly interesting example of an inter-cultural/inter-lingual process of “circulation of knowledge” (Surman, 2015) in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, despite the fragmentations in the scientific society within the Habsburg Empire during the so-called “nationalization of knowledge” (Ash & Surman, 2012). In this manner, a challenge (at least partially) of the separation and hierarchisation between centre(s) and periphery(ies) seems to be needed. The circulation of knowledge cannot be assumed as a “top-down” process or even from a centre spreading to the peripheries.

The parallelisation of the use of re-ordering vocabulary in the 1850s could appear, at first glance, as a mimesis and adjustment of the “local” to the “imperial” knowledge. However, taking a closer look and in the long-term view even in the period before 1848/49, we can better evaluate the crucial decade of the 1850s and such circulation of knowledge. It seemed to be depending on the parallel processes both of the stabilisation of the new region Istria and of the development of a scientific discourse in the Austrian Littoral. Istria already revealed, before 1848, its status as a laboratory for testing and adjusting new European cultural concepts.

The first part of the 1840s could be considered as a fundamental “turning point”. An initial attempt to homogenise and incorporate the new Istria into the imperial structure by the Austrian German-speaking bureaucracy in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (by the first administrative homologation of Istria in 1825) seemed to have failed already at the end of the 1830s. Large parts of the local society protested, even violently, against the local German-speaking Austrian bureaucrats and state officers because of their inefficiency and cultural distance (Apollonio, 1996). For

this reason, the imperial government of the Littoral under the leadership of Franz Seraph von Stadion began not only to reform the administrative structure of Istria between 1841 and 1846, supporting local political and social regional autonomies, but also to institutionalise and finance the already functioning scientific research societies (Dorsi, 1994, 131–188). This first phase of institutionalisation materialised progressively with the establishment of an official imperial scientific and cultural network on the regional level through the foundation of scientific institutions, newspapers and journals. The aim was to create a cultural connection between the imperial political power and the local elites in order to strengthen the imperial legitimacy on the local level.

The two main cultural and scientific projects were mostly represented by the newspaper *La Favilla* (between 1836 and 1846 and founded by Antonio Madonizza from Capodistria/Koper) and the journal *L'Istria* (founded and led by Pietro Kandler between 1846 and 1852). The two editorial projects were both sustained and financed by the Austrian Lloyd and the local Austrian lieutenancy. Although both of them rose to prominence at almost the same period during the establishment of an initial interest for Istria as a united region, they differed considerably from each other. *La Favilla* represented a forum of social and cultural discussions for the bourgeoisie of the Austrian Littoral. On the other hand, the magazine *L'Istria* was an official tool, firstly, for collecting the most preeminent local scientists and placing them within a coherent epistemic network and secondly, for implementing a “new” regional identity of “being Istrian”, although in a specific imperial way. This newspaper propagated, from the very first articles, the first imperial idea of Istria under the motto “United in the Diversity”. Under the charismatic leadership of Pietro Kandler, the first versions of cultural, historical and even naturalistic studies about Istria (conceived as a politically united but socioculturally diversified region) appeared.

Within these highly creative cultural projects during the late 1830s and 1840s, the very first descriptions of the cultural diversity on the Istrian peninsula appeared on the local level. Despite the previous absence of representations of different cultural groups (like the “Slavs”) by the local Italian speaking elite (mostly from the coast), starting from the 1840s some individual local agents had started to independently organise anthropological and linguistical research into forms of cultural diversity in Istria under the impulse of this flourishing period of scientific research. These two journals set the aim to collect and organise, in a coherent way, all the first attempts at discourses and studies on Istrian cultural diversity. This was the case with the first texts about the Istrian “Slavs” in *La Favilla* in the context of a long list of articles about a “romantic” trip through the Istrian peninsula written by Francesco Dall’Ongaro between 1838 and 1840.<sup>17</sup> Secondly, the first series of scientific essays

17 *La Favilla*, 12. 8. 1838: Dall’Ongaro, Cose Patrie. Viaggetto nell’Istria, 6–7 (also in: 16. 9. 1838, 26; 7. 10. 1838, 38; 14. 10. 1838, 42–43; 16. 12. 1838, 78–79; 4. 8. 1839, 5–6; 11. 8. 1839, 11–13; 6. 10. 1839, 77–79; 26. 4. 1840, 129–132).

appeared in *L'Istria* written by Antonio Facchinetti in the spring of 1847.<sup>18</sup> Both authors seemed to describe the cultural forms of Slavic speaking groups on the Istrian peninsula in their different ways under the influence of the cultural images and stereotypes about the Dalmatian “Slavs” (“Morlachs” or “Ajduchs”) through a cultural transfer from Dalmatia to the Austrian Littoral during the decade before 1848 (Wolff, 2001; Pirjevec, 2009, 3–10)<sup>19</sup>. Even the contemporary scholar Carlo De Franceschi denounced such a transfer in the columns of *Osservatore Triestino* in September 1843: *A famous Italian writer [...], who promised to spread the word about the customs of Istria, invented stories that could be applied to Dalmatian Morlaches, but not to the modern Istrians [...].*<sup>20</sup>

Another paradigmatic case regarding the first phase of the development of a systematic knowledge from local agents was the initial research and construction about the “imagined community” of the “Istro-Rumanians” (also known as “Cicci”, “Čiči”, “Tschitschen”). The scholar Antonio Covaz from Pisino/Pazin started the first collection of data about such “exotic” people, sometimes with the help of his fellow citizen Carlo De Franceschi (Dahmen, 1986). The first results were published in the first issues of Kandler’s *L'Istria* in January 1846.<sup>21</sup> The publication in *L'Istria* created an unexpected interest in some scholars and politicians from other parts of the Monarchy. After even less than a month, the Baron Karl von Geringer, exponent of the Viennese Court Chamber, expressed his interest in Covaz’s research about the “Istro-Rumanians”.<sup>22</sup> Also, influenced by Covaz’s essay, the philologist Gheorghe Asachi from Iași undertook research in the following months into the Istrian hinterland and a year later published a first article in the Rumanian language about the “Istro-Rumanians” (Dahmen, 1986, 243).

After this first phase of research and spread of knowledge, the construction of scientific discourses about such exotic “primitive” people gained in importance in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The control of these human groups in the Istrian hinterland became an area of dispute between the local Italian-speaking elites, the Croatian-speaking elites and the mostly German-speaking Empire’s scientists also through scientific discourse. For local nationalists the scientific proof of the “real” cultural/ethnic either Latin or Slavic nature of the Istro-Rumanians was fundamental in claiming control of the region through the so-called “right of the first settlers on the region”. At the same time, from the imperial point of view, the development of a coherent scientific discourse about the Istro-Rumanians, considered as one of the “last living primitive populations in Europe” (Ausstellung österreichischer Hausindustrie und Volkskunst, 1905,

18 *L'Istria*, a, 20.3.1847: D. A. Facchinetti, *Degli slavi istriani*: 81–82 (also in: 27. 3. 1847, 85–87; 3. 4. 1847, 93–96; 10. 4. 1847, 97–100; 17. 4. 1847, 102–106).

19 About the creation and spread of cultural representations of “Morlachs” in West Europe through Venice in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, cf.: Wolff, 2001.

20 *Osservatore triestino*, 10. 9. 1843: Carlo de Franceschi, *Intorno alla storia e statistica dell'Istria*, 176.


21 *L'Istria*, a, 3. 1. 1846: Antonio Covaz, *Dei Rimigliani o Vlachi d'Istria, con saggio del loro dialetto*, 7–8.

22 *L'Istria*, 31. 1. 1846, 21.

111–112), played an important role in the establishment of the self-legitimizing propaganda as a supranational “*Vielvölkerstaat*”. Their nature as a highly mixed population but with its own stable cultural and historical form, could scientifically confirm the concrete possibility of a coherent mixed, multinational identity. The “*Tschitschen*” were regarded as non-typified “stem”-people for developing a constant hybrid Habsburg identity (Istrien, 1863, 151; Bidermann, 1888; Fischer, 1896).

Such a worthwhile example of transfer from a local to imperial/global level confirms that the news about such studies from the remote province could have been spread around the Monarchy due to a pre-existing and well-functioning imperial scientific network, in which the Littoral and Istria took part, for instance, through the magazine *L'Istria*. It represented the first systematic institutionalisation of a local Istrian scientific network, through which Kandler (and indirectly the state power represented by Stadion) tried to connect the local scientists and scholars and collect them in a coherent discourse and practice.

Concerning the period after 1848/49, Czörnig’s *Ethnography* and his first *Ethnographische Karte der Österreichischen Monarchie* (Czörnig, 1855) can be considered the result of a collective research work which had involved several local personalities and networks. First of all, the work was carried out by a research committee from the Central Office for Administrative Statistics that had undertaken several field studies throughout the Kingdom since 1846 (D’Alessio, 2003, 67–68). However, the collection of data for the preparation of Czörnig’s results required a widespread network of contacts and collaborations on the regional and even sub-regional level. In Istria and the Littoral, Czörnig clearly took advantage of a pre-existing network of personal and professional connections which he had already established during his previous stays in the Littoral. Indeed, Czörnig was not alien to Trieste/Trst/Triest and Istria: he had worked as state officer in Trieste/Trst/Triest between 1828 and 1831. Moreover, after the March-Revolution, Czörnig was employed in the establishment and organisation of the “Central Maritime Administration” in Trieste/Trst/Triest between 1850 and 1852 (Tonetti, 1992, 2–10). As he wrote in the introduction to his *Ethnography* in 1857, he received helpful support from some important personalities from the local order. For instance, Count Coronini-Cromberg (from Gorizia/Gorica/Görz) provided “a commission, which accurately recorded and ordered people’s mixture from exactly each place” (Czörnig, 1857, VIII). Furthermore, due to the publication of important correspondence between some of the most pre-eminent scholars and scientists in the Littoral (such as those between Pietro Kandler and Tomaso Luciani), we are able to state that Czörnig took advantage of another personal connection, that is of the former public official in Lupoglav/Lupogliano Giovanni Rosa, who collected and provided data from field research for Czörnig (Radossi, 2014, 80). Rosa may be that “local expert in the spoken languages in Istria” mentioned by Czörnig in the introduction of the *Ethnography* (Czörnig, 1857, IX).



Karl Freiherr v. Czoernig.

Fig. 2: Portrait of Karl von Czoernig, 1804–1889, from *Wissenschaftlichen Bibliothek der Stadt Trier/Stadtarchiv* (Wikimedia Commons).

In this sense, it could be easily stated that the knowledge as well as the relative vocabulary about cultural diversity and mixing in the Kingdom were not just simple results produced in scientific centres but even peripheries like Istria were able to develop their own system of knowledge through internal dynamics. Istria, as a laboratory of diversity and hybridity, was not simply a “sounding board” of developments rising outside of it but was also able to create its own specific ideas, self-reflections and self-representations with its own vocabulary.

Referring back to the shared use of the same vocabulary of the “purity-hybridity dialectic”, the most remarkable thing is that the knowledge and a systematic awareness of the cultural diversity and mixture in Istria was developed in parallel by the nationalised group “Italians of Istria” and was not in conflict with the imperial one *a priori*. It happened simultaneously and it was connected in mutual synergy. However, the main field of the conflict was the different ways to consider the region and regional identification: either as miniature of the imperial “unity in the diversity” or in a socially-culturally exclusive, politically autonomist and ethnocentric way.

The fact that local agents were able to develop an alternative and competitive way to understand and control the “purity-hybridity dialectic” is confirmed by the rise and repeated use of the term “*assimilazione*”. It represented their own version of hybridity in the Italian language (connote positively), which defused the threatening and dreaded concept of “being hybrid” and was used in a productive way for proper cultural-political aims. After the shocking experience of the March Revolution in 1848, the “assimilation” gave the Istrian “Italian” bourgeoisie the dialogical and practical legitimacy to control the mostly Slavic-speaking rural masses through scientific studies and cultural policies (like educational projects) in order to incorporate them into their sphere of influence and control.

In this sense, instead of fighting the idea of hybridisation itself *a priori*, the first generation of Istrian Italian opinion-makers (principally Michele Fachinetti and Carlo De Franceschi)<sup>23</sup> had established the idea of “assimilation” as an answer to the external label “to be hybrid” exactly since the year 1848. Later, in the 1850s and 1860s (in the same period of Czörnig’s publications), Istrian scholars developed it as a compromise between the imperial concepts of “purity” and “mixing” from an ethnocentric perspective. Particularly through the works of authors like Pacifico Valussi (after his nationalistic “conversion”<sup>24</sup>), Carlo Combi or Giovanni Rosa, the concept of “assimilation” received a new interpretation: it was not only a way of simple acculturation of an illiterate rural population (as Francesco Dall’Ongaro had thematised on *La Favilla* already in 1839<sup>25</sup>). Assimilation progressively became a tool of cultural expansion in a political discourse within the general frame of the “purity-hybridity dialectic.” Firstly, assimilation increasingly adopted the status of a “spontaneous” process subjected to “natural laws”. Pacifico Valussi even called it “the natural law of assimilation” (“*la loi naturelle d’assimilation*”) in 1861 (Valussi, 1954, 36). Secondly, the assimilation became the central proof of the strength and legitimisation of the leading “Italianity” in Istria, e.g. its capacity to attract and embody the otherness which had been even more finely defined as the “Slavs” since 1848.

23 Osservatore triestino, 9. 8. 1848: Michele Fachinetti, Elemento nazionale, 701–702; Osservatore triestino, 23. 9. 1848: Carlo de Franceschi, Appendice, 903 (also in: 24. 9. 1848, 909).

24 Vivante, 1984, 69.

25 La Favilla, 18. 8. 1839: Francesco Dall’Ongaro, Viaggetto nell’Istria. IX. Isola di S. Nicolò. NIZKA, 21.

The Triestine writer and journalist Alessandro Mauroner declared in 1855: “*The Italian nationality has already proved to be invincible, as the conquerors have always been absorbed by it.*”<sup>26</sup>

Even the hybrid nature of the so-called “Italians of Istria” was not denied a priori at all in the ethnocentric narrations and historical continuities but was rather transposed back into a mythical ancestral past. This gave the “Italian group” in Istria its fortification and compactness through its assimilating, embodying capacity, whereas the “Slavs” remained highly divided in small, insignificant sub-groups and moved among themselves (Combi, 1858, 38–39; Rosa, 1860, 12–13; Gonan, 1888, 62). Assimilation of the “otherness” paradoxically became the main strategy for the reinforcement of their own “purity” by defining it as a sort of “asymmetric hybridity”. This particular concept could preserve the social, economic and political autonomist supremacy as the leading group of the region. For all these reasons, it can be claimed that the so-called “long-standing purity–hybridity dialectic” became a constitutive basis for developing self-reflection and regional/national identity even of the “Italians in Istria”.

#### SCIENCE OF THE (B)ORDER: SCIENCE AS A CREATIVE FACTOR OF A NEW-REGIONAL ORDER ON THE ADRIATIC COAST

The fact that science played a fundamental role in Istria in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century could depend on the status of Istria itself as a newly created region within a larger imperialistic project. If we speak about Istria as a unique region, as we know it today, we should admit that it represents a new political and administrative regional entity on the geographical Istrian peninsula. The unified Istrian region had only existed since the Napoleonic era between 1797 and 1813, when a non-pre-existing united region was created through mutations of the European order (Ivetic, 2014, 34–35).

It was not the first time that such a political-administrative regional entity had been created by the Viennese center *ex novo* after a change of the international order. After the dissolution of Poland-Lithuania and its partition, Vienna provided a completely new regional order called Galicia-Lodomeria, in order to fortify the newly acquired territories. Larry Wolff named this process of “region building” “the creation of Galicia” and used the analytical category of “fantasy” in order to underline the huge effort by the Viennese center and the local elites in constructing a cultural and scientific system of knowledge about the new region Galicia (Wolff, 2010).

After this epochal political shift, the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was a period of progressive but difficult creation of a new imperial regional order on the Adriatic coast. After 1848, the Viennese government began again to

26 The quotation is Mauroner’s from an article on the *Corriere Italiano* is available in: Cervani, 1969, 162.

reinforce the administrative “*Küstenland*” greater region<sup>27</sup> as an answer to its growing imperial ambitions to become a naval power in the Mediterranean. The newly united Istria was situated strategically between the two main commercial free ports of the Kingdom (Trieste/Trst/Triest and Fiume/Rijeka). Its status as a young and fragile regional order was highlighted during the March Revolution when the first attempt, since 1825, by the imperial order at having a unified, coherent political-administrative and cultural structure, seemed to have failed (AST, IR LL, AP, 50–59).

After the overcoming of the revolutionary forces within the Empire and the war in North Italy, it was clear to the imperial order that its navy could no longer be kept in the arsenal of Venice. A shift of the imperial maritime interests from the unsure Veneto was required and Istria, above all the naturally well-protected harbor of Pola/Pula, would be the new main maritime base from the mid-1850s (Cova, 2005, 47–148). As the German writer Johann Georg Kohl wrote in 1851, Istria became the “Austrian Crimea”.<sup>28</sup> The political imperial Viennese and Triestine centres needed stabilisation of such maritime order, even by using “culture” and “science” (as had already happened with Galicia some decades before).

However, as an unknown German-speaking writer stated in a travel book about Istria and the Austrian Littoral, still in 1863, Istria was considered as one of the lesser known provinces in the Austrian Kingdom: a “terra incognita”.<sup>29</sup> Such awareness of the lack of knowledge about Istria was expressed both by the imperial state and scientific societies and by local agents. The following wars against Piedmont and Italian Reign in 1859 and 1866 showed the lack of preparation of the Austrian Central State regarding the knowledge of the Adriatic Sea. As the German-Austrian geographer Eduard Brückner declared later (1910), the Austrian secretary of trade Bernhard von Wüllerstorf-Urbair discovered with astonishment in 1865, that the Austrian State did not own a proper map of the Adriatic Sea in German, only English maps (Brückner, 1910, 463). For this reason, the so-called “*Adriakommission*” was established by the Austrian Academy of Sciences in 1867

27 “Austrian Littoral” was created for the first time in 1749–1776 but it did contain the coastal half of the Istrian peninsula (Faber, 1995).

28 *It can be said that the relationship of Istria with Pola and Trieste is similar to that of Crimea with its excellent ports of Sevastopol and Odessa. Sevastopol is Odessa's war and aid port and as such it is of utmost importance. [...] In comparison, Sevastopol has the same function as a protector of the Black Sea trade routes as Pola has in relation to the Adriatic trade routes. The beauty of Crimea can also be compared with that of Istria. One main difference, however, is that the Russians did significantly more for Sevastopol than the Austrians did for Pola, and that the Russians are far more progressive with their fleets and their dominion on Eurinus than the Habsburgs with their fleet and their dominion on the Adriatic* (Kohl, 1851, 536–537).

29 *Of all the provinces of the Austrian Kingdom there is certainly none that is still so little known as Istria. [...] Istria is indeed also usually a terra incognita for historians, statisticians and geographers. We can find some single interesting notes and dates scattered in different works, but nobody has taken the effort to collect them in one picture and to summarise them in one frame* (Istrien, 1863, Vorwort).

as a permanent research institution between Vienna, the Littoral and Dalmatia for the calculation and research of the natural conformation of the Adriatic Sea (ÖAW, AC; Meister, 1947, 95–97).<sup>30</sup>

On the local level, the first generation of Istrian scientists who dealt with the question of the establishment of a coherent epistemic system within Istria expressed, even before 1848, the lack of an Istrian identification as well of their own institutionalised scientific discourse about the Istrian region. Such a lack was expressed by the Triestine journal *Archeografo triestino* in its first issue in 1837: *The absence of works on the history and geography of Istria is due to the lack of printing houses in the province and to the poverty of past centuries* (*Archeografo triestino*, 1837: Prefazione, III). Otherwise, six years later in 1843, even the lawyer, public officer and historian from Gologorica/Moncalvo Carlo De Franceschi expressed the deep lack of unity and a unique identity referring to the region Istria in the Triestine newspaper *Osservatore Triestino*. In his opinion, this was the main reason of the lack of scientific works about the region.<sup>31</sup>

In such a complex context of giving meaning to a new regional administrative entity, the first issues of Kandler's *L'Istria* of 1846 focused on the difficult effort to provide a coherent and unique representation and description of the new geography of Istria. At the same time, through *L'Istria*, Kandler made the effort to include the several scholars on the regional level into a coherent epistemic network. Therefore, this difficult attempt seems to have obviously failed mainly because not only one "geography of Istria" was possible. On the contrary, the idea of Istria could be described rather in the plural through different perspectives and as a composite representation, e.g. through several kinds of "geographies", like a "physical" one,<sup>32</sup> a "political" one<sup>33</sup> and a "human-cultural" (so-called "genetic") one<sup>34</sup>. In February 1846 a journalist described the young, ephemeral and artificial nature of the identification with the term "Istria":

*We have already observed how the name of a province sometimes signifies not only the physical land with borders, but also the land occupied by a people,*

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30 The *Adriakommission* established several research and observation stations along the whole Austrian seaboard from Grado until Budva. The Commission had its main quarters in Vienna and Trieste/Trst/Triest and was in direct contact with the Viennese Board of Trade and the Triestine Maritime Government. Otherwise, it received the financial support of the richest part of the Triestine bourgeois elites and private companies. Among the documents of the *Adriakommission* in the Archive of the Austrian Academy of Sciences some bills show the name of the banker Pasquale Revoltella and the Austrian Lloyd as main private financiers for its research projects (cf.: ÖAW, AC 1: 155, 232, 246, 255; ÖAW, AC 3: 685).

31 *Osservatore triestino*, 10. 9. 1843: Carlo de Franceschi, *Intorno alla storia e statistica dell'Istria*, 173.

32 L'Istria, a, 3. 1. 1846: Simone Slavich, *Della Geografia dell'Istria*, 2–7 (also in: 10. 1. 1846, 9–12; 17. 1. 1846, 13–15; 24. 1. 1846, 17–19; 21. 2. 1846, 37–38); L'Istria, a, 7. 3. 1846: *Delle carte geografiche dell'Istria*, 47–48.

33 L'Istria, a, 14. 3. 1846: *Geografia amministrativa d'Istria*, 49–52 (also in: 28. 3. 1846, 62–64; 11. 4. 1846, 73–75; 25. 4. 1846, 85–88).

34 L'Istria, a, 28. 2. 1846: *Della geografia genetica dell'Istria*, 41–42 (also in: 7. 3. 1846, 45–47).

*that have a common language or common origin. This is not the case of Istria, nor was it ever the case, as far as historical information is concerned. On the contrary, it seems that the physical configuration of the internal division and the particular position of the province (it opens, on one side, to the sea, and, on the other side, borders with Alpine provinces) made it easy for two racially and culturally different peoples, to occupy it in the most remote times, like at the time of the centuries-old transmigrations.* (L'Istria, a, 28. 2. 1846: *Della geografia genetica dell'Istria*, 41).

During the publication of the results of the first imperial ethnographic studies (1855–1857), the question of the organisation of scientific knowledge came up among some local scholars in 1856 (like Carlo Combi, Antonio Coiz, Carlo De Franceschi and Paolo Tedeschi). The beginning of the organisation of Istrian science was meant partially as an answer to the disappointing and even threatening results of the imperial science. In its official representations of the imperial policy of ethnicising, like on the *Ethnographic Map* (Czörnig, 1855), imperial statistics had massively reduced the number of “Italians” in Istria, in which they were represented as a meagre minority living in the tiny coastal part of the peninsula (D’Alessio, 2003, 53–57), marked by a narrow yellow strip surrounded by the green area of the “Slavs” (ct. Fig. 1).

Furthermore, there was also another reason for the need to develop an internal Istrian scientific discourse, as later Paolo Tedeschi confessed. A Milanese journal, *Il nipote di Vesta verde*, claimed in 1856 that Istrians were lacking their own identity because of their unclear hybrid nature:

*I had read in Nipote del Vesta Verde these words: “Istrians are neither meat nor fish”. To me, to me, he [Carlo Combi] immediately added, to us, friends, let prove to them, we are made by hard meat. So, that was the beginning of Porta Orientale (Tedeschi, 1890, IV).*

The old external categorizing threat of “being hybrid” appeared again, paradoxically this time from the Italian state, with whom the Istrian elites were trying to identify themselves nationally. The new appearance of the external definition of “hybridity” showed their cultural lack and activated the real need to establish a systematic scientific discourse about the diversity and “mixing” amongst “Istrians”. This renewed attack through the concept of “being mixed” reinforced the alarm of the contemporary development of the imperial, German-speaking ethnography, considered by Combi as “foreign” and “slanderous” (Combi, 1860, 388).

After the publication of the very first journal published by “Istrians” such as *Porta Orientale* under Combi in 1857 (Combi, 1890), a first range of *Ethnographies of Istria* in Italian was published by Carlo Combi between 1858 and 1860 (Combi, 1858; Combi, 1860). In this sense, the first institutionalisation of a scientific discourse from the local Italian-speaking elites revealed itself to be both

an answer to an external attack (from the Italian peninsula) and an adaption to the contemporary internal transformation process of the Austrian Monarchy. It took place principally through the reception of the vocabulary of the general Habsburg re-ordering. On the basis of these research and editorial projects between 1846 and 1860, a scientific-cultural “Istrian canon” was progressively established from the different generations of local scholars by collecting, selecting and organising previous publications about Istria’s ethnography, linguistics and history in the following decades (Ivetica, 1999, 145–177).<sup>35</sup>

Moreover, this internal organisation and institutionalisation of the local society by creating their own scientific discourse did not seem to be separate from the general context of the Littoral and the Kingdom and should be interpreted in a wider perspective. After the March Revolution, the scientific society of the Littoral followed the general trend of the institutionalisation of science in the Habsburg Monarchy. This was represented by the establishment of the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna in 1847 and the education and university reforms under the ministry of Leo von Thun und Hohenstein between 1849 and 1860. Indeed, since 1850, a second phase of an institutionalisation of science had taken place in the Littoral, above all by the transformation of the first private institution for natural science in Trieste, the “Zoological-Zootomic Cabinet”. This was founded in 1846 and became the “Civic Museum of Natural History” in 1852 (CMSN, 1, 20, Raggaglii II 1850–1854). This process of institutionalisation on the local level was led by the most pre-eminent exponents of the local (Triestine and Istrian) order and was also supported by the Habsburg dynasty. Exponents of the Habsburg family often visited the museum, which was dedicated to Ferdinand Maximilian of Habsburg in 1855 (Civico Museo Ferdinando Massimiliano in Trieste, 1856, 14).

The archive of the “Museum of Natural History” in Trieste represented a favoured point of observation of changes in the region as well as in the Austrian Kingdom from different perspectives. Concerning the region Istria, this institution became a central core for the development of a regional identity. The museum’s status as official but also as a shared institution permitted the development of multiple forms of identifications through multifaceted and diverse “cultural relationships” (Johler, 2012b, 34). It strengthened regional identity alongside national and imperial identities through scientific research and the organisation of the exhibits. It can be stated that the newly traced political-administrative boundaries of Istria, which created a new region, increasingly became the boundaries of research activities and scientific discourses of the local scientists and scholars too. An authentic “Science of the Littoral” was established in the centre

35 Examples of the progressive creation of an “Istrian canon”: Combi, 1858, 2; Combi, 1864; De Franceschi, 1879, 5–6; Benussi, 1885. Moreover, the long list of titles on Istria, Trieste/Trst/Triest and the whole Austrian Littoral in handwritten notes by Pietro Pervanoglù for a planned study about the “Ethnography of the Adriatic Space” in about 1870 reveal interesting proof of the sedimentation of such a canon already between the late 1860s and 1870s (CMSA, Pervanoglù: Norden. Geschichte, Geographie und Ethnographie der Küsten des adriatischen Meeres, 1870).

of Trieste for natural sciences, above all botany, humanities, such as archaeology and anthropology, used Istria (together with the County of Gorizia/Gorica/Görz) as a privileged research field.

A fundamental turning point for the development of the configuration as a “regional museum” was the election of the Triestine Carlo de Marchesetti as the museum’s president in 1876 (Marchesetti, 1890; 1896/97). Under his management the museum intensified the naturalistic and anthropological research in the region. Istria became the favoured field of botanic research in order to strengthen the so-called “scienza botanica del Litorale”, “the botanic science of the Litoral” (CMSN, 3, 1871, 5). During research trips around the region the central question about the borderlines of the research itself arose. In some of his botanic works, like *Flora of Parenzo* or *Flora of Trieste*, Marchesetti made interesting observations about the tricky question of the overlapping between the borders of scientific practice and those of the political-administrative:

*If tracing the boundaries of a botanical district is generally difficult, and uncertain where one wants to abide by political boundaries, it is almost impossible if neither big waterways, nor mountains, nor diversity of geographical formations can establish natural terms. This would be the case with Parenzo if we wanted to consider its flora limited only to its administrative territory. However, it is our job to search for wider natural boundaries, including parts of the surrounding districts of Montona, Pisino and Rovigno. Rounded up in this way, the botanical territory of Parenzo is limited to the north by the Mirna valley, to the west by the sea, to the south by the Leme canal and to the east by the long Canfanaro valley and the surface of the sandstone area between Vermo and the Chervar stream below Visinada. These borders can be considered botanically natural because they indicate as far as possible on a relatively small territory rather clear boundaries for the spread of several species, as we will see later, when we will consider more closely its flora* (Marchesetti, 1890, 25–26).

At the same time, by publishing their results of the naturalistic aspects of the region they motivated the “naturalisation” of the borders based on the earlier unstable concept of “geographical Istria” by Kandler’s *L’Istria* in the 1840s. This challenge was the integration of the earlier representations of Istria in plural between its political, historical and geographical declinations into a unified, scientifically well-founded discourse. Therefore, geography played a central role in the stabilisation of the borders between “Italians”, “Slovenians” and “Croats” in political discourses. The search for “natural boundaries” between different ethnic groups started to take place from the 1860s onwards and geography was needed to legitimise political aims through the “naturalisation” of unstable and disputed ethnic borders. Already in 1861, concerning the overlap of the borders of Istria with the ones of the “Italian nation”, Pacifico Valussi

declared the existence of a real “border traced by Nature” (“*les limites tracées par la nature*”, Valussi, 1954, 23).

In general, because of both the nationalistic demands and the imperial unmixing politics, the old political border before 1797 was broken down into a myriad of small, sub-regional boundaries and then ethnicised. The “border” and the segmentation between the different ways of thinking of the Istrian region never disappeared as analytical concepts in scientific discourses. For instance, in a letter to Hugo Schuchardt in 1883, the Istrian-Triestine professor Giuseppe Vatova declared that his own homeland (the Northern Istria) was a “border land” (“*paese di confine*”) where linguistic mixtures were more than common.<sup>36</sup>

The discourse about creating a regional identity through science cannot only be limited to the natural sciences. The humanities also played a decisive role in the process of fortifying the idea of Istria including geography, history, ethnography and folklore, as many works by Bernardo Benussi (cf.: Benussi, 1885) or by the archaeologist and paleoethnographer Marchesetti (ADT, RP MS Misc. 88 A/1; Marchesetti, 1884; Marchesetti, 1903; Mader, 1996; Bandelli & Montagnari Kokely, 2005) have shown since the 1870s and 80s. Thus, Istria remained a polyphonic, open concept resulting from a variety of different inclusive or exclusive representations, depending on the various political and cultural points of view. However, all these patchy versions of Istria could not always be in accordance with each other. Some actors understood “Istria” as a limping, constantly negotiated result of the repeated dialectic between the segmentation of the various Istrian conceptions and their re-composition, as Benussi’s various “geographies” and “histories” show. Benussi’s text *La liturgia slava nell’Istria (The Slavic Liturgy in Istria)* from 1893 explained this view thus:

*Regarding Istria, we must say in advance that we always want to consider the geographical Istria, as it was shaped in the great book of Nature in the form of mountains and seascapes. This is the case of that Istria, which is included among the bays of Trieste and Quarnero, between the Adriatic on the one hand, and the Vena and Caldiera mountains on the other. This excludes Liburnia beyond Mount Maggiore, and the islands of Quarnero, both because they are not part of Istria at all in terms of their geographical position, and because they have a completely different historical and national development from ours: including them in Istria would cause serious confusion, and could be the reason for many errors in the liturgical question that we are now going to study. Liburnia and the Quarnero islands were aggregated to Istria only in the year 1825 (Benussi, 1893, 153).*

36 This last question presented by you [Schuchardt] seems to me to be almost completely new. Actually, I can't say that I ever thought of it: as normal in a border land, some words seem to me to be infiltrated from German or Slavic in my own dialect, which is that of Capodistria and Trieste [...] (HSA, A, 12359).

Such historical and anthropological studies clearly aimed to reinforce the complex patchwork of the “human taxonomies” and the “purity-hybridity dialectic” established by official sciences between the 1840s and 1850s. These first cultural, ethno-linguistic representations needed to be transposed from a “two-dimensional” representation (as in statistic tables or ethnographic maps) to a “three-dimensional” frame (as in cultural and historical narratives), primarily through the creation of historical continuities. At the time when nationalistic and ethnocentric disputes arose between modern national parties at the local level, scientists and scholars began to develop a sort of interdisciplinary model of explanation and representation of the inner cultural diversity and “mixing” on the Istrian peninsula. On the basis of the ethnographic taxonomies from the 1850s/60s, local scholars created a high number of narratives of parallel historical continuities of all ethnic groups by following the previously traced division lines among them. Every ethno-linguistic group received its own historical continuity, even the mixed populations. For this reason, scholars continually used the topic of previous historical “migrations” in their explanations about the ethno-genesis of modern Istria in order to explain the impossible and uncategorizable, like the mixed populations, for instance, by thematising the period of migrations in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries (as a paradigmatic example: Benussi, 1885, 38–43, 116–119). In this sense, Istria was and still is, represented as a peculiar “migration land”. This collective work took the shape of an interdisciplinary scientific activity, where history, linguistics, archaeology and ethnography were often mixed with natural sciences such as botany, agronomy, medicine and geography.

#### AN INTERDISCIPLINARY “SCIENCE OF THE LITTORAL”: BOTANY AS A “THIRD SPACE” BETWEEN “NATURE” AND “CULTURE”

In this way, the Triestine museum was a space for the strengthening the sense of regional belonging by collecting and showing objects from several research fields in an interdisciplinary way.<sup>37</sup> In his numerous manuscripts about the re-organisation of the museum since the late 1870s, Marchesetti clearly aimed to spread the acquired knowledge across the Littoral society, in particular aiming at visitors from mid/low social classes and school teachers (CMSN, 3, 1877, 8; CMSN, 6, giugno 1897).

The question of the interdisciplinarity leads us back to the main question of the modalities and reasons for the concentration of terms like “mixing”, “hybridism” and “assimilation” on the Istrian reality throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Looking at

<sup>37</sup> Marchesetti wrote thus in a manuscript of 1885: *A rich quantity also came from the various excursions undertaken for zoological, botanical, geological and palaeoethnological purposes around our region. No less than 49 castellieri were visited this year, but the majority of them we did not know existed* (CMSN, 5, 1885, 1). About the practice of collecting and showing objects in West-European museums for developing new identities during the modern era, cf.: Bleichmar & Mancall, 2011.

the history of the word “hybridism” (and all its synonyms), the historian Robert Young stated that such a word arose in discourses about humans through a cultural transfer between different scientific disciplines, e.g. from zoology and botany in West European countries (mostly France and United Kingdom) in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Young, 1995, 1–29). The linguist Salvatore Battaglia placed the transfer from France and English into the Italian language between the 1840s and 1870s (Battaglia, 2002, 196–197). Checking the *Dictionary of Italian language* (*Dizionario della lingua italiana*) of that time, Tommaseo and Bellini confirm that such terms were already being used in Italian, referring to human and cultural aspects in the late 1860s (Tommaseo & Bellini, 1869, 1263–1264).

In this sense, the establishment of the main Istrian “purity-hybridity dialectic” surely required interdisciplinary transfers “from the biology to the culture” (Ruffié, 1976). This hybrid cultural process seems not to be a coincidence in the Istrian region. Istria based its economy prominently on agriculture, although the region was considered to be one of the poorest lands in the Kingdom (Visintin, 2015). For this reason, botany and agronomy became important as a way for modernising and stabilising the region (Starec, 1998). Trieste became an internationally well-known centre for natural scientific research and Istria got its scientific laboratory already in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. This was not only due to the establishment of the *Botanical Garden* (*Orto botanico*) in Trieste, that was even visited by the Austrian Emperor in 1832 (ADT, RP MS Misc. 32) and the King of Saxony in 1838 (Biasoletto, 1841). Furthermore, some botanical schools were organised and run by the most pre-eminent botanists of the Littoral, among them Biasoletto originally from the Istrian Dignano/Vodnjan.<sup>38</sup>

Due to their ability to analyse and change socio-economic conditions, science combined with technology was regarded as a practical overcoming strategy in different crisis moments. It regarded mostly the field of botanical and agricultural research, as the agrotechnical essays by the Istrians Pietro Stancovich<sup>39</sup>, Bartolomeo Biasoletto<sup>40</sup> or several articles about botanical topics in *La Favilla* reveal. The term “botany” was thus used not only to refer to plants and agriculture but also to “society” and “culture”. The intimate relationship and the close exchange between “nature” and “human” or “culture” were explained in several botanical works and newspaper articles by Istrian personalities.<sup>41</sup>

The use of multidisciplinary activity in research seemed to be a normal procedure in several fields. In 1905, Marchesetti exposed his position as a positivist researcher to the Romance philologist Hugo Schuchardt in Graz: *The sciences intertwine so variously that one discipline offers its hand to the other and serves as support for*

38 Cf.: *La Favilla*, 5. 7. 1840: Dall’Ongaro, Apertura delle annuali lezioni di botanica tenute dal Dr. Biasoletto, 209–210.

39 Cf.: Stancovich, 1820; Stancovich, 1825; Stancovich, 1840; Stancovich, 1841; Stancovich, 1842.

40 Biasoletto, 1853.

41 Cf.: *La Favilla*, 15. 4. 1842: P. V., Bibliografia, 111–113; *La Favilla*, 23. 4. 1843: F. M., Teatro, 61–62.

*the others* (HSA, A, 6849). Marchesetti explains to the linguist the ethno-national differences in Istria between “Italians” and “Slavs” through botany. According to his perception of “national traditions” of planting trees, some particular trees could be found in Italian cities or villages, that are, on the contrary, “traditionally” absent in Slavic social public spaces and replaced by other trees: *The Italian population [...] gave preference to the celtis tree on squares or in front of churches [...] ; the Slavs prefer the lime tree (lipa)* (HSA, A, 6850).

This process of hybridisation of knowledge seems to have its roots in the spread of interest in botany in the Littoral since the first half of the 19th century as well as to the establishment of scientific programs by the *Minerva* Society (Cf.: Archeografo Triestino; Gentile, 1910). An analysis of the publications of the Istrian botanist and pharmacist Bartolomeo Biasoletto reveals an interdisciplinarity in research and analysis, even between botany and zoology. Botany was perceived as a special hybrid meeting place between the natural and the human sciences (Latour, 1993, 22–25; Descola, 1986), in which the Istrian order, its society and economy could develop. In this sense, botanical terms, which were used in works by Istrian and Triestine botanists, seemed to become central as new analytic categories for the socio-cultural re-ordering in Istria – for instance the term “assimilation” in some Biasoletto’s texts.<sup>42</sup>

The following generations of Istrian opinion-makers after 1848, who partially developed narrations of Italian national continuity on Istria, were often also interested in botanical research. Clear traces of cultural and scientific transfer from the natural sciences to the human sciences can be found in local and imperial scientific works and in cultural productions about the composition of the Littoral’s population. Above all, this took place through the use of a wide range of botanical terms and concepts in the descriptions of Istria’s people. In 1857, the same year that Czörníg published his ethnographic studies, the Istrian prelate and teacher Antonio Coiz used a broader repertoire of botanical terms for his depiction of the ethnogenesis of modern Istria, such as “*innesto*” (“graft”), “*tronco*” (“trunk”), “*trampianto*” (“transplantation”) (Coiz, 1890, 12). One year later, in 1858, an anonymous Istrian writer of articles in the journal of Udine’s journal *L’Annotatore friuliano* explained the internal fragmentation and diversity of the Slavs of Istria and their difference to the other Slavs through botanical terms and figures of speech: the Slavic populations of Istria had been “scattered” (“*dispersa*”) such as “separated leaves” (“*foglie staccate*”) from their original “branch” (“*ramo*”).<sup>43</sup> Even Pacifico Valussi, one of the fathers of the concept of “*assimilazione spontanea*”, taught agricultural lessons in Friuli in the late 1850s.<sup>44</sup>

42 Cf.: Biasoletto, 1853, 2.

43 *L’Annotatore friulano*, 8. 8. 1858: Corrispondenza dall’Istria, 152.

44 *In the last agricultural lessons*, engineer Dr. Locatelli continued to talk about irrigation, pointing out the various ways of obtaining water and Dr. Valussi dealt with the developmental work of the soil, with special regard to the growth of plants. *L’Annotatore friulano*, 1. 4. 1858: Cose urbane e della provincia, 108.

A pronounced presence of terms related to “hybridity” also appeared in Istrian scientific editorials at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The main question was how Istrian farmers and landowners could protect agriculture at a time when it was strongly affected by some threatening plant diseases. Until the appearance of phylloxera in the 1870s, farmers in particular areas of Istria reached a certain level of prosperity due to the improvement and modernisation of wine production (Cattaruzza, 1979, 21–22). The new and unknown plague (along with other diseases like downy mildew) also threatened this initial meagre success and wealth. A long scientific dispute about the protection of vines against phylloxera and downy mildew lasted from the late 1870s until the 1890s within the network of the main Istrian agricultural research institutes, like the “Istrian Agrarian Society” or the “Agrarian School for Viticulture, Enology and Fruit Growing” (Visintin, 2015).

The period between the end of the 1880s and 1914 (when the “hybridism” term experienced its renaissance) was the time of testing and applying more modern agricultural techniques in Istria for the necessary treatment of affected vineyards. Around 1900, local scientists and agricultural institutes fiercely debated the introduction of grafting techniques for resistant grapevine varieties from France and the United States to Istria (Hugues, 1889, 91–94). As the director of the “Istrian Agrarian Society” Carlo Hugues explained in 1889, the solution to the agricultural problems in the last decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century by improving agricultural techniques could prevent the enormous rural exodus from Istria. The agricultural question was regarded as a hybrid field, where agrotechnology, culture and society came together: the solution lay in the middle and should be interdisciplinary (Hugues, 1889, 109).

The newspaper *L'Istria* from Parenzo/Poreč had indeed reported since the late 1880s about the spread of the use of such modern grafting and hybridisation techniques, where the term “ibridismo” appeared in 1898 (and also in a discussion about the protection of Istrian vineyards during a session of the Istrian Parliament).<sup>45</sup> In addition, the journal *L'Istria agricola* (from 1908 onwards the main mouthpiece of Istria’s main agricultural institutes) reflected this scientific debate. Terms like “ibrido”, “ibridismo” and “ibridizzazione” were constantly used in debates about the fertility of newly grafted grapevines.<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, the transfer between the natural sciences and the humanities did not seem to take place only in one clear direction. In such articles, even some expressions from the human sciences were used as explanatory terms for processes or phenomena in botany and agriculture. In 1911 the hybrids on grapevines were named “half-blood” (“mezzo sangue”).<sup>47</sup>

45 Cf.: *L'Istria*, 5. 8. 1887: Un nuovo innesto per la vite, 5; *L'Istria*, 5. 3. 1898: Cronaca dietale, 2–3.

46 Cf.: *L'Istria agricola*, 3, 1910: G. C., Gli ibridi produttori diretti, 346–347; *L'Istria agricola*, 4, 1911: Viti innestate che deperiscono per eccesso di produzione, 5–8; *L'Istria agricola*, 4, 1911: G. C., Gli ibridi produttori diretti, 508–510; *L'Istria agricola*, 6, 1913: G. C., L'ibridazione quale mezzo per aumentare la produttività dei semi, 40–41.

47 *L'Istria agricola*, 4, 1911: G. C., Gli ibridi produttori diretti, 509.

Moreover, a popularisation of these words in discourses about humans in local society clearly could also take place through teaching courses about the new grafting techniques for the local rural population. The news in *L'Istria* about classes concerning the new grafting techniques for women, organised by the “Istrian Agricultural Institute” of Parenzo/Poreč in 1893, shows a wide mobilisation of all possible parts of the local order. In this way, through the spread of new agrotechnical knowledge and including the female population, the local society was considered to have protected and reinvigorated its agriculture.<sup>48</sup>

Furthermore, local scientific institutions like the Triestine “Museum of Natural History” and its appendix, the “Adriatic Society for Natural Sciences” played a fundamental role as research centres for several scientific fields for the Istrian regional order due to a network between Trieste and Istria (cf.: ADT, RP MS Misc. 88/A/1: 210; 211). On some occasions, Istrian agricultural institutions consulted the main Triestine museum about botanical and entomological topics (cf.: CMSN, 4, 1881, 16). Simultaneously, the Museum and the Adriatic Society in Trieste became central meeting and discussion points for several scientific topics, ranging from natural sciences to anthropology. The presence of some influential personalities in these institutions, who used the term “hybridism” referring to the Istrian population, could confirm the interdisciplinary transfer of these terms on the regional level. Bernardo Benussi and Bernardo Schiavuzzi were both members of the “Adriatic Society of Natural Sciences” at the turn of the 20th Century, during the aforementioned “hybridism”-renaissance (cf. the lists of members in: *Bollettino della società adriatica di scienze naturali in Trieste*). For all these reasons, the crystallisation of a new transfer of the terms “hybridism”, “hybridity” and “hybridisation” from agricultural techniques and botany to human issues seems plausible between Trieste/Trst/Triest and Istria in the decades between 1890 and 1914.

## CONCLUSION

Despite the political unification process of Istria after 1797, the definition of Istrian region as a “borderland” paradoxically remained and even increased in cultural and scientific discussions. Internal borders and cultural-geographic divisions were multiplied, shifted and fortified through scientific activity. In this sense, a scientific discourse in this area can easily be defined as “science of the border(s)”. On the one hand it was determined by the establishment of political borders, on the other the “science of the border” had as its central aim the gradual definition and fortification of the inner borders between Istria’s ethnic groups. In such a complex process of “region building” and “tracing new borders” in the new Istrian region, the main dialectic of its re-ordering (“purity”/“diversity” vs. “mixture”/“hybridity”) emerged both on the imperial and regional levels.

48 L’Istria, 29. 4. 1893: Corso femminile d’innesto delle viti americane, 2–3.

Particularly among Istrian elites, this vocabulary became a marker for radical, threatening mutations, e.g. a symptom of fear of losing one's own supremacy and control of the socio-economic reality.

Lastly, looking at today's cultural-historical analyses of the development of the term "hybridism", current researchers have stated that the words "hybridism"/"hybridity" started to be used to categorise people in Western Europe, mainly in a colonial context from the 1840s (Young, 1995, 15–29; Gružinski, 1999, 12; Kappus, 2002, 322–323). That was not really the case with Istria. In such a highly interdisciplinary scientific milieu and in a region where agriculture and botany played an essential role for its own subsistence, the transfer of the term "hybridism" from botany to the humanities did easily take place within Istria and the Austrian Littoral. Therefore, the history of the "purity-hybridity dialectic" in Istria is an Istrian history, or at least a Habsburg one: it belongs to the internal dynamics of a periferic region within the Habsburg Monarchy itself. The region of Istria seemed to be able to develop such categories by itself and use them as a basis for a new inclusive and exclusive identification system.

## ISTRA MED ČISTOČO IN HIBRIDNOSTJO: USTVARJANJE ISTRSKE REGIJE SKOZI ZNANSTVENE RAZISKAVE 19. STOLETJA

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### *POVZETEK*

*V 19. stoletju zasledimo na istrskem polotoku kompleksen proces grajenja regionalne identitete znotraj Habsburškega cesarstva. Do tega je prišlo skozi obsežno znanstveno kategorizacijo istrskega večjezičnega prostora. Med raznimi znanstvenimi raziskavami o novi regionalni enoti so prišle do izraza kulturne kategorije »drugačnosti« in »hibridnosti«. Lokalni akterji so uporabljali izraz »hibridnost« z zaničljivim predznakom, saj je predpostavljal neko grožnjo. V določenem smislu se v tem kontekstu začne »dialektika dolgega obdobja, razpetega med čistostjo in hibridnostjo« (po analizi Pamele Ballinger), ki predstavlja temelj za razvoj nove istrske regionalne identitete. Raziskava poglablja temo na osnovi znanstvenih virov avstrijskega Primorja (Istre in Trsta) in Habsburškega cesarstva. »Znanost«, »cesarstvo« in »regija« so glavna »področja« nastanka istrske moderne regionalne identitete.*

*Ključne besede: regionalno grajenje, Habsburško cesarstvo, kulturna raznolikost, hibridna kultura, zgodovina znanosti, etnizacija Istre*

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## THE “HYBRIDS” AND THE RE-ORDERING OF ISTRIA, 1870–1914

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### ABSTRACT

*This article deals with the political strategies related to the diagnosis of a culturally diverse and hybrid Istria. Discussions about hybridity first appeared in the circles of Austrian and Italian experts from the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. There, the hybridity discourse was part of a re-ordering of the monarchy after the revolution of 1848. The exploration of Istrian cultural hybridity by imperial science is a very good example of how scientific categories in the sense of classifying the population could create social realities. The greatest credit for this was due to the state, science and its institutions. However, apart from these elite circles, regional and local actors in Istria also participated in the negotiation of identity and also used the categorization and classification of the population to achieve their political goals. The archive material and newspapers consulted show that Istrian hybridity was also a guideline for political action at the local level.*

**Keywords:** *hybridity, Istria, Kastav/Castua, nationalism, regionalism, indifference, threatened order, assimilation*

## GLI “IBRIDI” E IL RIORDINO DELL’ISTRIA, 1870–1914

### SINTESI

*L’articolo analizza alcune strategie politiche legate agli studi scientifici di diversità e ibridismo culturale in Istria. Le discussioni sull’ibridismo apparvero per la prima volta in circoli di esperti austriaci e italiani a partire dalla metà del XIX secolo, e facevano parte del processo di riorganizzazione della Monarchia asburgica dopo la rivoluzione del 1848. Il dibattito sull’ibridismo culturale in Istria da parte della scienza imperiale può essere considerato un chiaro esempio di come le categorie utilizzate per le classificazioni scientifiche della popolazione crearono nuove realtà sociali. In questo processo, lo Stato, la scienza e le loro istituzioni giocarono un ruolo centrale. Tuttavia, oltre a questi circoli elitari, anche gli attori regionali e locali parteciparono attivamente a processi di negoziazione dell’identità in Istria: anch’essi utilizzarono delle categorie scientifiche di classificazione della popolazione per raggiungere i loro obiettivi politici. Il materiale d’archivio e i giornali consultati dimostrano che la categoria dell’ibridismo in Istria fu una linea guida seguita anche nell’azione politica a livello locale.*

**Parole chiave:** *ibridismo, Istria, Kastav/Castua, nazionalismo, regionalismo, indifferenza, ordine minacciato, assimilazione*

INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

The Margravate of Istria (1849–1918) was one of the Habsburg crown lands characterized by a great heterogeneity in cultural and ethnic terms. Around the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the linguistic and ethnic diversity of Istria had repeatedly been described by Austrian ethnographers – especially Karl Freiherr von Czoernig<sup>2</sup> – since the middle of the century and by Italian intellectuals from Istria – such as Bernardo Benussi – from the 1870s. Czoernig and other Austrian scientists regarded Istria as an exception due to its newly discovered diversity and “mixture” of peoples (Czoernig, 1857, VIII). Then the term “hybridism” came from the scientific context as a term for the observation and description of linguistic-ethnic peculiarities in Istria (Johler, 2012). Especially the ethnographically not clearly classifiable people were considered as “hybrids.”

Parallel to the scientific negotiations on the affiliation and ethnographic development of “hybrids,” the Austrian government introduced modern structures of the state and its order and was an active player in ethnic production. After the greatest threat to the monarchy from the revolution of 1848/49, the Habsburg government sought to establish control over territories and peoples, triggering processes of ethnic inclusion and exclusion on the local levels.<sup>3</sup> At the latest then, the colloquial language surveys carried out every ten years since 1880 provided evidence of diversity. It became clear that there were numerous shades

1 This paper gives an introduction into the project G03 “Istria as ‘Experimental Station’ - Hybridity as (Threatened) Order,” which is part of the DFG (German Research Foundation) funded Collaborative Research Center 923 “Threatened Orders” at the Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen.

2 Czoernig, Karl Freiherr von: *Ethnographie der oesterreichischen Monarchie*, Wien 1857, VIII–IX.

3 The project G03 “Istria as ‘Experimental Station’ - Hybridity as (Threatened) Order” provides a new insight into the process of re-ordering the monarchy that took place between 1848 and 1914, based on the analytical model of “Threatened Orders” (Frie & Meier, 2014; Frie & Nieswand, 2017). Orders are conceptualized as arrangements of elements that are related to each other in a certain way and that structure social groups or even whole societies. The orders are threatened when agents become convinced that their options for action are uncertain, when behavior and routines are called into question, when agents feel they cannot rely on each other, and when agents manage to establish a threat discourse. Thus threat communication is a self-alarming from within the order and points to a concrete source of threat (Frie & Nieswand, 2017, 7). Successful self-alarming is followed by an open-ended process of re-ordering: actors endeavour to redesign their order which has gone off the rails and can thus be thematized and changed. Therefore, at the moment of threat the order becomes visible and at the same time it is changed. The revolution of 1848 certainly triggered the threat discourses at the state, regional and local levels. The real threat to absolutism by the nationalists and liberals preceded the general re-ordering of the social, political and cultural, i.e. the social transformation of the entire monarchy. However, the revolution also released fears and emotions down to the smallest communities and shaped further threat discourses which in the case of the local agents in Istria were also oriented towards the “hybrids.” The “Threatened Orders” model helps to sort out the complex events and changes in Istria and, by analyzing the threat communication related to hybridity and its effects, makes it possible to understand the political strategies and spheres of action of the actors. One of the central questions of the project is how macro-level strategies to gain knowledge and control over peoples have been implemented and promoted at the local level of Istrian communities.

and nuances between the supposedly pure ethnic groups in Istria (Brix, 1982). Slavs and Italians as the complex cultural realities could not be reduced to a few linguistic and political categories.

In the background of the elitist debate on hybridism, there was also a discussion on hybridity and diversity at the local level. The Croatian, Slovenian and Italian nationalists began to identify the culturally and nationally unclassifiable persons who were not visible as members of the respective peoples. They described them as assimilated, apolitical, indifferent or as side-switchers. From the 1870s onwards, the Croatian national actors in Istria understood the "hybrid" character of the peninsula as a threat to their own national mobilization. Soon they even found new terms to describe and defame the "hybrids". Already in its first editions, the political organ of the Croatian national actors *Naša Sloga* generated the image of the "hybrid" members of their allegedly own Slavic tribe. Depending on the regional idioms and contexts, the terms *Potalijancenjaci*, *Talijanaši* or *Talijomani*, which all meant something like "Italianized," could be observed in the political language. The Croatian national actors used the term *Šarenjaci* (*colorful*) to refer partly to *side-switchers*<sup>4</sup> and partly to people of ambiguous ethnic origin. Thus the terms, especially *Šarenjaci*, can be located as synonyms of the term hybridity. In the period between 1870 and the First World War, the Croatian national actors understood "hybrids" in Istria as a threat to national group formation and instrumentalized the threat of assimilation, which alluded to the concept of hybridity, for the national mobilization.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, at the same time there were also people who joined the so-called 'Istrian' movement with the aim of resisting nationalism and national unification. This article pays special attention to the 'Istrians' movement which was put together by precisely those people who the nationalists called *Šarenjaci* or "hybrids."

In the 1870s and 1880s, the Croatian national leaders from Istria saw the future of the whole monarchy only in the guarantee of a far-reaching equality of peoples. In fact, the monarchy tried to strengthen the rights of the individual peoples with its 'multiculturalism policy' in order to put a stop to the separational nationalism that destabilized the entire monarchy. However, Article 19 of the Basic Law of 1867<sup>6</sup> promoted even greater difference and the formation of collective national identities. The Slavs in Istria regularly recorded that state laws were not implemented at the

4 Side-switchers were also popular objects of attack for national actors in other parts of the monarchy. See Zahra, 2010, 103, 107.

5 This essay focuses mainly on the Croatian and Slavic negotiation of hybridity. For the Italian perspective, see e.g. the essay by F. Toncich in this volume.

6 Basic Law of 21.12.1867 on the General Rights of Nationals in the Kingdoms and Länder represented in the Council of the Realm, Art.19: All the ethnic entities of the empire enjoy equal rights, and each ethnic entity has an inviolable right to the preservation and fostering of its nationality and language. The state recognizes the equal rights of all current languages in schools, administration and public life. In countries populated by more than one ethnic entity, public places of learning should be so organised that, without making the learning of a second national language compulsory, each member of an ethnic entity should have adequate opportunity to receive education in his/her own language.

local level.<sup>7</sup> As a result, their confidence in the power of state structures waned and they believed they were exposed to the arbitrariness of the ruling Italian party in the Istrian parliament (*Sabor*). They also believed that the existing transitional situation of unstable legal security undermined the monarchy and threatened its existence. At the beginning of the 1870s, the primary goal of the national leaders on the Croatian and Slovenian sides was the establishment of an order of equal cultural expression. This, let us call it ‘order of the cultural’ postulated by the state policy of multiculturalism, never actually had a real chance of success. By insisting on their implementation and continued existence, the Slovenes and Croatians simultaneously attacked the established power relations and the political and, above all, economic superiority of the Italians in Istria. Equal cultural rights would have meant equal access for the Slavs to grammar schools, universities, the state government, trade networks and resources in general. The resulting socioeconomic conflicts, for example when the Italian administrations sabotaged the establishment of Croatian schools, faked election decisions or blocked investments in agriculture, were interpreted by the national actors in the sense of a national struggle. The formation of national borders was linked to the development of social and economic borders (D’Alessio, 2006a, 16). From this point of view all individuals and groups who were not on the side of the respective national leaders were accused of being renegades and traitors. The nationality struggle endangered by the traitors from the “own” ranks became a powerful narrative.

Research on national mobilization in Eastern, Central and Southeastern Europe has already pointed to the failures of national actors in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries and drawn attention to the perspective of “indifferents” and “hybrids” in the processes of national demarcation (Zahra, 2010; Zahra, 2008; Judson, 2006; King, 2002; Ballinger, 2002). This article on Istrian hybridity in the 19<sup>th</sup> century was inspired by the research that focused on the topics and concepts of indifference, coexistence/*convivenza* and a long term purity-hybridity-dialectic. Tara Zahra, for example, drew the picture of Bohemia’s nationalizing multicultural societies between 1900 and 1948 by setting the thematic anchor in the education of children and young people. In particular, she used the analysis category of “indifferent” or even national hermaphrodites and recorded the manifold strategies and manipulations of political actors throughout their transformation in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Zahra, 2008). She undertakes a historicization of national indifference and pursues the thesis of the persistence of national indifference into the 20<sup>th</sup> century and its influence on mass politics (Zahra, 2010). This article was also inspired by works, which stressed the fluidity of ethnic borders and identities in Istria. Vanni D’Alessio therefore used the term “shifting” instead of “crossing” to describe the movement between different ethnic positions and “identifications” (D’Alessio, 2006a, 18).

7 For example: „Hrvatski sabor i Hrvati izvan kraljevine“ [The Croatian parliament and the Croats outside the Kingdom], *Naša Sloga*, 1.8.1871; „Istarski sabor“ [The Istrian parliament], *Naša Sloga*, 16.11.1871.

The history of Istria in the 19<sup>th</sup> century was particularly prominent in the 1980s. At that time, the Croatian and Italian artists and intellectuals spread ideas about a perpetual multi-ethnic hybrid Istria.<sup>8</sup> The regional historiography was focused in particular on acculturation concepts in order to explain the linguistic and social diversity of Istria at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Thus, Miroslav Bertoša, in his long-term perspective on the Central Istrian village of Gologorica, concluded that there were "waves of acculturation" in the second half of the 19th century.<sup>9</sup> He thus addressed those negotiations of fluid ethnic and national identities that took place throughout Istria, especially from the 1870s onwards. The fact that Istrian hybridity had already been empirically described by Austrian ethnographers in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, had fallen into oblivion with the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy (Johler, 2012, 3, 9–21). Nevertheless, the Istrian literary and scientific works published from the 1980s onwards, against the background of threatening nationalism in the Yugoslav republics, were aimed at emphasizing the coexistence of Italians, Croats and Slovenes in Istria and its imperial legacies (Cocco, 2010, 7, 18, 21–22). As in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, discussing hybridity proved to be a symptom of the threatened order, here in the penultimate decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century especially as a symptom of the threatened coexistence between Italians, Slovenes and Croats in Istria.

Bertoša referred to this coexistence of Roman and Slavic population groups since the Middle Ages with the term *convivenza*. Thus, he interpreted the work of the first great national 'reawakener' of Istria, Bishop Juraj Dobrila, which was indeed directed towards the equilibrium and cultural equality of the Italians and Slavs in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, as a striving for the 'acculturation equilibrium' (Bertoša 1985, 173–174). Bertoša understood the socio-anthropological characteristics of Istria as an oscillation between ethnocentric forces and the forces of coexistence. The reality of Istrian cultural mixtures can be read in his conclusions as a centuries-long mutual influencing of the ethnic groups without one culture having ever been able to achieve the complete acculturation or assimilation of another culture (Bertoša, 1985, 100, 156, 167–168).

Nevertheless, if culture is understood as a hybrid entity that is processual, constructivist and praxeological as well as always characterized by overlaps, mixtures, and transfers (Johler, 2012, 2), such acculturation arguments become unsuitable. Another interesting way would be not to just describe Istria as a region with two, three or many different coexisting and struggling cultures but to follow the local discussions on hybridity in order to show how hybridity has been used as a resource and guiding principle for political action. Therefore, it can be shown how the negotiations of hybridity in the 19<sup>th</sup> century led to alternative concepts of order in Istria.

8 In the late 1980s, Istrian regionalism and a "hybrid", political, Istrian identity arose around the movement '*Istrijanstvo*' and the corresponding identity '*Istrijan/ka*'. Continuing to the '*Istrijanstvo*' in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, see Kappus, 2006.

9 To the chapter on Gologorica see Bertoša, 1985, 177–253, esp. 225, 228.

The article focuses on the reflection of actors at the local level, on the hybridity of the Istrian population and on the potential of these reflections for policy making. The first section describes how the “hybrids” were invented in Istria and declared a threat to national integration. The second section describes the Slavic national movements in Istria as hybrid movements, assuming a deep-rooted diversity consciousness among the Istrian inhabitants. The third and fourth sections focus on the “hybrid” so-called ‘Istrian’ movement in eastern Istria which, at the turn of the century, was an alternative to Croatian nationalism and a consciously culturally heterogeneous and explicitly regional movement. These ‘Istrians’ as “heroes of multicultural fantasies” (Zahra, 2010, 114) are exemplary for the investigation of the strategies of inclusion and exclusion on the basis of hybridity and not purism of any kind. Finally, the article attempts to classify this movement in the traditions of regionalism in the Adriatic region. The sources used in this essay come mainly from L’Archivio di Stato di Trieste – mainly administrative files and correspondence—and have not been used so far. This applies in particular to the given example of “hybrid” group formation. In addition, the first Croatian national newspaper in Istria, *Naša Sloga* (1870–1915), is cited as an important source because it establishes the threat discourse on hybridity and at the same time provides a source for tracking down the reflections of its authors. Due to the scope of the article, the following explanations concentrate mainly on the Croatian actors, but other perspectives that will be published in future publications will also be dealt with within the framework of the entire project.<sup>10</sup>

## THE THREAT DIAGNOSIS

Istrian diversity was a reality observed in languages, customs and traditions. Austrian ethnographers used the term “hybridism” (*Hibridismus*) for Istria, in particular, to describe the amalgamations, intermixtures and manifold cultural transfers (Nikočević, 2008, 68–70). Here the concept of “hybridism” was first intertwined with positive images of a multicultural Austria and included hopes of overcoming the national polarization that had already begun. The vision of a hybrid ‘Austrian national’ was a pillar of the concept that was inspired by Istrian conditions and the “hybrid” Istro-Romanians, who were ethnographically exemplarily recorded there (Johler, 2019). In the scientific ethnographic and statistical discourses, “hybridism”<sup>11</sup> functioned as an inclusion model for the maintenance of the monarchy. On the other hand, under the term *ibridismo*, Italian intellectuals

10 See footnote 1.

11 In this study the term hybridity is used exclusively as a source term. In a broader context, the term hybridity was subject to an enormous change in meaning: from the hubris of ancient demigods and medieval ‘noble bastards’ in the sense of crossing biological and social borders to the ‘infertility discourse’ in the colonial racial context, to today’s pop-cultural exploitation and commodification of hybridity. For a critical examination of the concept see Ha (2015).

understood the mergers of the various Slavic ethnic groups.<sup>12</sup> In the beginning, promising ideas about the assimilation of the Slavs to the Italian 'cultural nation' were connected with "hybridism" because, in Italian circles, the "hybrids" were regarded as easily assimilable. However, Croatian and Slovenian national leaders, from the 1870s onwards, constantly undermined the expectations of the Italian elite for the spontaneous assimilation of the '*popoli senza storia*'<sup>13</sup> into the Italian cultural nation (Bertoša, 1985, 105–107, 148–160). For the Slavs, who increasingly nationalized, the ethnographically produced cultural "nuances" and "mixes"<sup>14</sup> in Istria were the reasons for emotionalized discussions and conflicts.

In 1871, the first Istrian-Croatian People's Assembly (*Tabor*) took place near Kastav/Castua<sup>15</sup>, a small town in the region of Liburnija/Liburnia on the eastern border of Istria, with the participation of almost 8,000–10,000 people.<sup>16</sup> The great echo of the meeting was also heard outside of Istria and celebrated as a milestone in the national 'revival' of the Slavs in Istria. The organizers explicitly addressed their message on national unification to all Slavs of Istria, namely Croats and Slovenes. The *Tabor* took place on the border between the two crownlands (Istria and Carniola), the announcement said, and spoke of Slovenes and Croats as brothers with one body and one soul (*Naša Sloga*, 1.6.1871). Before that, on the

12 For the knowledge on Istrian diversity in the scientific and administrative Italian circles - see Toncich (in print).

13 For the Italian author Bernardo Benussi, who was widely acclaimed in Italian circles, the Slavs in Istria were history-less and had no claim to national realization. This view was also supported by the Italian delegate at the Austrian Constituent Assembly and historian De Franceschi, who in 1848 described the Slavs as incapable of nation-building. De Franceschi underlined a dichotomy between the urban Italians, who spoke the "language of civilized people" and the rural, barbaric Slavs with "non-culture". The historians Vanni D'Alessio and Marta Verginella (Verginella, 2006) have in their works refuted the "long-continued paradigm" about the persistence of the dichotomy between "Italian" cities and "Slavic" countryside. Verginella, for example, rejected the paradigm according to which the national conflicts between the Slavic and Italian populations were considered conflicts between the urban and the rural. D'Alessio pointed out, for example, the strong formation of an urban middle class among Croatians during the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (D'Alessio, 2006b, 135–137, 150–151; Verginella, 2017, 461, 469).

14 Karl von Czoernig recorded thirteen "ethnographic nuances" and countless mixes. See Czoernig, 1857, VIII–IX.

15 For simplicity's sake, the toponyms are used in all known spellings, regardless of the predominant national affiliation or language of the population.

16 Discussions were planned on Southslavian unity, the introduction of the Croatian language in administration and schools, developments in maritime affairs and other matters. *Naša Sloga*, 1.4.1871; Two items on the *Tabor* agenda were banned by the regional government in the run-up to the meeting. They affected the sovereignty of Istria as the Habsburg crownland and touched on the questions of Italian political and economic supremacy on the peninsula. Slavic cultural unification was an undesirable topic of negotiation. The regional government also banned the organizers from mobilizing against the association of Istria with Trieste/Triest/Trst and Gorica, which had been brought into the discussion by the Italian side. A. Rubeša, a Croatian member of the Istrian parliament and mayor of Kastav/Castua, opened and led the 'People's Assembly.' There were also speakers for the introduction of Croatian as a teaching language and the official language of the school director, E. Jelušić, for the development of the maritime system, M. Dr. Derenčin, and on the economic backwardness of East Istria by the landowners and by the deputies in the Istrian parliament, F. Marot. *Naša Sloga*, 16.5.1871, 1.6.1871; See for the speech of Jelušić, *Naša Sloga*, 1.6.1871, 16.6.1871; Marot also distinguished himself at parliament meetings (demand of agricultural and elementary schools), *Naša Sloga*, 1.11.1871.

Istrian peninsula a Slovenian *Tabor* was held in Kubed/Covedo in 1870 and this mass mobilization practice, which was actually taken over from Bohemia, was supposed to be the starting point for similar political meetings in Istria (Šetić, 2005, 48).<sup>17</sup>

In Kastav/Castua, Croatian politicians and members of the Istrian diet spoke mainly about the burning issue of languages. In particular, the culturally heterogeneous rural population in Istria in the 19<sup>th</sup> century was still mostly illiterate and a standardized language did not exist. Nationalism was the strongest engine of literacy. The already mentioned Basic Law of 1867 had a secondary consequence for the ethnicization of the law because not group and every individual had the right to legally assert their cultural interests. The demand for free use of one’s own language generated inclusion and exclusion processes right down to the individual communities. For example, the determination of the language of instruction was regulated by the school councils, which were specifically designated for this purpose, according to ethnic proportion (Stourzh, 2011, 291–292). Language was the medium and resource of national group formation. Thus, highly politicized discourses went hand in hand with the language question.

In their work, the Croatian actors of national ‘revival’ faced seemingly insurmountable difficulties of national integration. The Slavs, most of whom lived in rural regions, did not always vote for Slovenian or Croatian political representatives. Their children went to Italian-language classes, spoke a Slavic-Italian language mixture, and refused the discussions about Istria’s ties with Croatia. Examples of such national indifference of the Istrian population are numerous and can be traced in political writings of national activists. Apart from that, not all supposedly Croats agreed to blame the Italians for the poor national integration of Croatian farmers. For example, according to a newspaper article, a reader from the region Liburnija/Liburnia claimed that it was not Italianization, but the economic weakness of Istria that led Slavs and Italians to become beggars (Naša Sloga, 1.10.1870). Here the accusation of assimilation to Italianity, which the nationalists blamed for the grievances in the region, led to defensive reactions. In another example, two mostly Slavic Istrian towns from the region of Liburnija/Liburnia: Volosko/Volosca and Lovran/Laurana, spoke out against participating in the Kastav/Castua *Tabor* and openly opposed the negotiating points (Naša Sloga, 1.6.1871).<sup>18</sup> At the following municipal election in Kastav/Castua in 1872, besides the mayor F. Marot, several Šarenjaci,<sup>19</sup> (the term that nationalists used to describe people of ambiguous political orientation), also moved into the municipal council (Naša Sloga, 1.5.1872). Here the nationalists addressed a specific behavior that could not be explained by Italian assimilation. At least since

17 Tabori in Dolina followed in 1878, Brezovica/Bresovizza in 1883, and Lindar/Lindaro in 1885.

18 Among them were Frane Gajanić-Osojnak, who was probably considered *talijanaš* and one of the mayors of the area, Mate Puž (Tometić), because he refused to sign a protocol during *Tabor*. “In a bundle!” Prava Naša Sloga, 22.12.1900.

19 Literally: colorful, variegated.

the municipal elections in Kastav/Castua it had become obvious that those people in Kastav/Castua and elsewhere could not simply be neutralized. Among the elected *Šarenjaci* were also those who had spread prophecies of tax increases and extended military obligations in the event of the annexation of Istria to Croatia.<sup>20</sup>

The opposition of the population to nationalizing activities also included subversive actions and boycotts of elections. In the municipality of Buzet/Pinguente people, who were considered Croats by the nationalists, doubted the results of the local elections of 1872, in which the Croats achieved very good results. The *Narodnjaci* (supporters of the Croatian People’s Party) were said to have achieved success against the Italians with illegal advertising (*Naša Sloga*, 1.12.1872). In Žminj/Gimino, on 9 February 1873, a group of supposedly Slavic people disguised as priests, allegedly provoked the Croats after a mass (*Naša Sloga*, 1.4.1873). Furthermore, the *Šarenjaci* did not want to attend the visit of the Pazin/Pisino/Mitterburg region by the Slavic representative of rural Istria elected in 1873 in the Vienna Imperial Council, Dinko Vitezić.<sup>21</sup> The rejection of nationalism also meant the rejection of its proponents, the clergy and the church. The *Šarenjaci* were soon placed in the Croatian national newspaper *Naša Sloga* (Our Unity), also in contrast to the church.<sup>22</sup> The *Šarenjaci* warned that through the nationalist work of the clergy *Pazinština* (Pazin/Pisino/Mitterburg region) would turn to the crownland of Carniola.<sup>23</sup> Especially from Pazin/Pisino/Mitterburg, there were accusations by the *Šarenjaci* against the clergymen, during the municipal elections of 1875.<sup>24</sup>

The integration of the Slavs into the Italian culture increasingly took place through vertical mobility due to the diversification of modern occupational fields. The Croatian national actors blamed the Italianization through Italian language of instruction, the Italian political counter agitation and the political indifference of the Slavs because of their illiteracy. The purchase of Slavic votes further reinforced the asymmetry of power between the Slavic and Italian factions. All these threats to Croatian national integration, diagnosed by the national actors, can be attributed to a common characteristic - the cultural “hybridity” of their “own” population. At this point in history, Istria was the object of transformation from a culturally hybrid region to a region with clear ethnic categories. The implementation of classifying policies and thus the creation of multiculturalism on the part of the government was still in the process. The discussions that emerged in the 1870s at the local level, about indifference and ambiguity, corresponded to a struggle for one’s own identity, whereby “being mixed” seemed to be a logical explanation for the political deviations. The newspaper reports on the Kastav/Castua People’s Assembly, for example, dealt with the *Šarenjaci* as traitors who were not aware of their origins.<sup>25</sup> The term

20 “Franina i Jurina”, *Naša Sloga*, 16.5.1872.

21 Letters from the Pazin/Pisino/Mitterburg region, *Naša Sloga*, 1.6.1874.

22 “A little of everything,” *Naša Sloga*, 1.2.1874.

23 Letters from Pazin/Pisino/Mitterburg, *Naša Sloga*, 1.3.1874.

24 Letters from the Pazin/Pisino/Mitterburg region, *Naša Sloga*, 16.12.1875.

25 “Franina i Jurina,” *Naša Sloga*, 16.5.1872.

Šarenjaci shaped the discussion about the problems of national unification for the next decades. “Our foxes, [...] which poison the poor people like evil snakes,”<sup>26</sup> wrote the *Naša Sloga* about them.

The diagnosis of the threat posed by the “hybrids” was accompanied by a tightening of political language. The founding of the Croatian national newspaper *Naša Sloga* already reflected this diagnosis in its first editions and the establishment of the newspaper can be seen as a political strategy to achieve national integration. The expansion of Croatian and Slovenian reading houses (*čitaonice*) since 1866, to spread national awareness and gain influence in rural circles, was another pillar in the national struggle. Yet only the newspaper managed to channel the existing threat diagnosis about Italianization and indifference and to bundle them into a broad-based threat communication about the “hybrids.” The way in which the term *Šarenjaci* was constructed by Croatian national actors and disseminated to describe people and groups that were politically difficult to mobilize testified to a mature strategy and tactics.<sup>27</sup>

### THE HYBRID SLAVIC NATIONAL MOVEMENT(S)

From the mid-1870s onwards, the problems of national integration triggered an intensified debate among national leaders on all sides over ethnic affiliations in Istria. In the statements against the concepts of the Istrian-Italian intellectuals, who emphasized the fragmented nature of the Slavs in Istria, the reflections and knowledge of the Croatian national leaders about the ethnic and the national character of Istria were recorded. First and foremost, the Italian historian and teacher in Koper/Capodistria, Bernardo Benussi (1846–1929), regularly provoked outrage among Croatian and Slovenian actors. In 1874, for the first time for a wider public, the Istrian-Croatian intellectuals wrote about their views on the ethnic and linguistic diversity of Istria. They defended the diversity of Slavic groups in languages, customs and ethnicities and emphasized the extremely small difference between the groups. At that moment, in their understanding of nationality, they incorporated all Istrian inhabitants of Slavic origin, including the Istro-Romanians and supposedly linguistically mixed population groups. Benussi, on the other hand, emphasized the differences in order to emphasize the hybridity and lack of “compactness” of the Slavs of Istria and thus to locate the Italians as “compact” and “authentic” people.<sup>28</sup>

The Croatian national leaders, however, only rejected the concept of linguistic or cultural hybridity if it endangered the Slav-Italian demarcation. At the same

26 “Conversation between Zvana and Kata in Kaštelir,” *Naša Sloga*, 9.6.1892.

27 For a broader study of the naming and framing of “hybrids” see Simon, 2019, 65–75.

28 Benussi, Bernardo: *Saggio d’una Geografia dell’Istria, compilato ad uso della studiosa gioventù da Bernardo Dr. Benussi*, 1874. Quoted from: *Naša Sloga* 16.9.1874, 1.10.1874, 1.12.1874, 16.1.1875, 16.2.1875, 16.3.1875, 1.4.1875.

time, they promoted the Croatian-Slovenian “spaces in between” and expressed an increasing need for a Slavic anti-Italian group formation. Although they understood Croatian and Slovenian people as separated ethnic and national groups, they never negated their belonging to a culturally hybrid community of the Slavs and therefore their inclusionistic national integration. In Istria (as well as in Croatia-Slavonia, Carniola and probably some other neighboring multicultural regions), the early national emancipations since the 1830s had gone along with the idea of the South Slavic unity and Illyrismus. Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer (1815–1905), among others, brought the South Slavic idea to Istria via his, or the church, networks with Bishop Juraj Dobrila (1812–1882) situated in Pazin/Pisino/Mitterburg.<sup>29</sup> Later, *Naša Sloga* explicitly claimed the rights of the *Slavjani*, for example, before the 1870 local elections (*Naša Sloga*, 16.6.1870). The first edition of *Naša Sloga* stated that the maintenance and extension of Istrian autonomy and self-government were clear and “righteous wishes of the Slavs of Istria” (*pravedne želje slavjana istarskih*) (*Naša Sloga*, 1.6.1870). “The world will see what the Slavic Istrian spirit can do!”<sup>30</sup> The contributions from the Slovenian language were adapted to the Croatian language and thus made accessible to the readership (*Naša Sloga*, 1.1.1871).<sup>31</sup>

Croatian and Slovenian national revival in Istria was originally a hybrid movement, rooted in a commitment to a Slavic and supra-regional unity. In the Kastav/Castua *Tabor*, the Slovenes and Croats from Croatia-Slavonia were called brothers who had the same interests. The *Tabor* was an assembly for the rights of the Slavs, a hybrid event that simultaneously promoted the annexation of Istria to the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia, reflecting the hybridity of political positions (*Naša Sloga*, 16.4.1871). It culminated in the foundation of the Slovenian-Croatian association *Edinost*, whose newspaper of the same name, from 1876, was explicitly aimed at Croats and Slovenes from Trieste/Triest/Trst and Istria.<sup>32</sup> It can be assumed that the positively connotated imperial discourse on diversity had also been the foundation for a more collaborative and less confrontational national work between Croatian and Slovenian in Istria. Thus, it was possible for Croats and Slovenes to send joint representatives to the Vienna Imperial Council in 1907 (Marelić, 2014, 67).

29 The column in the form of a dialogue between e.g. the border guards from the Croatian Military Frontier “Gjoko and Marko” in the *Naša Sloga* corresponded in content to the orientation of Strossmayer’s Croatian People’s Party and its networking with Bishop Juraj Dobrila in Istria.

30 From a poem in *Naša Sloga*, 16.2.1873.

31 However, further gradations can also be identified between the used terms *Slovenci*, *Slovinci*, *Slavjani* or *Slaveni*. By *Slovenci*, the Croatian and Slovenian political actors in Istria actually understood the Slovenes in and around Trieste/Triest/Trst. The ethnonym *Slovinci* meant the Slavs of a certain area of Western Istria and not East Istrian inhabitants. See Blagonić, 2013, 22–23.

32 The first Slovenian political association *Edinost* for the Trieste/Triest/Trst region was founded at the end of 1874/beginning of 1875 and had about 300 members at its first plenary meeting. The journal was published in Koper from 1876. *Naša Sloga*, 16.2.1875. More about Croatian-Slovenian political work at the turn of the century in Klaić, 2014.

The demands for cultural equality were greatly dependent on the discourses from Bohemia, Dalmatia and Croatia-Slavonia. The first Croatian and Slovenian national actors in Istria often came from these regions, from where they brought specific contents and issues such as the threat of assimilation. In this respect, early and hybrid Slavic nationalism in Istria was ideally closely linked to the conflicts in other multicultural parts of the monarchy. *Naša Sloga* brought a political column on the Slav-German tensions in the monarchy in each issue in the first years of her appearance on the title page, in which the demands for equal rights for the Slavs and Germans were in the foreground. The notion of “Slavic language”<sup>33</sup> (*slavinski jezik*) (*Naša Sloga*, 16.8.1870) in Istria, referred to the antagonism between the German and Slavic peoples of Cisleithania and thus to belonging to the larger Slavic population. The success or victory of the Croatian People’s Party in the elections in Croatia-Slavonia in 1871, similar to the announced introduction of Croatian as the official language in Dalmatia in 1871, also fired hopes for equal rights for the Croatian and Slovenian languages in Istria.<sup>34</sup>

### THE “HYBRIDS” ARE ACTING

In the last two decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, a new phase of national integration of Croats in Istria began. Not only the balance in an ‘order of the cultural’ but also the ideal of an independent Croatian state and the supra-regional networking with its explicitly “own” nation outside Istria, was at the forefront in the minds of the respective national actors. In addition, the policy of the “Croatian Party of Rights” (*Hrvatska stranka prava*) of Ante Starčević, which claimed Croatian unity and independence, found its way into Istria. Matko Laginja, a Croatian member of the Istrian diet, spoke out in favor of granting individual peoples the right to associations under the Habsburg House. “Istria is inseparable from other countries of the Habsburg crown but the individual Austrian countries must decide on their own order and interests,” wrote Laginja. Furthermore, he was „neither an enemy of the Italians, nor of the Germans, but an enemy of the Jewish traitors and the renegades of his own people.“<sup>35</sup> The “hybrids” continued to be the target of the nationalists.

The union of Croats and Slovenes gained even more importance in particular as a contrast to the Italian party. Especially the inner Istria around the city of Pazin/Pisino/Mitterburg was strongly influenced and changed by the national strategies. The local population was forced to choose between either the Italian or

33 All translations from Croatian in the text are by the author.

34 *Naša Sloga*, 16.6.1871. – *Naša Sloga*, 1.6.1870–1.4.1871. – The (supposedly) Croatian-born governor of Dalmatia, Baron of Rodić, did not enjoy great popularity among the local farmers because he did not drive the reform and instead learned Italian. *Naša Sloga*, 16.5.1871.

35 Matko Laginja to the peasants of the districts of Pula/Pola, Poreč/Parenzo and Koper/Capodistria, Pula, 11.2.1891. AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 138/1891.

the Croatian group (D’Alessio, 2006a, 17). A parallel society, as the writer Mate Balota (Mijo Mirković) attested for the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, originated right here in the 1880s (Balota, 1950, 20). The Italian upper class could no longer rely on Italian majorities. The mobilization of Croatian and Slovenian voters finally brought significant successes, reducing the gaps between Slavic and Italian identifications. The supporters of the Italian party regularly disturbed the holding of elections in the rural communities, in which the Slavs were in the majority, provoking protests and interpellations of Slavic representatives.<sup>36</sup> The people of Istria perpetually saw the image of the central administration damaged due to their inability to uphold the electoral laws.

Around this time in Kastav/Castua a lawyer from Dalmatia, Ivan Krstić, organized a new, explicitly Istrian and thus regional movement<sup>37</sup> on a supraethnic basis. The political work of Ivan Krstić (also Giovanni or Johannes Krstić) can be explained on the one hand by his local commitment to the so-called ‘Istrian’ movement and on the other hand by his journalistic work.<sup>38</sup> In 1892, Krstić settled in Matulji/Mattuglie in the local community of Kastav/Castua and opened a wine wholesale business there. Only two years later, the local administration in Kastav/Castua tried to find ways to expel Krstić from the community. He represented those who were “Italianized” and called *Šarenjaci*. The competent court in Volosko/Volosca inquired, for the first time in December 1894, at the Volosko/Volosca district about the offences and convictions against Krstić. These were insults to officials, tax fraud in Rijeka and his poor morals.<sup>39</sup> Kastav/Castua was the birthplace of Matko Laginja and priest Vjekoslav Spinčić, both outstanding Croatian national leaders and parliamentarians in Istria. The fact that Krstić criticized these two and insulted them, quickly polarized the east coast of Istria and the Liburnija/Liburnia region. In order to punish Krstić for lies, the Kastav/

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36 There are numerous examples of electoral fraud, ballot buying and related conflicts involving the ‘Italianized’. Here, for example, is a detailed complaint of the Croatian party for the election of the delegates from the rural municipalities for the Reichsrat in the constituency Vodnjan/Dignano on 22.5.1885 with data on involved persons. The demand for cancellation of the election of G. B. De Franceschi was addressed to the House of Representatives. Archivio di Stato di Trieste/Triest/Trst (AST), Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 138/1891, Vodnjan/Dignano, 1.9.1885.

37 Misleadingly, “istarski” or “Istran” (spatial affiliation for people or things originated from the Istrian peninsula) and “istrijanski” or “Istrijani” (political affiliation) are equated in English and have the same name: “Istrian.” The reader has to keep this in mind when reading about the “Istrian movement,” i.e. the political movement of Ivan Krstić. For reasons of differentiation the political “Istrijanstvo” and the corresponding identity are placed in simple quotation marks in the text (‘Istrians’/‘Istrian’).

38 Krstić collaborated with the Italian liberals. He celebrated publicly, for example, together with the mayor of Pula, Lodovico Rizzi, who was elected by the eastern rural communities, and with Felice Bennati, who won in the fifth curia, the immense successes of his or rather Italian-liberal politics in the imperial council elections of 1900/01. What brought Krstić the support of the Italian liberals in particular was his vehement refusal to accept the idea of the Croatian „historical right of statehood“ being extended to Istria. “Victory is assured,” Prava Naša Sloga, 22.12.1900.

39 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901/1901 District in Volosko/Volosca to the court in Volosko/Volosca, 14.2.1895, signed Fabiani.

Castua municipal administration even decided in June 1896 to have its minutes of meetings, decisions etc. printed in the *Naša Sloga* to “prevent the people from being divided by slander and the spread of lies.”<sup>40</sup>

*Naša Sloga* fought the ‘Istrian’ movement with all the means of a newspaper. In addition to the accusing reports and accusing correspondences, the newspaper also published stagings of conversations so that Krstić’s positions were all the more clearly emphasized. It should become clear that Spinčić, in contrast to Krstić, did not rule out a simultaneity of ‘Croatian’ and ‘Slavic.’ In the 1890s, *Naša Sloga* reached all classes and occupational groups due to the growing Slavic middle class and was no longer oriented towards the farmers as in the 1870s. Nevertheless, its language remained simple and the content was characterized by complexity reduction. *Naša Sloga* staged talks, for example, between Ivan Defar and Ivan Krstić, and between the inhabitants of Kršan/Chersano and Rukavac (Šetić, 2005, 102) with the aim of educating the population and winning them over to the national side. In an invented dialogue, *Naša Sloga* let Krstić say that the ‘Istrians’ were Slavs and not Croats (*Naša Sloga*, 25.3.1897).

Krstić apparently enjoyed great influence among the population of Liburnija/Liburnia and in the places along the border of the crownland up to today’s Slovenia.<sup>41</sup> The events before, during and after the 1897 elections, showed to the Imperial Council what uncertainties Krstić’s political work had brought into the stronghold of Croatian nationalism. Krstić held election meetings, e.g. on 21 March 1897 in Matulji/Mattuglie, thus influencing the election to the IV. curia.<sup>42</sup> In March 1897, the municipal administration in Kastav/Castua meticulously persecuted numerous, but in sum rather harmless, disturbances of unrest such as insults and threats to individual politicians and influential national actors and reported them in part to the court and the district team in Volosko/Volosca. Assaults on the part of Krstić’s supporters occurred in particular against some recruits.<sup>43</sup> Elected representatives from the V. curia in Jelšane/Elsane were attacked in March 1897 by Krstić’s supporters in Jušići near Matulji/Mattuglie.<sup>44</sup>

Against it, Krstić’s supporters raised serious reproaches against the “Croats.” These would have threatened the ‘Istrians’ and it led to shootings, in which some ‘Istrians’ were seriously injured.<sup>45</sup> Apparently there were also arrests of Krstić’s supporters, for example, before the elections in Rukavac in February 1897.<sup>46</sup> The municipality leader even ordered the earlier evening closure of the taverns in the

40 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901/1901. Report on the meeting of the municipal council in Kastav/Castua, 4.2.1896 and 23.3.1896. Krstić’s criticism of the conditions of the municipality were not out of the air as the internal minutes of the meeting finally showed.

41 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901/1901 Minutes of the meeting in Kastav/Castua, 26.6.1897.

42 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901/1901 Minutes of the meeting in Kastav/Castua, 26.6.1897.

43 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901/1901 Minutes of the meeting in Kastav/Castua, 26.6.1897.

44 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901/1901 Minutes of the meeting in Kastav/Castua, 26.6.1897.

45 “In a bundle!” Prava *Naša Sloga*, 22.12.1900.

46 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901. Minutes of the meeting in Kastav/Castua, 26.6.1897.




Fig. 1: *Kastav / Castua, 1679*, by Janez Vajkard Valvasor (Wikimedia Commons).

western parts of the Kastav/Castua municipality at 9 p.m. because of the threat to public peace and order, emanating from Krstić’s supporters.<sup>47</sup>

In February 1897, in Matulji/Mattuglie, the followers of Krstić independently elected a new mayor from the ranks of the ‘Istrians’ without the knowledge of the Kastav/Castua community administration.<sup>48</sup> The community administration in Kastav/Castua opposed the election and thus provoked local protests.<sup>49</sup> In the election fever of 1897, Krstić gathered several hundred followers and led this group to Volosko/Volosca accompanied by ‘Krstić’s music.’ When the human train was prevented from entering the city, Krstić led it through the other villages, where he held speeches and let the music play. The music was an expression of the protest against the Catholic Church because these events took place during Lent, when music games were forbidden by the church.<sup>50</sup>

In April 1897, the Kastav/Castua municipal council asked Ivan Krstić to leave the municipality. However, for the district court, Krstić was a regular taxpayer and not allowed to be expelled. Two months later, a special Kastav/Castua municipal committee brought a new decision on the basis of new allegations and asked Krstić for a personal statement. Krstić was alleged to have refused to comment.

47 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901. Report on the meeting of the municipal council in Kastav/Castua, 20.3.1897; *ibid.*, Minutes of the municipal council meeting in Kastav/Castua, 26.6.1897.

48 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901 Minutes of the meeting in Kastav/Castua, 26.6.1897.

49 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901 Report on the meeting of the municipal council in Kastav/Castua, 20.3.1897; *Ibid.* Minutes of the community meeting in Kastav/Castua, 26.6.1897.

50 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901 Minutes of the meeting in Kastav/Castua, 26.6.1897.

In any case, the head of the municipality even reported this to the Ministry of the Interior in Vienna.<sup>51</sup>

By a decision of 26 June 1897, the Kastav/Castua municipal committee brought new evidence of Krstić's immorality and again requested the expulsion of Ivan Krstić from the district administration in Volosko/Volosca.<sup>52</sup> Krstić had founded his own newspaper in 1896, the *Prava Naša Sloga* (Our True Unity), which mocked the nationalist *Naša Sloga* (Our Unity) and not only with its "unmistakable" name. Krstić also denounced some municipality council members for corruption, which made him a prime enemy of the emerging national order at the local and regional levels.<sup>53</sup>

A detailed summary, prepared by the municipal committee, showed a very active opposition role of Krstić towards the Croatian nationalists. He was very critical of the Croatian political actors in the municipality and the district. Employment, wages, dismissals, waste of community revenue, community donations, debt relief, "scandalous" election financing and secret disbursements to prominent national leaders were among the contents of his criticism.<sup>54</sup> He succeeded in getting the parliamentary committee in Poreč/Parenzo to take a close look at the municipality council in Kastav/Castua. In the *Prava Naša Sloga* he accused the deputy Spinčić of incitement of the people because he forced them to become Croats.<sup>55</sup> The local administration of Kastav/Castua was regularly put on the defensive because of the *Prava Naša Sloga*. Krstić's accusations were exaggerated but in the matter he touched on the realities of a community on the nationalism course, whose representatives mobilized and tried to find resources.<sup>56</sup>

51 Convolute on the litigation in the case Krstić against Kastav/Castua and Volosko/Volosca between 1896 and 1901 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901, here municipal administration Kastav/Castua to the Ministry of the Interior, 1.12.1897 or *ibid.*, municipal representation in Kastav/Castua to the district council in Volosko/Volosca, signed. Jelušić, 17.10.1901.

52 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901 Minutes of the meeting of the municipal committee of Kastav/Castua, 26.6.1897; *ibid.*, municipal administration of Kastav/Castua to the Ministry of the Interior, 1.12.1897. The municipal committee included the chairman Kazimir Jelušić, Mate Kundić, Anton Lučić Garsoni, Luka Medvedić, Frane Monjac, Mate Trinajstić, Vinko Blečić, Ljudevit Sušanj, Josip Afrić and Vjekoslav Kinkela. Vinko Marjanović took the minutes. It was said that Krstić insulted Frane Ferlan, Ludoviko Jelušić and some others. AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901 Minutes of the meeting in Kastav/Castua, 26.6.1897; *Ibid.* Kastav/Castua municipal administration to the Ministry of the Interior, 1.12.1897.

53 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901 Minutes of the meeting in Kastav/Castua, 26.6.1897.

54 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901 Minutes of the Kastav/Castua municipal meeting, 26.6.1897. In the eleventh edition of *Prava Naša Sloga*, Krstić criticized a payment made by a municipality populated by Istro-Romanians to the lawyer Dr. Stanger. Unfortunately, the community meeting made no note of any further details.

55 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901 Minutes of the meeting in Kastav/Castua, 26.6.1897. The twelfth edition of *Prava Naša Sloga* was quoted here; *Ibid.* Report on the meeting of the municipal council in Kastav/Castua, 29.9.1896.

56 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901. In fact, the municipality books of Kastav/Castua, including minutes of the meetings of the community committees, inventories and above all the financial books, had not been kept properly since 1894. Some officials and municipal officials therefore were accused of serious misconduct by Krstić.

The Croatian nationalists tried to stop Krstić’s growing influence among the population, in vain. Croatian parliamentarians, such as Spinčić, urged the district council in Volosko/Volosca and apparently also the governor in Trieste/Triest/Trst, Teodoro de Rinaldini (1890–1897), against Krstić.<sup>57</sup> The district team in Volosko/Volosca rejected many applications of the Kastav/Castua municipality for the deportation of Ivan Krstić, several times.<sup>58</sup> The head of the Kastav/Castua municipality, Jelušić, repeatedly informed the Ministry of the Interior in Vienna and the governor’s office in Trieste/Triest/Trst. The reception note in Vienna was that Dr. Krstić was considered an “Italian agitator.”<sup>59</sup>

On 15 August 1898, Krstić tried to convene a People’s Assembly of the *Narodno-istarska stranka*<sup>60</sup> (Istrian People’s Party) in Matulji/Mattuglie. This nascent party explicitly addressed all classes, especially peasants and workers. The party leader of the Slovenian socialist party, Etbin Kristan,<sup>61</sup> was to take part in the meeting but there is no evidence that he actually did.<sup>62</sup> The district administration had approved the event subject to conditions, but apparently the police banned it in the last hours before it was due to begin. Since there had been no time for the cancellation before, the people had already gathered. The number of people present amounted to several thousands and probably exceeded the expectations of the police, so that they began to block access to the venue. The gathered people refused to leave the square without a corresponding appeal from Krstić, which the latter did not want to make. Although the assembly had failed, it had mobilized thousands of people for the ‘Istrian’ movement.<sup>63</sup>

On 19 September 1901, the governor’s office in Trieste/Triest/Trst again rejected the appointment of the Kastav/Castua municipal council.<sup>64</sup> On 1 October 1901 however, the Ministry of the Interior asked the governor in Trieste/Triest/

57 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901 Minutes of the Kastav/Castua municipal meeting with reference to the 13th edition of *Prava Naša Sloga*, 26.6.1897.

58 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901. District team in Volosko/Volosca to the municipal administration in Kastav/Castua concerning rejection of the opposition, 16.11.1897; Ibid. Municipal head in Kastav/Castua, Jelušić, to the governor’s office in Trieste/Triest/Trst, 26.8.1898.

59 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901 Kastav/Castua municipal administration to the Ministry of the Interior, 1.12.1897; ibid. Minutes of the meeting in Kastav/Castua, 19.8.1898.

60 In the tabular overview of the election results in the general electoral class for Istria in 1901 the governor’s office in Trieste/Triest/Trst noted that there was an “Istrian party of Dr. Krstić” in the political district of Volosco. AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901, 1/2, 4 Election results in the general electoral class for Istria 1901; It was also said that it was “remarkable” that in the “municipalities of Moschienizze (6 electors) and Veprinaz (4 electors) and in Rukavaz (6 electors) in the municipality of Kastua, the Slavic-Italian and Istrian-Italian Party won”. Afterwards, the reference was added that the party of Dr. Krstić was linked to the Italian party. Ibid., Election results in the electoral class of the rural communities in 1901.

61 The Slovenian socialists even supported the Italian liberals in Istria in some cases. The support for Krstić should be seen in the context of flexible and opportune political cooperation. For more information on socialism in Istria and Etbin Kristan’s concept of nationality, see Cataruzza, 2011, e.g. 72–85.

62 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901 Minutes of the meeting in Kastav/Castua, 19.8.1898.

63 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901 Minutes of the meeting in Kastav/Castua, 19.8.1898.

64 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901 Minutes of the local meeting Kastav/Castua, 9.10.1901; ibid., 213 commemorative bitface to the governor in Trieste/Triest/Trst, 24.10.1899.

Trst to immediately give a “report on the matter of the interpellation of the deputies, Dr Ferri and comrades, concerning an expulsion from the municipality of Castua to the Ministry of the Interior.”<sup>65</sup> Meanwhile, on 17 October 1901, the local administration of Kastav/Castua again complained that the district council in Volosko/Volosca had been delaying the clarification of the case for three years. The Kastav municipality demanded that the Ministry of the Interior intervene in the proceedings. Articles from the newspaper *Prava Naša Sloga* would prove the moral distortions of Krstić and its harmful influence on public order in the community, it was said. Krstić would operate no trade and then there would be no legal basis for his remaining in the municipality.<sup>66</sup> Finally, on 29 November 1901, the Ministry of the Interior rejected the recourse and the expulsion of Krstić.<sup>67</sup>

The political work of Ivan Krstić was strongly connected to socioeconomic conflicts of the region. Since 1896, the local representatives of Kastav/Castua had urged the governor in Trieste/Triest/Trst against the division of the municipality.<sup>68</sup> At the center of the dispute was the Lužina municipal forest, over which the inhabitants of Breza/Bresa claimed ownership.<sup>69</sup> In other places, where solidarity had been established, such as Bregi/Breghi, Rukavac/Ruccavazzo and Kučeli/Cuceli, which also claimed municipal property, unrest broke out in the spring of 1897, which led to the deposition of the mayors there, by the municipal administration in Kastav/Castua.<sup>70</sup> Krstić was one of those who strongly interfered with the plans for the division of the community.<sup>71</sup> The dispute over Lužina reached all political and judicial instances between Kastav/Castua and Trieste/Triest/Trst and even the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Finance in Vienna in 1896.<sup>72</sup> The Istrian parliament finally decided on the division of the municipality, and the municipal representatives from Kastav/Castua were again on the defensive. Not only could they not achieve Krstić’s expulsion, but economically important community territories threatened to split off.

65 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901 Letter from the Ministry of the Interior to the Trieste/Triest/Trst Governor, 1.10.1901.

66 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901 Local government in Kastav/Castua to the district team in Volosko/Volosca, 17.10.1901.

67 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901 Letter from the Ministry of the Interior to the Trieste/Triest/Trst governor, 29.11.1901.

68 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 213/1899 Commemorative bitface to the governor in Trieste/Triest/Trst, 24.10.1899.

69 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901 Report on the meeting of the municipal council in Kastav/Castua, 29.9.1896 and 1.–2.12.1896.

70 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901 Minutes of the Kastav/Castua municipal meeting, 26.6.1897; ibid., Report of the Kastav/Castua municipal meeting, 1.–2.12.1896 and 20.3.1897.

71 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901 Minutes of the meeting in Kastav/Castua, 26.6.1897; In issues 24 and 29 of *Prava Naša Sloga*, Krstić encouraged the residents to stand up for the division of the municipality.

72 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901 Minutes of the meeting in Kastav/Castua, 26.6.1897. The plaintiff Fran Matetić from Breza/Bresa was also mentioned in this context.

In July 1899, the Kastav/Castua municipal representatives sent a memorandum to the Ministry of the Interior in Vienna with the wish that the law on the division of the Kastav/Castua municipality, passed by the Istrian parliament, should not be submitted to the highest body for signature. The division had already been striven for by the Italians for twenty years and recently also by other enemies, it said.<sup>73</sup> In fact, as early as 1875, some places refused to pay the fees for the use of the forest they considered their property.<sup>74</sup>

### THE ISTRIJANI

Ivan Krstić managed to gain political influence in East Istria around the turn of the century. The Croatian nationalists suspected that the district leader in Volosko/Volosca and the governor in Trieste/Triest/Trst were protecting Krstić but they could not prove that.<sup>75</sup> Despite all complaints, Krstić remained in Kastav/Castua and expanded his oppositional work. The ‘Istrians’ already had imagined Istria as an antinationalistic regional entity within the imperial order and rejected the new policy of the supporters of the Croatian Party of Rights. The protagonists of the ‘Istrian’ movement continued to express their loyalty to the Crown and explicitly described themselves as “Istrian Slavs.”<sup>76</sup>

*Oh! Jesus [...] Following your teaching, we will take care of our concerns and respect the foreign, love our neighbors as ourselves, live in peace and have love for everyone, remaining what we have been, true Istrian Slavs!*<sup>77</sup>

The ‘Istrian’ program of Krstić was inclusive. He respected the confession of each individual as a Croat but – in contrast to Spinčić and Laginja – did not want any union with Croatia. Istrian Slavs and Croats enjoyed more freedom than Croats in the Kingdom of Croatia, he stressed. In contrast to Croatia, they founded reading houses in Istria, sang Croatian national songs and printed their national press.<sup>78</sup> “Istrian suffering does not become Croatian bread,” headlined *Prava Naša Sloga*, to emphasize that Istrian social problems would not be solved by joining Croatia.<sup>79</sup> The focus of Krstić’s work was on regional affiliation and a re-ordering of Istria in the sense of a return to old circumstances thirty years ago, when, as he said, the population lived together peacefully.<sup>80</sup>

73 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 213/1899 Commemorative bitface to the governor in Trieste/Triest/Trst, 24.10.1899.

74 “Kastav/Castua municipal property,” *Naša Sloga*, 16.1.1875.

75 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901 Minutes of the meeting in Kastav/Castua, 19.8.1898.

76 AST, Luogotenenza, Atti presidiali 236/1901 Minutes of the meeting in Kastav/Castua, 26.6.1897.

77 “Confiscated!” *Prava Naša Sloga*, 22.12.1900.

78 “Istrian suffering does not become Croatian bread,” *Prava Naša Sloga*, 22.12.1900.

79 “Istrian suffering does not become Croatian bread,” *Prava Naša Sloga*, 22.12.1900.

80 “In a bundle!” *Prava Naša Sloga*, 22.12.1900.

Not the faith, but the clergy and the Roman Catholic Church were the targets of his attack.<sup>81</sup> Many of the leading Croatian nationalists were priests. Thirty years ago in Istria, there was no knowledge about the unfortunate Croatian politics of priests and others, he wrote.<sup>82</sup>

*Seriously brothers, this was a great incomparable time when the world’s savior was born, without differences in nationality and without differences in names! We who grew up yesterday, oh how sweet and happy we remember the distant days of our childhood and innocent happiness! [...] At that time it was not thought of what nationality the people were, but it was sung for peace for all people! And today?<sup>83</sup>*

In the pre-Christmas period of 1900, Krstić put the prehistory of multicultural Istria, now created as such by imperial and nationalistic policies, into the focus of his work. Since 1880, population surveys have favored the further consolidation of national identities on the basis of colloquial languages and have reduced the “spaces in-between” so vehemently defended by Krstić. Krstić criticized the colloquial language surveys, for example, citing the Christmas story, when he compared the journey of Mary and Joseph to Bethlehem in order to “fulfil the general duty of population survey” (*podlože obćenitoj dužnosti popiševanja pučanstva*) with the current situation in Istria.<sup>84</sup>

The Reich Council elections of 1900/01 again caused confrontations between Krstić and the nationalists. Laginja and Spinčić sowed hatred among the population, so did Krstić (*Prava Naša Sloga*, 22.12.1900). As in previous elections since the 1870s, the national *Naša Sloga* threatened to expose voters, who did not vote for Croats.<sup>85</sup> The Croats fought “for naked existence, for existence or non-existence,” according to Spinčić.<sup>86</sup> At the last elections of the Reich Council in Cisleithania, according to the various curia, the supporters of Krstić achieved a huge success while Matko Laginja lost his seat in the Reich Council (Klaić, 2014, 38). The victory against the Croats in Istria was secured, it was said in the *Prava Naša Sloga*.<sup>87</sup> Krstić supported the Italian liberals in protest against the Croatization of Istria referring to the Croats’ own regional and Slavic identity in Istria.

81 “Christmas!” *Prava Naša Sloga*, 22.12.1900.

82 “In a bundle!” *Prava Naša Sloga*, 22.12.1900.

83 “Christmas!” *Prava Naša Sloga*, 22.12.1900.

84 “Christmas!” *Prava Naša Sloga*, 22.12.1900.

85 “In a bundle!” *Prava Naša Sloga*, 22.12.1900.

86 “Istrian suffering does not become Croatian bread,” *Prava Naša Sloga*, 22.12.1900.

87 “Victory is assured,” *Prava Naša Sloga*, 22.12.1900; As in 1891, the Croatian-Slovenian People’s Party lost its mandate in the curia of the rural communities of western Istria. In the east of Istria, Spinčić was able to win the mandate of the rural communities. The Croatian-Slovenian People’s Party suffered a defeat with only one place won, while the Italian liberals won four out of five places for the Imperial Council, especially through the votes of the ‘Istrians.’

*I am a Slav, I will remain a Slav, and I will die with the Istrians! My heart is filled with joy precisely for me as the representative of Liburnia, because I know that I have contributed to the beautiful and lovely Liburnia saving the honourable name of our mother, Istria.<sup>88</sup>*

In response to Krstić’s agitation, between 1900 and 1904, the political journal *Narodni List* (People’s Gazette) was published in Opatija, specially set up to combat the ‘Istrians’. The newspaper published in Volosko/Volosca, first by Ivan Poščić and then by Viktor Car Emin, was intended to create a balance between the ‘Istrian’ movement and the Croatian nationalists.<sup>89</sup> A total of 42 issues were published up to October 1904.

The Istrian idea of Ivan Krstić, did not tolerate any *diferenci nacijona*. It was an offer to “all those born in Istria, regardless of nationality.”<sup>90</sup> He imagined the regional ‘Istrian’ order as a unity of Italians, Slavs and all others born in Istria. He drew a sharp line between the ‘Istrians,’ who spoke Italian, came from Istria and were true Austrians, and between the national Italians. After the Triple Alliance from 1882, between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy, the Italian prime minister Crispi dissolved the irredentist association *Associazione pro l’Italia Irredenta* and diminished the Italian irredentism in Istria. From Krstić’s point of view, there was no danger on the part of the liberal Istrian Italians, well aware of the work of the legal *Lega Nazionale*, an association that clearly promoted Italian national interests at the expense of the Slavic in Istria. He said that the ‘Istrian’ Italians in Pula defended Istria from the Italian attacks from Italy and were loyal to the monarchy.<sup>91</sup> He also drew historical evidence of Croatia’s hostility towards Austria.<sup>92</sup>

In general, Krstić’s loyalty to the crown was the anchor of his ‘Istrian’ policy, which explicitly advocated a return to the old Istrian order as it existed before 1870.<sup>93</sup> The ‘Istrian’ policy served as a bridge to restore peace between the Slavs and Italians. The policy of the ‘Istrians’ is for the “holy Austrian cause” because “our party is not Italian, but national Istrian.”<sup>94</sup>

The Istrian Italians supported Ivan Krstić because he met their ideas about a hybrid and dispersed Slavic and negated a Croatian or Slovenian nation on the Istrian peninsula. The Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Finance in Vienna were informed about the confrontations of the national Croats, Italians and ‘Istrians’ in Liburnija/Liburnia and at the level of the crownland and apparently

88 “Victory is assured,” *Prava Naša Sloga*, 22.12.1900.

89 “In a bundle,” *Prava Naša Sloga*, 22.12.1900. The *Narodni List*, written in the popular Chakavian (*Čakavski*) dialect, gathered the above-mentioned publishers as well as R. Katalanić Jeretov, V. Nazor, E. Kumičić, M. Nikolić, V. Rubeša and J. Hranilović. Krstić called it a “stinky paper” which is meaningless and only writes about him.

90 “In a bundle!” *Prava Naša Sloga*, 22.12.1900.

91 “In a bundle!” *Prava Naša Sloga*, 22.12.1900.

92 “In a bundle!” *Prava Naša Sloga*, 22.12.1900.

93 “Istrian suffering does not become Croatian bread,” *Prava Naša Sloga*, 22.12.1900.

94 Letter by Nino Percich Rožin, Volosko/Volosca, 16.12.1900, *Prava Naša Sloga*, 22.12.1900.

took the side of the Italian liberals and Krstić. The national actors of the Croats and Slovenes, who clearly articulated their wishes for the unification of Istria with other Slavic countries in the 1890s,<sup>95</sup> could hardly hope for support in Vienna. With the introduction of direct elections and the abolition of the right to vote in curia, the Croatian-Slovenian People’s Party was finally able to assert itself in 1907 in Istria with a victory over the Italians (Šetić, 2005, 72–74). The ‘Istrian’ movement was neutralized with the death of its protagonist. Ivan Krstić died under unexplained circumstances, probably in 1906, in a mental hospital in Rijeka (Šetić, 2005, 51, 69, 72, 102, 425).<sup>96</sup> The ideas of Ivan Krstić did not expire with his death but for a while influenced the local conflicts and political strategies in Eastern Istria.<sup>97</sup>

Krstić stood for a regional order and can be compared with the Dalmatian, Dubrovnik, Rijeka/Fiume and Trieste/Triest/Trst regionalists. Josip Vrandečić notes for these regional movements that between the rejection of Austrian centralism and Croatian “annexationism” the “love for an idealized Italy” arose and was embodied in the regional currents (Vrandečić, 2003, 81). The regionalists of these regions came from a bourgeois environment of the Mediterranean type, which cultivated the concept of cities as self-governing units in the struggle for independence against other states (Vrandečić, 2003, 69).

Krstić’s regionalism was preceded by the Italian-Istrian regionalism. Some Italian intellectuals had demanded an autonomous Trieste/Triest/Trst around the middle of the century. The historian, archaeologist and lawyer Pietro Kandler (1804–1872) advocated an autonomy for Trieste/Triest/Trst within the Habsburg Monarchy, which is why he was also opposed by irredentist circles. He gathered regionalists and autonomists around his magazine, *L’Istria* (1845–1852), and thus was undoubtedly a pioneer of the regionalist currents in the 19<sup>th</sup> century there (Bertoša, 1985, 110–113). Kandler stood like no other for a “moderate antislav” and (isolated from his colleagues) advocate of the free development of “Slavic culture” (Bertoša, 1985, 105–107, 158–160). The Croatian nationalists observed these ideas, never developing sympathies for possible slavophile statements of the Italians. This was also the case when the newspaper *Il Cittadino*, published in Trieste/Triest/Trst under the editorship of an Istrian Italian in 1874, spoke out in favor of Italian-Slavic cooperation and common opposition to the sons of other countries that took advantage of their dispute.<sup>98</sup>

95 E.g. «Association,» *Naša Sloga*, 10.3.1898.

96 Only a few authors have considered Ivan Krstić and referred their interpretations of the events in Liburnija/Liburnia only to the articles of *Naša Sloga*. Ideological premises of his politics remained in the dark. No sources were cited on the circumstances of his death either. E.g. Trogrlić, Stipan: “Istrijanski pokret” Ivana Krstića [The “Istrian Movement” of Ivan Krstić]. In: *Istarska danica*, 2003, 156–159.

97 HR-DAR-26, 2/10 the head of the municipality of Zamet, Rubeša, to the mayor of Kastav, Zamet, 22.10.1906. In this case, for example, it was about the construction or extension of the church of the Holy Cross (*Sv. Križ*); HR-DAR-26, 4/35 from the report on the meeting of the municipal council Kastav of 11.6.1900 it becomes clear that Krstić was involved in the case.

98 Letters from Pazin/Pisino/Mitterburg, *Naša Sloga*, 16.12.1874.

It can be assumed that regionalism for Krstić was, similar to Kandler, a logical continuation of monarchical politics. The historical right of statehood of the individual countries represented by the Vienna Imperial Council, which was even granted a certain degree of sovereignty, was indeed in tension with imperial centralism. However, it was precisely in strengthening the regions with their parliaments that one hoped for the containment of nationalism and supra-regional national networking (Vrandečić, 2003, 78). From 1861, the constitution provided for a federalism with the subjectivity and legitimacy of the individual countries which was also rooted in the politics of the bourgeois and national movements (Vrandečić, 2003, 78–79). The regional and autonomous currents on the Adriatic Sea, emerged in the footsteps of Austrian classicism during the Metternich restoration and referred to centuries-old municipalism with the Habsburgs and ancient Mediterranean Rome. Their emphatically a-national, multicultural and conservative world of ideas was based on the Habsburg sympathies for the legacy of the Holy Roman Empire. As a supranational and integrative power understood in this way, the monarchy was increasingly shaken after the revolution (Vrandečić, 2003, 79). The ancient Mediterranean heritage scared off the actors of the national revival; politically only small currents remained loyal to it.

Nikola Tommaseo's Dalmatian regionalism, which presumptively served as a model for the 'Istrian' movement, also stood for better relations with Vienna as the guarantor of independence from Croatia (Vrandečić, 2003, 81). Tommaseo's policy was based on the assumption of an ethnic-cultural Slavo-Dalmatianism (*slavo-dalmatinstvo*), which was founded on the *convivenza* and continued throughout the country (Vrandečić, 2003, 72, 75).<sup>99</sup>

## CONCLUSION

The article illustrated the emergence of diversity and hybridity discourses about Istria - first in the imperial centers around the mid of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and second in local Istria from the 1870s. It proceeds from the concept of hybridity used in early Austrian ethnography in relation to Istria, a source concept that alludes to the complexity of socio-cultural conditions. In the article, the term "hybrids" was used to describe those people, who stood outside the emerging linguistic, cultural, political and ethnic categories and were perceived as such by their contemporaries. The text is mainly focused on the Croatian-Istrian perspective. In the 1870s, the Croatian national actors established a narrative about the Istrian hybridity as a threat to the Istrian order, which was considered as based on equal cultural rights promoted by the government. They invented the term "Šarenjaci" to blame and defame those who were nationally indifferent, somehow culturally "mixed," assimilated or opportunistic people. Through the observation of various negotiations on hybridity by local Croatian national actors, so in the

99 In Rijeka, autonomism was pro-Hungarian until the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

newspaper “*Naša Sloga*,” the article showed how hybridity was extremely rooted in political ideas and strategies. The awareness of diversity and hybridity of the Istrian population seemed to produce inclusivistic, and not exclusivistic, political strategies. Thus, the actors used the concept of hybridism to describe social reality and, on the other hand, as one of the leading principles to express their political visions. The reflections of the politicians, experts and intellectuals on hybridity revealed several imaginations and visions of the Istrian order: Istria as an order of cultural equality, as a regional entity, as a South Slavic order or as part of an autonomous national Croatia. The threat discourse on hybridity serves here as a lens through which Istrian realities and policies can be analyzed. The essay could show, to some extent, that the national movement of Croats in Istria was generally a hybrid and inclusive movement.

The article also highlighted an interesting phenomenon of the mobilization of anti-nationalistic individuals in the eastern parts of Istria. It is very impressive that the practical dimension of hybridity can be studied here. Scientific categories create identities and groups, and these people can become active actors. The ‘Istrian’ movement brought together “hybrid” Istrians and enabled them to exert political influence at local and regional level. With an extremely active local commitment and their own newspaper, the ‘Istrians’ unsettled the Croatian national actors and repeatedly urged them to reflect on the Istrian order. The ideological roots of ‘Istrian’ politics probably lay in the regionalist tendencies of the bordering regions, but they will have to be examined comprehensively in future studies. In addition, the Istrian example shows an extremely active negotiation of affiliations at the local level. Here, the ‘illiterate’ and “unlettered” peasant population, excluded by the Austrian and Italian elites merely as “historically dispossessed masses,” did indeed take part in the negotiation of their identity. This points to specific constellations of power “from below”. Local actors from Istria’s peasant and small-town milieu conducted fierce negotiations on hybridity with their own order reflections and strategies from the 1870s onwards.

## »HIBRIDI« IN REORGANIZACIJA ISTRE, 1870–1914

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## POVZETEK

Članek prikazuje pojav raznolikosti in hibridnih diskurzov o Istri – najprej v cesarskih središčih sredi 19. stoletja in nato v lokalni Istri v 1870-ih. Izhaja iz koncepta hibridnosti, ki je bil v zgodnji avstrijski etnografiji uporabljen pri obravnavi Istre, izvornega koncepta, ki aludira na kompleksnost družbeno-kulturnih razmer. V članku je izraz »hibridi« uporabljen za označevanje tistih ljudi, ki so živelji zunaj nastajajočih jezikovnih, kulturnih, političnih in etničnih kategorij in so jih kot take dojemali njihovi sodobniki. Besedilo se osredotoča predvsem na hrvaško-istrsko perspektivo. V 1870-ih so hrvaški nacionalni akterji vzpostavili naracijo o istrski hibridnosti kot grožnji istrskemu redu, za katerega je veljalo, da temelji na enakih kulturnih pravicah, ki jih spodbuja vlada. Izumili so izraz „Šarenjaci“, da bi krivili in obrekovali tiste, ki so bili narodno indiferentni, nekako kulturno „mešani“, asimilirani ali oportunistični posamezniki. Članek je z opazovanjem različnih pogajanj o hibridnosti lokalnih hrvaških akterjev, tudi v časopisih, kot je Naša Sloga, pokazal, kako je bila hibridnost izjemno zakorenjena v političnih idejah in strategijah. Ob zavedanju raznolikosti in hibridnosti istrskega prebivalstva se je zdelo, da ustvarjajo vključujoče in ne izključujoče politične strategije. Zato so akterji uporabili koncept hibridnosti, da bi opisali družbeno resničnost, in ga, po drugi strani, uporabili kot eno od vodilnih načel za izražanje svojih političnih vizij. Refleksije politikov, strokovnjakov in intelektualcev o hibridnosti so razkrile več imaginarijev in vizij istrskega reda: Istra kot red kulturne enakosti, kot regionalna entiteta, kot južnoslovanski red ali kot del avtonomne nacionalne Hrvaške. Grožnja diskurza o hibridnosti tu služi kot prizma, skozi katero je mogoče analizirati istrske realnosti in politike. Članek bi lahko do neke mere pokazal, da je bilo nacionalno gibanje Hrvatov v Istri na splošno hibridno in vključujoče gibanje. Članek je izpostavil tudi zanimiv pojav mobilizacije protinacionalističnih posameznikov v vzhodnih delih Istre. Zelo impresivno je, da lahko tukaj preučimo praktično dimenzijo hibridnosti. Znanstvene kategorije ustvarjajo identitete in skupine in ti ljudje lahko postanejo aktivni akterji. „Istrijansko“ gibanje je združilo „hibridne“ Istrijane in jim omogočilo politični vpliv na lokalni in regionalni ravni. Z izredno dejavno lokalno zavzetostjo in lastnim časopisom so „Istrijani“ vznemirili hrvaške nacionalne akterje in jih večkrat pozvali, naj razmisljijo o istrskem redu. Ideološke korenine „istrijanske“ politike verjetno ležijo v regionalističnih težnjah obmejnih regij, vendar jih bo treba v prihodnjih študijah še temeljito preučiti. Poleg tega istrski primer kaže na izredno aktivno pogajanje o pripadnostih na lokalni ravni. Tu je „nepismeno“

*kmečko prebivalstvo, ki ga avstrijska in italijanska elita označujeta za „ljudstvo brez zgodovine“, dejansko sodelovalo pri pogajanjih o svoji identiteti. To kaže na specifična razmerja moči „od spodaj“. Lokalni akterji iz istrskega kmečkega in mestnega okolja so od 1870 dalje nadaljevali z ostrimi pogajanji o hibridnosti z lastnimi razmisleki in strategijami.*

*Ključne besede: hibridnost, Istra, Kastav/Kastua, nacionalizem, regionalizem, indiferenčnost, ogroženi red, asimilacija*

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## A MIXTURE WITHOUT MIXING: FEARS OF LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL HYBRIDITY IN THE SLOVENIAN-ITALIAN BORDERLAND

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### *ABSTRACT*

*This article explores the recent trend of avoiding the terminology of “mixing” and “mixture” and accordingly replacing it with the term prepletanje (“interweaving”) in current Slovenian social scientific literature as well as in public language use. The avoidance is especially remarkable in the Slovenian-Italian borderland where the studies of linguistic and cultural contact, of bilingualism and multiculturalism are flourishing on both sides of the state border, in particular among the ethnic Slovenians from the Adriatic coast. The paper brings forward evidence of the systematic “mixophobic” nature of this rejection of the terminology and imagery of mixing and hybridization, replacing it with the notion of linguistic and cultural interaction in which interwoven strands can always be separated again, if necessary.*

*Keywords:* mixtures (linguistic and cultural), interweaving (linguistic and cultural), hybridity, mixing, Italian-Slovenian borderland

## UNA MESCOLANZA NON MESCOLATA: PAURE DELL'IBRIDISMO LINGUISTICO E CULTURALE AL CONFINE ITALO-SLOVENO

### *SINTESI*

*L'articolo prende in analisi l'attuale tendenza ad evitare la terminologia relativa alla “mescolanza” sia nella letteratura delle scienze sociali che nel linguaggio pubblico di lingua slovena. Questa terminologia viene rimpiazzata, piuttosto, con il termine prepletanje (“intreccio”). Ciò concerne soprattutto la zona del confine italo-sloveno, dove, da entrambi i lati (in particolare tra gli sloveni del litorale adriatico), prosperano studi sui contatti linguistici e culturali, sul bilinguismo e multiculturalismo. L'articolo porta degli esempi della “fobia della mescolanza”, che sistematicamente rigetta la terminologia e l'immaginario della mescolanza e dell'ibridizzazione. Al massimo,*

*la rimpiazza con la nozione di interazione linguistico-culturale, grazie alle quale gli elementi intrecciati posso pur sempre essere disgiunti nuovamente, qualora necessario.*

*Parole chiave: mescolanze (linguistiche e culturali), intrecci (linguistici e culturali), ibridismo, confine italo-sloveno*

## INTRODUCTION

In this article I explore the tendency of avoiding the terms “mixing” and “mixture” in current Slovenian scholarly literature dealing with linguistic and cultural interactions of the type commonly described as mixing. This avoidance is especially remarkable in Western Slovenia, or more precisely, in the Slovenian-Italian borderland where the studies of linguistic and cultural contact, of bilingualism and multiculturalism are flourishing on the both sides of the state border, in particular among the ethnic Slovenians from the Adriatic coast, on the Slovenian as well as on Italian side.

*Mešanje* and *mešanica*, “mixing” and “mixture,” is being overwhelmingly replaced by the gerund *prepletanje* (“interweaving” or “intertwining”) and the noun *preplet* (the result of such action). This replacement has generally occurred since the independence of Slovenia in 1991. What is perhaps especially striking is the fact that it has taken place in a rather discreet manner, under the radar, as it were. I could not find any trace of scholarly discussion regarding the relative value or use of the metaphors of mixing and interweaving, not to mention an argument in favor of introducing the term interweaving.<sup>1</sup> How the consensus – or just the habit – of using “prepletanje” instead of “mešanje” managed to establish itself with such success is outside the scope of this essay. Surveys of the metaphors and terms for linguistic and cultural mixtures used in relevant Western literature seldom include “interweaving.” Anthropologist Melville Herskovits, for example, who had made great use of a wide range of the metaphors of linguistic and cultural interaction, is a rare exception but he referred to interweaving in only one of his works (Baron, 2003).<sup>2</sup> Other recent Western overviews of the relevant literature do not register its usage at all (e.g., Stewart, 2007; Burke, 2009).<sup>3</sup>

This frequent use of the *preplet-* metaphor may certainly be surprising in an age that is celebrating mixtures, hybridity, fusions and syncretisms. What makes

- 1 By contrast, this does not apply to those scholars who prefer to use “usual” metaphors for interacting. An excellent case in point is the discussion of the notions of hybridity, mixture, translation, collage, *métissage*, creolization, transculturation and several others by the group of sociologists and anthropologists working on migrant and borderland identities (Sedmak & Zadel, 2015; Milharčič-Hladnik, 2015; Jurić Pahor, 2015; Janko Spreizer, 2015).
- 2 Herskovits claimed that it is necessary to sort our African threads amidst a mess of yarn. Elsewhere in his writings about African Americans in the United States, he indicated that the European sources (or “threads,” if you will) are more prominent and easier to identify. The metaphor of rewoven threads apparently represents an interweaving of European and African cultural elements, through acculturative processes, for which “mechanisms” must be adduced (Baron, 2003, 107–108).
- 3 The sociolinguistic notion of *intertwined* languages as a very special and rare case of *mixed* languages, introduced by Bakker (1997), is rather idiosyncratic in its terminology and therefore not suitable for our purpose: “*I call this process language intertwining. Basically this is the combination of the grammatical system (phonology, morphology, syntax) of one language with the lexicon of another. Intertwined languages are genetically related to two languages and therefore they do not fit into the family tree model.*” (Bakker, 1997, 203).



Fig. 1: The linguist Hugo von Schuchardt, 1842–1927 (Wikimedia Commons).

“together”) is not metaphorized in Slovene (and for this reason I will consistently use “interweaving”). Both strands, the one originating from *plectere* and the other from *texere*, adequately translate as *plesti*, *(pre)pletati*, *preplet*.

The avoidance of the terminology of mixing and mixtures is not equally systematic in all relevant disciplinary fields. The two fields that are arguably (see the methodological remark below) most affected by the frequent usage of the *prepletanje* terminology, seem to be the (socio)linguistic studies of contact languages in the Western Slovenian borderland and the Slovene Studies (*slovenistika*) in general. When it comes to “interweaving of cultures,” also ethnology and folkloristics come in the foreground although most visibly on their margins where the discipline in question is morphing to its applied, didactic and divulgated forms.

The conspicuous preference for the *prepletanje* terminology in the Western Slovenian borderland might give the impression that this is a straightforward Italian import. As a matter of fact, the popular notion of *intreccio*, ‘interweaving,’ in Italy is very similar to the Slovene *preplet(anje)*.<sup>4</sup> *Intreccio di lingue e culture* and *prepletanje jezikov in kultur*, “interweaving of languages and cultures,” is a revered formula in both language communities. (By contrast, the French equivalent “l’entrelacement des langues et des cultures,” as well

*preplet* and *prepletanje* so different from all of these is that the components (perhaps best imagined as strands), interwoven or intertwined in the *preplet*, do not blend, do not fuse, do not dissolve: they retain their previous separate identity. The Slovene verb *plesti*, “to weave, to braid, to ply,” has its origin in the IE \**plek-*, similar to the Greek *plékein*, Latin *plecto*, *plectere*, English *plait*, German *flechten*, Albanian *plectō* and so forth.

There is another verb in Slovene that translates into English as “to weave” and into German as “weben” and that is *tkati* with its link to the Latin *texere*. The result of the action is *textile* (noun), “fabric, cloth”: *tkanina* and *tkivo* in Slovene. The meanings of *textus* (noun) are similar. The English distinction between interweaving and intertwining does not really apply in Slovene since the focal meaning of intertwining (“firmly bind the strands together”) is not metaphorized in Slovene (and for this reason I will consistently use “interweaving”). Both strands, the one originating from *plectere* and the other from *texere*, adequately translate as *plesti*, *(pre)pletati*, *preplet*.

4 I am grateful to the Italianist scholar Martina Ožbot Currie for turning my attention to the *intreccio* metaphor.

as “l’enchevêtrement des langues et des cultures,” is a rare occurrence.) I nevertheless have my doubts about the possibility of such an import but I will not go into the issue of origins and possible diffusions here.

The bilingual, often trilingual, area around Trieste (Karst, Istria, Friuli) as well as in the city itself, where *intrecci* and *prepletanja* are currently flourishing, is the very same area whose linguistic practices and processes had been studied by the famous linguist, Hugo von Schuchardt. German by birth but Austrian in character, Schuchardt was very interested in language mixtures and mixing (*Sprachmischung*, *Mischsprache*). Better known as a pioneer of creolistics, he also established the study of contact languages. His fascinating booklet, titled *Slavo-German and Slavic-Italian* (Schuchardt, 1884), offered as a gift to the prominent Slovene philologist and linguist Franc Miklošič (Franz von Miklosich) for his 70<sup>th</sup> birthday, was based on a rich collection of very heterogeneous materials, including information provided by his correspondents from the region. One of them was Karel Štrekelj, a linguist and ethnologist from the Karst countryside above Trieste, a specialist for Slovene Karstic dialects and professor of Slavic Philology at the University of Graz at the time Schuchardt was teaching there.<sup>5</sup>

Schuchardt offered his book to his friend Miklošič because the latter was also interested in language mixing and the resulting language change. At the time, the leading Slovenian philologists and linguists, regardless of their feelings about language mixing, did not avoid the time-honored terminology of



Fig. 2: Schuchardt's booklet, titled Slavic-German and Slavic-Italian language, studies the phenomena of language mixing in the Italian-Slovenian borderland.

5 In the *Hugo Schuchardt Archiv*, his letters to Schuchardt have not yet been edited. [Http://schuchardt.uni-graz.at/id/letter/5337#\\_ftn6](http://schuchardt.uni-graz.at/id/letter/5337#_ftn6). Accessed: 3 November 2019.

mixing and mixtures.<sup>6</sup> How could they avoid it when Luther himself – a very important figure for the Slovenian nation-builders of the time – had already claimed that *alles sprachen sind vermischt*?<sup>7</sup> Writing in 1981, a century after Schuchardt's book, Jože Toporišič, then the leading national linguist, commenting on the trend of code-mixing and code-shifting between the Slovene and Serbo-Croatian could still exclaim “But this is the mixing of languages and nothing good can come from it” (Toporišič, 2011, 246).

In the region in question, Hugo Schuchardt is still largely ignored. While elsewhere, from the 1980s onwards, Schuchardt has been steadily rediscovered and his rediscovery has prompted a new wave of interesting scholarship on his contribution to the studies of languages in contact, the impact of the “interweaving” metaphor seems to efficiently block his rediscovery.<sup>8</sup>

#### METHODOLOGICAL CAVEAT

Due to the relative scarcity of a corpora of contemporary Slovene language, additional techniques and tools had to be used, in particular intense internet searches and long-term systematic observation of the usage of relevant terms. The titles of the social scientific publications and conference presentations, the titles of PhD, MA and BA theses in selected disciplines but also the titles of various events such as museum exhibitions have proved to be a fruitful source. None of them could, of course, replace an extensive reading of relevant philological, linguistic and culturological (in particular ethnological) literature in the Slovene language, dealing in particular with the region of my choice but not exclusively.

#### PROMOTING PREPLETANJE IN SCHOLARLY LITERATURE

The next step is to present some selected evidence of the avoidance of *mešanje* by replacing it with *prepletanje*. I will limit myself to two particularly clear cases suggesting that the promotion of the use of the interweaving metaphor in linguistic terminology is of a determined and systematic character.

6 Jernej (Bartholomeus) Kopitar wrote thus “[d]a also die walachische Sprache nicht wie die neugriechische nur eine durch die Länge der Zeit in ihren Formen etwas veränderte Originalsprache, sondern eine durch Vermischung zweier in Materie und Form verschiedener Sprachen entstandene Mengesprache ist...” (Kopitar, 1857, 187).

7 “Alles sprachen sind vermischt und unter einander gemenget, denn die Länder sind benachbart, und eins stösst an das ander; darum borget eins vom andern etliche Wort.” (Luther, 1846, A 578, 569).

8 In the wealth of Schuchardtian studies dealing with the contact languages, I find the following especially rewarding: Baggioni, 1988; Swiggers, 1989; Venier, 2012; 2015; Nicolaï, 2014; 2016. Ethnologists and anthropologists are only rarely aware of Schuchardt's work but see Johler, 2012. Recently, a selection of Schuchardt's theoretical texts, also including the book in question, have been translated into French and published in a bilingual edition (Nicolaï & Tabouret-Keller, 2011).

## First case

Soon after independence, Neva Godini, an ethnic Slovene teacher from the small town of Aurisina (Nabrežina) north of Trieste, published an article about the Central Karstic vocabulary in the time of Karel Štrekelj (1859–1912), the above-mentioned specialist for the Central Karstic (or “Gorizian”) dialects and also her fellow Karstian (Godini, 1994). Štrekelj wrote his PhD thesis under the guidance of Fran Miklošič, the holder of the chair for Slavic Philology at the University of Vienna. By the end of the century, Štrekelj was based in Graz, where he became professor of Slavic languages in 1896. Hugo von Schuchardt, who held the chair for Romance philology at the same university, was already familiar with his contribution to the study of Slavic elements in the Friulian vocabulary (Štrekelj, 1890), to which he reacted in the following issue of the journal with a note, the title of which signaled the problematic of Slavic-Italian mixtures (Schuchardt, 1891).

Godini maintained that in the 1990s, the Karstic lexicon was still abounding with Germanic and Romance loanwords, though in different proportions than in Štrekelj’s time. In order to illustrate the current linguistic situation of the Slovene Karstic dialect in and around Aurisina, she concluded the article with the local *Vagrant’s hymn* which “sounds rather archaic but was actually composed only in 1946, when a group of local internees returned from Germany. It became so popular that it was later considered a folk song.” To this she added: “In its simplicity, almost naivety, [the song] clearly and tangibly displays the interweaving (*prepletanje*) of the Slovenian expressive stock with the Romance and Germanic stock” (Godini, 1994, 272). The last two lines of the poem refer to the decrease in the Romance and Germanic loanwords in the new postwar era:

*Ki su bučardø, špicø, mæcuøla in pønčot?  
Adijo njømška Micø, oj servus, kristigot!*

(Where have *bučarde*, *špice*, *macole* and *pančoti* gone?  
Goodbye the German *Mice*, *servus*, *kristigot!*)<sup>9</sup>

These two lines are so strongly reminiscent of the poem *L’Eco del Klutsch* that one cannot but suspect that the anonymous author of the “hymn” must have been acquainted with it. *L’Eco del Klutsch* (The Echo of the Klutsch)<sup>10</sup> was written by the Triestine regional poet Polifemo Acca (his real name was

9 The nouns from the first verse are all Romance loanwords, denoting the tools that were used by the workers in the marble quarry of Aurisina.

10 Klutsch is the name of a brook in Trieste while it also seems to be a Germanized form of the Slovene word *ključ*, “key”.

Giglio Padovan). In literature on Padovan, 1885 is invariably given as the year of the publication of the song. Curiously, Schuchardt published this sonnet in its entirety a year earlier, without revealing the source, in his book (Schuchardt, 1884, 74). Indeed, he had good reason to publish it in its integral form since the poem offered a fascinating list of Slovene and German, or Slavic and Germanic and Friulian, loanwords that Padovan actually considered barbarisms. By exposing them as characteristic of the Triestine idiom, he simultaneously expressed his hope that they would soon be swept away.

Unlike the purist Padovan, Schuchardt delighted in this “Barbarisirung [sic] des Triestiner Italienisch” (Schuchardt, 1884, 74) and went on explaining every hybrid word in each line. Just to convey an idea of the poem and to show its similarity to the Vagrant’s Hymn, let me reproduce here the second quatrain of the sonnet:

*O fraile, o juzche, o mlecherze, o berschizze,  
Pech, pinter, clanfer, bogneri e sinteri,  
Cuguluf, presniz, crapfeni e sparheri  
E zvitichi e giarizzi e cluche e spizze.*

The two poems address the same phenomenon of *Sprachmischung* (to put it in Schuchardt’s terms), of the same *contact languages* in the same linguistic area, here defined as the Italian-Slovenian borderland in and around Trieste, above all Istria and the Karst. The common trait of both poems, enumerating the hybrid words and possibly a common message (though the intent of the Vagrant’s Hymn is not necessarily purist), is that by themselves they prove that ethnic and linguistic boundaries within the area are not an obstacle. Their contact is more a prerequisite for the mixing of languages, consistent with the Schuchardt’s claim that “the *Sprachmischung* [language mixing] is directly proportional to *Berührung* [contact], to the level of its daily recurrence, its stability and its depth” (Venier, 2015, 107).

Godini therefore studies the same phenomenon as Schuchardt and she studies it in the same region as Schuchardt who actually made it widely known as a region of language contact and mixing (or hybridization).<sup>11</sup> Schuchardt and Štrekelj are the founders of the studies of language contact and mixing in this area, yet Godini had nevertheless turned the central notion of mixing into *prepletanje*, “interweaving.” She did so without any theoretical supporting argument; even without clarification or a warning that the central notion and thereby the very nature of the phenomenon had been renamed. That this move was far from random, is supported, in the German summary (Zusammenfassung)

11 Schuchardt clearly preferred *Mischung* to (*sprachliche*) *Hybridität*. The latter appears in the book only twice. See Schuchardt, 1884, 10, 35.

of the article, by the German translation of *prepletanje* with *Verflechtungen*.<sup>12</sup> The fact that Schuchardt and the whole German speaking tradition used the terminology of *mischen*, *Sprachmischung*, *Mischsprache*, *Einmischung*, etc., has suddenly stopped being relevant. The Slovene speaking linguists in the area seem to have suddenly felt entitled to overthrow the scientific terminology of another language in an entirely arbitrary manner.

Some might of course argue that *prepletanje* is actually nearly synonymous with *mešanje*, supporting their argument with various dictionaries that list some meanings of mixing as nearly synonymous with some meanings of interweaving (never before the fourth or third meaning listed in the line). This holds true only for a small segment where some similar meanings of both words meet or intersect. For the rest, this claim is totally wrong. Except for the small intersection where, for example, both

*the writer sheds light on the interweaving of the folk beliefs with the official Church Creed*

and

*the writer sheds light on the mixture of the folk beliefs with the official Church Creed*

are in line with the standard language, an overextended “interweaving” in place of “mixing” is literally out of place. It is the wrong word for the context: a suitable definition of the catachresis.

## Second Case

In 2014, two scholars from the University of Udine published a book on bilingualism in children (Crescentini & Fabbro, 2014a). The publication was financed by the European Foundation for Regional Development and was part of the Programme for the Transborder Italo-Slovenian Cooperation. This explains why it was simultaneously published in the Slovene translation (Crescentini & Fabbro, 2014b). In the penultimate chapter, the authors (a neuropsychologist and a neuropsychiatrist) first introduce mixing (*mescolamento*) and switching (*commutazione*) of languages as the phenomena characterizing bilingual persons. In the second paragraph of the chapter, they move from switching to mixing, duly maintaining that “il mescolamento delle lingue (*code-mixing*)” is quite a frequent phenomenon in bilingual people. In the rest of the paragraph, they strictly refer to “i fenomeni

12 “Verflechtungen der slowenischen Sprachelemente mit germanischen und romanischen” (273). Also the translation of “prepletanje” with “Verflechtung” is inaccurate since the latter conveys the meanings of tightly interwoven, interconnected, interdependent, integrated phenomena (this is the reason why *l'histoire croisée* or *entangled history* is called *Verflechtungsgeschichte* in German), entirely absent in the vacuous notion of *prepletanje* as used by its new practitioners. For the concept of Verflechtung (entanglement) in modern social science, see Christ et al. 2016.

di *mixing*.” In the Slovene translation, “mescolanza delle lingue (*mixing*)” from the initial paragraph is correctly translated as “mešanje jezikov (t.i. *mixing*).” In the second paragraph however, mixing of languages suddenly becomes “prepletanje jezikovnih kodov (t.j. code-mixing),” “interweaving of language codes (i.e. code-mixing)” (Crescentini & Fabbro, 2014b, 46). Mixing becomes interweaving. As *mescolamento* is correctly translated as *mešanje* also in the contents of the book, it seems less likely that this surprising switch can be ascribed to an extremely careless translator. It seems more likely that a careless *editor*, who was implementing the unwritten decree that *mescolanza* had to be turned into *prepletanje*, incidentally caught sight of the second paragraph without reading the text in its entirety.

What might look like an arbitrary intervention, is most likely indicative of the systematic character of a certain language policing (or censorship) that suppresses *mešanje* and replaces it with *prepletanje*.

## INVADING THE COMMON USE OF LANGUAGE

Many more cases of the academic usage of the term *prepletanje* could easily be found. As mentioned before, they abound especially in the Western Slovenian borderland. The center (the capital) seems to be somewhat less affected. However, this does not seem to also apply to non-academic usage. In common use – in particular in advertising in the cultural sphere – the word *prepletanje* has become irresistible. This trend that I will outline in the following also interferes with scholarly usages where academics have their own reason for using the word. The interference can easily be detected in the titles of university theses such as “Bosniaks in Slovenia: the Interweaving of Language and Culture – the Case of the Bosniaks of Velenje” (a BA thesis). The “fatal attraction” of this word that the current students of ethnology seemingly cannot resist has, in this case, most likely submerged the reasons responsible for its introduction in the academia in the Western Slovenian borderland. What things are actually *interweaving* in this title? Are language and culture of the Bosniaks being interwoven like two strands? Or is language and culture of the Bosniaks being interwoven with that of their ethnic Slovenian counterparts? Or is there a third, undisclosed possibility? Considering that such a BA thesis as a rule does not show any interest in the issues of language at all, even less in their interweaving or any other known interaction, it is even more obvious that it does not promote “interweaving” against “mixing.” Here, *prepletanje* is just a *flatus vocis*. Its aim seems to be to evoke “cosmopolitan” images of coexistence.

The mainstream media go even further in the same direction. There is an apparently rich imagination of the cases of interweaving. One would never expect that so many and so variable phenomena are capable of interweaving but besides naming and enumerating these phenomena, the question as to *what* precisely is being interwoven and *how* this interweaving is taking place, is never asked. This means that also the question as to *what* is actually interweaving and *how* precisely does it differ from mixing and other similar phenomena is never asked.

Let me briefly illustrate a segment of a wider array of things that can typically indulge in interweaving according to the media and advertising (with tourism and travel advertisers as possibly the most “creative” promoters). Here are some examples of things that may be of special interest to anthropologists and linguists, gathered from the web pages:

1) Interweaving of languages and cultures: This is arguably the most popular cliché concerning interweaving:

[...] it also encompasses the musical traditions of the Eastern Adriatic where the interweaving of languages, primarily Slavic, and cultures, primarily Latin and Levantine, is very conspicuous.<sup>13</sup>

While this is an instance of the cultural tourist marketing of a region, the following case originates from the academic environment of the borderland and shows to what extent the academic communication can be permeated with the language used in advertising:

*The focus of the conference will be intercultural contacts and the situation of the language and literature at the point of contact since the conference will take place in Nova Gorica, a city where the interweaving of languages and cultures is reflected in everyday life.*

2) Interweaving of languages only:

*From Ljubljana to the quadri-lingual Kanalska dolina (Val Canale), where in everyday life, the Italian, Slovene, German and Friulian interweave in a perpetual and entirely natural process.*

*The tight interweaving of the English and Spanish in the USA has resulted in a special combination of languages, known as Spanglish.*

The second statement comes close to the proper linguistic statement. However, what about the first one? Are the four languages of Val Canale, like four strips or strands, being woven together into a multilingual braid? Or are they being combined into something? Or, more likely, are they just “peacefully coexisting” alongside one another?

3) Interweaving of peoples/nations:

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13 For the reasons of commodity and discretion, this and the following examples, all gathered from the internet, are quoted without references.

*The week of India's culture – One could hardly find in this world a country where so many cultures, nations and peoples are being interwoven [...] as in India.*

*The interweaving of peoples mirrors a language mosaic of the predominantly Slavic interior of Istria, consisting of the two Istrian languages, Slovene and Croatian, while the linguistically diverse towns eventually chose the official Venetian Italian as their language.*

(Difficult to understand anything in this “cryptic” ethnological declaration, including the direction of mirroring.)

4) Interweaving of “races”:<sup>14</sup>

*In Asia, diverse races are interweaving. These two pictures show the members of the two predominant races.*

The writer of the travel reportage blog most likely did not intend diverse races to mix in Asia. They could have simply said that diverse races live (or coexist) in Asia. But why speak in plain language?

*Yet the Vikings, despite ever more intense interweaving of diverse cultures and races, cannot really go against their football roots.*

Here, the “interweaving” comes to some extent closer to “interaction”—or even “mixing”—than in previous statement.

*The interweaving of different cultures and races has given the city a special character.*

Again, do different races of the city undergo the process of interweaving (whatever that may mean) or do they just coexist in the city, *nebeneinander*?

5) Interweaving of foods, cuisines, and tastes:

A recipe for beef ribs in coffee sauce:

*If we envisage coffee as a spice and if we substitute salt for sugar, we get a delicious food in which wine and coffee interweave.*

14 The term *race* is put here in scare quotes only for the sake of anticipating and repelling possible criticism aimed at censoring the notion of race. The word race is not inherently evil and today it badly needs a critical analysis of its usage. This is not to deny that the notion of race in the case of the human species (i.e. human race) actually denotes a non-existent entity (since the human species does not happen to be subdivided into sub-species or races). This is also not to deny that talking about human races is outdated, regressive and potentially dangerous.

Another culinary suggestion:

*Waters also excellently interweave with foods.*

It is not a coincidence that one finds the most incongruous occurrences of “interweaving” precisely in the domain of foods and drinks (and of liquid and certain non-liquid substances more generally). In our culture, as well as in numerous others, the liquids, and the drinks in particular, are the paragon of the substances that *are mixed* and that *have to be mixed*. Don’t we *mix* water with wine, oil with vinegar, milk with sugar, coffee with brandy, and different wine or spirits among themselves? Don’t we mix different coffees, if we want to get an excellent coffee mixture?

WHERE *PREPLETANJE* REIGNS,  
NOTHING ELSE GROWS

One does not need to google the morpheme *-plet-* and its different variants for long in order to establish that, in the current Slovene usage, virtually all things, all phenomena, material as well as immaterial, are capable of “interweaving.” This means that the word has undergone a semantic (over)extension. Thus extended, the word is used in a wider sense than is possible in ordinary speech. It acquires meanings that it does not have in standard language. Due to its semantic extension, the frequency of its occurrence in certain sectors of common language use has correspondingly increased.

Considered from the point of view of ordinary language usage, there is no need to sound the alarm. The vogue of *prepletanje* may be seen as a silly fashion. Fashions come and go and many of them are silly. Moreover, fun may be poked at those who suddenly discover that wine and coffee are interweaving in the beef ribs sauce. They would not be the first to be ridiculed for their mannerist ways of speaking. Who knows? – someone might find out someday that mineral water and wine are interweaving in the glass of *spritzer* or *gemischt*, a drink well-known throughout the Eastern Adriatic as *gemišt* or *špricer*. The way things stand, it is quite possible, even likely, that this will happen someday. Consequently, someone might propose that the name of the drink should be corrected accordingly, perhaps into *pletenac* (in Croatian) or *prepleteneč* (in Slovenian). *Intreccio* in Italian?

The susceptibility of regional scholarly discourses for this invasive catachrestic word is, on the contrary, far from amusing. In anthropology, ethnology and neighboring disciplines, we definitely need to develop deeper historical and epistemological understanding of the metaphors and concepts that we make use of for describing, analyzing and theorizing the most diverse forms of cultural interaction among different collectivities. To do so, we possess an impressive store of concepts and metaphors, some of which are more useful for certain ends, some of which are less useful. In

order to select and evolve optimal analytical tools, we need to work permanently on them. Some of these concepts are also older than others; some even happen to be very old, in particular the concept of mixing and mixture. Mixtures continue to be widely suspected of having unpleasant characteristics, if not being utterly bad. This may arguably be the strongest single reason for their avoidance. Some people seem to find this concept outdated, too old, not sophisticated enough. Anthropologists with their presentist bias are among those most inclined to discard “outdated” concepts. Even those among them who seriously study concepts such as hybridity, creolization, métissage (with its equivalents in the Spanish and Portuguese language), syncretism, (cultural) translation, transculturation, bricolage, and so forth, sometimes seem to lack the awareness that mixing and mixture, too, are concepts and not just plain words. (How many times do *mixing* and *mixture* appear in indices of such books?)

Even fewer are aware that mixing and mixture, together with some related concepts, were the two concepts intensely elaborated from the very beginning of Ancient Greek philosophy and continuing through the centuries of its development until its end. As Richard Sharvy (1983) has argued, “[q]uestions about mixture and combination were among the most central topics discussed by the earliest philosophers.” Aristotle’s thought on conceptual distinctions between *mixis* (mixture) and *krasis* (fusion) and some others, as developed in particular in his breathtaking work of philosophy of nature titled *De generatione et corruptione*, is perhaps the acme of all philosophical thinking of mixtures. Aristotle is also arguably a philosopher whom current anthropologists find the least interesting.

Avoiding the systematic and in-depth analysis of the relevant concepts of relations that some prefer to describe in terms of mixtures, others in terms of hybridization, and others again in terms of creolization or translation or entanglements or bricolage, anthropologists and ethnologists tend to become an easy prey for the predators speaking PC language. Virtually every metaphor or concept from the store can be denounced as “politically incorrect”, “racist,” “xenophobe,” “sexist,” etc. This has happened with hybridity, with mixing, with *méztizaje*, more recently with creolization. All are made suspect because of their “biological roots,” so the exorcism of everything resembling biology becomes the paramount and often the only one, obligation of the scholar.

#### *IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION: WHAT HAPPENS TO HYBRIDITY?*

Avoiding the terminology of mixtures (and hybrids) and opting for the rhetoric of interweaving may thus *also* turn out to be a PC strategy. Namely, if “mixing of languages” is a term bearing a pejorative connotation, then its replacement with “interweaving of languages” (or peoples, or cultures, or races) elegantly solves all the problems. Its connotation is highly positive, its message is optimistic; the word itself looks so innocent and untainted and free of any “biology” that nobody could possibly expose it to PC suspicions.

This is not to argue that the fear of the “PC predators” has played a very significant role here. In any case, in this Mediterranean region the passion for political correctness has been incomparably weaker compared to its North Atlantic birthplace. In my view, it is fear of mixing that is critical: the time-honored perception that mixing is bad but also the fear of losing one’s identity, the fear that a new identity might arise out of two previous identities. Interweaving, on the contrary, is a promise of a happy and colorful “multicultural” future for the diverse linguistic and cultural communities of the borderlands; something resembling a patterned *intreccio* woven from the threads of vivid colors, or an equally colorful fabric of a *pleteni vzorec*, or even a wildly optimistic interweaving partying of fabrics and human phenotypes of the United Colors of Benetton.

This might help to explain why the devotees of interweaving remain impermeable also to the discourses of *hybridity*. This resistance is naturally perfectly consistent with the resistance to mixing. However, the thing is that many devotees of interweaving and of hybridity work side by side in the same academic institutions, share the same cabinets and the classrooms at the same university departments and publish their articles in the same journals, both in the borderland and, to a lesser extent, in the capital. Considering that the discourse of hybridity, especially in its postcolonial edition, has its reception and enjoys certain popularity also in the borderland, it would be a reasonable expectation that the devotees of interweaving might borrow a thing or two from it. None of that happens, however. Where *prepletanje* reigns, there is no room for mixtures, hybridity, blends, compounds, and syncretism. This notion is not just one among many equals, all working towards the same goal.

The article by Neva Godini on Karel Štrekelj and the Karstic dialects that was discussed above is an excellent illustration of the exclusionary nature of the discourse of interweaving. Godini is totally silent about *Sprachmischungen* despite the fact that Schuchardt had described the same area as an area of language mixing. The word *hybrid* nevertheless appears in her article. It appears only once, and this in the footnote where she comments on the dialectal word *tèr* for the tower or the church tower (*torre* in Italian and *turn*, a loanword from German, in neighboring villages), expressing hope that it is not “a weird hybrid of the two loanwords” but an autochthonous phonetic development of a Romance loanword (Godini, 1994, 269). A hybrid cannot be but “weird”. This can be seen as a strong signal that the discourse of hybridity (and by extension mixing) should not be *mixed* with the discourse of interweaving.

## MEŠANICE BREZ MEŠANJA: BOJAZNI PRED JEZIKOVNO IN KULTURNO HIBRIDNOSTJO NA SLOVENSKO-ITALIJANSKEM MEJNEM OBMOČJU

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### *POVZETEK*

*Članek raziskuje sodobno težnjo izogibanja terminologiji »mešanja« in »mešanic« ter njenega nadomeščanja z izrazom »prepletanje« v tekoči slovenski družboslovni literaturi kakor tudi v javni rabi. To izogibanje je posebno očitno na italijansko-slovenskem obmejnem območju, kjer so preučevanja jezikovnih in kulturnih stikov, dvojezičnosti in multikulturnosti v polnem razmahu na obeh straneh državne meje, še zlasti med etničnimi Slovenci na jadranski obali. Članek prinaša dokumentacijo, ki kaže na sistematično »miksofobno« naravo zavračanja terminologije in podobja mešanja ter hibridizacije in njunega nadomeščanja s pojmi jezikovnih in kulturnih interakcij, v katerih je prepletene niti po potrebi zmeraj mogoče znova razplesti.*

*Ključne besede: mešanice (jezikovne in kulturne), prepletanje (jezikovno in kulturno), hibridnost, mešanje, italijansko-slovenski obmejni prostor*

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**POLITIČKI ODNOSI KOMUNA BUDVE I DUBROVNIKA OD 1358.  
DO KRAJA XIV. STOLJEĆA**

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**POLITIČNI ODNOSI MED OBČINAMA BUDVA IN DUBROVNIK OD LETA  
1358 DO KONCA 14. STOLETJA**

**IZVLEČEK**

*Avtor analizira povezave med občinama Budva in Dubrovnik od leta 1358 do konca 14. stoletja. Na podlagi neobjavljenih in objavljenih virov iz Državnega arhiva v Dubrovniku (Reformationes, Lettere e commissioni di Levante, Diversa Cancellariae, Debita Notariae in Lamenta de foris) ter ustrezne zgodovinske literature, so v kronološkem vrstnem redu predstavljeni politični odnosi med tema dvema dalmatinska občinama. Pri tem se primerja in analizira vloga zunanjih sil (kneza Vojislava Vojinovića, Kotorja in Benetk), ki so vplivale na zbljevanje in prijateljske odnose med Budvo in mestom. Dubrovčane je Budva zanimala zaradi konflikta s Kotorjem. Pomembno je bilo imeti takega zaveznika, saj je bil ta najblžji vojaškim podvigom proti Kotorju: da ga blokirajo in nadzirajo trgovinski uvoz in izvoz blaga. V zameno so budvanski gospodarji z družino v mestu dobili zatočišče, pomoč z orožjem, hrano, denarjem in darili. Dubrovčani so se izogibali trgovini z občino Budva zaradi njene gospodarske nerazvitosti. Predstavljena je udeležba Budvančanov v gospodarskem življenju srednjeveškega Dubrovnika.*

*Ključne besede: Budva, Dubrovnik, politični odnosi, 14. stoletje, gospodarstvo, južna Dalmacija*

**LE RELAZIONI POLITICHE TRA IL COMUNE DI BUDVA E IL COMUNE DI  
RAGUSA DAL 1358 ALLA FINE DEL XIV SECOLO**

**SINTESI**

*L'autore si presta ad analizzare le relazioni tra il comune di Budva e il comune di Ragusa nel periodo dal 1358 fino alla fine del XIV secolo. Basandosi sulle fonti inedite e quelle pubblicate dagli Archivi di Stato di Ragusa e sulla letteratura pertinente, nell'articolo sono presentati nell'ordine cronologico fatti concreti sugli eventi politici riguardanti le due comunità dalmate. L'autore confronta e analizza il ruolo delle forze*

esterne (il Principe Vojislav Vojinović, Cattaro e Venezia) le quali hanno influenzato il riavvicinamento e le relazioni amichevoli tra Budva e la città di Ragusa. Il popolo di Ragusa era interessato a Budva dato il suo conflitto con Cattaro. Era importante avere un simile alleato, visto che Budva era la città più vicina a Cattaro e così anche più idonea per le iniziative militari contro di essa: per bloccare la città, controllare l'importazione e l'esportazione di merci. In cambio di tali iniziative, i signori di Budva ottenevano protezione per le loro famiglie nella città, l'assistenza in armi, alimentari, denaro e regali. A causa del mancato sviluppo economico i ragusani evitano il commercio con Budva. Nel presente lavoro viene presentata la partecipazione di Budva alla vita economica della Ragusa medievale.

*Parole chiave: Budva, Ragusa, relazioni politiche, XIV secolo, economia, Dalmazia meridionale*

## UVOD

Budva se nalazi u jugoistočnom dijelu Jadranskog mora, smještena na samoj obali. Grad je podignut na malom poluotoku i povezan s kopnom uskim zemljanim nasipom. Sa svih je strana bio zaklonjen zidovima, čiji su temelji uglavnom nastali u antičko doba ili ranom srednjem vijeku (Vučković, 1965, 643; Antonović, 2003, 37–38). Zbog svoje starine u dubrovačkim vrelima nazivali su ga *Starigrad* (Jireček, 1959, bilj. 56). Unutrašnjost grada u kasnom srednjem vijeku bila je male površine.<sup>1</sup> Barski nadbiskup Marin Bici 1610. godine izvještava papu Pavlu V. (1605.–1621.) da Budva ima oko 600 duša (Bici, 1985, 18). Budvanska se, pak, komuna prostirala na nekoliko četvornih kilometara, obuhvaćajući: Zavalu, Maine, Pobore, otok Sv. Nikole i dio župe Grbalj (Vučković, 1965, 643–644, 647; Bujuklić, 1988, 39). Dubrovačka srednjovjekovna komuna bila je otvorena prema zaleđu.<sup>2</sup> Zahvaljujući svom izvanrednom geografskom položaju na jugu Jadrana, dobrim primorskim i kopnenim komunikacijama i snažnom gospodarskom razvoju, grad je imao veliki utjecaj na zaleđe (Ničetić, 1996, 93; Ćirković, 1997, 49, 54).

Spoznanje u historiografiji o vezama Budve i Dubrovnika u naznačenom vremenskom razdoblju su nepotpuna. Dosad je objavljeno nekoliko sintetskih djela koja obrađuju samo neka pitanja političkih i gospodarskih odnosa budvanske i dubrovačke komune (Ćirković et al., 1970; Bujuklić, 1988), no ne postoje pojedinačni radovi (članci i rasprave). Ova je tema ostala pomalo zanemarena u dosadašnjim istraživanjima. Srednjovjekovno razdoblje Budve i inače je slabo proučeno, ponajprije zbog toga što srednjovjekovna arhivska građa grada Budve nije sačuvana. Dokumenti su uništeni u brojnim požarima, potresima i ratnim pustošenjima. Sačuvan je tek Statut grada iz sredine XIV. stoljeća, od kojega se manji dio odnosi na ovo razdoblje (Vučković, Luketić & Bujuklić, 1988, 5–11; Dinić-Knežević, 1999, 131). Budva i njezini stanovnici spominju se u povijesnim vrelima u Državnom arhivu u Dubrovniku, ali su ti spomeni razasuti po raznim serijama (*Reformationes, Lettere e commissioni di Levante, Diversa Cancellarie, Debita Notariae i Lamenta de foris*) i potrebno ih je bilo sustavno prikupiti i objediniti.<sup>3</sup> Sačuvana i sakupljena građa za ovaj rad raspoređena je dosta nerazmjerno u odnosu na pojedine godine. Najveći broj spomena Budve (*Budua, Budoa*) odnosi se na razdoblje od 1361.–1364., kada je komuna bila saveznik Dubrovčanima u ratu protiv Vojislava Vojinovića (početak XIV. stoljeća–1363.) i kotorske komune. Zahvaljujući uvidu u dubrovačke dokumente, možemo steći jasniju predodžbu o odnosima ove dvije komune na južnom Jadranu.

1 Opis Budve iz 1598. donosi nam Giuseppe Rosaccio. O tome: Pavić, 2003, 178–179.

2 Uspoređi: Raukar, 1982, 43–47, 99–117.

3 DAD, DC, ser. 25, sv. 22–27, 30, 32–33; DN, ser. 26, sv. 8–9; Lam. de for., ser. 40, sv. 52; Gelcich, 1896; MR II, 1882; MR III, 1895; Smičiklas, 1914; Smičiklas, 1915; Tadić, 1935; Dinić, 1951; Dinić, 1964; Lonza & Šundrica, 2005; Lonza, 2011.

## GODINA 1358. U POVIJESTI DALMACIJE – PROSTORNI OKVIR

Na čelu komuna u južnom dijelu Jadrana nalazio se knez (Malović-Đukić, 1999, 14–143; Šanek & Grbavac, 2017, 376–377). Budva je bila dio Srpske države (osvojena između 1184.–1186. do 1360.). Nakon smrti cara Dušana 1355. godine, država je oslabila. Dušanov nasljednik Uroš (1355.–1371.) nije uspio održati vlast nad cijelim teritorijem. U prvim godinama njegove vladavine središnja vlast se nije osjećala na zetskom primorju. Ovo slabljenje imalo je utjecaja na budvansku komunu, koja se osamostalila 1360. i umjesto kneza spominje se kaštelan (Bujuklić, 1988, 14, 17). Dubrovnik se od 1204. do 1358. nalazio u sastavu Mletačke Republike. Godina 1358. predstavlja prekretnicu za Dubrovnik u političkim, diplomatskim i privrednim odnosima. Višegradskim ugovorom grad je potvrđen kao dio Ugarsko-hrvatskog Kraljevstva.<sup>4</sup> Poslije višegradske povelje (3. siječnja 1359.) izbor kneza bio je u rukama dubrovačkog plemstva. Ovi događaji utjecali su na veću emancipaciju grada, koji od srednjovjekovne komune polako postaje suverena Republika i samostalno gradi vanjskopolitičke odnose s regionalnim vladarima i komunama, među kojima je i Budva.<sup>5</sup>

Budvanska komuna posjedovala je određenu samostalnost i u srpskoj državi. Zauzvrat imala je neke vojne obveze prema vladaru: davala je vojni odred od 50 vojnika, ako bi išao u pohod na teritoriju od Kotora do Skadra. Komuna je bila dužna dati vladaru i njegovim službenicima, ako posjete grad, počast od tri obroka. Po odredbama budvanskog Statuta, grad je bilo dužan svake godine na blagdan Sv. Ivana srpskom caru davati 100 perpera, dok je 5 perpera išlo gradskom knezu (Vučković, Luketić & Bujuklić, 1988, 15–16; Bujuklić, 1988, 16).

Budva i Dubrovnik pripadali su teritorijalnom području Dalmacije koje se kroz stoljeća mijenjalo (Basić, 2017, 7–54). Od 1358. Ugarsko-hrvatski vladari teritorij Dalmacije od sredine Kvarnera do granica grada Drača, smatrali su svojom političko-teritorijalnom interesnom zonom. Venecija je tada potisnuta s istočnog Jadrana. Prostrana cijela Dalmacija bila je ponovljena i u Torinskom miru (1381.) (Šunjić, 1967, 29–30; Foretić, 1984, 237, 240–241; Harris, 2006, 59). Početkom XV. stoljeća, Mletačkim osvajanjem zetskog primorja, gubi se naziv Dalmacija i teritorij od Budve prema Draču Mlečani nazivaju Albanijom (Jireček, 1959, 276).

## SUKOB BUDVE I DUBROVNIKA (1359.–1360.)

Na formiranje odnosa Budve i Dubrovnika utjecala je politička situacija na južnom Jadranu. Do 1358. imamo malo informacija o njihovim političkim odnosima, tek nakon te godine imamo više podataka. U dubrovačkim dokumentima Budvani

4 O tome vidjeti: Foretić, 1980, 132–138; Klaić, 1984, 229; Dinić-Knežević, 1986, 17–20; Janeković-Römer, 1998, 293–303; Janeković-Römer, 2003, 10–48, 64–68, 80–85, 90–116; Vekarić, 2011, 231; Kunčević, 2015, 84, 93, 116.

5 Foretić, 1980, 152–158, 181–185; Mitić, 1988, 54, 229; Kao Republika prvi put se javlja u jednoj odredbi iz 1385. i taj naslov interno koriste sami Dubrovčani. U međunarodnim odnosima najraniji spomen Dubrovnika kao Republike nalazi se u pismu pape Eugena IV. iz 1443. godine. Kunčević, 2015, 95, bilj. 193.

se spominju kao pirati koji napadaju Dubrovčane na moru. Početkom proljeća 1359. jedna budvanska lađa isplovila je na otvoreno more i napala dubrovački trgovaci brod. Trojica pirata iz Budva bila su uhićena. Zbog tog događaja Dubrovčani 14. svibnja pišu kaštelanu iz Budve da im nadoknadi gubitke. Trebalo je uputiti poslanstvo da utvrdi gdje se nalaze dubrovačke lađe u Budvi i u kakvom su stanju. Kapetanu dubrovačke lađe dano je ovlaštenje da zaplovi te da ako uhvati nekog Budvanina može ga ispitivati i mučiti da otkrije je li ubio kojeg Dubrovčanina. Ako otkrije da jest, trebalo ga je u moru udaviti. Ako se ispostavi da nije kriv, trebalo ga je poslati u zatvor. Veliko vijeće odlučilo je organizirati napad na Budvu i potrošiti za to najviše 50 perpera. Marin (Maroje) Menčetić, Jakov Žurgović i Nikola Zauarnigo bili su određeni za izvršenje ove odluke (MR II, 1882, 273–274). Inače, u vrelima se navodi da su Dubrovčani prepoznavali Budvu po šumovitu pejzažu (Mihaljčić, 2001a, 201). Navedeni napad nije izvršen, jer je Budva tada bila pod vlašću srpskog cara. Gusarski napadi na trgovce bili su znak slabljenja središnje vlasti cara Uroša nad Budvom. Veliko vijeće 2. srpnja glasovalo je da se gusari iz Budve kazne, da im se iskopaju oči zbog njihovih nedjela koje su učinili Dubrovčanima (MR II, 1882, 275).

O ovoj se odluci ponovo vijećalo 3. srpnja 1359. godine. Članovi Malog vijeća izjašnjavali su se na koji način treba kazniti pirate iz Budve. Tog dana prisustvovalo je 76 delegata. Predložene su tri kazne: da se zadrže u zatvoru, da im se iskopaju oči ili da se objese. Za drugu odluku, da im se izvade oči, glasovao je najveći broj (36 glasačkih kuglica). Kao glavni razlog za ovako surovu kaznu naveli su taj što su gusari iz Budve izvadili oči trojici Dubrovčana, pa ih je trebalo kazniti na isti način. Za izvršenje kazne bio je zadužen vojnik Mateo Menčetić i krvnik (čije se ime ne navodi). Odluka je provedena 14. srpnja, u prisustvu Franciska Placencija, notara i vikara kurije, kao i velikog mnoštva ljudi (MR III, 1895, 2). Ova mjera nije iskorijenila gusarenje, jer je već sljedećeg mjeseca izvršen novi napad na trgovce. O ovom napadu pirata poslano je 30. kolovoza izvješće mletačkom Senatu. Obavijestili su dužda da je 19. kolovoza u luku Budvu uplovio veliki batelum sa 12 ljudi da uzmu neki provijant (nije navedeno koje su to bile namirnice). Budvani su zarobili te ljudi i batelum. Ljude su oslobodili za određenu sumu novca, ali batelum nisu htjeli vratiti ni za novac, jer su imali namjeru s njim činiti štetu. Dubrovčani mole Mlečane da zaštite trgovacku plovidbu i da brodovi koji plove prema Budvi ne trpe gubitke. Poklisar je dodao da je potrebno da se Budva, kao gnezdo gusara, sruši radi osiguravanja pomorske trgovine. Grad je na taj korak bio spreman, ali se nije usuđivao napadati podanike vladara Srbije, jer su trgovci s njim surađivali i bojali se srpske osvete (MR II, 1882, 278–286; Smičiklas, 1914, 614–615).

Veliko vijeće 3. listopada ponovno je raspravljalo o piratima. Odlučeno je da se knezu i vijeću naloži izricanje kazne za ljude iz Budve i sve ostale koji su povrijedili ili će nauditi dubrovačkoj komuni (MR II, 1882, 287). Početkom travnja 1360. Veliko vijeće donosi odluku da se izaberu trojica predstavnika koji će sprječavati gusarske napade iz Budve ili bilo koga drugoga tko bi htio nanijeti štetu Gradu. Osam dana kasnije, Malo vijeće je potvrdilo tu odluku i izabralo trojicu plemića: Nikola Čavarnigo, Marin (Maroje) Menčetić i Đivo Črijević, za sprovođenje te mjere (MR III, 1895, 29).

Ubrzo su Dubrovčani uvidjeli da je bolje sklopiti primirje s budvanskom komunom. Veliko vijeće 6. svibnja donijelo je odluku da se povedu pregovori za sklapanje mira (MR III, 1895, 33). Senat je 21. svibnja potvrđio odluku o miru s Budvom, pod uvjetom da vrate brod i naredi svojim stanovnicima da ne napadaju Dubrovčane. Ako do napada ipak dođe, komuna je bila dužna predati zločince. Kao jamac mira trebao je biti zetski mitropolit, koji je imao veliki utjecaj. Grad se nalazio u posebnom odnosu prema poglavaru zetske crkve i on je povremeno dolazio u njega (MR III, 1895, 35). Zbog sporazuma s Budvanima poslan je poslanik Kliment (Klime) Držić (19. listopada 1360.) zetskom mitropolitu, koji je tada stolovao u manastiru Sv. Mihaila (na Prevlaci u Boki Kotorskoj) (Jireček, 1959, 358; Ćirković et al., 1970, 11). Do zaključenja mirovnog sporazuma došlo je posredstvom mitropolita. Srpski car Uroš 1360. nije imao vlast u Budvi, a to potvrđuje obraćanje grada Sv. Vlaha mitropolitu da verificira ugovor. Od tada započinje novo razdoblje u odnosima između dvije komune, koje karakteriziraju prijateljske veze.

#### SAVEZ BUDVANSKOG KAŠTELANA POVRŠKA (1361.–1364.) S DUBROVNIKOM

Početkom proljeća 1361. Dubrovčani navode da su se Budva, Bar, Ulcinj i Skadar odvojili od srpskog vladara. Spomenuti gradovi bili su sfera utjecaja novih zetskih gospodara, Balšića (1360.–1421.). Zetskog mitropolita iz Budve potisnuo je kaštelan (zapovjednik) tvrđave Površko. U ljeto 1361. u dubrovačkim vrelima javlja se kao neovisni gospodar Budve, zabilježen kao: *Poveresco, Povereschus*. U ratu koji je sredinom 1361. započeo humski knez Vojislav Vojinović s Dubrovčanima, Kotor se svrstao na stranu Vojinovića, a Budva na strani Grada (Mihaljčić, 2001b, 51, 59, 62; Tomović, 2011, 358–360). Ovo je još jedna potvrda da Budva nije bila pod vlašću srpskog vladara, jer su Vojislav i Kotor nastupali jedinstveno u ratu protiv Dubrovnika kao podanici srpskog cara. Nakon ovog sukoba obustavljena je trgovina između Grada i srpske države. Dubrovčani su u isto vrijeme s morske strane Kotoru nametnuli gospodarsku blokadu. Njihova galija smještena u Bokokotorskom zaljevu hvatala je kotorske lađe i kontrolirala uvoz i izvoz. Već od ove opsade grada 1361.–62. počinje gospodarsko opadanje Kotora (Dabinović, 1958, 47–48; Ćirković, 1997, 50–51).

Budva je bila na granici interesa zetske vladarske obitelji Balšić, kneza Vojislava Vojinovića i Kotora. U srpnju 1361. Balšići su postali dubrovački građani. Upravljali su uskim pojasom između Skadarskog jezera i mora te vjerojatno držali i grad Bar (Šekularac, 2011, 34–37). Dubrovački poslanik Kliment Držić ponudio im je savez u borbi protiv kneza Vojislava i Kotora. Upozorava ih da se humski knez sprema zauzeti Budvu, zbog čega trebaju čuvati tvrđavu, jer ako bi je Vojinović osvojio, nastala bi velika šteta obitelji Balšić (Tadić, 1935, 57–58; Smičiklas, 1915, 161–162; Jelčić, 2010, 45–46). Komuna Budva je, vjerojatno, od te godine bila u vazalnom odnosu prema Balšićima, s teritorijalno-upravnom samostalnošću i obvezama koje su davali srpskom caru. Budvani su sačuvali svoju gradsku autonomiju pozivajući se na svoj Statut. Grad je vodio samostalnu vanjsku politiku. Kaštelan Površko samostalno ratu-

je i pregovara s Dubrovnikom, a Balšiće ne nalazimo u tim dokumentima (Mihaljić, 2001b, 61, 69). Vojinović je namjeravao napasti i osvojiti Budvu, gdje bi otvorio novo tržište soli koje bi povjerio Kotoranima. Na taj bi način ugrozio Dubrovčane koji su imali monopol nad trgovinom solju na južnom Jadranu (Mihaljić, 2001b, 44). Zbog ove opasnosti u srpnju 1361., kaštelan Površko zatražio je pomoć od grada. Molio je da mu se ustupi nekoliko bacača kamena i topova. Grad nije mogao to dati, pa se ispričavao da u tome oskudijeva. Umjesto toga, ponudio je četiri luka (sa strijelama) i jedan sanduk kopalja (MR III, 1895, 99). Nemamo podatke u dokumentima je li napad na Budvu izvršen, no ako je do toga i došlo, ona nije osvojena.

Veliko vijeće 3. rujna 1361. dozvolilo je Površku da može iz Grada sv. Vlaha iznijeti opremu (oružje) i tkanine za svoju obitelj te da se postara za magistra marangona kojega šalje knez i Malo vijeće (MR III, 1895, 117). Senat mu je 27. listopada dao darove i povlastice. Dva dana kasnije Površku je dodijeljeno i dubrovačko građanstvo.<sup>6</sup> Politički motiv za dodjelu građanstva bio je znak zahvalnosti za pomoć Dubrovniku u borbi protiv Vojislava Vojinovića i Kotorana. Površko je tituliran kao *dominus Budue*. Dubrovačka vlada davala je građanstvo pojedinim istaknutim ljudima za njihove zasluge ili onima čije je prijateljstvo smatrala korisnim. Ovo građanstvo bitno se razlikovalo od građanstva danog pojedinim imućnim trgovcima ili zanatlijama koje je Vlada naseljavala u Dubrovnik, ili čvršće vezivala za interes grada. Od svojih počasnih građana Vlada je očekivala prijateljsku podršku kad god bi to bilo potrebno, a u zamjenu je pružala utočište, kao i druge usluge. Površku i njegovim potomcima dana je mogućnost da borave u Gradu. Dobio je i jednu kuću na raspolaganje, s pravom boravka na trošak Dubrovnika, u slučaju opasnosti da mora napustiti Budvu (Mijušković, 1961, 90–102; Janeković-Römer, 1993, 29–34; Jelčić, 2010, 186–187). Ne znamo koju je kuću dobio i gdje je bila smještena u rasteru grada. Vjerojatno se radi o nekoj unajmljenoj građanskoj kući. Gradske vlasti su ovim diplomatskim poklonom, kao činom neverbalne komunikacije, izrazile zahvalnost, poštovanje i prijateljstvo u ime vlasti i čitave zajednice.

U studenom 1361. Površko je uspio odbiti napad Kotorana i zarobiti vlastelina Dživa Buću. Predao ga je Dubrovčanima, koji su uglednog Kotoranina držali u zatvoru čitavo vrijeme rata. U tom je sukobu kaštelan Budve pretrpio gubitak, a neki članovi njegove obitelji (kćer i zet) su zarobljeni (Ćirković et al., 1970, 14). Dubrovčani su pomagali Budvanima, ulagali su velike napore da spriječe uvoz oružja, soli i hrane u Kotor. Presretali su mletačke lađe, pretresali ih, robu plijenili, te su zbog toga dolazili u sukob s mletačkom vladom. U ožujku 1362. Kotorani su napadali kaštel, tijekom tih napada su Budvani imali veliku štetu. Vlada je 30. ožujka dala Površku 50 starija ječma u znak sažaljenja zbog gubitka koji je pretrpio od Kotorana i da taj ječam uzme iz zaliha komune. Zatim da mu se da i 100 perpera pomoći (MR III, 1895, 173). Ovaj novac Površko je mogao iskoristiti za snabdijevanje kaštela u hrani i oružjem. U prvoj polovici travnja 1362. Kotorani

6 *Poveresco dominus Budoe...sono campane more solito congregato, factus fuit civis Eagusii, qui juravit esse fidelis perpetuo civitatis Eagusii sieut quilibet verus civis.* (29. 11. 1361.). MR III, 1895, 133–134.

su ponovo napali budvansku tvrđavu. U tom napadu kaštelan je zamalo izgubio svoju tvrđavu, a uspio ju je sačuvati tek uz pomoć svojih prijatelja Dubrovčana. Sredinom travnja, grad je poručivao Površku da se nikako ne predaje, jer oni će mu na svaki zahtjev poslati pomoć u ljudima, namirnicama, majstorima i svemu što je potrebno da se obrani. Hrabrili su ga i nudili da se njegova obitelj skloni u Grad (MR III, 1895, 181; Ćirković et al., 1970, 14–15). Dobre odnose s Površkom i zetskim primorjem imao je dubrovački trgovac Marin Menčetić (Manken, 1960, 340–341). Da bi pomogla svom prijatelju u obrani od Kotorana, na njegov zahtjev, Dubrovačka komuna mu je 3. travnja 1362. odobrila da kupi brod za Površku (MR III, 1895, 257). Ovaj vojni poklon ojačao je pozicije Budvana na moru i pomogao u obrani kaštela.

Ratni sukob između kneza Vojislava i Kotorana s jedne protiv Dubrovnika i kaštelana Površka s druge strane okončan je sklapanjem mira u ljetu 1362. Tada je car Uroš izdao povelju u Onogoštu 22. kolovoza (Mihaljčić, 2001b, 69). Krajem srpnja prilikom mirovnih pregovora Dubrovčani su postavili uvjet da se njihov prijatelj Površko mora naći u mirovnom sporazumu (MR III, 1895, 210). Zetski gospodari Balšići nisu izravno sudjelovali u ratu protiv Vojislava Vojinovića, jer ih ne nalazimo u odlukama vijeća u vezi s pregovorima (Mihaljčić, 2001b, 69). Rat između Vojislava i Dubrovnika rasvjetljava prilike u srpskom carstvu. Uroš se sve do sklapanja mira ne primjećuje u događajima, nije bio u stanju da zaustavi napade svoga vlastelina, niti da čitavu svoju državu pokrene u taj rat. Srpski vladar djelovao je više kao posrednik, nego kao zaraćena strana protiv grada i Budve. U Uroševoj mirovnoj povelji isticalo se da su obje strane u sukobu bile dužne jedna drugoj vratiti zarobljenike (Ćirković et al., 1970, 15–16; Mihaljčić, 2001b, 67–68). U gradu je bio zarobljenik Dživo Buća, kojega su Dubrovčani držali u tamnici zbog toga što su u Kotoru bili zarobljeni kći i zet budvanskog kaštelana s još dva njegova čovjeka. Površko je tih dana boravio u gradu, jer je morao pričekati da se izvrši razmjena zarobljenika. Dana mu je 26. kolovoza 1362. naoružana galija da ga odveze kući, a da se spomenuta galija odmah vrati u grad.<sup>7</sup>

Odmah poslije sklapanja mira u Onogoštu obnovljena je trgovina u Srbiji i dozvoljeno je da podanici carevi i kneza Vojislava dolaze u Grad sv. Vlaha (Maličović, 2010, 177). Dubrovčani su tražili da se odmah izvrši razmjena zarobljenika. Vijeće umoljenih je 13. rujna 1362. ukazalo Dživu da piše Kotoranima da oslobode zarobljenike, što je on odmah i učinio. Zbog važnosti ovog vlastelina, kotorska je komuna odmah reagirala pa je 20. rujna u Grad stigao njihov zastupnik, koji je od dubrovačke Vlade tražio da puste Dživa napominjući da su to obećali caru Urošu i knezu Vojislavu. Vijeće umoljenih je odgovorilo da ga hoće pustiti, ali čim bude zadovoljen Površko, te zato upućuju kotorskog zastupnika da o tome pregovara s budvanskim kaštelanom. Međutim, Kotorani su okljevali pustiti zarobljenike i

7 Senat je 13. kolovoza 1362. odlučio da se budvanskom kaštelanu pošalje galija koja bi ga prevezla u grad. MR III, 1895, 140, 217.

zbog toga Grad nije htio pustiti kotorskog vlastelina. Zbog toga su se umiješali car Uroš i knez Vojislav. Grad sv. Vlaha želio je pomoći svom prijatelju Površku, ali s druge strane nije htio izazivati cara srpskog i kneza humskog protiv sebe (MR III, 1895, 222–224, 226). Dubrovčani su pokušali svojom vještom diplomacijom izmiriti Budvane i Kotorane. Ponudili su ulogu medijatora, pa je 14. listopada Veliko vijeće donijelo odluku da se u Budvu pošalje poslanik. Predlagano je kaštelanu da umjesto kotorskog vlastelina u tamnicu primi njegovog sina kao jamstvo, a Dživo da se pusti na slobodu. Buća je trebao vratiti zeta i kćer Površkovu, nakon čega će njegov sin biti oslobođen. Ovaj dubrovački prijedlog Površko nije prihvatio, jer je imao veliko nepovjerenje prema Kotoranima. O ovom pitanju raspravljano je u Gradu 10. prosinca 1362. godine. Na zahtjev srpskog cara, Vlada je odlučila ponovno poslati poslanika kaštelanu. Dubrovčani su posreduvali da se Površko složi s razmjenom zarobljenika. Misija je uspjela te je razmjena zarobljenika izvršena do kraja mjeseca (MR III, 1895, 231–232, 240). Dubrovčanima nisu odgovarali daljnji sukobi, jer ratna zbivanja su ugrožavala slobodnu i sigurnu trgovinu na zetskom primorju.

U prosincu 1363. umro je knez Vojislav. Neprljateljstva Kotorana protiv Budve nastavljena su. U jesen 1364. kotorski su brodovi bili pod zidinama Budve. Tijekom duge opsade uspjeli su ubiti Površka. Dubrovčani nisu mogli pomoći svom savezniku. Komuna je bila u gotovo beznadnom položaju i svakoga časa je mogla pasti u ruke Kotorana. Površkova obitelj (majka, žena i sin) izvijestili su Grad da žele napustiti Budvu (Ćirković et al., 1970, 17, 20). Dubrovačka komuna krajem studenog 1364. poslala je galiju da prihvati obitelj Površkovu. Plan je bio sljedeći: kapetan galije Jakov Žurgović, Pavle Sorkočević i Dobre Kaličević trebali su ploviti do granice kaštela Budve. Jedan ili dvojica ljudi trebali su pokušati spasiti obitelj pokojnog kaštelana, dovesti ih u grad s njihovim stvarima, namještajem, oružjem i ljudima, kao i svim drugim što im treba. Ako se članovi misije nađu u oružarnici kotorskih brodova, trebaju ih pozdraviti kao prijatelje. Ako ne dobiju njihovo razumijevanje, trebaju se vratiti na galiju, ali ako ih napadnu, dužni su bili braniti se. Unatoč ‘neutralnosti’ kojom su se javno hvalili, Dubrovčani su imali tajni zadatak da uz pomoć Budvana oštete i zapale ratne sprave u tvrđavi i da zapale kaštelanovu galiju kako ne bi pala u ruke Kotoranima (Gelcich, 1896, 23–24; Smičiklas, 1915, 406–407). Poslanici su se izložili velikoj opasnosti i uspjeli su prebaciti Površkovu obitelj u Grad i pružiti joj utočište. Gradske vlasti su ukazivale gostoprivrstvo svojim starim prijateljima i materijalno ih pomagali.

Zapovjedniku dubrovačke galije naloženo je da izrazi sućut Balši II. Balšiću (? – 1385.) zbog dvostrukе nesreće: zbog zarobljavanja njegovog brata Đurđa u ljeto 1364. od strane Karla Topije (oko 1338.–1388.) i smrti vjernog budvanskog kaštelana. Grad je izrazio žaljenje zbog pogibije Površka kao najvjernijeg prijatelja, brata i građanina čija je smrt izazvala veliku tugu u Gradu (Gelcich, 1896, 24; Smičiklas, 1915, 407). Dubrovčani su biranim riječima o pokojniku podilazili budućem nasljedniku Budve, jer su bili zabrinuti tko će naslijediti Površka i kako će se promjene odraziti na njihove interese.

## BUDVANSKI KAŠTELAN NIKOLA ZAKARIJA (1364.–1388.) I DUBROVNIK

Na mjesto pognulog Površka u gradu Budvi javlja se kao kaštelan vojvoda Nikola Zakarija. Idući Površkovim stopama, on održava dobre odnose s Dubrovčanima. Nikola se ponekad u vrelima naziva Sakat (*Sacchat*) (Dinić-Knežević, 1995, 182, bilj. 85). Zajedno sa svojom braćom (*Andrea, Giue, Dimiter et Progon*) on je 28. listopada 1365. primljen za počasnog dubrovačkog građanina (Jireček, 1897, 589; Manken, 1960, 96). Sljedeće godine u srpnju kaštelan je izabran za mletačkog građanina (Jireček, 1897, 589). Budva je bila važna kao saveznički, jer je zbog strateškog položaja na južnom Jadranu mogla kontrolirati izlazak i ulazak robe u Kotor. To su bili politički motivi za dodjelu dubrovačkog i mletačkog građanstva. Komuna je nastavila priznavati vrhovnu vlast zetskih gospodara Balšića (Mihaljić, 2001b, 165, 167). Zbog lošeg postupanja Površka prema mletačkim trgovcima, Mlečani su od 1365. do 1369. tražili od kapetana jadranske flote da nadoknadi štetu od Budve. Venecija je taj dug tražila najprije od Površkove žene ili nasljednika, a zatim od obitelji Balšić. U mletačkim dokumentima kao kaštelani Budve navode se Đurđe I. ili Balša II. Balšić, zato što je komuna priznavala vrhovnu vlast zetskih gospodara (Ćirković et al., 1970, 22, 24; Ćuk, 1986, 106–107). Važno je istaknuti da je u Bokokotorskom zaljevu došlo do političkih promjena: Kotor je do 1371. godine bio pod vlašću Nemanjića, a zatim je priznao vlast Ugarsko-hrvatskih vladara (1371.–1384.) (Butorac, 1966, 91–92).

U dubrovačkim dokumentima Nikola se spominje u znatno manjem opsegu. Tijekom 1378. izbio je rat između Venecije i Genove. Na strani Genove ušlo je Ugarsko-hrvatsko kraljevstvo i Dubrovnik (Foretić, 1980, 160–162). Mletačka flota osvojila je Kotor 13. kolovoza 1378. od kralja Ludovika I. Anžuvinaca (1342.–1382.) (Ćirković et al., 1970, 22, 24). Grad i Kotor ponovno su se našli u neprijateljskim taborima (Foretić, 1980, 160–161). Početkom veljače 1379. u gradu je boravio poslanik Nikole Zakarije. Dubrovačka komuna 13. veljače odlučila je poslaniku budvanskog kaštelana dodijeliti barku s jednim čovjekom, radi povratka u Budvu. Po povratku je brod imao zadatku uploviti u Kotorski zaljev (Gelcich, 1896, 195). Ne znamo razlog dolaska i tijek razgovora, no smatramo da je to bilo povezano sa zajedničkom borbom protiv Mlečana u Kotoru, jer na to nam ukazuju i daljnji događaji.

U lipnju 1379. Kotorani, vjerojatno impresionirani vijestima o porazu mletačke flote u Puli i u strahu od dolaska Genovljana u Dubrovnik, zbacili su vlast i podčinili se Ugarsko-hrvatskom kralju. Međutim, mletačka posada s kapetanom Jakovom Ripom je ostala u Kotoru i povukla se u utvrdu (Antonović, 2003, 102; Maliković, 2010, 189). Iste godine, 28. srpnja, Senat je donio odluku da se kaštelanu Nikoli da isprava s pečatom komune, kao potvrda da je dubrovački građanin (Gelcich, 1896, 232). Gradu je ponovno trebao vojni saveznički, a vješta dubrovačka diplomacija ponovno je Budvu uključila na svoju stranu u borbi pro-

tiv Mlečana koji su vladali utvrdom u Kotoru. To je bio motiv za ponovnu dodjelu građanstva. Kao u doba Površka, Budva je bila najbliža baza za vojne poduhvate protiv Kotora, a zato im je i trebao Nikola.

Nikola je zajedno s Dubrovčanima onemogućavao Kotoru ostvariti prihode od prodaje soli, a na taj su način htjeli potisnuti svog protivnika u trgovini s balkanskim zaleđem i držati monopol (Ćirković et al., 1970, 39; Foretić, 1980, 161; Krekić, 2007, 321). Kao saveznik Grada sv. Vlaha zaustavio je kotorski brod koji je bio natovaren solju. U Vijeću umoljenih 7. svibnja 1380. donesena je odluka da se taj brod pod tajnim okolnostima prosljedi u Grad. Kaštelanu Budve dan je zauzvrat poklon od 15 lakata tkanine.<sup>8</sup> Dvadeset dana kasnije, Malo vijeće željelo je u Gradu udomiti Nikolu u znak zahvalnosti za pomoć. Kao nagradu dali su mu 10 perpera za boravak i kuću za smještaj (Dinić, 1951, 39). Dubrovčani su darivanjem tkanina i kuće željeli iskazati zahvalnost prema svom savezniku.

Nikola Zakarija bio je u službi Dubrovnika i kasnije. Na nagon Grada zaustavljao je brodove zadarskih i drugih trgovaca koji su 1382. i 1383. godine prenosili sol za Novi koji je kralj Tvrtko I. (1353.–1391.) otvorio u Dračevici. Otvaranje tržišta soli u Novom nanosilo je štetu trgovačkim interesima Grada sv. Vlaha, zato su uz pomoć Nikole pokušali to zaustaviti (Bujuklić, 1988, 19). Kralj Tvrtko izvršio je opsadu Kotora početkom 1383. godine. Tada je zapovjednik Budve oduzeo kožu, vosak i drugu robu (u vrijednosti od 120 dukata) dubrovačkom trgovcu Marinu. Tražeći naknadu, Marin je krajem veljače 1383. pokušavao povratiti robu (DAD, 1; Dinić-Knežević, 1995, 192, bilj. 85). Nemamo podataka o nadoknadi pričinjene štete i o tome je li ovaj napad budvanskog kaštelana negativno utjecao na odnose s Gradom.

Poslije pogibije zetskog gospodara Balše II. (18. rujna 1385.), u sukobu s Osmanlijama na Saurskom polju nedaleko od Berata, vlast u Zeti pripala je njegovom sinovcu Đuradu II. Stracimiroviću Balšiću (1385.–1403.). Balšina pogibija bila je povod da se od centralne vlasti odmetnu pojedine vlastelinske obitelji, među kojima je bila obitelj Zakarija koja je težila potpunoj samostalnosti (Ćirković et al., 1970, 50). Nikola je došao u sukob s novim zetskim vladarom Đurđem II. vjerojatno 1386. godine (Bujuklić, 1988, 19). To nam potvrđuje i Dubrovčanin Mavro Orbini, u svom poznatom djelu *Kraljevstvo Slavena*, koji kaže da su Nikola i njegov brat Andrija imali sukob s zetskim gospodarom (Orbin, 1968, 132). Kaštelan budvanski spominje se u dubrovačkim dokumentima krajem ožujka 1386. kao značajna ličnost u Zeti (Dinić, 1964, 226). Kaštelanu Budve 14. siječnja 1388. dozvoljeno je da može kupiti od komune do 20 stari ječma (Dinić, 1964, 450). To je njegov posljednji spomen u dubrovačkim vrelima. Nemamo podatke je li Nikola umro prirodnom smrću ili je točno Orbinijevo izlaganje da je Balšić kaznio odmetnike vađenjem očiju. U prvoj polovici 1389. godine Budvom je zavladao zetski gospodar Đurđad II.

8 Dinić, 1951, 37. U povijesti Crne Gore II./2 navedena je pogrešna godina 1379., bez datuma. Ćirković et al., 1970, 39

## BUDVANSKI GOSPODARI ĐURAĐ II. STRACIMIROVIĆ BALŠIĆ, RADIĆ CRNOJEVIĆ, SANDALJ HRANIĆ I DUBROVNIK OD 1389.–1398.

Početkom srpnja 1389. Đurad II. se nalazio u Budvi, gdje su ga posjetila dva dubrovačka poslanika i pozvala ga da posjeti Dubrovnik (Dinić, 1964, 531–532, 560). Vršene su pripreme za njegov doček 8. srpnja, a vijećano je o poklonu i odlučeno da mu se pokloni *unam peciam scarleti fini et duas pecias panni de cumis* (Dinić, 1964, 532, 560–561). Dubrovčani su, darovanjem kvalitetnih tkanina i vrijednog sukna tkanog u Kumi, željeli ukazati poštovanje i pažnju prema svom gostu. Balšić je, vjerojatno zbog osmanlijske provale u Srbiju i bitke na Kosovu, odgodio svoj dolazak u grad, ne želeći napustiti Zetu u tim opasnim danima.

Grad je 1391. godine zabranio svim svojim stanovnicima odlazak u Budvu. Malo vijeće 1. travnja 1391. donosi odluku da se zbog kuge ne dozvoli vlasnicima brodova i njihovoj posadi, kao ni nikome drugome, odlazak u mesta *Budva usque Dulcinium* te se zabranjuje pristup svima koji bi s područja od Budve do Ulcinja htjeli doći u Dubrovnik. Prekršitelji su mogli biti kažnjeni novčanom kaznom do 100 dukata (Lonza & Šundrica, 2005, 153; Blažina-Tomić, 2007, 87).

Radić Crnojević (? – 1396.) član ugledne zetske vlastelinske obitelji, preoteo je od svog bivšeg gospodara Đurđa II. Budvu, prije studenog 1392. godine. U je svojoj tituli isticao da je gospodar Budve i Zete (Milutinović, 1999, 203). S Dubrovčanima su Crnojevići bili u dobrom odnosima. Braća Crnojevići (Radić i Stefan) u prvoj polovici 1395. obećavaju Dubrovčanima prijateljstvo i daju im slobodu trgovine na teritoriju kojim vladaju (Rudić, 2008, 157–161). U prvoj polovini lipnja 1395. Grad je poslao Radiču *ambasatori* sa *barcham armatam ad remos sex*. Senat je 21. lipnja izabrao *ser Nicolao de Gociis ambassiatori ad Radićium Cernoevich*. Nikola ga nije u Budvi našao, pa mu je zbog novonastalih okolnosti 6. kolovoza dano uputstvo da čeka *Radiz pro aliquos dies* (Lonza, 2011, 225–226, 228). Tijekom 1395. Đurad II. ušao je u ratni sukob s Radičem zbog Budve. Sredinom kolovoza iste godine u Dubrovniku se vijećalo o slanju poslanstva Đurađu II. Stracimiroviću i Radiču Crnojeviću (*pro ambaxiatore ad Iura et Radiz*). O tome je vijećano 16., 18., i 23. kolovoza (*pro denariis quondam Zive de Menze*) (Lonza, 2011, 229–230). Vijeće umoljenih 23. kolovoza donosi odluku *pro donis ad Iurchum* – da mu da poklon preko *ambassiatoribus* u iznosu od 30 perpera. Radić je dobio za poklon 15 perpera (Lonza, 2011, 230). Ovo poslanstvo imalo je zadatak prekinuti daljnje borbe između Balšića i Crnojevića. Dubrovačke vlasti su nastojale da poklonima, kao neverbalnom komunikacijom, odašilju poruke mira zaraćenim stranama u svojim diplomatskim misijama. Na osnovu iskustva u diplomaciji, vjerovali su da će misiju uspješno završiti podmićivanjem, i tako ih pridobiti za vlastitu korist. Lakovjerni i pohlepni vladari lako su nasjedali na ovu igru Dubrovčana. Međutim, učinak diplomatskih misija nije dao rezultata.

Krajem svibnja 1396. Radić je poginuo u sukobu s Đurđevom vojskom (Ćirković et al., 1970, 64). U međuvremenu se Budva našla pod vlašću bosanskog

vojvode Sandalja Hranića (oko 1370.–1435.). Vojvoda je Budvu dao na upravu supruzi Jeleni, odmah nakon vjenčanja u lipnju 1396. godine.<sup>9</sup> Jelena je gospodarila Budvom sve do proljeća 1398. Tijekom te dvije godine Bosanci su prodavali sol dovoženu iz talijanskog grada Brindizija. Naravno, to nije odgovaralo interesima Sv. Vlaha, jer se nisu nikako slagali s postojanjem većeg broja tržišta soli. Na teritoriju od Neretve do Bojane trgovina solju bila je ograničena samo na četiri mjesta: Drijeva, Dubrovnik, Kotor i Sv. Srđ. U prvoj polovici prosinca 1397. Dubrovčani su poslali u Sutorinu i Budvu svoje ljude da ispitaju sve što se odnosilo na prodaju soli. Grad je 11. travnja 1398. uputio barku da stražari da se sol ne uvozi u Budvu, Boku i Sutorinu. Donesena je odluka da se prijateljski piše vojvodi Sandalju da ne dovozi sol u Budvu i Sutorinu. Upućena je bila još jedna barka četiri dana kasnije, koja je imala zadatak da pretresa sve čamce i pljeni sol koja se ondje otkrije te se donese u Dubrovnik (Gecić, 1955, 100).

Trećeg dana siječnja 1398. dubrovačke vlasti su ovlastile Marina Gundulića da posreduje pri sklapanju mira između Đurđa II. i Sandalja. Tada je bosanski vojvoda boravio u Ratačkoj opatiji, koja se tih godina nalazila pod njegovom vlašću, i u njoj je ugostio dubrovačkog poklislara (Ćorović, 1940, 356; Marković, 2006, 134). Do njihova pomirenja moglo je doći u prvoj polovici siječnja, jer je Sandalj uzmaknuo. Razlog odstupanja Hranića mogao je biti izazvan zbog hladne zime i opasnosti od Osmanlija (Kurtović, 2009, 102, bilj. 342). Sklapanje mira odgovaralo je i zetskom gospodaru i bosanskom vojvodi. U ožujku 1398. Sandalj je odlučio preseliti svoju suprugu iz Budve, jer se nije osjećala sigurno. Hranić je u travnju 1398. molio dubrovačke vlasti da prebace dva njegova čovjeka, skadarskog arhiđakona Teodora i Radinca u Budvu. Vijeće umoljenih odlučilo je da ne može ispuniti njegovu molbu, želeći na taj način ostati po strani. Vlada je ipak krajem travnja 1398. dozvolila da Sandaljevu ženu prebace brodom u Dubrovnik, usprkos svim ranije nanesenim štetama Gradu od strane Hranićevih ljudi.<sup>10</sup> Plemićima koji su išli po Sandaljevu ženu bilo je naređeno: ako zateknu barku ili brod natovaren solju u Budvi da ne dozvole istovar soli, da spale brod i barku koja je dovezla sol (Gecić, 1955, 100). Kada se bosanski vojvoda povukao iz Budve, spor oko prodaje soli smanjen je (Premović, 2018, 881, bilj. 12).

Na samom kraju XIV. stoljeća na južnom Jadranu učvršćuju se dvije nove vlasti: Osmanlije i Venecija. Osmanlije su sve više prodirale na zapad i postupno osvajale gradove sjeverne Albanije. Zbog zaustavljanja osmanlijskog prodiranja i zaštite kršćana na Jadranu, Žigmund je dao suglasnost i pristao da Mleci 1396. od Đurđa II. preuzmu: Skadar, Sveti Srđ, Skadarsko jezero s tamošnjim otocima,

9 O ovom povijesnom događaju vidjeti: Ćirković, 1964, 178; Ćirković et al., 1970, 65–66; Jelčić, 2010, 231–232. U povijesnoj nauci postoji nedoumica da li je Jelena bila kćer Radiča Crnojevića ili njegova udovica. Na temelju žurbe, kojom je vjenčanje bilo obavljeno nakon Radićeve pogibije, trebalo bi se opredijeliti za ovu drugu mogućnost. Vidjeti o tome više u: Ančić, 1986, 44–45; Rudić, 2008, 160; Najnovija istraživanja o Jeleninom podrijetlu, sa navođenjem vrela i starije literature, vidi: Kurtović, 2009, 83, 86.

10 Posljednji podatak u dubrovačkim vrelima iz kojeg se vidi da je Jelena još boravila u Budvi je od 11. 5. 1398., kada su Dubrovčani poslali svog poslanika. Ančić, 1986, 45, bilj. 29, 34; Kurtović, 2009, 88, 102, 380.

područje na lijevoj obali Bojane prema moru, tvrđavu Šati i carinu u Danju s okolnim selima (Ćuk, 1986, 95; Schmitt, 2001, 237–239). Preuzimanjem ovih posjeda došlo je do povrede Torinskog mira (1381.). Međutim, nadzor Jadrana bio je trajni mletački politički cilj. Osmanlijski prodor došao je kao dobar povod da poput pravih križara brane kršćanstvo od Osmanlija i preuzmu južni Jadran. Mlečani su Budvu zauzeli od Balše III. Balšića (1403.–1421.) 1405. godine (Ćirković et al., 1970, 89–90).

## TRGOVINA I TRGOVAČKI ODNOSI

U XIV. stoljeću na zetskom primorju najznačajniji gospodarski centar bio je Kotor, a za njim su Ulcinj i Bar osjetno zaostajali. Budva se nikada nije posebno isticala.<sup>11</sup> Postoji više objašnjenja njene nerazvijenosti. Komuna leži na otvorenoj obali bez prirodne luke i izložena je sjevernim vjetrovima, čime je onemogućeno pristajanje većih brodova. Nepovoljna okolnost je bila da je smještena u blizini dva razvijena lučka grada: Kotora i Bara, koji su pomorcima bili daleko privlačniji. U budvanskem Statutu uopće nema propisa posvećenih pomorstvu. Kopneni put s unutarnjim dijelom Balkanskog poluotoka bio je ometen otežanim prolazom planinskog vijenca koji se uzdižao od obale i protezao cijelim područjem ovog obalnog grada (Bujuklić, 1988, 13–14). Pored ovih geografskih, utjecali su i negativni politički razlozi: pedesetih godina XIV. stoljeća gusari budvanski napadali su trgovce, rat Budve i Kotora od 1361.–1364., ratni sukob na južnom Jadranu 1378.–1381., sukob Balšića, Crnojevića i Hranića oko Budve od 1392.–1398. godine.

U sačuvanim dokumentima Budvani se rijetko spominju kao trgovci u Dubrovniku. Vulkoj Drahćić iz Budve 2. ožujka 1379. kupio je od Radoslava Vesele brod s kompletnom opremom za 48,5 perpera. Od navedene sume platio je 20 perpera, dok je ostatak Budvanin trebao otplaćivati u ratama od sedam perpera. Kao jamci navedeni su Dabroje Skonja i Radoslav Milošević. U dokumentu se navodi da su plaćanja izvršena u dogovorenim rokovima (DAD, 2). Gospodarski život budvanske komune uglavnom je bio ograničen na neposrednu okolicu, gdje su obradiva zemlja, vinogradi i maslinici bili osnovni izvor prihoda. Odredbe posvećene trgovini i trgovcima u budvanskom Statutu govore o prodaji vina, žitarica, ulja i soli. Spomeni ovih najvažnijih proizvoda ukazuju na slabu razvijenost. U samo jednoj odredbi Statuta raspravlja se o trgovcima i obvezi naplate carine na robu koja se unosi u grad, ali ona potječe iz XV. stoljeća (Vučković, Luketić & Bujuklić, 1988, 27; Bujuklić, 1988, 37).

Najznačajnija financijska destinacija na istočnoj obali Jadrana bio je Dubrovnik, vrlo privlačan trgovcima iz Zete, Srbije i Bosne. U drugoj polovici XIV. stoljeća bio je središte velikih komercijalnih transakcija i novčanih kredita (Voje,

11 Dinić-Knežević, 1999, 131–139; O gospodarskoj nerazvijenosti Budve i vezama s Dubrovnikom u XIII. stoljeću vidjeti: Lučić, 1969, 833, 852.

1968, 210–211; Voje, 1976, 87–94). Budvani se vrlo rijetko spominju kao korisnici kredita. Krajem prosinca 1369. trgovac Tripko Marković iz Budve zajedno sa Stjepkom Ivanovićem iz Zadra (stanovnik Dubrovnika), Petarom Radostićem i Bogdanom Milčevićem uzeli su kredit za trgovinu (DAD, 3). Među Budvanima koji su uzimali zajmove susrećemo Stjepana Oslića. Krajem travnja 1371. on je vratio dug u robi Vitku Ruhiću u vrijednosti od 14 perpera (DAD, 4). Budvani se spominju kao jamci dužnika. Brajko Radovanić i Poznan Kanamdić registrirani su kao jamci 24. prosinca 1381. (DAD, 5). U notarskim dokumetima 13. studenog 1382. zabilježen je Radić Milinović da duguje krojaču Dominčetu 78 perpera s rokom naplate do tri mjeseca od prvog predstojećeg putovanja (DAD, 6). U dokumentima ima spomena o trgovackim poduhvatima. Vlahan Vitić 10. lipnja 1378. izjavljuje da je sklopio dogovor s Bogojem Milojevićem zbog ustupanja barke za plovidbu u Budvu i da će utovariti koliko bude mogao robe (nije navedeno koje vrste). Cijena za jednu plovidbu iznosit će dvadeset perpera, a kazna za svaki dan zadržavanja barke dva perpera (DAD, 7). Iz Budve se u Dubrovnik uvozio građevinski materijal. Krajem prosinca 1369. Dobrić Radončić obvezao se na isporuku mlinskog kamena u Grad (DAD, 8). Žito je najvažniji poljoprivredni proizvod za prehranu stanovništva. U arhivskoj građi nalazimo podatke da se žito iz Dubrovnika izvozilo u Budvu. Da bi se žito izvezlo, potrebna je bila dozvola Velikog vijeća.<sup>12</sup> *Illisu de Budua* 22. veljače 1388. dozvoljeno je da može kupiti 15 stari ječma (Dinić, 1964, 456). Ovi rijetki spomeni u arhivskoj građi svjedoče o nerazvijenosti budvanske komune. Zato je dubrovački trgovci zaobilaze, jer im ne daje mogućnost za trgovacko poslovanje i stjecanje novčane dobiti.

## BUDVANI U DUBROVNIKU

Nakon nemilosrdne kuge 1348. godine, koja je izazvala promjene u svim područjima života,<sup>13</sup> početkom pedesetih godina XIV. stoljeća u Dubrovniku dolazi do gospodarskog uzleta (Raukar, 1984, 245). Dubrovačko gospodarstvo osjetilo je potrebu za stranom radnom snagom. Obrtnicima i trgovcima trebali su šegrti, a bogatim vlasteoskim i građanskim obiteljima kućna posluga. Nuđene su razne povlastice novom stanovništvu za dolazak u grad, novac se ulaže u trgovinu, u uvoz ili izvoz robe (Božić, 1949, 30; Dinić-Knežević, 1974, 19, 26–27; Ćirković, 1997, 53–54; Pešorda-Vardić 2012, 37). U potrazi za poslom dolazi manji broj Budvana, koji su Dubrovnik promatrali kao obećani grad u potrazi za boljim životom.<sup>14</sup> Pružao im je mogućnost da prezive i nešto zarade. Njihov boravak u gradu odnosi se na ulazak u službu služenja ili dolazak na nauk obrta.

12 O uvozu i izvozu žita iz srednjovjekovnog Dubrovnika u XIV. stoljeću vidjeti: Dinić-Knežević, 1967, 79–131. Uobičajena mjera za žitarice bio je starij, star (*starium*). Star je bila mjera za zapreminu, po današnjoj decimalnoj mjeri iznosio bi: 1 starium = oko 64,5 kg (do 71,5 kg). Manken, 1960, 103–104.

13 Iscrpan prikaz tijeka epidemije kuge u Dubrovniku 1348. godine vidjeti u: Ravančić, 2010.

14 Doseljenje stanovništva iz slavenskoga zaleđa u Dubrovnik obrađeno je u radu: Benyovsky Latin, 2017, 473–500.

U arhivskim dokumentima spominju se stanovnici iz Budve koji dolaze služiti po kućama kao sluge i sluškinje. Ugovori o stupanju u službu redovito su bilježeni i uglavnom su to bili muškarci. Prvi ugovor zabilježen je 1366. godine. Od tada pa do 1398. došlo je 15 muškaraca i jedna žena, koji su našli zaposlenje u gradu. U ugovorima se obično navodi da će raditi sve što znaju i mogu (Dinić-Knežević, 1995, 51). Događalo se i to da dubrovački vlastelin odustane od sluge. U drugoj polovici listopada 1387. Mirko Stannerović dao je pristanak da njegova Punica stupi u službu kod Blaža Natalijevog Zontomanke. Ugovor je sklopljen na tri godine. Punica je dužna pratiti gospodara na cestama, čuvati kuću i slušati sve što Blaž naredi. Gospodar obećava da će je hraniti i oblačiti, a na kraju ugovorenog roka isplatit će naknadu u visini od tri perpera. Na margini teksta napisana je napomena o otkazivanju ugovora, jer je Blaž odustao (DAD, 9). Ne znamo razlog Blaževa odustanka, no moguće je da nije bio zadovoljan s službom svoje sluškinje. Muškarci su obično dobivali od tri do pet perpera (najčešće pet), a ponekad su radili samo da se prehrane (Dinić-Knežević, 1995, 51). Siromašni stanovnici iz zaleđa dolazili su u grad i stupali u kmetski odnos kod dubrovačke vlastele. Milec Obradović iz Budve s dvojicom svojih sinova 25. siječnja 1382. postao je kmet Živka Vlaha Mečetića. Obradovići bez Živkova dopuštenja nisu ga mogli napustiti, a jamac je bio Dabec Obradović (vjerojatno njihov rođak) (Dinić-Knežević, 1995, 121).

Obrti u Budvi bili su slabo razvijeni. Ovoj djelatnosti u budvanskom Statutu posvećeno je svega nekoliko odredbi koje se odnose na: uljarski, pekarski i mesarski obrt. Teško je pretpostaviti da nije bilo drugih (Bujuklić, 1988, 37). Zbog nerazvijene obrtničke djelatnosti, koja je bila vezana za svakodnevne životne potrebe, mladići iz Budve dolazili su u grad učiti obrt. U razdoblju od 1369. do 1398. godine zabilježeno je 13 ugovora. Budvani koji su služili u Dubrovniku: Radoslav (24. 9. 1369.), Dragoš Bogojević (21. 9. 1369.), Mihat Radošević (6. 3. 1371.), Ratko Ljepčinović (25. 5. 1371.), Ivan Ratković (24. 2. 1376.), Bratič Pripčić (18. 5. 1376.), Milatko Stannerović (21. 5. 1376.), Pavle Ožinić (4. 10. 1379.), Jurko Petročević (19. 11. 1376.), Jurko Dobriković (17. 5. 1386.), Butko Dobrić (3. 8. 1387.), Petar (2. 3. 1389.) i Juras Janković (26.5. 1398.) (DAD, 10). Ovi mladi Budvani sklapali su ugovore na razdoblje od pet do osam godina. Učili su sljedeće obrte: obućarski, kovački, bačvarski, brodograditeljski, krojački itd. U svim slučajevima sami mladići su zaključivali ugovor sa svojim gospodarom, što bi ukazivalo da su po godinama bili stariji. U jednom dijelu ugovora kao nagrada predviđena je hrana i odjeća. Nagrada u novcu obično je iznosila od 4 do 6 perpera godišnje (Dinić-Knežević, 1995, 90–91). Događalo se i da sluga opljačka svog gospodara. Zbog toga je Pripko kovač 5. travnja 1373. podnio tužbu protiv Medoja iz Budve (DAD, 11). Po svom položaju nisu se mnogo razlikovali od kućne posluge, jer su tijekom proučavanja obrta bili sluge svojih majstora. Učeni obrtnici i šegrti uglavnom se nisu vraćali svojim kućama, ostajući tako u privlačnijem dubrovačkom poslovnom okruženju (Dinić-Knežević, 1974, 27–28, 33).

Neki Budvani stalno su živjeli u Dubrovniku. Bratko Ivanc iz Budve 25. rujna 1392. ostavio je svoje dvije kamene kuće u Gradu te drugu pokretnu i nepokretnu imovinu svom nećaku dubrovačkom berberinu Dimku i Novaku Radmusoviću (DAD, 12; Dinić-Knežević, 1995, 209). Budvani su mogli dobiti dubrovačko građanstvo ako su tu boravili određeno vrijeme i bili korisni Gradu. Pored budvanskih kaštelana Površka i Nikole Zakarije, dubrovačko građanstvo 31. siječnja 1359. stekao je Stjepan Dobroslavić *calegar de Budva*. Stjepan se bavio postolarskim zanatom (MR II, 1882, 263; Manken, 1960, 92). Kao dubrovački građanin Dobroslavić imao je obavezu doseliti se s obitelji, kupiti nekretninu, izvršavati sve obaveze i terete građana. Podnosiла se molba Malom vijeću, a od 1395. trebala je i potvrda Velikog vijeća. Dubrovački vlastodršci nisu bili precizno odredili kriterij koliko dugo netko treba u Gradu stanovati, da bi dobio građanstvo. Pretpostavlja se da se radilo o rastezljivom kriteriju koji je ovisio o potrebama i procjenama vlasti.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> O uvjetima za dobivanje dubrovačkog građanstva vidjeti opširnije u: Mijušković, 1961, 102–124; Janeković-Römer, 2005, 321–322; Pešorda-Vardić 2012, 86–87.

## POLITICAL RELATIONS OF BUDVA AND DUBROVNIK COMMUNES FROM 1358 UNTIL THE END OF THE 14<sup>th</sup> CENTURY

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### SUMMARY

*The political relations between Budva and Dubrovnik from 1358 until the end of the 14<sup>th</sup> century were very intense. During 1359, they were in hostile relations, because of the Budva pirates' attacks on Dubrovnik merchants. With their skilful diplomacy, the citizens of Dubrovnik successfully resolved these misunderstandings. The following year, a peace agreement was concluded, followed by the friendly relations between the two towns. During the conflict between Dubrovnik and the prince Vojislav Vojinović and Kotor 1361–1362, Budva was Dubrovnik's ally. St. Blasius city authorities granted citizenship to lord Površko (1361–1364) at the end of October 1361, for alliance and military support. This diplomatic gift expresses gratitude, respect, and friendship. When Površko was killed in November 1364 by Kotor, the citizens of Dubrovnik sent a galley to save his family. The city authorities showed hospitality and provided material support to Površko's family. Duke Nikola Zakaria (1364–1388) replaced the deceased Površko as castellan in the town of Budva. During the war between Venice and Genoa from 1378 to 1381, Dubrovnik needed a military ally in the southern Adriatic. The great Dubrovnik diplomacy again won Budva over to their side in the fight against the Venetians who ruled in Kotor. This was the motive for granting citizenship to Nikola, the master of Budva, at the end of July 1379. The concept of granting citizenship and friendship to Budva's masters included helping Dubrovnik in the fight against Kotor. Budva had the task to attack Kotor and block the communes, to control the commercial import and export of goods. In return, the masters of Budva were given shelter for themselves and their family in the town, assistance in weapons, food, money, and gifts. In chronological order, we processed the diplomatic missions of deputies from Dubrovnik in Budva and their basic guidelines. The documents show that the deputies' goals were different: support the Castellan of Budva in the fight against Kotor (1361–1362), mediation in the conflicts of Durad II Balšić over Budva with Radić Crnojević in 1395 and Duke Sandalj Hranić in 1398, etc. Gifts played an important role in diplomatic relations between Dubrovnik and Budva. The most frequent gifts to Budva's masters were textiles that Dubrovnik gave to gain concrete and long-term political benefits. Budva was economically underdeveloped and the traders from Dubrovnik were bypassing Budva, because there was not enough opportunity for business and profit. In search of a job and a better life, a small number of people from Budva came to study various crafts in Dubrovnik or were engaged as servants and maids. Based on the analysis of the sources in the reported period, we came to the conclusion that Budva and Dubrovnik had very good political relations.*

**Keywords:** Budva, Dubrovnik, political relations, fourteenth century, the economy, southern Dalmatia

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## O DR. MILANU JAKLIČU IN PRVEM PREVODU *KOMUNISTIČNEGA MANIFESTA* V SLOVENSKI JEZIK

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### *IZVLEČEK*

*Prvi prevod Komunističnega manifesta v slovenski jezik je opravil pravnik dr. Milan Jaklič (Podgorica (Dobropolje), 14. februar 1886 – Ljubljana, 30. junij 1963). Prevod je leta 1908 izdala založba časopisa Naprej, glasila idrijske okrajne organizacije Jugoslovanske socialnodemokratske stranke. Jaklič je bil med vidnejšimi člani stranke. Pred prvo svetovno vojno je sodeloval v uredništvu njenega glasila Zarja, po vojni pa je postal politični urednik njenega novega glasila Naprej. Od konca novembra 1919 do začetka marca 1920 je deloval v funkciji vodenja poverjeništva Deželne vlade za Slovenijo za socialno politiko. Konec maja 1920 je postal načelnik pri ministrstvu za socialno politiko v Beogradu, v letih 1923–1927 pa je bil ravnatelj Osrednjega urada za zavarovanje delavcev v Zagrebu. Nato se je kot privatnik posvetil raziskovanju na področju agronomije. Med drugo svetovno vojno je bil v italijanski internaciji. Po vojni je živel na Vrhniki in v letih 1945–1962 kot pravnik honorarno delal pri Okrajnem in nato Krajevnem ljudskem odboru Vrhnika ter na občini Vrhnika. Jakličev prevod Komunističnega manifesta je bil sestavni del naporov socialne demokracije, da bi zagotovila sistematično izdajanje socialističnih publikacij. Prispeval je k napredku socialističnega tiska na Slovenskem na začetku 20. stoletja.*

*Ključne besede: Komunistični manifest, dr. Milan Jaklič, Jugoslovanska socialnodemokratska stranka, Anton Kristan, založba časopisa Naprej*

### *DR. MILAN JAKLIČ E LA PRIMA TRADUZIONE IN SLOVENO DEL MANIFESTO COMUNISTA*

### *SINTESI*

*Il primo a tradurre il Manifesto comunista in lingua slovena era stato l'avvocato dr. Milan Jaklič (Podgorica (Dobropolje), 14 febbraio 1886 – Lubiana, 30 giugno 1963). La traduzione venne pubblicata nel 1908 dalla casa editrice del quotidiano Naprej, il giornale dell'organizzazione distrettuale di Idrija del partito socialdemocratico jugoslavo (Jugoslovanska socialnodemokratska stranka). Jaklič era uno dei membri più in vista del partito. Precedentemente alla Prima guerra mondiale*

aveva collaborato alla redazione del quotidiano *Zarja* e dopo la guerra divenne il direttore politico della nuova serie del giornale *Naprej*. Dalla fine di novembre 1919 agli inizi di marzo 1920 era dirigente della Commissione per le politiche sociali del Governo provinciale per la Slovenia. Alla fine di maggio 1920 divenne direttore del Ministero per le politiche sociali a Belgrado e negli anni 1923–1927 aveva diretto l’Ufficio centrale per l’assicurazione dei lavoratori a Zagabria. In seguito si dedicò alla ricerca privata nel campo dell’agronomia. Durante la Seconda guerra mondiale venne internato dalle autorità italiane. Nel dopoguerra visse a Vrhnika e negli anni 1945–1962 lavorò a tempo parziale come giurista presso il Comitato popolare distrettuale e poi per presso quello locale e al municipio di Vrhnika. La traduzione di Jaklič del Manifesto comunista era parte integrante degli sforzi della socialdemocrazia per garantire la pubblicazione sistematica delle pubblicazioni socialiste. Aveva contribuito allo sviluppo della stampa socialista in Slovenia agli inizi del secolo XX.

*Parole chiave: Manifesto comunista, dr. Milan Jaklič, Partito socialdemocratico jugoslavo (Jugoslovanska socialnodemokratska stranka), Anton Kristan, casa editrice del quotidiano Naprej*

UVOD<sup>1</sup>

O bistvu oblikovalcev političnega prostora posebej govorijo ključne ideje, ki so vodile k njihovemu pojavu. Med njimi je v času moderne močno izstopala komunistična, ki je svojo utegeljitev dobila v *Komunističnem manifestu* Karla Marxa in Friedrika Engelsa leta 1848. *Manifest* je opredelil razvoj marksističnega delavskega gibanja in njegovih strank – socialnodemokratskih in komunističnih. Njegovo umestitev v različna nacionalna okolja so najbolje zagotovili s prevodom v domači jezik, kar je olajšalo spoznavno razumevanje delovanja nacionalnih marksističnih političnih subjektov.

Na Slovenskem je to prvi storil pravnik dr. Milan Jaklič (Podgorica (Dobropolje), 14. februar 1886 – Ljubljana, 30. junij 1963), ki je poskrbel za prevod *Komunističnega manifesta* v slovenski jezik. Prevod je kot IV. zvezek knjižnice časopisa *Naprej* leta 1908 izšel v Idriji. Izdala ga je založba časopisa *Naprej*, glasila idrijske okrajne organizacije Jugoslovanske socialnodemokratske stranke (JSDS).<sup>2</sup> Ob tem, ko je letos minilo sto let od ustanovitve prve komunistične organizacije na Slovenskem, (Klopčič, 1969; Adamič et al., 1980, 90–95; Perovšek, 1998, 92, 106–110; Deželak Barič, 2006, 232–235) bomo opozorili na gmotni vidik, ki je spremeljal prvo slovensko izdajo *Komunističnega manifesta*.

## DR. MILAN JAKLIČ

Prevajalec *Komunističnega manifesta* Milan Jaklič je osnovno šolo in I. državno gimnazijo, kjer je bil v letih 1902–1903 predsednik dijaškega Slovenskega kluba,<sup>3</sup> obiskoval v Ljubljani. Po maturi leta 1904 je vpisal študij prava na Dunaju in ga z opravljenim rigorozom zaključil leta 1908. Leta 1905 se je približal socialni demokraciji in bil kot pripadnik JSDS v letih 1907–1914 sodelavec njenih glasil *Rdeči prapor* in *Zarja*, prvega socialnodemokratskega dnevnika na Slovenskem; od leta 1911 je sodeloval v uredništvu *Zarje*. Sodeloval je še pri socialnodemokratskem sindikalnem glasilu *Železničar* in bil med sodelavci *Našega lista*, tednika, ki je spremeljal slovensko življenje s stališča svobodomiselnosti.<sup>4</sup> Prevajal je tudi drugo marksistično in leposlovno literaturo (Ferri, 1910 [1911]); Go'rkij, 1912; Wilde, 1921).

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- 1 Članek je nastal v okviru izvajanja raziskovalnega programa št. P6-0281: *Idejnopolitični in kulturni pluralizem in monizem na Slovenskem v 20. stoletju*, ki ga sofinancira Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije iz državnega proračuna. / The authors acknowledge the financial support from the state budget by the Slovenian Research Agency (Programme No. P6-0281: *Conceptually-Political and Cultural Pluralism and Monism in 20th Century Slovenia*).
- 2 Druga izdaja Jakličevega prevoda je izšla leta 1920, faksimilizirane izdaje prve pa v letih 1967, 1983 in 2008.
- 3 PADMJJ, Glavni zapisnik "Slovenskega kluba" v Ljubljani, 1902–1903.
- 4 PADMJJ, kuverta Milan Jaklič, Življenjepisni podatki; Zarja, 18. 9. 1911: Ljubljana in Kranjsko: Spodnja Šiška, 2; Zarja, 9. 10. 1911: Po šišenskih volitvah, 2.



Sl. 1: Milan Jaklič kmalu po prevodu Komunističnega manifesta (PADMJ).

Jaklič je bil med vidnejšimi člani JSDS. Poleg opravljanja uredniške funkcije je med VIII. in XI. zborom JSDS v letih 1912–1919 sodeloval v strankinem vodstvu (Pijade, 1951, 255; Adamič et al., 1980, 21, 23, 25), pred prvo svetovno vojno pa je deloval še kot odbornik socialnodemokratskega kulturnega in izobraževalnega društva Vzajemnost v Šiški v Ljubljani.<sup>5</sup> O zgodovini gospodarskega razvoja in kapitalističnega družbenega reda je pripravil več predavanj na Delavski šoli Vzajemnosti.<sup>6</sup> Na občinskih volitvah leta 1911 je bil kot strankin kandidat izvoljen v občinski odbor Spodnja Šiška.<sup>7</sup> Med prvo svetovno vojno je bil kot prisednik v službi pravosodne uprave na območju Višnjega sodišča v Gradcu, od leta 1915 v okviru vojaške sodne službe.<sup>8</sup>

Jaklič je po končani vojni v času pred združitvijo Države Slovencev, Hrvatov in Srbov in Kraljevine Srbije 1. decembra 1918<sup>9</sup> nastopil kot eden od govornikov na shodih, ki jih je JSDS 24. novembra 1918 pripravila po Sloveniji glede notranje ureditve bodoče jugoslovanske države.<sup>10</sup> Dejaven je bil še pri založniški zadruži socialistične omladine Slovenska socialna matica, ki je izdajala

revijo *Demokracija*.<sup>11</sup> Bil je tudi med kulturnimi in političnimi delavci, ki so na ljubljanskega župana dr. Ivana Tavčarja<sup>12</sup> naslovili protestno izjavo, ker na dan pogreba Ivana Cankarja ni hotel razobesiti žalne zastave na Mestni hiši (Grdina, 2019, 231; Perovšek, 2018a, 65–66).<sup>13</sup> Konec leta 1918 je prevzel politično vodenje strankinega osrednjega glasila *Naprej* v Ljubljani.<sup>14</sup>

5 Rdeči prapor, 16. 4. 1910: Društvene vesti: upravni odsek ‚Vzajemnosti‘, 3; Rdeči prapor, 30. 4. 1910: Društvene vesti: upravni odsek ‚Vzajemnosti‘ za Šiško, 4.

6 Zarja, 12. 10. 1911: Delavska šola ‚Vzajemnosti‘, 2; Zarja, 20. 10. 1911: Ljubljana in Kranjsko: Delavska šola ‚Vzajemnosti‘, 2; Zarja, 28. 10. 1911: Ljubljana in Kranjsko: Delavska šola ‚Vzajemnosti‘, 2.

7 Zarja, 18. 9. 1911: Ljubljana in Kranjsko: Spodnja Šiška, 2; Zarja, 26. 9. 1911: Boj za občino v Sp. Šiški, 2.

8 PADMJ, kuverta Milan Jaklič, Življenjepisni podatki.

9 Več o tem v: Perovšek, 2019, 370.

10 Naprej, 20. 11. 1918: Delavstvo in jugoslovanska država, 4; Naprej, 21. 11. 1918: Delavstvo in jugoslovanska država, 3. O shodih JSDS 24. 11. 1918 podrobneje v: Perovšek, 2004, 477–50; Perovšek, 2018b, 263.

11 Naprej, 30. 11. 1918: Dnevne vesti: socialistična družba, 4.

12 Podrobneje o županovanju dr. Ivana Tavčarja v: Perovšek, 2017, 559–614.

13 Naprej, 16. 12. 1918: Poslano, 2.

14 Naprej, 18. 12. 1918: Dnevne vesti: izpod domačega krova, 2.

Jaklič je kmalu po ustanovitvi jugoslovanske države (Kraljestva/Kraljevine Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev) sodeloval v pripravljalnem odboru društva Akademski dom, ki so ga nameravali ustanoviti v podporo slovenskim študentom v Zagrebu. V odboru so bili predstavniki vseh treh tedaj obstoječih političnih strank.<sup>15</sup> Po odstopu Deželne vlade za Slovenijo (DVS) v začetku novembra 1919 in imenovanju liberalnega politika dr. Gregorja Žerjava<sup>16</sup> za novega mandatarja vlade je bil kot predstavnik JSDS od konca novembra 1919 do začetka marca 1920 dejaven v funkciji vodenja poverjenštva DVS za socialno politiko. Mesta poverjenika vlade ni prevzel, ker DVS v tem obdobju niso imenovali (Adamič et al., 1980, 26–27; [Ribnikar], 1998, 21–23).<sup>17</sup> Kljub temu so ga v politiki in v upravnopolitičnih aktih obravnavali kot poverjenika za socialno politiko DVS v tem obdobju (Ribnikar, 2002, 211).<sup>18</sup>

Konec maja 1920 je Jaklič postal načelnik pri ministrstvu za socialno politiko v Beogradu.<sup>19</sup> Leta 1921 je bil kot načelnik pri tem ministrstvu član komisije, ki je po odloku ministrstva za gozdove in rude izdelala poročilo za ureditev novih prejemkov delavcev in ureditev cen premoga pri Trboveljski premogokopni družbi v Sloveniji.<sup>20</sup> Vodil je tudi komisijo ministrstva za socialno politiko ter ministrstva za gozdove in rude, ki je izdelala rudarsko plačilno pogodbo za delavce pri Trboveljski premogokopni družbi.<sup>21</sup> V času delovanja na ministrstvu za socialno politiko je izdelal statut, službeno pragmatiko in druge organizacijske pravilnike za Osrednji urad za zavarovanje delavcev v Zagrebu, ki so ga ustanovili leta 1923.<sup>22</sup> Njegov ravnatelj je bil v letih 1923–1927.<sup>23</sup> Medtem se politično ni vidneje udejstvoval. Od leta 1927 do 1938 se je kot privatnik na zakupnem zemljišču posvetil raziskovanju kulture krompirja, posebej ga je zanimala pridelava topinamburja (laške repice). V letih 1939–1940 je za kemično tovarno Škrob – Dekstrin v Domžalah na zemljiščih v Križu in Jabljah organiziral pridelovanje industrijskega krompirja. O izsledkih svojih raziskav je pisal v glasilu Kmetijske družbe v Ljubljani *Kmetovalec*, z njimi pa je seznanil tudi vodstvo Tovarne dušika v Rušah (Jaklič, 1939a; Jaklič, 1939b; Jaklič, 1939c; Jaklič, 1939d; Stiplovšek, 1993, 431–432).<sup>24</sup>

15 Naprej, 3. 1. 1919: *Dnevne vesti: Akademski dom*, 2.

16 O življenju in delu dr. Gregorja Žerjava podrobnejše v: Perovšek, 2011, 313–346.

17 Naprej, 6. 3. 1920: *Dnevne vesti: osebna vest*, 3.

18 Uradni list deželne vlade za Slovenijo, 14. 6. 1920: „Iz Službenih Novin kraljestva Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca“, 335; Slovenec, 30. 1. 1923: „Socialne“ zasluge demokratske stranke, 2.

19 Uradni list deželne vlade za Slovenijo, 14. 6. 1920: „Iz Službenih Novin kraljestva Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca“, 335.

20 Naprej, 25. 8. 1921: Poročilo prve trboveljske komisije, 1; Naprej, 26. 8. 1921: Poročilo prve trboveljske komisije, 1; Naprej, 27. 8. 1921: Poročilo prve trboveljske komisije, 1–2; Naprej, 29. 8. 1921: Poročilo prve trboveljske komisije, 1–2.

21 Naprej, 22. 11. 1921: Za povišanje draginjskih doklad ruderjem, 1–2.

22 PADMJJ, kuverta Milan Jaklič, Življenjepisni podatki; Jutro, 10. 9. 1922: Socialna politika: središnji urad za zavarovanje delavcev v Zagrebu, 10.

23 PADMJJ, kuverta Milan Jaklič, Življenjepisni podatki; Slovenec, 30. 1. 1923: „Socialne“ zasluge demokratske stranke, 2.

24 PADMJJ, kuverta Milan Jaklič, Življenjepisni podatki; PADMJJ, mapa Topinambur.

Med drugo svetovno vojno je bil zaradi javnega nastopa proti rekrutiraju v t. i. belo gardo od novembra 1942 do septembra 1943 interniran v italijanskih koncentracijskih taboriščih Monigo in Visco, njegov prevod *Komunističnega manifesta* pa je bil v času druge svetovne vojne še vedno aktualna temeljna literatura slovenskega komunističnega gibanja.<sup>25</sup> Po koncu vojne je živel na Vrhniki in v letih 1945–1962 kot pravnik honorarno delal pri Okrajnem ljudskem odboru in nato Krajevnem ljudskem odboru Vrhnika ter na občini Vrhnika. Deloval je na področju agrarne reforme, kmetijstva, gozdarstva, odkupov in pravnih zadev.<sup>26</sup>

## OKOLIŠCINE PRVEGA PREVODA KOMUNISTIČNEGA MANIFESTA

O okolišinah, v katerih je nastal prvi slovenski prevod *Komunističnega manifesta*, govorijo sporočila, ki jih je Milanu Jakliču konec novembra 1907 pisal urednik časopisa *Naprej* in njegove založbe ter ravnatelj Prve idrijske čipkarske zadruge v Idriji Anton Kristan (1881–1930). V svojem, že navajanem privatnem arhivu, jih hrani Jakličeva hči Milanka Jakopič Jaklič, ki mi je ljubeznivo omogočila vpogled v očetovo gradivo. Dovolila je tudi, da ga lahko uporabim pri raziskovalnem delu. Za omenjeno dovoljenje se ji prisrčno zahvaljujem.

Kristan je v zvezi s prevodom *Komunističnega manifesta* novembra 1907 Jakliču poslal dopisnico in dvoje pisem. Jakliča je seznanil, da je honorar 200 kron, ki ga je pričakoval za opravljeni prevod, previsok. „*Prijatelj!*”, mu je napisal v dopisnici 21. novembra 1907, „*ko bom imel čas Ti bom sporočil malo več o honorarjih, ali vedi: da bi ti jaz prav rad ustregel, ko bi mogel. Pošiljam pa ti brezobvezno 50 K – po clearingu<sup>27</sup> čipkarske Zadruge, samo da ustrežem deloma Tvojim potrebam, in daljše Ti sporočim v kratkem. Pozdrav A. [.] Kristan*“.<sup>28</sup>

Kot je napovedal, je bil Kristan v naslednjem sporočilu obširnejši. Že naslednji dan, 22. novembra 1907, je v pismu Jakliču pojasnil celotno finančno shemo natisa in prodaje *Komunističnega manifesta* v slovenščini. Po njegovih izračunih bi tisk 1500 izvodov *Manifesta* znašal 220 kron. Če bi k temu prišteli 200 kron predlaganega honorarja in 45 kron za plačilo knjigoveških storitev, bi bili celotni stroški natisa 465 kron. Glede na njegove založniške izkušnje in tip literature, ki jo je predstavljal *Komunistični manifest*, bi v dveh letih po ceni 40 vinarjev – taka je bila tudi cena enega izvoda (Marx & Engels, 1908) – prodali 1000 izvodov, kar bi zneslo 400 kron (1 K = 100 v., op. J. P.). Deficit bi bil 65 kron. Pri enoletnih pet odstotnih obrestih od zneska 465 kron, ki bi znašale 23,25 kron, 20 odstotnem popustu prodajalcem od

25 Podrobneje o tem v: Prunk, 2017, 237–246.

26 PADMJJ, kuverta Milan Jaklič, Življenjepisni podatki; PADMJJ, kuverte korespondence iz internacije; PADMJJ, splošno gradivo.

27 Kliringu.

28 PADMJJ, kuverta Komunistični manifest, dopisnica Antonia Kristana Milanu Jakliču z dne 21. 11. 1907.

predvidenih prodanih izvodov, ki bi znašal 80 kron, stroških razpošiljanja 1000 izvodov (po 5 v. za izvod), ki bi znašali 50 kron, in prvotnem deficitu 65 kron bi bil skupni deficit 218,25 kron. Kristan je vprašal: "Kdo pa bo izdajal knjige, kjer bi imel tak deficit?" Nekaj deficitu pri znanstveni knjigi – *Komunističnem manifestu* bi že utrpeli, a po sprejemljivem računu. Ta je bil: prevajalec bi dobil 50 kron, stroški tiska bi znašali 220 kron, knjigoveške storitve pa 45 kron, skupaj 315 kron. K temu bi bilo potreбno prišteti še obresti kapitala 20 kron, dvajsetodstotni popust prodajalcem 80 kron, stroške za razpošiljanje 50 kron, kar bi skupaj zneslo 465 kron. Po tem izračunu stroškov prevoda, tiska, knjigoveških storitev, razpošiljanja in drugih postavk ter prihodka 400 kron od 1000 izvodov po ceni 40 vinarjev, bi deficit znašal 65 kron. Na zalogi bi za razprodajo v desetih letih ostalo še 500 izvodov. Za Kristana je bil to sprejemljiv izračun, zato Jakliču ni mogel poslati več kot 50 kron. "Vaša zahteva je sicer lepa – ali nevsprejemljiva", je zapisal. Pripomnil je, da hrvaška izdaja *Manifesta* stane 30 helerjev (vinarjev) in da se znanstvena dela izdajajo le s subvencijo, ki pa je založba časopisa *Naprej* nima. Ob tem je postavil tri klicaje. Jakliču je predlagal, da sprejme honorar 50 kron in za prejeti znesek opravi še korekturo prevoda. Sporočil mu je, da bo brošuro takoj dal v tisk, "da izide okrog Božiča. Vam prepričam pravico, da konec l. 1910 pregledate račun brošure (v moji glavni knjigi – folis [list – op. J. P.] *Manifest*) in če najdete kaj dobička – dobite ga 50 %. Mislim, da solidnejši biti ne morem. Premislite gorenje ter mi takoj odgovorite. Vaš A. Kristan".<sup>29</sup>

V pripisu k pismu je Kristan Jakliča, ki je tedaj še študiral na Dunaju, zaprosil, naj v klubu socialističnih akademikov vzbudi zanimanje za (neuradni) mesečnik slovenske socialne demokracije *Naši zapiski* (Rozman, 1971–1972). *Zapiski* naj bi postali klubsko glasilo, socialistični akademiki pa njegovi sodelavci. Prispevke naj bi pošiljali uredništvu v Idriji – dr. Dragotinu Lončarju (1876–1954), profesorju mestne realke. "Spisov se za enkrat prav nič ne honorira. Ko pojde bolje, se bode tudi to zgodilo. Pozdrav Cankarju! AK".<sup>30</sup>



Sl. 2: Anton Kristan (»Prva slovenska narodna vlada«, *Ilustrirani Slovenec*, 28. oktober 1928, št. 44, 348).

29 PADMJJ, kuverta Komunistični manifest, pismo Antonia Kristana Milanu Jakliču z dne 22. 11. 1907.

30 PADMJJ, kuverta Komunistični manifest, pismo Antonia Kristana Milanu Jakliču z dne 22. 11. 1907. Jaklič je bil z Ivanom Cankarjem v tesnejših stikih, ki so po vsej verjetnosti temeljili v njunem srečevanju na Dunaju, mogoče tudi zaradi tedanjega Cankarjevega zbljanja s socialno demokracijo.

Glede višine honorarja za prevod *Komunističnega manifesta* je ostalo pri Kristanovem izračunu. 26. novembra 1907 je Jakliču, ki mu je bil sicer naklonjen, poslal krtačni odtis manifesta s prošnjo, da ga zanesljivo vrne do 2. decembra. „*Preglej ga dobro*”, je zapisal. „*Pojde takoj v tisek.*” O preostalih 150 kronah, ki jih Jakliču ni izplačal, je sporočil, da mu jih trenutno ne more dati. „*Saj jih nimam. Za posojilo – potrebujem oficielnega sklepa odbora lokalne organizacije [JSDS v Idriji].*” Pripomnil je še, da njegove ocene glede naklade in dinamike prodaje *Komunističnega manifesta* „*ostanejo, kajti – soc. dem. stranke na Slovenskem ne pozna skoro nikdo takó dobro kot jaz*”. Na koncu pisma je Jakliča še enkrat pozval, naj do 2. decembra 1907 vrne *Manifest*. „*Med tem bo seja – in mogoče kak pameten sklep. [...] Toliko v naglici. [...] Tvoj AKristan*”.<sup>31</sup>

Naj se na tem mestu ustavimo pri honorarju, ki ga je pričakoval Jaklič. Kristan bi ga mu bil, kot je zatrjeval, pripravljen izplačati, a tega nista dopuščala gmotno stanje založbe časopisa *Naprej* in z njim povezan založniški izračun. Pripominjamo pa, da je bilo 200 kron tedaj zelo velika vsota. Jakličev gmotni študentski položaj bi nedvomno okrepila. Vendar tudi 50 kron v tedanjih razmerah ni bilo zanemarljivo. Že za 40 kron je bilo na Dunaju mogoče, sicer skromno, preživeti mesec dni.<sup>32</sup> Glede na gospodarske razmere pa je v Ljubljani v primerljivem času (leta 1910) 50 kron pomenilo malo več kot trimesečno najemnino stanovanja v pritličju ali nadstropju z dvema prostoroma in sanitarijami v stanovanju na cesti sv. Petra (današnji Trubarjevi cesti) v bližini Zmajskega mostu oziroma malo manj kot trimesečno najemnino prav tako etažnega stanovanja s tremi prostori (soba, kabinet, kuhinja, sanitarije v stanovanju) v bližini Tobačne tovarne (Studen, 1991a, 421; Studen, 1991b, 596). Stanovanja so bila na mestnem obrobju, a še vedno blizu osrčja mesta. Če od življenjskih stroškov preidemo na področje neleposlovnih prevajalskih in avtorskih honorarjev, naj navedemo, da je bil junija 1907 deželnki odbor vojvodine Kranjske Društvu slovenskih profesorjev za eno tiskovno polo prevoda učne knjige za srednje šole v slovenski jezik pripravljen plačati 60 kron.<sup>33</sup> Honorar za pripravo izvirnega slovenskega učbenika za 4. razred srednjih šol (Orožen, 1907) je znašal 420 kron. Honorarji za druge izvirne slovenske učne knjige so bili še višji.<sup>34</sup>


Jakličev prevod *Komunističnega manifesta* obenem s predgovori Karla Marxa in Friedricha Engelsa k posameznim izdajam, je obsegal eno in tri četrt tiskovne pole besedila (Marx & Engels, 1908). Za eno polo svojega prevoda je prejel slabo polovico honorarja, kot ga je bil za tiskovno polo besedila slovenske inačice učne knjige pripravljen plačati kranjski deželnki odbor. Zahtevnost prevajalskega dela je bila približno enaka. Jakličev honorar je bil opazno manjši od honorarja prevoda učne knjige, a ta je bil v okviru tedanjih prizadovanj za povečanje nabora

31 PADMJJ, kuverta Komunistični manifest, pismo Antonu Kristanu Jakliču z dne 26. 11. 1907.

32 Za podatek se zahvaljujem prof. ddr. Igorju Grdini (2020).

33 Slovenec, 6. 11. 1907: Slovenske učne knjige, 2.

34 Slovenec, 6. 11. 1907: Slovenske učne knjige, 2.



Sl. 3: Pismo Antonia Kristana Milana Jakliču 26. novembra 1907 (PADMJJ).

slovenskih učnih knjig vpet v sistemsko podporo prevodov učbenikov v slovenski jezik.<sup>35</sup> Razpolaganja s finančnimi sredstvi kranjskega deželnega odbora ter v tistem letu ustanovljene in, kot je opozoril Kristan, nesubvencionirane založbe časopisa *Naprej* tudi ni bilo mogoče primerjati. Lahko rečemo, da je Kristan,

35 Slovenec, 6. 11. 1907: Slovenske učne knjige, 1–2.

kolikor je le mogel, Jakliču šel nasproti in mu glede na založniški izračun in položaj založbe, ki jo je vodil, izplačal še vedno sprejemljiv honorar. Spomnimo še, da v socialnodemokratskih in tudi širših krogih uveljavljeni oziroma poznani ter kvalitetni *Naši zapiski* honorarjev tedaj niso izplačevali.

## SKLEP

Toliko o gmotnem vidiku prvega prevoda *Komunističnega manifesta* v slovenski jezik. Po eni strani predstavlja enega od primerov iz zgodovine slovenskega založništva, po drugi strani pa odpira pot k poznavanju prevajalca, urednika, politične osebe, visokega državnega funkcionarja v Kraljevini SHS in raziskovalca na področju agronomije dr. Milana Jakliča. Nanj doslej v zgodovinopisu niso posebej opozorili. Tudi omemb, da je prevedel *Komunistični manifest* je malo (najdemo jo v npr. Ferenc et al., 1981, 39).<sup>36</sup> Glede na vpliv, ki ga je imel *Komunistični manifest* v zgodovini, je prav, da se bolje pozna tudi njegovega prvega slovenskega prevajalca in njegovo življenjsko pot. Kot prevajalec sicer ni bil polno imenovan. Vzrokov za navedbo zgolj začetnice Jakličevega imena ter začetnice in končnice njegovega priimka v izdaji *Manifesta* leta 1908 je lahko več. O tem, zakaj sta bodisi prevajalec bodisi založba tako ravnala, ne bomo domnevali, to je bilo vprašanje preseje oziroma odločitve enega ali drugega ali obeh. Opozorili bi le, da je bilo v družbi opazno širše odklanjanje socialnodemokratskega gibanja in komunistične ideje (Repe, 2018, 475–476).

Prvi slovenski prevod *Komunističnega manifesta* je izšel med 11. in 15. januarjem 1908, zelo blizu roka, ki ga je napovedal Kristan.<sup>37</sup> Izid so v marksističnem delavskem gibanju toplo pozdravili. *Naprej* je opozoril, da je “ta znameniti spis Karla Marksа in Friderika Engelsа [...] preveden v lepi slovenščini”. Pridan mu je še “tolmač nekaterih tujk, ki se nahajajo v ‚Manifestu‘. Noben socialist bi ne smel biti brez ‚Komunističnega manifesta!‘”<sup>38</sup> Rdeči prapor pa je poudaril, da je “Komunistični manifest [...] evangelij socializma! Izšel je leta 1848 v dvanajstih izdajah. Preložen je že v vse evropske jezike. Po šestdesetih letih smo ga dobili še Slovenci! [...] Dobi se v vseh knjigarnah v Ljubljani, Trstu, Gorici in Kranju, v upravi ‚Rdečega Praporja‘ [v Ljubljani] in v založbi časopisa ‚Naprej!‘ v Idriji. Noben zaveden delavec bi ne smel biti brez Komunističnega manifesta.”<sup>39</sup>

Prevod *Komunističnega manifesta* je bil sestavni del naporov socialne demokracije, da bi zagotovila sistematično izdajanje socialističnih publikacij. Tak sklep je soglasno sprejel VII. zbor JSDS, ki se je od 2. do 4. aprila 1907 zbral

36 Navedbo prevajalca *Komunističnega manifesta* Milana Jakliča najdemo tudi v COBISS.SI – bralci: iskalni niz *Komunistični manifest*, zadetki št. 10–12, 16, 19, 20, ogled: 3. 11. 2020.

37 Rdeči prapor, 15. 1. 1908: Umetnost in književnost: ‚Komunistični manifest‘, 3; Rdeči prapor, 18. 1. 1908: ‚Komunistični manifest‘, Rdeči prapor, 4; Naprej!, 18. 1. 1908: V založbi časopisa ‚Naprej!‘ so izšle sledeče knjige in brošure, 8.

38 Naprej!, 18. 1. 1908: Iz idrijskega okraja: *Komunistični manifest*, 8.

39 Rdeči prapor, 18. 1. 1908: ‚Komunistični manifest‘, 4.



Sl. 4: Naslovica prvega prevoda Komunističnega manifesta v slovenski jezik (Knjižnica Inštituta za novejšo zgodovino).

v Trstu.<sup>40</sup> O njegovem uresničevanju je na VIII. zboru JSDS, zbranem od 31. januarja do 2. februarja 1909 v Ljubljani, poročal Anton Kristan. Poudaril je, da je napredek socialističnega tiska očiten.

*Danes lahko rečemo, da imamo že kaj vzeti v roke. Štirinajst lepih brošur od „Socializma“<sup>41</sup> in „Socialne demokracije“<sup>42</sup> do „Nevarnega socializma“<sup>43</sup> in „Strahov“<sup>44</sup> – lepa vrsta jih je, ki se bo seveda še pomnožila v najkrajšem času. Tudi „Komunistični manifest“ že lahko beremo v slovenskem jeziku in večji del „Erfurtskega programa“<sup>45</sup>. Da, vesel je človek, ki je videl pred leti našo mizerijo v tiskovnem pogledu in ki vidi danes tozadevni dejanski položaj. Vendar imamo še vse premalo, ker bi še vse več lahko imeli. (Pijade, 1951, 180).*

Kristanova želja, izrečena dobro desetletje po ustanovitvi JSDS leta 1896, ni bila zaman, saj so uveljavljeni socialistični avtorji – Anton in Etbin Kristan (1867–1953), Albin Prepeluh – Abditus (1880–1938), dr. Anton Dermota (1876–1914), dr. Dragotin Lončar, dr. Henrik Tuma (1858–1935), krog, zbran okoli *Naših zapiskov*, in drugi, že tedaj in kasneje obogatili slovensko marksistično politično in teoretično literaturo. Leta 1908 je k njenemu razvoju s svojim prevodom *Komunističnega manifesta* prispeval tudi Milan Jaklič.

40 Rdeči prapor, 1. 3. 1907: Naš zbor, 2.

41 Kristan, 1907a.

42 Kristan, 1907b.

43 Kristan, 1908a.

44 Kristan, 1908b.

45 Kautsky, 1908.

## DR. MILAN JAKLIČ AND THE FIRST TRANSLATION OF THE *COMMUNIST MANIFESTO* INTO THE SLOVENE LANGUAGE

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### SUMMARY

*Creators of the political sphere were significantly influenced by key ideas of the time in which they lived in. In the Modern period, communism attracted a lot of attention and was acknowledged in 1848 by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in The Communist Manifesto. The Manifesto defined the development of the Marxist Labour Movement and its parties – social democratic and communist. Its position in various national environments was best achieved with a translation into the local language, which facilitated the recognition of national Marxist political subjects' work. On the Slovene territory, the first translation of The Communist Manifesto into the Slovene language was done by dr. Miran Jaklič (jurist, Podgorica (Dobropolje), February 14, 1886 – Ljubljana, June 30, 1963). It was published by the publishing house Naprej, a gazette of the district organization of the Yugoslav Social Democratic Party (JSDS) in Idrija. Milan Jaklič attended the primary and secondary schools in Ljubljana and finished law studies in Vienna in 1908. In 1905, he began sympathizing with social democracy. Between the years 1907 and 1914 he was, as a member of the JSDS, actively involved in creating its gazettes Rdeči prapor and Zarja, the first social democratic journal on Slovene territory. From 1911 he was a part of Zarja's editorship. He translated Marxist and other literature (Enrico Ferri, Socialism and the Modern Science (Ljubljana, 1910 [1911]), Maksim Go'rki; Mother: Social Novel (Ljubljana, 1912), Oscar Wilde, Fairly Tales (Ljubljana, 1921). Jaklič was one of the more prominent members of the JSDS. Besides his editorial function, he was a part of the party's leadership between 1912 and 1919. In 1918, he took over the political leadership of the party's main gazette Naprej in Ljubljana. After 1919, when the Provincial Government for Slovenia (DVS) resigned and the liberal dr. Gregor Žerjav constituted the government, Jaklič, as a representor of JSDS, led the social politics ministry from November 1919 to March 1920. At the end of May 1920, he was the head of the Ministry for social politics in Belgrade and between 1923 and 1927 head of the Central bureau for workers insurance in Zagreb. Between 1927 and 1937 he devoted himself to researching potatoes and was especially interested in the growth of Jerusalem artichoke. Because of his public views against the enlistment to the so-called White Guard, he was interned to Italian concentration camps Monigo and Visco between November 1942 and September 1943. After the war he lived in Vrhnika and between 1945 and 1962 worked at the District People's Court, at the Local People's Committee and at the Vrhnika Municipality. The circumstances in which the first translation of The Communist Manifesto was created, are described in letters sent to Milan Jaklič in November 1907 by the editor of Naprej and the head of the First*

*Lace Cooperative in Idrija, Anton Kristan (1881–1930). He explained to Jaklič, who was a student in Vienna at the time, the complete financial situation of the publishing house and the publication of the manifesto. He pointed out that the fee he expected for the translation was too high and offered and eventually payed a still high enough sum. The translation of The Communist Manifesto was part of the social democracy's efforts to guarantee a systematic publishing of socialist publications. Such decision was made unanimously at the 7<sup>th</sup> assembly of JSDS in 1907 in Trieste. Its realization was reported at the 8<sup>th</sup> assembly of JSDS in 1909 in Ljubljana by Anton Kristan, who talked about the translation of The Communist Manifesto. He emphasized the evident progress of the socialist print. Milan Jaklič thus joined other meritorious socialist authors who contributed to this fact – Anton and Etbin Kristan (1867–1953), Albin Prepeluh – Abditus (1880–1938), dr. Anton Dermota (1876–1914), dr. Dragotin Lončar, dr. Henrik Tuma (1858–1935) and others.*

*Keywords: The Communist Manifesto, dr. Milan Jaklič, Yugoslav Social Democratic Party (Jugoslovanska socialnodemokratska stranka), Anton Kristan, publishing house of the Naprej journal*

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## MED CESARJEM IN KRALJEM: LAVANTINSKI KNEZOŠKOF MIHAEL NAPOTNIK V LETU 1918 IN PO NJEM

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### *IZVLEČEK*

*Najvidnejša poteza delovanja lavantinskega knezoškofa Mihaela Napotnika v letu 1918 je njegova odsotnost s širšega političnega prizorišča. Napotnik se tako rekoč ni udeleževal procesa slovenskega poslavljanja od Habsburške monarhije. Po drugi strani svoji duhovščini ni poskušal preprečiti njenega prevzemanja ali zgolj utrjevanja vodilne vloge v tem dogajanju. Precej jasno je, da je Napotnik predstavljal običajno škofovsko figuro po standardih habsburške avstrijske Cerkve, ki je bila še vedno močno prežeta s predstavo o nujnosti zveze med prestolom in oltarjem. Škof je še leta 1918 objavil zbirko svojih govorov in pridig, posvečenih pokojnima cesarju Francu Jožefu I. in cesarici Elizabeti. Toda sočasno se zdi, da je nekak modus vivendi našel tudi z novim državnim okvirjem monarhije Karađorđevićev po letu 1918.*

*Ključne besede: Mihael Napotnik, Lavantinska škofija, Maribor med prvo svetovno vojno, Cerkev in država v Avstriji, legitimizem, Anton Mahnič*

### TRA L'IMPERATORE E IL RE: L'ARCIVESCOVO DI MARIBOR MIHAEL NAPOTNIK DAL 1918 IN POI

### *SINTESI*

*Nell'anno 1918 la caratteristica principale dell'operato dell'arcivescovo di Maribor Mihael Napotnik era la sua assenza dalla scena politica più ampia. Il Napotnik praticamente non aveva preso parte al processo di distacco degli sloveni dalla Monarchia asburgica. D'altra parte, non aveva cercato di impedire al suo clero di prenderne parte o semplicemente di consolidare il ruolo guida durante quegli eventi. Risulta abbastanza evidente che il Napotnik rappresentava una figura episcopale ordinaria per gli standard della Chiesa austriaca asburgica ancora fortemente intrisa dell'idea della necessità di una connessione tra il trono e l'altare. Già nel 1918 il vescovo pubblicò una raccolta dei suoi discorsi e sermoni dedicati al defunto imperatore Francesco Giuseppe I e all'imperatrice Elisabetta. Ma allo stesso tempo, sembra che dopo il 1918 sia riuscito a trovare una sorta di modus vivendi con le nuove strutture statali della monarchia dei Karađorđević.*

*Parole chiave: Mihael Napotnik, diocesi di Maribor, Maribor durante la Prima guerra mondiale, Chiesa e stato in Austria, legittimità, Anton Mahnič*

UVOD<sup>1</sup>

V ospredju pričujočega prispevka bo delovanje lavantinskega knezoškofa Mihaela Napotnika v času spremembe državnega okvira po prvi svetovni vojni in takoj po njem. Dr. Mihael Napotnik je v letu 1918 stopil že v trideseto leto vodenja lavantinske škofije (iz obsežne literature o njem je potrebno upoštevati predvsem: Škulj, 1993; Lukman, 1935; Dolinar, 1983; Kovačič, 1928, zlasti 416–428; Ambrožič, 2010, zlasti 403–409; Hozjan, 2006; Ožinger, 1991, 495 ss.; Montanar, 2007, predvsem 180–189; Boldin, 2009; prim. še Lazarini, 2012a in 2012b; Matjašič Friš, 2009). Na neki način je bilo to verjetno najtežje leto, ne le zato, ker so se že v prejšnjih vojnih letih nakopičeno pomanjkanje, materialno in moralno razdejanje praktično vse leto še stopnjevali (prim. iz skoraj brezbrezne literature Svoljšak & Antoličič, 2018; Nećak & Repe, 2005; Svoljšak, 2009; Hazemali & Matjašič Friš, 2018; Jenuš, 2012 in 2017; Skitek, 2018; Kerec, 2018; Šimac, 2015; Ščavnica, 2018; Podbersič, 2018). S hitrimi koraki je ob vedno novih državnih predpisih, ki so vsakič zahtevali več odpovedi, in ob Slovencem na Štajerskem še posebej nerazumljivem »nemškem kurzu« vladajočih pešalo tudi zaupanje v prej kot samo-umevno dojeto državno strukturo (o dinamiki slovenskega slovesa od tega okvira gl. zdaj predvsem temeljni študiji Rahten, 2016, in Lukanc, 2014; za posamezne vidike prim. še Perovšek, 2015, 2018a in 2018b; Rahten, 2017). Izkušeni knezoškof je ostajal pri tem prelomnem dogajanju presenetljivo v ozadju, lahko bi celo rekli, da v poročilih iz prelomnega leta blesti s svojo odsotnostjo. Podobno odsotna je ta doba iz številnih zapisov po njegovi smrti.

Zaradi tega bom v začetku te razprave na kratko umestil Napotnika v avstrijski episkopat v času razpadanja Habsburške monarhije, nato nekaj besed namenil dogajanju v škofiji v letu 1918 in se nato vrnil k oceni škofove vsaj prvi pogled vpadljive odsotnosti iz premislekov o prihodnosti, ki so zaznamovali devetindvajseto in trideseto leto njegovega škofovanja.

Ko se soočamo z likom in delom drugega Slomškovega naslednika, je potrebno imeti pred očmi naravo razmerja med Katoliško cerkvijo in državo v monarhiji, kot se je v grobem izoblikovala že v obdobju protireformacije in katoliške obnove (prim. Dolinar, 2004; Bruckmüller, 2007, zlasti 69–72). Pozneje je verjetno najmočnejši pečat pustil jožefinizem, ki je uveljavil zvezo med tronom in oltarjem z izrazito prevladajočo vlogo prvega. To ni pustilo posledic le v dojemanju velikega dela politične elite, marveč je tudi vsaj pri višji hierarhiji zabetoniralo predstave o duhovnikih kot zvestih služabnikih države, ki je bila posebljena v habsburški dinastiji (Bruckmüller, 2007, 77).

1 Prispevek je nastal v okviru raziskovalnega programa *Preteklost severovzhodne Slovenije med slovenskimi zgodovinskimi deželami in v interakciji z evropskim sosedstvom* št. P6-0128 in raziskovalnih projektov *Kontemporalnost razumevanjskega konteksta ter izražanje osebne in družbene svobode* št. J7-8283 ter *Kultura spominjanja gradnikov slovenskega naroda in države* št. J6-9354, ki jih financira Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije.

Sicer je v ponapoleonskem obdobju prišlo do popravkov smeri v smislu večanja vpliva in s tem avtonomije “oltarja”, se pravi Cerkve, kar je doseglo vrh s sklenitvijo konkordata leta 1855 (prim. Rumpler, 1997, zlasti 342–344, in Leeb et al., 2003, 363 ss.). Toda sprejemanje verskih zakonov med letoma 1868 in 1874 in ravnanje avstrijskih škofov na prvem vatikanskem cerkvenem zboru (prim. Cvirk, 2005, predvsem 31–34, in Leeb et al., 2003, 368 s.) je jasno pokazalo moč jožefinske dediščine, ki niti v naslednjih desetletjih ni opesala. Kot bistroumno ugotavljajo Leeb in drugi (2003, 368), je namreč ohranitev položaja državne Cerkve tudi po dokončni odpovedi konkordata za katoličane pomenila večji državni nadzor kot pri ostalih verskih skupnostih v državi. V skladu s tem se je oblikoval prevladujoči profil katoliških avstrijskih škofov, od katerih je večino tako ali tako imenoval cesar. Morda še bolj kot drugje je ideal cerkvenega nadpastirja kot služabnika države prihajal v poštev na problematičnih območjih, kjer so prihajali v ospredje nacionalni boji. Tako gre tudi razumeti premisleke, ki so bili v ospredju pred Napotnikovim imenovanjem na lavantinski škofovski sedež. Glede na strukturo prebivalstva v škofiji kajpак ni prihajalo v poštev, da nadpastir ne bi bil Slovenec, po drugi strani pa si oblasti seveda niso že zelele nekoga, ki bi se postavljal na čelo slovenskega političnega gibanja (prim. Rajšp, 1993, zlasti 78–79).

Napotnikova precej manjša angažiranost na političnem parketu je že pred prevratnim obdobjem kajpак bodla v oči zlasti zaradi primerjave s povsem drugačno usmeritvijo ljubljanskih kolegov Jakoba Missie in Antona Bonaventure Jegliča, ki pa sta delovala v skoraj povsem slovenski deželi. Jedko je model avstrijskega državnega cerkvenstva že v letih izdajanja *Rimskega katolika* kritiziral tudi poznejši škof na Krku Anton Mahnič. Slednji je morda celo edini med slovenskimi katoliškimi prvaki do konca premislil posledice na tesni zvezi trona in oltarja utemeljenega razmerja med Cerkvijo in državo v Avstriji. Nekakšna posebnost njegovega pristopa je tudi v tem, da je razumel, da mora vlak peljati v obe smeri. Ko je zahteval več avtonomnega manevrskega prostora za Cerkev, je bil pripravljen pristati na odpoved njeni tesni vpetosti v politično odločanje: »*Nič ne more bolj zadržavati pravega napredka, nič se bolj ne protivi ustanovi božji nego, ako hoče država gospodovati v Cerkvi, kakor ni od druge strani nič bolj pogubno za družbo in Cerkev samo kakor to, ako se služabniki oltarja silijo v upravo posvetnih zadev.*« (Mahnič, 1912, 145). Jasno je namreč sprevidel, kakšen je lahko končni rezultat razmerij, v katerem sta država in Cerkev povezani tako tesno, kot je narekovala jožefinska (in po svoje že starejša) dediščina: »*Kajti v liberalni državi se lehko zgodi, da vodi bogočastne zadeve minister-žid, minister-ateist, minister-mason – in po predlogu takega ministra naj se imenujejo potem katoliški škofje!*« (Mahnič, 1912, 146). Že tu se morda napoveduje razlika med lavantinskim in bodočim krškim škofom, ki se bo pokazala tudi leta 1918.

Toda lepo število avstrijskih škofov je prevratno obdobje doživel s podobno zadrego kot on. Če povsem preskočim tiste iz ogrske polovice, kjer bi bilo veliko zanimivih zgledov, se najbolj ponuja primerjava s češkimi. Tam so bili za zasedbo najobčutljivejših škofij običajno na razpolago sicer češko govoreči, a izrazito

dinastično in avstrijsko misleči plemiči, ki jih za lavantinsko ali kakšno drugo večinsko slovensko diecezo seveda ni bilo na razpolago. Nemara je značilen primer nadškofa Leva Skrbenskega z Hříště, ki je spočetka doživel meteorski vzpon v cerkveni hierarhiji, saj je bil za praškega nadškofa imenovan že pri šestintridesetih, za kardinala pa pri osemintridesetih letih. Vendar se v zapletenih čeških političnih razmerah ni najbolje znašel in se je že sredi prve svetovne vojne preselil na nadškofijski sedež v Olomoucu, a po nastanku nove češkoslovaške države niti tam ni mogel dolgo obstati. Ker je tako mlad vstopil v kardinalski kolegij, je bil zadnjih deset let svojega življenje kardinal duhovnik z najdaljšim stažem (kardinal protoduhovnik), toda že zdavnaj brez škofije (Leisching, 1985, 82). Svoji škofiji se je po razpadu monarhije med drugim odrekel tudi njegov praski naslednik Paul grof Hayn. Napotnik se je novim razmeram slednjič vendarle bolje prilagodil, kot bo še razvidno. Ampak k lavantinskemu nadpastirju se bom vrnil, ko orišem splošne razmere v njegovi škofiji leta 1918.

## LAVANTINSKA ŠKOFIJA V LETU 1918

Na zunaj je precej stvari teklo po ustaljenih tirnicah. Število duš pod Napotnikovo škofovsko palico se je med letoma 1917 in 1918 nekoliko zmanjšalo in s 514.330 ob koncu prvega padlo na 512.252 ob koncu drugega, kar ni bilo čisto običajno, a padec je bil majhen (Personalstand, 1918, 231). A če je gibanje »los von Rom« ob začetku vojne, leta 1914, dobilo zadnji pospešek, čeprav s 143 izstopi iz Katoliške cerkve ni bilo blizu vrhuncem z začetka 20. stoletja, je v zadnjem vojnem letu Katoliško cerkev zapustilo samo 83 oseb (Ambrožič, 2010, 403–404; o gibanjem prim. še Cvirk, 1997, 237–241; Kovačič, 1928, zlasti 418–420). V primerjavi s prejšnjim letom se je nekoliko povečalo število nezasedenih župnij. Ob koncu leta 1918 jih je bilo med 221 nezasedenih devet. Padlo je tudi število vseh duhovnikov v škofiji, in sicer s 539 na 526 (Personalstand, 1918, 230).

Na fronti se je ob koncu svetovne vojne udinjalo ali v tujini bivalo vsega sedemnajst duhovnikov (Personalstand, 1918, 216–218). Med tistimi, ki so pozneje dosegli pomembne službe, sta bila desna roka poznejšega škofa Ivana Jožefa Tomažiča, mariborski stolni župnik Mihael Umek,<sup>2</sup> in poznejši celjski opat Peter Jurak, ki mu je škof Karlin dal prednost celo pred samim Antonom Korošcem.<sup>3</sup>

2 Mihael Umek (1886–1966) se je rodil v Pišecah. V duhovnika je bil posvečen leta 1910. Bil je zadnji dvorni kaplan in škofijiški tajnik knezoškofa Napotnika in prvi njegovega naslednika Andreja Karlina. Od leta 1930 do 1961 je bil stolni župnik. Sočasno z imenovanjem na to mesto je postal tudi stolni kanonik. V času nemške okupacije je bil med manjšino duhovnikov lavantinske škofije, ki jih ni doletela preselitev. Umrl je kot stolni dekan leta 1966 v Mariboru (Montanar, 2009, 151–155).

3 Peter Jurak (1884–1944) je postal celjski opat leta 1924 po številnih zapletih po smrti svojega dolgoletnega predhodnika Franca Ogradija, ki je umrl že leta 1921. Mesto opata je mikalo tudi voditelja Slovenske ljudske stranke Antona Korošca, vendar ga lavantinski škof Karlin nanj ni želel imenovati. Nazadnje se je odločil za Juraka in Korošec je to izbiro kot takratni minister za vere potrdil (Orožen, 1974, 441).

Stolni kapitelj, od 1. avgusta 1917 pod vodstvom stolnega prošta Martina Matka,<sup>4</sup> je imel od začetka 1918 poleg obeh dignitet zasedenih vseh pet rednih kanonikatov. Prvega februarja tega leta je namreč stolni kanonik postal Maksimilijan Vraber.<sup>5</sup> Član kapitla je bil od oktobra 1915 tudi že prej omenjeni kasnejši škof Tomažič. Naslednji mesec sta položaja častnih kanonikov zasedla dva izkušena dušnopastirska mačka, šmarski dekan Janez Bohanec in njegov brežiški kolega Jožef Mesiček. S tem sta se pridružila trem že prej imenovanim častnim članom stolnega kapitla (in dvema, imenovana *extra statum*) (Nova častna kanonika, 1918, 3). V zbor mašnikov lavantinske škofije je knezoškof Napotnik 23. junija 1918 s posvečenjem uvrstil osem novomašnikov, od katerih je bil eden rojen na Kranjskem, sicer pa so v veliki večini prihajali iz vzhodnih predelov škofije (Personalstand, 1918, 62–64). Med novomašniki iz leta 1918 je Ivan (od Križa) Greif že sorazmerno mlad postal zadnji infulirani ptujski prošt.<sup>6</sup> Njegov kolega Jurij Mikolič iz žetalske fare se je že pred prejemom zakramenta svetega reda okril s srebrno medaljo za hrabrost in s Karlovim častnim križem (Letošnji novomašniki, 1918, 4). Šest kaplanov in en kurat iz lavantinske škofije je v zadnjem letu vojne našlo čas, da opravijo župniški izpit (Župnijski izpit, 1918, 2).

Zamrla ni niti dobrodelna vnema, ki se ni v najožjem smislu tikala vojnih naporov in posledic. Potekalo je namreč intenzivno zbiranje sredstev za nameravano bolnišnico usmiljenih bratov na posestvu zakoncev Nidorfer v Vrbju pri Žalcu (prim. Ambrožič, 2010, 416). Sam knezoškof je dal vzor s tem, ko je podaril 30.000 kron (Za stavbo, 1918, 4). Gvardijan brežiških frančiškanov pater Ananija Vračko je kljub vojnemu pomanjkanju na lavantinsko javnost marca 1918 naslovil prošnjo za pomoč pri obnovi v potresu prejšnje leto močno poškodovanega samostana in cerkve (Prošnja oo. frančiškanov, 1918, 3; o potresu prim. Nećak, 2018). Nekako vsakdanje je potekalo še zadnje avstrijsko praznovanje velike noči na sedežu lavantinske škofije. Na veliki četrtek, 28. marca 1918, je knezoškof Napotnik umil noge dvanajstim med 70 in 89 let starim starejšim občanom. Vstajenje so s procesijo po takratnem običaju praznovali na veliko soboto, 30. marca, ob šestih zvečer (Sveti obred, 1918, 4). Da se dogajajo premiki, je nakazovalo predvsem dejstvo, da je bil v katoliškem *Slovenskem gospodarju* program obredov velikega tedna objavljen v neposredni soseščini vznesenega uvodnika z naslovom *Letošnja velika noč*, v katerem je bilo izraženo pričakovanje precej posvetnega vstajenja,

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4 Martin Matek (1860–1930) se je rodil v Gornjem Gradu in postal kanonik leta 1902. Za prošta je bil umeščen 1. avgusta 1917, več kot leto dni po smrti svojega predhodnika Karla Hribovška. Na položaju je ostal do svoje smrti (Ambrožič, 2009, 94, 97).

5 Maksimilijan Vraber (1877–1945) se je rodil na Kapli. Kanonikat je prevzel 1. februarja 1918. Od leta 1931 je bil stolni dekan, leta 1934 pa je kot stolni prošt nasledil Ivana Jožefa Tomažiča, ki je leto pred tem postal škof ordinarij. Umrl je leta 1945 v Mariboru (Ambrožič, 2009, 94, 97).

6 Ivan Greif (1893–1971) se je rodil v Staršah in je po mašniškem posvečenju med drugim služboval kot kaplan v Turnišču, že leta 1934 pa je postal ptujski prošt. Med drugo svetovno vojno je bil pregnan na Hrvaško, kjer je deloval v Kotoribi v okupiranem Medmuru, po vrnitvi na Štajersko pa je opravljal službo prošta do smrti. Po njej so proštijsko faro sv. Jurija prevzeli minoriti (Kolarič, 2007, 69–73).

kajti sklep je bil: »*Slovenci! Slovenke! Jugoslovani! Bliža nam se veselo vstajenje našega rodu. Bliža se nam svoboda, samostojnost! Živila Jugoslavija! Aleluja.*« (Letošnja velika noč, 1918, 1).

Naslednji košček stalnosti in normalnosti v zadnjem vojnem letu so ponudile običajne birmice in vizitacije po dekanijah škofije. Kot v prejšnjih letih so se slednje zvrstile med prvo polovico maja in drugo polovico julija (povzeto po Personalstand, 1918, 257–271). Začele so se v mariborski okolici. 12. maja je knezoškof dar svetega Duha priklical nad 246 birmank in birmancev v župniji Sv. Marjeta ob Pesnici, v današnji Pernici. Teden dni pozneje, na binkoštni praznik, je zakrament birmice v mariborski stolnici prejelo dotlej rekordnih 1.478 fantov in deklet. To je bila dobra polovica vseh 2.579 birmanih v dekanatu. Nadaljevanje sezone vizitacij je preprečilo poslabšanje Napotnikovega zdravstvenega stanja ob koncu maja, ki je dan pred telovskim praznikom terjalo celo lažjo operacijo. Eden od dveh operaterjev je bil dolgoletni mariborski mestni zdravnik in avtor zgodovine poimenovanj mariborskih mestnih ulic iz leta 1906 Arthur Mally (Personalstand, 1918, 265; za Mallyjevo delo gl. Mally, 1906). Toda že 8. junija je bil škof že v pogonu in je birmoval v dekaniji Šmarje pri Jelšah; birmanih je bilo 2.940 otrok. Tretja postaja je bila ob koncu junija dekanija Celje z najvišjim številom birmank in birmancev (3.283). V času bivanja na širšem območju Celja je Napotnik obiskal tudi gradbišče postojanke usmiljenih bratov v Vrbju, ki ga je prej velikodušno obdaril. Na zadnji etapi svojega romanja po škofiji v letu 1918 je lavantinski vladika ostal v Savinjski dolini in se mudil v braslovški dekaniji. Dar svetega Duha je po Napotnikovih rokah prejelo v primerjavi z ostalimi postajami manj številnih 2.183 fantov in deklet.

Delovanje velikega in malega semenišča je že na zunaj kazalo več znamenj vojnih razmer. Slednje so prihajale na dan predvsem v tem, da je bil velik del malih semeniščnikov v vojaški službi. Sicer pa je v prvi letnik bogoslovja leta 1918 vstopilo osem novincev, kar je bilo precej več kot leto poprej, ko so bili v prvem letniku le trije, še od tega je bil eden v vojski. Med gojenci malega semenišča je leto 1918 v vojaški suknji pričakalo šest od devetih osmošolcev, devet od dvanajstih sedmošolcev, dvanajst od šestnajstih šestošolcev in celo eden od desetih petošolcev (podatke prinaša Personalstand, 1918, 64–67).

Morda je nekaj tolažbe v težkih razmerah lavantinskim vernicam in vernikom prineslo sporočilo, ki jih je doseglo februarja 1918. Govorilo je, da je papež Benedikt XV. že novembra minulega leta običajni petdesetdnevni odpustek, ki je veljal, če je človek izrekel besede *Laudetur Iesus Christus* (z odgovorom *In aeternum. Amen*), tudi v lavantinski škofiji razširil na govorke in govorce slovenščine, ki so ta pozdrav v materinščini okrajšali samo na *Hvaljen Jezus*, odgovor pa samo na *Amen* (Krščanski pozdrav, 1918, 3).

## KNEZOŠKOF NAPOTNIK IN ČAS PRELOMA

Ta bolj ali manj suha dejstva povedo o tem, kako so na razgibano leto 1918 gledal lavantinski knezoškof in kako njegovi duhovniki, malo ali nič. Kar se



Sl. 1: Mihael Napotnik (1850–1922). Naslikal H. Prader leta 1910. Hrani Nadškofjski ordinariat Maribor (Wikimedia Commons).

tiče Mihaela Napotnika, je imel v slovenskem zgodovinopisu verjetno to smolo, da so ga radi primerjali z dejavnostjo ljubljanskega kolega Antona Bonaventure Jegliča (prim. o njunih odnosih Kolar, 1993). Slednji je takšno primerjavo nekako napeljal že sam s svojim dnevniškim zapisom o očitku avstrijskega ministrskega predsednika barona Maxa Hussareka, izrečenem konec julija 1918, zakaj ob deklaracijskem gibanju ni zadržan podobno kot Napotnik ali ilirski metropolit Sedej (Jegličev dnevnik, 2015, 755, vpis 11. 8. 1918). Kot je znano, se je Jeglič izgovarjal na popolnoma drugačne razmere, v katerih živila druga slovenska nadpastirja, pri čemer je še posebej izpostavil bolezen lavantinskega škofa. Ta je bil v dneh, ko se je Jeglič zagovarjal pred premierjem, res operiran, vendar očitno še ni bil čisto na koncu. Potrebno je torej povedati, da sta se lavantinski in ljubljanski vladika po svoji *formi mentis* po vsem videzu tako zelo razlikovala, da nekoliko hudomušno skoraj ni moč reči, da sta igrala v različnih ligah, marveč kar v različnih disciplinah (prim. v zvezi s tem precej neposredno oznako Napotnikove osebnosti pri Trstenjak, 1993; posamezne pomembne gradnike za razumevanje njegove osebnosti prinaša tudi Lukan, 1993). Gotovo niti ni šlo zgolj za to, da bi bil Napotnik otroško navezan na lik in delo cesarja Franca Jožefa, in to zaradi tega, ker mu je ta skrajšal služenje vojaškega roka s treh na eno leto (prim. Ožinger, 1991, 496). Čeprav si sam v svoji nerodnosti zlahka predstavljam, kaj bi meni pomenila takšna usluga, gre po vsej verjetnosti pri tovrstni razlagi vendarle za poskus Napotniku naklonjenih opazovalcev, kako pojasniti ravnanje nadpastirja, ki je po njihovem mnenju nekako obtičal v »včerajšnjem svetu«.

Pogled na nekatere značilne škofovske figure iz obeh polovic 1867 vzpostavljenne dvojne monarhije med drugo polovico 19. in začetkom 20. stoletja napeljuje, kot že nakazano na začetku, prej na misel, da je predstavljal dolgoletni lavantinski nadpastir nekakšen standard cerkvenega kneza, ki je zmes mojstra bogoslužnih opravil in državnega uradnika (prim. predvsem Bruckmüller, 2007). Za ljudi te baže je bilo ob legitimističnem stališču, izvirajočem iz prepričanja o moči naveze med habsburškim tronom in oltarjem, značilno tudi, da so se v nacionalnih sporih, ki nekako niso sodili v njihov svet in so jih dojemali kot novodobni tujek, držali v ozadju, kar je zgodovinarjem nacionalnih historiografij po letu 1918 povzročilo nemalo težav. A v slovenskem kontekstu niti opozorilo na vseavstrijski kontekst ob Napotniku ni v veliko pomoč. Na eni strani je namreč v prizadevanju za nacionalno uveljavitev in v političnih spopadih tako rekoč hiperaktivni Jeglič, na drugi tudi zgodnejši škofov predhodnik Slomšek.<sup>7</sup> Da je kmečki sin s Tepanjskega Vrha med slovenskimi duhovniki izjema, so poudarjali že tisti, ki so ga po smrti predhodnika Stepišnika priporočali za naslednika tudi z argumentom, da se zna vesti v višji družbi, kar da za njegove slovenske tovariše ni značilno (Rajšp, 1993, 79).

Seveda Napotnikova nevidnost na javnem političnem polju v primerjavi z Jegličem ni pomenila, da je držal roke križem. Tudi njemu lahko pravzaprav priznamo

<sup>7</sup> Ta druga primerjava je zelo navzoča tudi v prikazih škofovovanja lavantinskih škofov v Mariboru (prim. recimo Kovačič, 1928, ali Ambrožič, 2010).

pravo deloholičnost, le da je svoje vidne sadove dajala predvsem na duhovnem področju. Tako je drugi Slomškov naslednik morda celo najbolj zaslužen za današnjo podobo katoliškega Maribora. Močno je namreč podpiral gradnjo najprepoznavnejše mestne cerkve, frančiškanske bazilike, ki jo je prav on posvetil in ji izposloval ta laskavi papeški naslov, ki so ga v začetku 20. stoletja podeljevali bolj skopo kot v njegovi drugi polovici (Lazarini, 2012a, 176–178, 198–199). Enako nosi njegov pečat današnja notranja oprema mariborske stolnice (Vidmar, 2009; 2010).

Poleg tega je bil knezoškof verjetno najplodovitejši lavantinski nadpastir sploh. Svojo obsežno produkcijo je hkrati pridno priobčeval, velikokrat v samozaložbi (za kratek pregled njegovega opusa gl. Kovačič, 1928, 425–426; Lukman, 1935, 192). Razen zgodovinskih in eksegetskih spisov, med katerimi je najbolj znan tisti o obljubi, da bo Devica rodila, iz Izajeve knjige, tvorijo značilno hrbtenico njegovega opusa njegove številne in retorično izpiljene pridige (prim. Rajhman, 1993; Peklaj, 1993, zlasti 101–102). Svojo uradniško žilico avstrijskega škofa je po drugi strani najbolj izpričal z obsežno dokumentacijo škofijskih sinod, ki jih je vodil. Že kmalu po škofovi smrti je slednja naletela na vsaj zadržano kritiko celo med vodilnimi lavantinskimi duhovniki. Že bližnji Napotnikov sodelavec Franc Kovačič je v *Zgodovini Lavantinske škofije* ob vsej hvali dodelanosti sklepov knezoškofovih sinod značilno pripomnil, da vrednosti takšnih dokumentov ne gre presojati le po pravni dodelanosti njihove dikcije, marveč po uresničevanju v praksi (Kovačič, 1928, 422). Oceno je nato zaostril Kovačičev naslednik na čelu *Voditelja v bogoslovnih vedah* Franc Ksaver Lukman, ki je zapisal kar, da bi bilo lepo, če bi v uresničevanje sklepov sinod Napotnik vložil toliko truda kot v njihovo pripravo (Lukman, 1935, 191).

Na kratko povedano bi lahko razmerje med Jegličem in Napotnikom primerjali z razmerjem med papežem Frančiškom in njegovim predhodnikom Benediktom XVI., pri čemer je bil prvi seveda podoben v javnosti vseskozi navzocemu in tako rekoč hiperaktivnemu Argentincu, medtem ko je Napotnik bolj ustrezal profesorskemu Bavarcu. Razvoj predstav o razmerju med Cerkvijo in državo v 20. stoletju sicer ni bil nujno neugoden za lavantinskega nadpastirja (prim. o tem razmerju v prvi polovici 20. stoletja v srednji Evropi Mithans, 2017, zlasti 17–24). Prevladujoča in dominantna Jegličeva vloga v kranjski politiki, ki jo je od njegovih bližnjih sodelavcev za nazaj najbolj bičal njegov stolni prošt Ignacij Nadrah (2010, 170–175), bi v obnembu sodobnih trendov delovala še bolj čudno, kot je delovala na sodobnike ljubljanskega škofa.

Če bi imel Napotnik podobna naziranja o razmerju med katoliškim političnim gibanjem in škofom, kot jih je imel Jeglič, si tudi ni mogoče zamisliti, da bi tako širokogrudno dovoljeval štajerskim katoliškim politikom in lavantinskim duhovnikom agitacijo za Majniško deklaracijo, ki je sam uradno ni podprl. Med njenimi podporniki ni bila samo večina njegovega klera, temveč tudi nekateri njegovi pomembni neposredni sopotniki. Končno je bil voditelj gibanja Napotnikov duhovnik Anton Korošec, ki ga je knezoškof s Konjiškega posvetil v mašnika, njun medsebojni odnos pa ni bil vedno lahek, kot je pozneje pričal Ivan Ahčin (prim.

kar nekaj zapisov v Godeša & Dolenc, 1999). Kljub temu okoliščina, da knezoškof kljub siceršnji zvestobi do habsburške hiše ni ukrenil ničesar zoper to, da je prav njegova duhovščina postala žarišče deklaracijskega gibanja, kaže celo v smer, da bi znal obstajati razkorak med njegovim mnenjem zasebnika in njegovim ravnanjem škofa-uradnika (kot razmišlja recimo Stavbar, 1993, predvsem 195; prim. zdaj še Stavbar, 2018).

Druga plat iste zadržanosti je seveda, da se *Slovenski gospodar* ni mogel nadejati javne izjave svojega škofa v prid napredajočemu južnoslovanskemu zblževanju. Še več, v članku Škof za Jugoslavijo, objavljenem le dober teden dni pred ustanovitvijo Narodnega sveta, Napotnikovega imena katoliški list iz njegove škofije ne navaja med »narodnozavednimi škofi«, med katere prišteva Jegliča, Mahniča in zagrebškega nadškofa Antuna Bauerja. V nadaljevanju nato povzema odločno »projugoslovansko« stališče krškega nadpastirja Antona Mahniča iz zagrebških *Novin* (Škof za Jugoslavijo, 1918, 1). Tudi njega se pogosto omenja v istem stavku s pojmom legitimizem, ki ga pripisujejo Napotniku, vendar obstaja, kot sem pokazal zgoraj, verjetno pomemben razloček. Veliko Mahničevih pogledov na razmerje med Cerkvijo in državo izhaja iz doslednega zavračanja dediščine jožefinizma, ki je ravno vzpostavil izrazito uradniški model avstrijskega episkopata in vsekakor ohranjal vpliv še v 20. stoletje (prim. recimo Benedik, 1990; ali tudi Pirc, 1990).

Napotnik sam je še v letu 1918 razmišljal drugače. Pridigo ob osemnajsti vojni pobožnosti in šesti prošnji procesiji (o številnih pobožnostih v lavantinski škofiji leta 1918, namenjenih molitvi za konec vojne, gl. Personalstand, 1918, 247–251) na četrto postno nedeljo 10. marca je po eni strani posvetil nedelji veselega posta primerenemu izražanju veselja nad sklenitvijo separatnega miru v Brest-Litovsku. Po drugi strani je najprej na dolgo razpredal o domnevnih naukih, ki da jih je prineslo skoraj štiriletno krvavo in boleče vojskovanje (gl. Napotnik, 1918). Posebne zasluge za mir, ki se je zasvetil na obzorju z ruskim izstopom iz vojne, je pripisal cesarju Karlu I., »*unserem geliebten und allverehrten Landesvater*«, ki da ga zaradi njegovih mirovnih prizadevanj cenijo tudi v sovražnem taboru, in »*papežu miru*« miru Benediktu XV. (Napotnik, 1918, 3/3 in 4; o odmevih Benediktovih mirovnih prizadevanj prim. zdaj Kolar, 2018, o podobnih prizadevanjih cesarja Karla I. pa Griesser Pečar, 2015).

Pod geslom *Per quae peccat quis, per haec et torquetur* je skušal škof v odrekanjih vojnega časa ugledati Božjo kazen za predvojne prestopke človeštva. Ker je pred vojno vladalo brezmejno uživanje, je sedaj vse na karte. Ker je bilo prej vse obsedeno z modo in z velikim trudom za lepo obleko, zdaj skoraj ni obleke, če pa že, je je dovolj komaj, da pokrijemo tisto goloto, ki so jo ljudje pred vojno tako radi razkazovali. V vojni je Napotnik ugledal tudi kaznovalnega angela zaradi grehov zoper svetost krščanskega zakona, ki obenem dobro skrbi za preprečevanje prenaseljenosti planeta. Posebej veliko naj bi bilo po njegovih informacijah družin, ki so izgubili sinove edince, v Franciji, kjer so se pred vojno posebej odlikovali z naporji za nadzor rojstev. Nekako sodobno zveni knezoškof,

ko tarna, kako je bilo pred veliko vojno vse obsedeno z denarjem. Brez česar koli ga je bilo mogoče kar tako dobiti celo na borzi. Zdaj da je Bog temu naredil konec, saj denar je, a ga človek nima za kaj zamenjati. In če so prej ljudje desetletja zapuščali podeželje in se odpravljali v mesta, da bi se tam predajali uživanju, je Bog med vojno tok obrnil in zdaj ljudje za živežem iz mest bežijo a deželo (za vse te poudarke gl. Napotnik, 1918, 1/1–6).

Potem ko je Napotnik naštel in obširno opisal še orožja vere, ki so verujočemu na voljo v trenutkih vojne preizkušnje, je pridigo zaključil z besedami: »*Mein Schlachtruf lautet nun: Friede! Friede! Um den Frieden kämpfen ja auch unsere herrlichen Heere. Ich erwarte kaum, dass ich von meinem Bischofsstuhl rufen kann: Pax vobis! Friede sei mit euch!*« (Napotnik, 1918, 4/6).<sup>8</sup> Vprašanje je, kakšen vtis je na v frančiškanski baziliki zbrano množico, med katero je bilo menda veliko vojakov, naredilo nadpastirjevo modrovanje o vojnih grozotah kot kazni za predvojno pretiravanje. Gotovo pa so njegovi škofljani z njim delili željo po miru.

Da so se njihove predstave o prihodnosti od škofovih vsaj jeseni 1918 bržkone precej razlikovale, priča kratko besedilo, ki ga je Napotnik podpisal na svoj god, 29. septembra tega leta. Postavil ga je na začetek zbirke svojih nagovorov v čast pokojnima vladarjem Francu Jožefu I. in njegovi ženi Elizabeti. Šlo je v bistvu za razširjeno in pomnoženo izdajo podobne zbirke s povednim naslovom *Dajte cesarju, kar je cesarjevega*, ki jo je dal lavantinski vladika natisniti v prvem vojnem letu (Napotnik, 1914). Kot sam pravi, je to storil tudi zato, da bi razblinil dvome o domoljubju spodnještajerske duhovščine. Ker je knjiga med vojno pošla, je Napotnik izdal novo v spomin na vse dobrote, ki da jih je njemu in njegovi škofiji izkazal pokojni cesar in kralj. Da se je nekaj vendarle prelamljalo, kaže v tem predgovoru zgolj zadnja poved: »*Die Gedenkschrift wäre wohl grösser geworden, wenn nicht verschiedene, inzwischen aufgetauchte Schwierigkeiten deren weitere Drucklegung unmöglich gemacht hätten.*« (Napotnik, 1919, 6).<sup>9</sup> Ni bilo veliko presenečenje, da je bila knjiga z naslovom, ki se v slovenskem prevodu glasi *V pobožen spomin na nekdanji veličanstvi cesarja Franca Jožefa I. in cesarico Elizabeto*, leta 1919 zaplenjena (Lukman, 1935, 191).

## PREOBRET IN LOŠČENJE PODOBE

Prizadetni Napotnikovi sopotniki so po končani vojni in prelomu skušali zloščiti njegovo podobo. Pri tem v svoji vnemi istovetnosti, ki je sama bržkone nista gojila, niso pripisali le leta 1922 umrlemu škofu, temveč tudi njegovi nič hudega sluteči materi: »*Prepričanega mladeniča – Jugoslovana dokazujejo rajnega vladiko njegove potopisne črtice iz slovanskega juga. [...] Ravnokar*

8 »*Moj bojni klic se zdaj glasi: Mir! Mir! Za mir se vendar bojujejo tudi naše sijajne armade. Komaj čakam, da bom lahko s škofovskega sedeža zaklical: Pax vobis! Mir z vami!*«

9 »*Ta spominski spis bi se verjetno še razširil, če različne težave, ki so se vmes pojavile, ne bi preprečile nadaljnjega tiskanja.*«

*na kratko omenjeni literarni proizvodi iz slovenske ter osobito jugoslovanske prošlosti nam ovekovečajo rajnega knezoškofa kot literata mladeniča, ki je bil zvest sin svoje matere ne samo Slovenke – ampak Jugoslovanke!« (Posebna izdaja, 1922, 1).*

Nekaj osnove za tako posmrtno preobrazbo je dal škof Napotnik kar sam. Nemara že s tem, da je leta 1921 na začudenje škofa Jegliča poslal svojega predstavnika na pogreb pravoslavnega kralja Petra I., ki se ga ljubljanski katoliški škof ni udeležil (Jegličev dnevnik, 2015, 839, vpis 9. 9. 1921), še bolj pa s svojo zahvalo za najvišje državno odlikovanje, red svetega Save prve stopnje. Ko mu ga je pokrajinski namestnik Ivan Hribar v imenu kralja Aleksandra I. dva meseca pred smrtno, 29. januarja 1922, prinesel, je svoj govor (menda je šlo pri osnutku zanj tudi za njegov zadnji spis) Napotnik zaključil značilno, da ga bolj ne bi mogel: »*Gorko želim in prosim Kralja kraljev, da bogato blagoslovi imenitno delovanje kraljevega Veličanstva. [...] Bože pravde, varuj in živi kralja Aleksandra in njegovo nevesto!*« (Medved, 1922, 29). Zadeva od daleč zveni tako rekoč v slogu krilatice »*Cesar je mrtev, živel kralj*«. Ironija zgodovine je hotela, da je cesar in kralj Karel dejansko umrl samo štiri dni za škofom Napotnikom (o okoliščinah prim. Rahten, 2016, 312 ss.).

## BETWEEN AN EMPEROR AND A KING: THE PRINCE-BISHOP MIHAEL NAPOTNIK OF LAVANT IN THE YEAR 1918 AND AFTERWARDS

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### SUMMARY

*During the last year of the World War I, the Prince-bishop Mihael Napotnik of Lavant already entered his 30<sup>th</sup> year as leader of the Lower Styrian diocese with its seat in Maribor. Although he had justly been regarded one of the most active members of the Austrian episcopate during the last pre-war decades, his remarkable absence from the greater political stage was the most obvious feature of his tenure in 1918. This circumstance already puzzled bishop's contemporaries, particularly in comparison with Napotnik's Ljubljana counterpart, Anton Bonaventura Jeglič who played a pivotal role during the separation of Slovenes from Habsburg monarchy. On the other hand, Napotnik himself took virtually no part in this process, although he did nothing to prevent his diocesan clergy from assuming (or only consolidating) their lead in it. His priest, Anton Korošec, even served as the more or less undisputed leader of these efforts. It is indeed almost impossible to answer the question, whether Napotnik was only unable to prevent his priests in their political actions (or was not interested in doing so, due to his preoccupation with theological writing), or there was a deeper antagonism between his public appearance as a typical Austrian ecclesiastical prince and his personal opinions and desires. It is pretty clear that Napotnik indeed represented a rather common bishop by standards of the Habsburg Austrian church, still deeply permeated by a sense of the necessity of union between throne and altar. So, it couldn't be expected that the Prince-bishop of Lavant would take any public action in the direction of breaching the long preserved political framework. It is therefore characteristic that the Catholic newspaper of Styrian Slovenes, Slovenski gospodar, felt compelled to "mobilize" the bishop of Krk, Anton Mahnič, as a proponent of change in early August 1918, when it became clear that the old certainties were shaken beyond repair. Mahnič was known as staunch champion of legitimism himself, but was on the other hand strongly opposed to the Josephine foundations of Austrian church system. Such opposition can't be traced in Napotnik, who even at the end of 1918 published his collection of speeches and sermons, dedicated to late emperor Francis Joseph I and his wife empress Elisabeth. But he obviously found some form of modus vivendi with the new state framework, since he both sent his representatives to the king Peter I's funeral (what Jeglič didn't do) in 1921 and shortly before his own death in spring 1922 warmly accepted a state decoration awarded to him by the king Alexander I. Regarding the life of Napotnik's diocese in the year 1918, many aspects offered some appearance of normality. The Prince-bishop conferred rite of confirmation to more than 10.000 children. He also ordained eight new*

*priests. But on the other hand, a major part of his flock endured ever increasing hardships due to war efforts of the ailing monarchy. Many priests and seminarians were part of this efforts on the battlefield. The bishop led many processions and prayers for peace. Particularly his sermon, delivered on the Laetare Sunday in the wake of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty, gives us an insight in his thinking at the time. In the sermon Napotnik underlined a deep wish for peace, but also interpreted the Great war as a God's punishment for transgressions of humanity in the decades leading to it. Similarly, he singled out the emperor Charles I and the pope Benedict XV as great peacemakers.*

*Keywords: Mihael Napotnik, Diocese of Lavant, Maribor during the World War I, Church and state in Austria, legitimism, Anton Mahnič*

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## RESPUBLIKA MÖRSKA – MURSKA REPUBLIKA, 1919

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## IZVLEČEK

Članek obravnava nastanek Murske republike, ki jo je ambiciozni Vilmoš Tkalec razglasil 29. maja 1919. Oriše dogodke in analizira vzroke, ki so ga vodili v razglasitev te kratko živeče tворbe. Prekmurje se je kot sestavni del Madžarske po koncu prve svetovne vojne znašlo na pogorišču razpadle avstro-ogrške monarhije. Stalno menjavanje vlad, vojaški vpadi in splošno pomanjkanje so pokrajino ob Muri pahnili v kaos. Eden od prelomnih dogodkov v državi leta 1919 je bila razglasitev Madžarske sovjetske republike 21. marca. Tkalec je na račun svoje dotedanje zveste vojaške službe novim madžarskim oblastem dobil položaj namestnika ljudskega komisarja za Železno županijo v Murski Soboti, in tako nadaljeval svoj nenadni karierni vzpon. Kmalu se je zapletel v obsežno tihotapsko mrežo ob meji z Avstrijo, ki mu je omogočila utrditev moči in razširitev njegovega vpliva. Samovoljno je začel voditi pokrajino, kar pa ni bilo po godu nekaterim članom soboškega sovjeta (sveta), ki so ga prijavili osrednji oblasti. Kljub grožnji aretacije se ni hotel odpovedati pridobljeni moči. Nasprotno, šel je v tvegan podvig – razglasitev neodvisnosti od Budimpešte. Poveljeval je nekaj manj kot 1300 vojakom, podčastnikom in prostovoljcem. Murska republika pa se je obdržala le nekaj dni, do 3. junija 1919. Madžarska Rdeča armada jo je uspešno zatrla, vstajniki pa so s Tkalcem vred pobegnili v Avstrijo.

*Ključne besede: Murska republika, 1919, Vilmoš Tkalec, Prekmurje, Madžarska sovjetska republika, Kraljevina Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev (SHS)*

## RESPUBLIKA MÖRSKA – LA REPUBBLICA DI MURA, 1919

## SINTESI

*L'articolo tratta la formazione della Repubblica di Mura, proclamata dall'ambizioso Vilmoš Tkalec il 29 maggio 1919. Delinea gli eventi e analizza le ragioni che hanno portato alla sua proclamazione che ebbe però breve durata. Come parte integrante dell'Ungheria dopo la fine della Prima guerra mondiale, la regione di*

*Oltremura (Prekmurje) si trovò sulle ceneri della ex Monarchia austro-ungarica. Il frequente cambiamento di governi, le incursioni militari e la penuria generale gettarono la regione della Mura nel caos. Uno dei punti di svolta del Paese nel 1919 fu la proclamazione della Repubblica sovietica ungherese il 21 marzo. A causa del suo fedele servizio militare in favore delle nuove autorità ungheresi, il Tkalec ricevette l'incarico di vicecommissario del popolo per la contea Železna županija (Vas megye / Provincia di Vas) della Murska Sobota, continuando così il suo improvviso avanzamento di carriera. Ben presto fu coinvolto in una vasta rete di contrabbando lungo il confine con l'Austria e ciò li permise di consolidare il potere e di espandere la propria influenza. Iniziò così arbitrariamente a dirigere la provincia. Il suo operato però non era molto gradito da alcuni membri del consiglio dei soviet (svéta) di Murska Sobota che lo avevano denunciato alle autorità centrali. Nonostante la minaccia di arresto, rifiutò di cedere il potere e, al contrario, intraprese un'impresa rischiosa – la dichiarazione di indipendenza da Budapest. Al suo comando aveva poco meno di 1.300 soldati, sottoufficiali e volontari. La Repubblica di Mura riuscì a resistere solo pochi giorni, fino al 3 giugno 1919. Fu soppressa dall'Armata Rossa ungherese, mentre i ribelli, incluso Tkalec, fuggirono in Austria.*

*Parole chiave: Repubblica di Mura, 1919, Vilmoš Tkalec, Oltremura (Prekmurje), Repubblica sovietica ungherese, Regno dei Serbi, Croati e Sloveni (SHS)*

UVOD<sup>1</sup> IN STANJE RAZISKAV

Lani je minilo sto let od priključitve Prekmurja k državi matičnega naroda, kot tudi razglasitve kratko živeče Murske republike, ki jo je ustvaril Vilmoš Tkalec,<sup>2</sup> verjetno pustolovec in avanturist, kot ga Prekmurje dotej še ni videlo. V obdobju Kraljevine Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev (SHS) je spomin na Mursko republiko tako hitro zbledel, kot je tudi sama nenadno nastala in izginila. V teh letih ni izšlo nobeno delo, ki bi znanstveno pristopilo k raziskovanju kratko živeče republike; omeniti sicer velja Miška Kranjca (Zadravec, 1979), ki je leta 1933 objavil novelo *Rdeči gardist*, ki je nazorno prikazala življenje običajnega kmeta med prevratnim obdobjem v Prekmurju.

Med prvimi je Mursko republiko začel znanstveno obdelovati Rudi Kyovsky (Kyovsky, 1956; Kyovsky, 1961). Sledil mu je madžarski zgodovinar László Kővágó (Kővágó, 1964), ki je v delu z naslovom *A magyarországi délszlávok 1918–1919-ben* (Južni Slovani na Madžarskem med letoma 1918–1919) izčrpno analiziral vzroke za nastanek in propad Murske republike ter natančno orisal ofenzivo madžarske Rdeče armade zoper Tkalčeve vojsko. Od šestdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja je nato opazno povečanje raziskav prevratnega obdobja in same Murske republike; vendar so avtorji v duhu takratnih časov pogosto prišli do napačnih zaključkov. Najpomembnejši deli, ki sta izšli v tistem obdobju, sta nedvomno *Murska republika Julija Titla* (1970) in zbornik razprav *Revolucionarno vrenje v Pomurju v letih 1918–1920* (zlasti Kokolj, 1981).

Iz novejšega obdobja ne smemo prezreti raziskav Metke Fujs, Viktorja Vrbnjaka in Zoltána Paksyja. Navsezadnje pa ne moremo tudi mimo magistrske naloge *Ustanovitev Murske republike v luči sočasnega časopisja* Natalije Cigut (2017), ki izčrpno

1 Objava je del raziskovalnega programa št. P6-0138 (A): *Preteklost severovzhodne Slovenije med slovenskimi zgodovinskimi deželami in v interakciji z evropskim sosedstvom*, in raziskovalnega projekta št. J6-9354: *Kultura spominjanja gradnikov slovenskega naroda in države*, ki ju financira Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije.

2 Vilmoš (Viljem) Tkalec, kantor, učitelj in politik. Rodil se je 8. januarja 1894 v Turnišču. Med leti 1912 in 1914 je deloval kot kantor in učitelj, jeseni 1914 pa se je prostovoljno javil v vojsko. V madžarski vojski je hitro napredoval do oficirskega čina honvedskega nadporočnika. Dobil je tudi odlikovanje. Med vojno je bil ranjen in zajet v rusko ujetništvo, iz katerega se mu je uspelo rešiti leta 1917. Po vojni se mu je ponudila možnost zaposlitve v šolstvu, vendar je raje ostal v madžarski vojski kot rezervni oficir. Takoj po vojni leta 1918 se je poročil z Margitko Preisler, učiteljico v Odrancih. Novembra istega leta je na prošnjo veleposestnikov krvavo zadušil nemire v Medmurju in tudi v dolnjem Prekmurju. Ni povsem jasno, ali je svoje metode pri zadušitvi upora ubral sam, ali pa se je ravnal po navodilih svojih nadrejenih, čeprav je bil on eden izmed vodilnih častnikov v pokrajini. Po razglasitvi Madžarske sovjetske republike mu je bila dodeljena funkcija namestnika ljudskega komisarja za Prekmurje. Tkalec je bil nedvomno nadarjen človek, ki pa ni izbiral sredstev za doseglo svojih ciljev. To se je videlo pri zatrtju novembarskih uporov in pozneje pri razglasitvi Murske republike 29. maja 1919. Po zatrtju republike je pobegnil v Avstrijo, od koder se je po padcu komunizma na Madžarskem vrnil v Prekmurje. Jugoslovanske oblasti so ga takoj aretirale in odvedle v dolnjelendavski zapor, iz katerega mu je s pomočjo pažnikov na začetku leta 1920 uspelo pobegniti na Madžarsko. Ustalil se je v vasi Nagykarácsony in služboval kot učitelj. Umrl je 27. maja 1950 v Budimpešti (Brenk & Stanonik, 2008, 1178; Fujs, 1992, 87–88).

obravnava Tkalčeve delovanje, in monografije Darjana Lorenčiča z naslovom *1919: rdeče Prekmurje* (2019), ki je izšla ob njeni okrogli stoti obletnici. V monografiji je obravnaval celotno prevratno obdobje v Prekmurju, s poudarkom na Murski republiki. Razen analize prevratnih dogodkov v pokrajini ob Muri in samega pojava le-te se je posvetil še doživljanju prebivalcev, in kaj je vplivalo na njihove odločitve v tistih usodnih trenutkih. Med spletnim gradivom o njej je v okviru Wikipedije trenutno najobsežnejša in najnovejša predstavitev geslo v madžarsčini, medtem ko je slovensko le v nekaj stavkih oziroma še brez izpisane vsebine. Na spletu je dostopna tudi (Kuzmič, 2020) priročna bibliografija objav o Prekmurju v tej dobi.

## PREKMURJE OB KONCU VELIKE MORIJE

Ob razglasitvi premirja med antanto in Avstro-Ogrsko 3. novembra 1918, ki je naznanilo konec prve svetovne vojne na tukajšnjih ozemljih, in dokončnega premirja osem dni zatem, si je cel svet po štirih letih krvavih bojev končno oddahnil – prišel je mir, ki so si ga vsi žeeli. Toda navkljub premirju se boji med novonastalimi državami, ki so vzklile na pogorišču monarhije, niso končali in so potekali dalje. Nove neodvisne države so z blagoslovom antante naravnost tekmovale v zavzemanju ozemlja močno okrnjene Avstrije in Madžarske.<sup>3</sup> Še posebej huda usoda je zadela Madžarsko, ki je bila razkosana in so ji sovražne sile grozile z vseh strani (Kontler, 2005, 261–263).

V tem za državo obupnem položaju se je kot njen takratni sestavni del znašla tudi majhna, oddaljena in povrh pozabljena pokrajina na levem bregu Mure, takrat v domačem prekmurskoslovenskem govoru imenovana »slovenska krajina«, se pravi Prekmurje. Ob koncu vojne je bila prenaseljena in izrazito kmečko usmerjena. Prebivalstvo se je do pričetka vojne kar množično izseljevalo; mnogi, ki so ostali doma, pa so si morali služiti kruh s sezonskim delom na ogrskih veleposestih. Le majhen delež prebivalcev je imel dovolj zemlje, da jim ni bilo potrebno odhajati na sezonska dela (Vrbnjak, 2007, 77). Takratno stanje, vsakdanjik in življenske razmere se lahko opiše z besedami kot vsesplošno pomanjkanje tudi osnovnih življenskih dobrin že med vojno, negotovost, upravičen srd ter malone tragično vračanje stotin in stotin domačih fantov in mož iz vojske, nekaterih še zdravih, drugih tako ali drugače ranjenih oziroma prizadetih.

Posledice vojne so čutili preživeli: invalidi, vdove, otroci brez očetov, kmetije brez moške delovne sile idr. Najhujši pa je bil krvni davek. Vojskovanje je pokrajini od okrog 20.000 v njej mobiliziranih vzelo skorajda 2.800 življenj mrtvih in pogrešanih – številka je predstavljala tri odstotke leta 1910 popisane celotne populacije prostora (Fujs, 2015, 59, 63; Fujs, 2016). Vse intenzivnejše madžarizacije slovenskega prebivalstva v vojnih letih, še zlasti pa vpoklicanih prekmurskih

3 Več o tem v: Griesser-Pečar, 2019.

Slovencev, ni treba posebej poudarjati, saj je po že desetletjih izvajanja postala ustaljena, vsakodnevna ter vseprisotna danost (Hazemali, 2017, 173).

Konec prve svetovne vojne je prinesel korenite politične in družbene spremembe na Madžarskem. Trohneči stebri starega reda so dokončno omagali pod pritiskom sprememb in se zrušili. Na ruševinah starega pa se je začel graditi novi red, ki si ga je zamislila antanta. Po vojni se je situacija še dodatno poslabšala. Demobilizirani vojaki, ki so se vračali z vzhodne fronte, so pogosto na svoji poti domov ropali ter povzročali nered. Nekateri, navdihnjeni nad oktobrsko revolucijo,<sup>4</sup> so začeli v domačem okolju naznanjati, da stari svet, kjer so vladali gospodje, nezadržno propada in da se je na ruševinah tega začel prebujati nov, pravičnejši svet (Paksy, 2007, 7–8).

Kaosu, ki je sledil vojni, se ni moglo izogniti niti Prekmurje. Dodatno olje na ogenj je prililo zborovanje v Ljutomeru, ki ga je mariborski Narodni svet za Štajersko organiziral 3. novembra in so se ga udeležili mnogi Prekmurci, zlasti mladina. Čez Muro so se vrnili navdihnjeni in bojevito razpoloženi. V domačih krajih, posebej v Dolnjem Prekmurju, so začeli agitirati za jugoslovansko državo in sovaščane podpihovati zoper Madžare, veleposestnike in tudi Jude, ki so v njihovih očeh predstavljeni simbol oderuštva (Vrbnjak, 2007, 88).<sup>5</sup> Pri tem ne smemo pozabiti, da je levji delež k razraščajoči se nestrnosti proti tukajšnjim Judom prispeval znani duhovnik Jožef Klekl starejši.<sup>6</sup> Ta je z antisemitskimi članki v *Novinah*<sup>7</sup> – časniku, ki je od začetka izhajanja leta 1913 predstavljal edino slovensko čtivo, iz katerega se je lahko pismeni prekmurskoslovenski človek redno informiral in si z njim hkrati blažil asimilacijske pritiske oblasti – hujskal bralce proti Judom prav v času kroničnega pomanjkanja, ko so ljudje mrzlično iskali grešnega kozla za nastalo situacijo.

V tedanji evropski družbi je bil antisemitizem močno zakoreninjen; vendar se s tem nikakor ne more opravičevati Kleklovih antisemitskih izpadov. Navsezadnje je taisti antisemitizem vodil do holokavsta v drugi svetovni vojni. Pred koncem vojne je sovražno pisanje do Judov doseglo vrhunec. Med njegovimi mnogimi tovrstnimi članki je tu predstavljen del iz članka, kjer je pisal o t. i. »židovski zaroti«:

4 O oktobrski revoluciji in Slovencih podrobneje v: Repe, 2018; Komel, 2018.

5 O položaju Prekmurcev takoj po prvi svetovni vojni več v: Kerec, 2016.

6 Jožef Klekl starejši, slovenski katoliški duhovnik, pisatelj, politik, urednik in založnik. Rodil se je leta 1874 v Krajni. Študij bogoslovja je zaključil v Sombotelu in je nato kot kaplan in župnik opravljal duhovniško službo v več krajih. Leta 1904 je začel izdajati katoliški mesečnik *Marijin list*, ki je pozneje imel še otroško prilogo *Marijikin Ograček*. V Črenšovce se je, zavoljo obolelosti hitro upokojen, preselil leta 1910. Tri leta po upokojitvi je začel izdajati tednik *Novine*. Po vojni se je od začetka prevratne dobe zavzemal za avtonomijo Prekmurja, bodisi znotraj Madžarske bodisi v Kraljevini SHS. Med drugo svetovno vojno so ga Madžari internirali ter postavili pred sodišče z otožbo veleizdaje in grožnjo smrti, vendar je preživel. Sodeloval je pri agrarni reformi, ustanovil je hranilnico, posojilnico in agrarno zadrugo v Črenšovcih ter prvi kulturni dom in prvo katoliško tiskarno. Sodeloval je tudi pri ustanovitvi dijaškega doma v Murski Soboti. Umrl je leta 1948 v Murski Soboti (Kuzmič, 1991).

7 *Novine* so pod Kleklom izhajale v vseh letih prve svetovne vojne (Kerec, 2018, 812).

[...] *Najvekši del novin na sveti majo židovje v rokah; kūpili so tiskarne, plačujejo pisatele, v njihovih rokah so fabrike, šteri papir, farbo i druge za stamp potrebne reči delajo. Zato pa ma židovska novina papir i zato lehko pišejo teliko proti krščanskoj veri. Majo vse v rokah, Kristuša pa meti nečejo. [...]*<sup>8</sup>

Kakorkoli že, v začetku novembra je po ljutomerskem zborovanju v dolnjem Prekmurju prišlo do spontanih izbruhanov nezadovoljstva in nemirov, ki so jih zanetile naštete okoliščine. Najprej se je zgodilo ropanje in razbijanje trgovin ter gostiln v Beltincih, kjer so bile praktično vse v lasti Judov, nato pa tudi v Črenšovcih, Veliki Polani in v manjšem obsegu tudi v drugih krajih. V Beltincih so se po ropanju judovskih trgovin obrnili še proti gradu, ga izropali ter začgali celoten inventar. Med nemiri je tako prišlo do prvega in najverjetnejše edinega protijudovskega pogroma na slovenskem etničnem ozemlju v sodobni zgodovini. Nemire je Klekl takoj obsodil, se umaknil na varno v svojo hišo v Črenšovcih in tam počakal na prihod madžarske narodne straže, ki ji je poveljeval nihče drug kot Vilmoš Tkalec. Takrat ga lahko prvič zasledimo kot pomembno osebnost v prevratni dobi, ki pa se je predstavila na neslaven način – najprej je nadvse krvavo zadušil upore v Medmurju. Metode pa ni spremenil niti v svojem domačem okolišu, kjer je prav tako na krut, vendar učinkovit način zadušil izbruhe nezadovoljstva. V Črenšovcih je »drugim za zgled« dal obesiti Martina Vuka. Ljudje tega niso pozabili, in prav zaradi tega je pozneje v dolnjem Prekmurju zaman iskal podporo za Mursko republiko (Klekl, 1937, 21; Jerič, 2001, 66–67).

V Medmurje so ga oblasti poslale z vojaško enoto s ciljem gašenja ljudskega upiranja, ki se je 2. novembra 1918 v Prelogu in Goričanu razraslo v splošno ropanje in razbijanje judovskih lokalov, hiš madžarskega ter pomadžarjenega velikoposetniškega življa in uradništva. V Goričanu je dogajanje doseglo vrhunec z razglasitvijo takoimenovane *Goričanske republike* (od 3. do 16. novembra). Oblasti so reagirale z razglasitvijo hitrega izrednega sodišča v vseh obmejnih županijah, na podlagi vesti o nemirih pa semkaj poslale več enot vojaštva in orožnikov, ki so usmrtili skupno čez 160 ujetih ljudi. Tkalec je deloval v več krajih, najkonkretnje pa v Sv. Martinu na Muri, kamor je s četo mornarjev prišel iz Čakovca.

Vinko Žganec je v okviru opisa takratnih dogajanj v Medmurju njegovo intervencijo opisal takole – povzeto: Po splošnem oropanju Festetičevega marofa Novi Dvori med 3. in 6. novembrom je na podlagi upravnikove prijave iz Čakovca v Sv. Martin 8. novembra prišla četa madžarskih mornarjev pod vodstvom »nekega Prekmurca, učitelja Tkalc, znanega nadporočnika«. Takoj je ukazal obesiti in ustreliti šest mož, zatem pa – na podlagi pravkar razglašenega izrednega sodišča – še nadaljnjih več oseb. V naslednjih dneh je od ujetih ljudi iz sosednje Hlapičine izsiljeval velike vsote denarja v zameno za njihova življenja! Njegovi vojaki so

8 *Novine*, 21. 1. 1917: Koliko zemlé májo židovje na Vogrskem, 3; tudi v: Lorenčič, 2019, 46–47. Podobno so pisali tudi slovenski časopisi v osrednjeslovenskem prostoru.

res znali »uživati«: nastanili so se v šoli, kamor so privlekli tudi štiri dekleta iz vasi Vrhovljani, ki so ponoči med polnočjo in 2.00 uro morala gola plesati pred njimi, le-ti pa so jih vmes udarjali z usnjenimi biči (Jahn, 2003, 126–128; Žganec, 1940). To njegovo početje in predvsem usmrtitve so sprožili množično razburjenje med ljudmi ter »dosegli«, da so ga oblasti hitro zatem poslale v dolnje Prekmurje.

Po svojih neslavnih podvigih na območju Medmurja in v Dolnjem Prekmurju je začasno poniknil v ozadje vse do nenadnega in nepričakovanega komunističnega preobrata na Madžarskem 21. marca 1919. Do tega je prišlo zaradi ultimata, znanega kot »Vyxov memorandum«, ki ga je antanta poslala Károlyijevi vladi in od nje zahtevala privolitev v okupacijo velikega dela Madžarske s strani češkoslovaških in romunskih čet. Namreč antanta je bila prepričana, da je izbruh revolucije na Madžarskem neizogiven in se jo da preprečiti le z vstopom in okupacijo romunske in češkoslovaške vojske. S tem pa si je antanta naredila medvedjo uslugo. Malokdo je pričakoval, da bo ta ukrep kontraproduktiven. Pod močnim pritiskom Károlyi ni privolil v ultimat in je raje oblast prepustil socialdemokratom, najbolj vplivni stranki v vladni koaliciji, ki je nemudoma stopila v pogajanja s komunistično stranko in se s slednjo tudi združila v enotno stranko. Že naslednji dan, 21. marca, je Béla Kun,<sup>9</sup> voditelj madžarskih komunistov, razglasil ustanovitev Madžarske republike svétov oz. sovjетov, edine več mesecev živeče komunistične države na ozemlju ukinjene monarhije. Preobrat se je zgodil na miren in legalen način, znotraj okvirov parlamentarizma (Bleicken et al., 1976, 542; Földes, 2006, 178).

## TKALČEV VZPON

Tudi v Prekmurje je komunistični preobrat segel brez odlašanja. Že 23. marca so v Mursko Soboto, skupaj z madžarsko Rdečo armado, prispeali predstavniki nove oblasti in vzpostavili sovjet za Prekmurje (v prekmurskem jeziku: *Tanács szlovenske krajine*). Ljudski komisar<sup>10</sup> v Železni županiji je ostal prekmurski Slovenec Béla Obál, ki je to funkcijo opravljal že pred koncem Károlyijevega režima. Podpiral je avtonomijo Prekmurja znotraj Madžarske oziroma osnovanje Murske županije, ki bi zaobjemala celotno slovensko etnično ozemlje na levem bregu Mure. Prav v tem obdobju pa se ponovno pojavi Tkalec; pravzaprav je bil Obálov nečak. Ta

9 Béla Kun, madžarski novinar, politik in revolucionar. Rojen leta 1886 v vasi Lele v Transilvaniji. Pred komunističnem preobratom je deloval kot sindikalist. Med vojno je padel v rusko ujetništvo, kjer se je navdušil nad boljševizmom. Bil je med prvimi Madžari, ki so se pridružili boljševikom. Leta 1917 je v Sankt Peterburgu osebno srečal Lenina, s katerim je ostal v stiku vse do konca Madžarske sovjetske republike. Med diktaturo proletariata je deloval kot ljudski komisar za zunanje zadeve. Po njenem propadu je bil prisiljen emigrirati v Avstrijo, nato v Sovjetsko zvezo, kjer je bil usmrčen med Stalinovimi čistkami leta 1939 (Siklós, 1988, 28; Rokai et al., 2002, 304).

10 Z novo oblastjo so dotedanji funkcijski naziv *veliki župan* preimenovali v *ljudski komisar*. Funkcija – najvišji uradnik županije in vodja celotne županijske uprave v isti osebi – je ostala enaka.

močna rodbinska vez mu je omogočila nagel vzpon in uresničitev njegovih aspiracij po moči. Po nemirih na Dólinskom in vse do preobrata je iskal možnost, da bi se dokazal in se morebiti povzpel po družbeni lestvici. Vendar je obtičal v obmejni narodni straži kot rezervni poročnik. Možnost, da se dokaže in poteši svojo željo po moči, se mu je odprla takoj po preobratu, ko ga je stric imenoval za svojega namestnika za Prekmurje s sedežem v Murski Soboti.<sup>11</sup>

Izvršni odbor prekmurskega sovjeta je bil tričlanski direktorij s člani Samuelom Ritscherjem,<sup>12</sup> Józsefom Fülekyjem<sup>13</sup> in Šandorjem Černjavičem.<sup>14</sup> Klekl je pozneje v svojih spominih trojico opisal z naslednjimi besedami: »[...] en fiškališ, en dijak in en oštarijaš [...] po veri eden židov, eden evangeličanec, pa eden katoličanec. Po narodnosti nieden ne meo za Slovence [...].« (Klekl, 1921, 15).

V soboškem sovjetu je kmalu nato prišlo do čistk, ki so bile nujne za utrditev oblasti sovjetov. Odstranili so najočitnejše t. i. »reakcionarne elemente« kot recimo industrialca Gézo Hartnerja in Jánosa Czifráka. Obmejno vojaštvu se je iz t. i. »bele garde« oz. obmejne narodne straže preoblikovalo v »rdečo gardo«. Novo oblast je kmečko prebivalstvo, v pokrajini vsekakor večinsko ter pod močnim vplivom duhovščine, sprejelo z nezaupanjem. Oblast je, navkljub čistkam, še naprej v večji meri ostala v rokah madžarskih šovinistov. Tako seveda ni bilo za pričakovati, da bi prekmurski Slovenci od le-teh dobili konkretnejše avtonomne pravice. Prebivalstvo je zaradi nerešenega agrarnega in nacionalnega vprašanja postajalo vse bolj dovzetno za jugoslovansko in protirevolucionarno propagando. Da bi preprečili širjenje »reakcionarnih elementov«, je oblast sovjetov Kleklu takoj odvzela lastniške pravice nad časnikom *Novine* in postavila novo uredniško ekipo. Novi glavni urednik je postal Jožef Puszta, njegov pomočnik Jožef Kološa, Tkalec pa odgovorni urednik. V revolucionarnem duhu so spremenili ime časnika v *Rdeče Novine* in opustili gajico ter jo nadomestili z madžarskim črkopisom, kar je docela ustrezalo Tkalčevemu »staroslovenskemu« nacionalnemu prepričanju.<sup>15</sup>

11 PAM, 1691/001/00126, t. e. 3 107/1; glej tudi: Lorenčič, 2019, 17.

12 Samuel Ritscher je bil soboški Jud in odvetnik. Bil je član madžarizacijske organizacije VMKE (slov.: Madžarsko izobraževalno društvo Slovenske krajine), kjer je zasedal funkcijo odbornika. Ob ustanovitvi socialdemokratske stranke v Murski Soboti je bil izvoljen za tajnika. Poleg tega je bil član upravnega odbora soboške hranilnice in lastnik hiše na današnji Slomškovi ul. 6. Po proglašitvi Madžarske sovjetske republike je imel ob nedeljah v centru mesta dolge govore (Kokolj, 1981, 209).

13 József Füley je bil ob razglasitvi diktature proletariata dijak na šoli za oblikovanje in je v Mursko Soboto prispeval z vojakji Rdeče armade iz Sombotela. V tukajšnjem direktoriju je bil najbolj zvest revoluciji in mnogi so ga imeli za edinega pravega komunista. Podpiral je upravno avtonomijo pokrajine. Ni se strinjal s samovoljnimi ravnanjem Tkalca in njegovih sodelavcev, in je zaradi tega tudi izstopil iz direktorija (Kokolj, 1981, 200).

14 Šandor Černjavič, domačin iz Borejcev. V ruskem ujetništvu se je navdušil nad oktobrsko revolucijo. Po vrnitvi iz ujetništva je bil med ustanovnimi člani soboške socialdemokratske stranke in je postal tudi njen predsednik. Od januarja 1919 do maja 1945 je bil poslovodja kolodvorske restavracije (Kokolj, 1981, 200).

15 Tkalec je zagovarjal zloglasno »vendsko teorijo«, ki jo je širila madžarska propaganda med prekmurskimi Slovenci z namenom, da bi zaježila širjenje »jugoslovanstva«. Vendska teorija je trdila, da prekmurski Slovenci pravzaprav nimajo nobene povezave s Slovenci na desnem bregu Mure in z jugoslovenskim bazenom, in da so pleme za sebe (MNL, VaML, A bolsevizmus a Muraszombati járásban, Muraszombati Járásközigazgatási iratai, 946/1920; glej tudi: Cigut, 2017, 70–71).

Od svojega nastopa v funkciji namestnika ljudskega komisarja je Tkalec začel vse bolj uveljavljati svoje težnje po pridobitvi samostojne uprave nad celotnim Prekmurjem. Že 29. marca je obvestil delavske sovjete v Zalaegerszegu, Monoštru in Dolnji Lendavi, da je soboški sovjet prevzel upravljanje v celotnem Prekmurju in se preimenoval v *Slovenski Tanač Delavcov*. Za svojo funkcijo je uporabljal izraz *Ravnitelstvo Slovenske okrogline*. Enostransko ravnanje njega in njegovih sodelavcev pa so prej omenjeni sovjeti preprosto ignorirali, kar mu je vlilo poguma. Malo pozneje je razglasil, da ne priznava nikakršnih odredb vodstev Zalske in Železne županije, torej tudi ne odredb komisarja Béle Obála. Njegov stric se sicer sprva ni zmenil za nečakovo samovoljno ravnanje, najverjetneje iz prepričanja, da pač na lastno pest uresničuje njegovo – Obálovo idejo o osnovanju teritorialnoupravno avtonomne Murske županije, kar je bil tudi Tkalčev cilj.

Vendar slednjemu pri snovanju avtonomije Prekmurja niso bile v ospredju narodnostne pravice prekmurskih Slovencev in tega tudi ni poudarjal, čeprav mu je bila raba prekmurskoslovenskega jezika na šolah in v uradih ob madžarščini samoumevna. Avtonomije tako sploh ni podpiral na podlagi teh pravic, kaj šele da bi bil njegov končni cilj eventualna priključitev pokrajine k Jugoslaviji. Avtonomija, seveda z njim na čelu, bi mu omogočala od Železne in Zalske županije neodvisno delovanje z enakimi županijskooblaštnimi pooblastili kot dotlej, oz. celovito vodenje prostora po lastni volji. Tako bi si okrepil osebni vpliv in zadowolil svojo neomajno slo po moči. To potrjuje tudi naslednji pogovor s tiskovnim referentom Bélo Kelemenom, ki se mu je 9. aprila pritoževal, da 28 »vendskih« krajevnih občin beltinskega okraja, dodeljenih v Tkalčeve upravno področje, dejansko še vedno upravno spada pod Zalsko županijo. Tkalec mu je zatrdil, da se je področje političnega pooblaščenca raztezalo na 114 občin v murskosobškem okraju Železne županije, na 14 občin v monoštrskem okraju in tudi na po Kelemenu spornih 28 občin Zalske županije, ter dodal, da »vendsko« ljudstvo v beltinskem okraju zahteva politično in upravno enotnost celotnega Prekmurja.



Sl. 1: Vilmoš Tkalec z ženo Margitko (Pokrajinska in študijska knjižnica Murska Sobota, <https://ms.sik.si/>, 22. 3. 2020).

Posvaril je še, da ima ljudstvo v tamkajšnjem okraju zaradi nezainteresiranosti in nesposobnosti oblasti v Zalski županiji pretežno jugoslovanska čustva, ki se znajo razširiti še na preostali del »Vendov«.<sup>16</sup>

Tako tukajšnji kmečki živelj kot v celi državi je na začetku, ko še ni zapadel pod močan vpliv »reakcionarne« propagande, z visokimi pričakovanji spremjal »mirno rdečo revolucijo«. Od nove sovjetske oblasti so pričakovali dokončno razrešitev agrarnega vprašanja, ki ga je obljubljala vsaka prejšnja vlada, a ga nobena ni rešila. Enako so obljubljali tudi komunisti. Zato so se kmetje množično udeležili prvih splošnih in demokratičnih volitev na Madžarskem v prvi polovici aprila. Povprečnemu kmetu takrat ni bilo mar za ideološke boje, ampak mu je bila bistvena razdelitev zemlje.

Nekateri sicer maloštevilni vzpostavljeni vaški sovjeti v Prekmurju, kot recimo vaški sovjet v Kupšincih, so že pred volitvami začeli na lastno pest razdeljevati veleposesniško zemljo med kmete. Osrednja oblast je temu nasprotovala in poudarjala, da je razdeljevanje pred volitvami preuranjeno. Hkrati je ukazala, da jim morajo že razdeljeno zemljo odvzeti. Béla Kun je menil, da mora pravkar rojena država najprej utrditi zunanje meje Madžarske in odbiti intervencijske sile, da se lahko potem posveča notranjim težavam. Pri tem pa je naredil nepopravljivo napako, saj se je s prelaganjem agrarne reforme zameril kmetom, ki so nato podlegli protikomunistični propagandi. Le-to so vneto izvajali Cerkev in notranji »reakcionarni« elementi s pomočjo izseljenega oziroma pobeglega madžarskega plemstva ter držav antante. Oblast je tako ostala brez ključne in najštevilčnejše opore – zaslonbe kmečkega sloja. Od tega trenutka naprej je bila madžarska revolucija, enako kot vse dotedanje vlade/oblasti, obsojena na propad (Titl, 1970, 22, 25–27; Kokolj, 1981, 140).

Tkalčeve vse bolj neodvisno vodenje pokrajine je zahtevalo zaupanje tako kroga najbližjih sodelavcev, v pokrajini nastanjenega vojaštva in seveda tudi prebivalstva. Zavoljo nezmožnosti tukajšnje samozadostne oskrbe se je takoj aktivno vključil v tihotapstvo, ki se je ob avstrijski meji med vojno močno razpaslo. Obmejno in prekomejno tihotapljenje vseh vrst živil in mnogih drugih vrst dobrin, recimo tkanin, v Avstrijo, Nemčijo (živila) in obratno v notranjost države (tkanine, pretihotapljene iz Italije) je na celotnem poteku zahodnih meja Madžarske do konca leta 1918 (»konjunktura lakote«) doseglo višek ter se nadaljevalo v povojnem letu. Tihotapili so tisoči. Bilo je običajni način preživetja, vsekakor tudi v Prekmurju. Dobiček od tihotapstva mu je omogočal financiranje vojaštva in kupovanja zvestobe bližnjih sodelavcev, z dobavo osnovnih potrebščin pa je tudi vzpostavil in ohranjal minimalno podporo ljudi vsaj v okolici Murske Sobote in na Goričkem. Vojnaštvo je tako postajalo vse bolj zvesto njemu in ne Budimpešti. To se je stopnjevalo do te mere, da je začelo upoštevati le njegove – in njegovih najbližjih – direktne ukaze, za ukaze Budimpešte pa se preprosto ni več zmenilo. V tihotapstvo ni vmešal le najbližjih sodelavcev, temveč tudi sam soboški sovjet,

16 PAM, 1691/001/00126, t. e. 3 107/1; glej tudi: Kokolj, 1981, 136–138.

kar pa je vznemirilo nekatere člane le-tega, ki so še naprej ostali zvesti osrednji oblasti. Prav tako pa je razburil sicer maloštevilne trgovce, ki so se že od prej ukvarjali s tihotapstvom in so bili zaradi njega sedaj ob dobiček.

Najverjetneje iz zavisti so se omenjeni nezadovoljneži začeli pritoževati soboškemu sovjetu in so s pomočjo tajnika Fülekyja sredi maja poslali prijavo osrednji oblasti. Budimpešta je po prejeti prijavi v Mursko Soboto nemudoma poslala preiskovalce, ki so ga pridržali na lokalni orožniški postaji. Tik preden so ga hoteli zaslišati, pa je v postajo nepričakovano vdrila tukajšnja enota Rdeče garde pod vodstvom Károlyja Polláka in od preiskovalca Forgácsa zahtevala takojšnjo predajo Tkalcu njim pod pretvezo, da ga morajo najprej zaslišati oni, zatem pa ga lahko preiskovalci osrednje oblasti. Forgácseva naloga je bila jasna: po kratkem formalnem zaslišanju bi ga moral aretirati in odvesti v glavno mesto. Vendar je pod močnim pritiskom popustil in ga predal Polláku. Hkrati je takoj po odhodu Rdeče garde iz postaje poslal brzjavko v Budimpešto, da so mu gardisti preprečili aretacijo. Tkalcu so bili v bistvu šteti dnevi, in tega se je tudi sam zavedal. Predaja osrednji oblasti mu nikakor ni prišla v poštev, saj pod nobenim pogojem ni hotel žrtvovati pridobljene pozicije moči, po kateri je hrepenel. Zato se je odločil za drzno in nadvse tvegano potezo: razglasitev neodvisne republike.

Za avanturista tipa Vilmoša Tkalca je bila to sploh edina možnost izogniti se aretaciji. Kot prvi ukrep je zavaroval svoje premoženje; nato pa je brez premisleka navezal stik z murskosoboškim grofom Lászlóm Szapáryjem, takrat že beguncem v Gradcu. Prepričal ga je, da pravzaprav nikoli ni bil »rdeč«, temveč v bistvu ves čas »bel«, vendar je bil primoran to skrivati. Po prvotnem skepticizmu je grof uvidel, da ga lahko izkoristi za že zamišljeno protirevolucijo, ki bi jo lahko preko Prekmurja razširil nad celotno Madžarsko. Tako mu je obljubil svojo pomoč v primeru agresije Madžarske sovjetske republike. Povezal ga je tudi z vodstvom avstrijskih krščanskih socialistov, ki so mu prav tako obljubili pomoč. Szapáry in ostali madžarski plemiški emigranti v Avstriji so bili tesno povezani s protirevolucijsko vlado v Aradu.<sup>17</sup>

V obdobju priprav na razglasitev Murske republike je bila Madžarska prezaposlena z obrambo svojih meja pred intervencijskimi silami Romunije ter Češkoslovaške, in notranji politiki ni posvečala ustrezne pozornosti. Zaradi tega je »reakcija« znotraj države pridobivala na moči, prebivalstvo pa je vse manj sledilo osrednji vlasti. V Prekmurju ni bilo nič drugače. Nezadovoljstvo tako civilnega prebivalstva kot tudi vojaštva, takoj po novoletni Jurišičevi epizodni zasedbi nastanjenega v pokrajini, se je iz dneva v dan večalo. Trenutek je bil zrel za enkraten podvig.

Največjo oporo za svoj načrt je Tkalec našel pri Károlyju Győryju, poveljniku domače obmejne »rdeče« straže, ki jo je ustanovil Béla Obál še pred komunističnim preobratom, in je bila v veliki meri sestavljena iz prekmurskih Slovencev. Győry je prostovoljno sodeloval v njegovem tihotapstvu. Mnogi mladi Prekmurci so v »rdeči«

17 PAM, 1691/001/00126, t. e. 3 107/1; glej tudi: Titl, 1970, 53–54; Filipič, 1993; Göncz, 2001, 153–154.

straži videli možnost za hiter zaslužek, saj sta jima oba obljudljala mamljive plače, v bistvu financirane izključno iz tihotapstva. Nekaj pa je bilo tudi takih, ki v zaslužku niso videli primarne motivacije za pridružitev, temveč so v straži bodisi videli možnost za širjenje slovenske zavesti in jugoslovanske propagande med vojaki in samim prebivalstvom, bodisi so jih privlačile revolucionarne parole. S pomočjo Győryja in drugih tu nastanjeneih podčastnikov je Tkalec na svojo stran pridobil večino tega vojaštva, okrog 350 mož.<sup>18</sup>

Pred razglasitvijo Murske republike so njegovi sodelavci od vasi do vasi nazznali prihajajočo novo oblast, ki bi naj bila zasnovana na socialdemokratskih principih. Obljudljali so težko pričakovano agrarno reformo, ki so jo obljudljale vse vlade, tudi komunistična. Vendar nobena ni uresničila obljube. V okolini Murske Sobote in na Goričkem, kjer je živilo večinsko evangeličansko prebivalstvo, so našli več podpore za svoj podvig kot pa na povsem katoliškem Dólinskem, kjer je Klekl še naprej ohranjal močan vpliv na ljudi. Tega se je Tkalec zavedal. Zato je v drugi polovici maja v spremstvu okrajnega načelnika Cigányja obiskal Klekla na njegovem domu v Črenšovcih in ga prosil za pomoč pri izvedbi upora zoper komunistični režim. Svojo odločitev je podkrepil z argumentom, da se je naveličal le-tega, saj je ljudstvu prinesel le trpljenje. Njegova prošnja je Klekla presenetila. Zato ga je ta iz previdnosti vprašal, če ima sploh dovolj podpore in orožja za izvedbo vstaje. Tkalec mu je zagotovil, da ima goričko mladino na njegovi strani. Prav tako sta mu obljudili pomoč tudi avstrijska in italijanska stran, medtem ko se bo z Jugoslovani še sestal. Klekl pa je bil skeptičen. Postavil mu je pogoj, da s svojo agitacijo med ljudstvom ne bo začel, dokler ne bo zagotovljena pomoč Avstrijev, Italijanov ter Jugoslovanov. Tkalec je na pogoj pristal, vendar se od takrat naprej nista več srečala. Klekl ga je že takrat sumil, da se je za upor po vsej verjetnosti odločil zaradi očitne nenaklonjenosti centralne oblasti, ki ga je poklicala v Budimpešto na zaslišanje.<sup>19</sup>

Medtem ko se je Tkalec s svojimi sodelavci pospešeno pripravljal na svoj podvig, je iz štaba II. armadnega korpusa na II. bataljon 20. brigade, ki je predstavljal glavnino vseh oboroženih vojaških enot v Prekmurju, nenadoma prišel ukaz o premestitvi v Zalaegerszeg in takojšnji združitvi s preostalom delom 20. brigade, njihove položaje pa bi prevzela obmejna »rdeča« straža. Komandant bataljona pa je s premestitvijo namerno zavlačeval. Zato je prejel nov ultimativni ukaz, da mora bataljon do 29. maja do 12. ure opoldne izvršiti ukazano ali pa odložiti orožje in se raziti. Bataljon je tudi ta ukaz ignoriral in ostal v Prekmurju. Za Tkalca je bilo to ključnega pomena: v primeru napada mu je ta enota krepila upanje na resnejši odpor vojaštvu osrednjih oblasti. Trenutek je bil zrel za odkrit upor, ki mu je bil kot zapisano edina možnost, da se znebi odgovornosti za svoja tihotapska in druga dejanja.<sup>20</sup>

18 ARS, SIAS 1551, t. e. 52, Zbirka kopij: Dokumenti do 1941, Madžarska, Prekmurje; glej tudi: Kővágó, 1964, 207.

19 ARS, SIAS 1551, t. e. 52, Zbirka kopij: Dokumenti do 1941, Madžarska, Prekmurje; glej tudi: Kokolj, 1981, 153.

20 PAM, 1691/001/00126, t. e. 3 107/1; *Novine*, 13. 7. 1919: Kak je nastala republika Tkáczova?, 1.

O mesecih takratnega življenja v pokrajini pod sovjetsko oblastjo na tem mestu ni vredno izgubljati prostora. Svojevrstno ilustracijo razmer so lahko v kratkem, pa odločnem pozivu dan pred Tkalčeve razglasitvijo samostojnosti prebrali bralci v sosednjem hrvaškem prostoru:

*Pred vrhuncem terora madjarskih boljševika, koji bez milosrdja pljačkaju i ubijaju Prekomurske Slavene, morali smo ostaviti naše domove da spasimo gole živote. Zaklinjemo Narodno Predstavništvo u Beogradu, da se pred kulturnom Evropom zauzme za nas pravedne žrtve madjarskog krvoljštva. Zahtijevamo da se Prekomurje, koje neprekidno obitava 120 000 svijesnih Jugoslavena, zaposjedne po jugoslavenskim četama i prisajedini našoj pravoj domovini Jugoslaviji. Potpis: 300 Jugoslavena iz Prekomurja.<sup>21</sup>*

#### RAZGLASITEV »RESPUBLIKE MÖRSKE«

Po enotedenskih pogajanjih na avstrijski in jugoslovanski strani (od Jugoslovanov ni dobil nobenega zagotovila, zato je še isti dan v Radgono poslal Vincenca Šerugo<sup>22</sup> na pogajanje) se je 29. maja zjutraj vrnil v Mursko Soboto. Od Avstrijev je dobil obljubo vojaške pomoči v obliki orožja in prostovoljcev. Razmere na fronti z Romunijo so se takrat nekoliko stabilizirale. Zato pa so hudi boji potekali s češkoslovaško vojsko na jugu današnje Slovaške, kjer je Rdeča armada nizala uspehe. Kljub temu se je na Madžarskem razraščal splošni protikomunistični sentiment, celo med člani lokalnih sovjetov. Tkalec je zaradi takih razmer in občutenja v državi postal še bolj samozavesten in prepričan v svoj uspeh (Kővágó, 1964, 213).

Pred razglasitvijo republike je Tkalec zaprosil Vincenca Šerugo za sodelovanje pri uporu. Njegovo sodelovanje se mu je zdelo ključnega pomena iz dveh razlogov: med zavednimi prekmurskimi Slovenci v obmejnih stražah je užival veliko podpore, in imel je dobre povezave na jugoslovanski strani. Šeruga je privolil v sodelovanje, z njim pa si je Tkalec zagotovil popolno lojalnost obmejnih straž ter hkrati tudi zavaroval hrbet pred Jugoslovani. Tik pred proglašitvijo neodvisne republike je Šeruga prosil za prisotnost pri razoroževanju nekaterih obmejnih straž v Gederovcih in na Cankovi. Nato pa ga je napotil v Radgono, kjer se je sestal z jugoslovanskim komandantom Radgone majorjem M. H. Pogledičem in ga seznanil s stanjem v

21 *Volja naroda*, 28. 5. 1919: Iz Medjimurja. Dopus iz Štrigove. Pomaganje prekomurskih Slovenaca, 5. Poziv je najverjetnejše spisal kak član razpuščene *Prekmurske legije*, morda celo kateri od članov razpuščenega Narodnega sveta za Prekmurje, ki so se po 15. maju umaknili v Štrigovo.

22 Vincenc Šeruga, rojen v Rankovcih leta 1883. Po končani nemški meščanski šoli v Radgoni je obiskoval učiteljišče v Mariboru, kjer je razvil slovensko zavest. Po končanem šolanju ni postal učitelj, temveč nadporočnik v vojaški kaznilnici v Möllersdorfu. Pred koncem vojne je bil razrešen s položaja in se je ponudil Narodnemu svetu v Ljubljani, ki pa ga ni sprejel, ker je bil takrat madžarski državljan. Po zavrnitvi se je vrnil nazaj v domače Rankovce, kjer so ga preživljali sorodniki. Februarja 1919 se je obrnil na Klekla, ki mu je ponudil vodstvo delegacije v Budimpešto. V obdobju diktature proletariata je, verjetno iz pragmatičnih razlogov, prestopil med socialdemokrate, a hkrati je še vedno deloval proti komunistom (Kokolj, 1981, 199).

Prekmurju. Major pa ni obvladal pogovorne slovenščine; zato mu je Vincenc spisal pismo v nemščini in mu ga osebno izročil. V pismu je majorja zaprosil, naj bi se vojska SHS v primeru bojev v pokrajini vzdržala kakršnih koli sovražnih akcij proti bodoči republiki. Obvestil ga je, da bo slednja takoj po proglašitvi premaknila svoje obmejne straže, nastanjene ob Muri, v notranjost in jih razporedila za obrambo pred Rdečo armado. Dodal je, da njihove razpoložljive čete niso primerno oborožene, zato bi jim bila vojaška pomoč z jugoslovanske strani v obliki orožja in municije več kot dobrodošla. Nazadnje je tudi napisal, da lahko antantna ali jugoslovanska vojska v primeru silovitega napada Rdeče armade, v spremstvu vstajniške vojske, vstopi na ozemlje republike iz smeri Dolnje Lendave. V tem slučaju bi se vstajniška vojska brezpogojno podredila antantni oz. jugoslovanski vojski. Major je prošnjo sprejel in jo je posredoval naprej v Beograd. Odgovor je prišel dva dni po razglasitvi republike, dne 31. maja. SHS je zagotovila, da bodo njene čete nevtralne, in vzela na znanje odmik obmejnih straž v notranjost. Zaprosene pomoči pa ni mogla ponuditi, saj je v tako kratkem časovnem okviru ni mogla primerno organizirati – jugoslovanska vojska bi za to rabila vsaj deset dni, če ne več. Šeruga pa je pozneje ugotovil, da je bila jugoslovanska vojska tedaj v visoki pripravljenosti na morebitno »boljševiško invazijo« preko Mure.<sup>23</sup>

Šeruga se je po izročitvi tega pisma sestal še s predstavniki madžarske plemiške emigracije v Radgoni, med drugim tudi z grofom Szapáryjem, ki je zagotovil finančno podporo republiki. Slednji mu je nato naročil izpis pisma v nemščini, ki bi orisalo problematično stanje v Prekmurju. Pismo je grof takoj prevedel v več jezikov in izvode razposlal ministrskim predsednikom v London, Berlin, Pariz, Rim in na Dunaj. Kakor je Šeruga pozneje napisal v svojem poročilu generalu Maistru, je bil grof navdušen nad pismom in obenem začuden, da ga ni spoznal že prej. Obljubljal mu je službo njegovega morda osebnega sekretarja. V poročilu je Šeruga zatrdil, da so hoteli republiko izkoristiti za morebitno priključitev pokrajine k Jugoslaviji.<sup>24</sup>

Po ureditvi zadnjih formalnosti so bile stvari nared za ustanovitev republike. Tkaletc je takoj po vrtnitvi iz Radgone 29. maja dopoldne sklical člane soboškega sovjeta. Izredne seje se je udeležilo 12 od 48 članov. Prisotnim je predlagal odcepitev od Madžarske sovjetske republike in ustanovitev neodvisne socialistične Murske republike na ozemlju današnjega Prekmurja, ki pa se je na južnem robu zaključevalo na črti od sedanje državne meje na vzhodnem robu do Mure: med Žitkovci in Kamovci – nad Radmožanci – pod Veliko Polano, se pravi med Dolnjo Bistro in Hotizo na Muro. Ob tem je jamčil, da lahko računajo na avstrijsko in jugoslovansko pomoč. Predlog je bil soglasno sprejet. Tako so novo oblast razglasili za štirimi stenami v hotelu Dobray (današnja Zvezda) ob 11.30 uri. Iz prisotnih članov je bil sestavljen upravni direktorij, ki je deloval kot vlada samostojne države. Upravni direktorij ga je izvolil za predsednika, 29. maj pa so določili za državni praznik.<sup>25</sup>

23 PAM, 1691/001/00126, t. e. 3 107/1; glej tudi: Titl, 1970, 60.

24 PAM, 1691/001/00126, t. e. 3 107/1; glej tudi: Kyovsky, 1961, 84.

25 PAM, 1691/001/00126, t. e. 3 107/1; glej tudi: Kokolj, 1981, 153–154, 156.



Sl. 2: Hotel Dobray v Murski Soboti, današnja Zvezda. Na sliki je balkon, pod katerim se je 29. maja 1919 zbralо ljudstvo in vojaštvo ob razglasitvi Murske republike (<http://www.pomurci.si/?id=629>, 22. 3. 2020).

Razglasitev je bila nenačna in mnogi ljudje v pokrajini se sploh niso zavedali, da je do nje prišlo, čeprav so Tkalčevi sodelavci že dva tedna prej od vasi do vasi naznanjali bodočo odcepitev. Razlog za to je bilo nejasno razlaganje. Kljub temu pa se je na dogodek razglasitve pred hotelom Dobray zbrala večtisočglava množica, ki je pozdravljala naznanitev neodvisnosti. Med to množico je bilo pomešanega veliko vojaštva, ki je že veliko prej zvedelo za podvig, in skrbelo, da na razglasitvi ne bi prišlo do provokacij. Zatem je potekalo zborovanje v madžarskem in prekmursko-slovenskem jeziku. Šele drugi dan so se od vasi do vasi začele širiti vesti o dejanski razglasitvi neodvisnosti od Madžarske.<sup>26</sup>

Novonastala neodvisna državica je bila vsaj na papirju osnovana na socialdemokratiskih načelih, ki so po vojni v Evropi dosegle višek popularnosti, in hkrati na elementih slovenskega nacionalizma kot sklicevanje na prekmursko-slovenski jezik, katerega uporaba je bila nujna za zagotovitev podpore večinskega slovenskega dela prebivalstva. Svoj podvig je Tkalec skušal legitimirati celo s sklicevanjem na svobočno in pravico do samoodločbe (Kokolj & Horvat, 1977, 291–292).

Vojaško poveljstvo rdečearmejcev za obrambo meje v Dolnji Lendavi in predsednik tamkajšnjega direktorija Ernő Reiter sta še isti dan, tik pred razglasitvijo neodvisne republike, dobivala napačne informacije glede opisanega Vilmoševega prehoda na jugoslovansko stran v preteklih dneh, kjer se je pravzaprav neuspešno pogajal z Jugoslovani za vojaško pomoč. Reiterja so tudi obvestili, da je bilo

26 PAM, 1691/001/00126, t. e. 3 107/1; glej tudi: Fujs, 1992, 87–88.

*Preglednica 1: Sestava in številčnost vojaštva Murske republike na dan ustanovitve.*

	vojaki	častniki	skupaj
<b>II. bataljon 20. brigade</b>	580	21	601
<b>obmejne rdeče straže</b>	289	12	302
<b>X. bataljon Rdeče armade</b>	25	2	27
			<b>930</b>

vojaštvo v Murski Soboti sovražno nastrojeno proti osrednji oblasti. Vse vesti je telegrafska posredoval vrhovnemu poveljstvu Rdeče armade in osrednji vlad, ki je naslednji dan skušala prek Napoleona Tógyánya neuspešno vzpostaviti telefonsko povezavo z Mursko Soboto in se pogajati s Tkalcem. Slednji se je tedaj z ženo in premičnim premoženjem že mudil v Gradcu, kjer je Avstrijcem poročal o položaju v Prekmurju in si hkrati zavaroval pot za pobeg. Druge zadeve v pokrajini ga niso več zanimale – protirevolucijo je zaupal svojim vojakom. Celotno situacijo je Reiterju razjasnil šele Füleky, ki se je umaknil v Dolnjo Lendavo in zahteval zatrje te pustolovščine z vojaškim posredovanjem. V republiki ni videl nič več in nič manj kot izdajo proletarske revolucije (Kokolj, 1981, 158–159).

Začetno zmedo na madžarski strani je hotel novi upravni direktorij republike čim bolj izkoristiti za konsolidacijo moči in pripravo obrambe. Tako, ko je podpolkovnik Kálmán Györi, poveljnik rdečearmejskih čet v Prekmurju, izvedel za protirevolucijo, je odstopil in svoje mesto prepustil stotniku Jenóju Perneczkyju (Kokolj, 1981, 156–157). Ta je razpolagal z dokajšnjim številom mož, ki so ostali v Prekmurju in so protirevolucijo dojemali z vso resnostjo.

II. bataljon 20. brigade je predstavljal glavnino oboroženih enot republike in je štel 601 moža. Tkalcu je ostalo zvestih 289 najemniških vojakov in 13 oficirjev iz obmejnih rdečih straž, ki so bili plačani iz obrambnega sklada in denarja, pridobljenega iz tihotapstva. Pridružilo se mu je tudi nekaj mož iz X. bataljona Rdeče armade, in sicer 25 vojakov in dva oficirja. Preostalo jedro tega bataljona se je umaknilo proti Dolnji Lendavi in se združilo s tamkajšnjim I. bataljonom 47. brigade, ki je sodeloval pri poznejšem zatrju republike. Z obljubo po razdelitvi gospoščinske in cerkvene zemlje ter z dobrim plačilom je na svojo stran pridobil okrog tristo prostovoljcev z Goričkega, ki so bili zelo zagreti v boju proti Rdeči armadi.

K tej zagretosti pa niso prispevale le Vilmoševe obljube ter denar, temveč tudi sovraštvo do komunizma. Le-to se je močno razraslo tako na Goričkem kot po preostalem Prekmurju, predvsem zaradi vpliva duhovščine in nerešenega agrarnega vprašanja. Pozneje – in tudi prepozno, ko je že padla Murska Smbota, in so v okolici Kroga potekali zadnji boji, je iz Avstrije s tovornjaki prispelo kakih petdeset prostovoljcev in nekaj streliva ter orožja. Vseh skupaj – če se prišteje prostovoljce iz Goričkega in Avstrije – je Murska republika štela 1280 za boj

sposobnih mož. Oboroženi so bili s puškami, 26 strojnicami, tremi minometalci in dvema topovoma, ki jih je imela posebna topniška enota (Kővágó, 1964, 214–215; Lorenčič, 2019, 130–132).

Po razglasitvi neodvisnosti od osrednje vlade v Budimpešti so te enote ustavile ves železniški promet, razstrelile železnicu med Puconci in Hodošem ter razorožile še poslednje Budimpešti zveste vojake (Lorenčič, 2019, 129). Šele 31. maja ob 12.00 uri so se voditelji republike odločili delovati po »diplomatski« poti ter z brzovjavko direktoriju Železne županije in ljudskemu komisariatu za zunanje zadeve v Budimpešti sporočili naslednje:

*Madžarska sovjetska republika, ljudski komisar za zunanje zadeve. Čast mi je sporociti vam, da smo na izrecno željo prebivalcev Vendske krajine sovjeti delavcev, vojakov in kmetov Vendske krajine 29 t. m.*

proklamirali Mursko republiko, ki obsega področje Zalske in Železne županije, na katerem žive Vendi. Razglasitev Murske republike temelji na pravici narodov do samoodločbe. Za izgradnjo našega socialističnega družbenega življenja in na osnovi programa internacionalne socialne demokracije prsimo za podporo Madžarsko sovjetsko republiko, s katero želimo živeti v najbolj prijateljskih odnosih. V primeru, da bi Madžarska sovjetska republika z orožjem napadla Mursko republiko, smo prisiljeni izjaviti, da bomo po potrebi sprejeli pomoč sosednjih imperialističnih držav, kar pa bomo storili samo v primeru skrajne potrebe. Zahtevamo, da se enote Madžarske sovjetske republike takoj umaknejo z ozemlja Murske republike. Izvršilni komite Murske republike. (Kokolj, 1981, 157–158).



Zemljevid 1: Položaji enot in smer ofenzive madžarske Rdeče armade 2. junija 1919 (Lorenčič, 2019, 117–119).



Sl. 3: Uniforma vojaka Rdeče armade (Dornay Béla Múzeum, Salgótarján, A magyar vörös hadsereg Léván, <https://hu.museum-digital.org/portal/index.php?t=objekt&og-es=514634>, 13. 3. 2020).

## ZAČETEK KONCA

Čete novonastale Murske republike so uspele v dveh dneh od razglasitve neodvisnosti zasesti praktično ves opisan teritorij, niso pa zasedle Porabja. Perneczky je enote razporedil od Hotize in vse do današnje madžarsko – slovenske meje navzgor do Hodoša in današnje tromeje. Zavarovana je bila tudi meja z Avstrijo z izjemo Cankove, kjer je potekal oskrbovalni koridor med republiko in Avstrijo. Potemtakem so zasedli vse ozemlje, takrat poseljeno z etničnimi Slovenci; niso pa zasedli narodnostno mešanega ozemlja, torej Monoštra in Dolne Lendave ter njene okolice. Voditelji so bili mišljena, da bo glavni napad Rdeče armade potekal iz smeri Dolne Lendave. Zato so z vojaštvom močno utrdili južni del ozemlja, medtem ko so na severno mejo razporedili le nekaj obrambnih postojank. Meja z jugoslovansko državo pa je ostala popolnoma nezavarovana kljub temu, da je Jugoslavija svojo nevtralnost razglasila šele 31. maja (Lorenčič, 2019, 131–132).

Takoj po prejetem telegramu od predsednika dolnjelendskega direktorija Reiterja, da je Tkalec prebegnil na jugoslovansko stran – dejansko pa se je tam le pogajal – in da se v Prekmurju pripravlja organizirani odpor, je vrhovno poveljstvo Rdeče armade brez odlašanja in navkljub nepopolnim vestem ukazalo II. armadnemu korpusu s sedežem v Székesfehérváru mobilizacijo zoper upornike v Prekmurju. Tamkajšnji štab je na pod-

lagi razpoložljivih informacij ocenil, da je separatistična tvorba razpolagala s štirimi ali petimi četami, oboroženimi s približno tisoč puškami. Istočasno je vrhovno poveljstvo v Zalaegerszeg poslalo bataljon zanesljivih kovinarskih delavcev, ki je v mesto prispel 30. maja in je med napadom na republiko služil kot rezervni bataljon v zaledju. Drugi rezervni bataljon pa je v Zalaegerszeg prispel 2. junija.<sup>27</sup>

Poveljstvo Rdeče armade je tako zbralno – če prištejemo še ta dva rezervna bataljona, prispela v Zalaegerszeg – šest bataljonov, ki so 2. junija začeli z ofenzivo na štirih frontnih izhodiščih:

1. V liniji Monošter – Gornji Senik: IV. bataljon 18. brigade, z nalogo prodreti v smeri Cankove ob avstrijski meji. S tem so hoteli upornikom odsekatи dostop do Avstrije.
2. Bajánsenye: III. bataljon 20. brigade in polovica topniške enote, ki sta morala v naglici prek Prosenjakovcev, Fokovcev in Puconcev prodreti do Murske Sobote.
3. Csesztreg: I. bataljon 20. brigade in druga polovica topniške enote. Ta bataljon je moral prodreti mimo Dobrovnika do Mure in s tem presekatи oskrbovalne linije enotam Murske republike, nameščenim na črti Hotiza – Turnišče.
4. Radmožanci – Hotiza: I. bataljon 47. brigade, razdeljen v dve skupini: prva je začela prodirati prek Radmožancev proti Murski Soboti, druga pa proti Hotizi in nato ob Muri navzgor do Cankove, kjer bi se verjetno združil s tja prispelim IV. bataljonom 18. brigade (Lorenčič, 2019, 132–133).

Kot je vodstvo republike predvidevalo, so se prvi boji dejansko pričeli na južni meji republike med Dobrovnikom in Dolnjo Lendavo. Perneczkyju je to ofenzivo uspelo odbiti, in za trenutek se je zazdeleno, da jim bo celo uspelo zavzeti Dolnjo Lendavo. Vladne čete pa so se hitro reorganizirale in uspešno odbile tamkajšnji napad Perneczkyjevih enot. Severni del ozemlja državice je ostal praktično nezavarovan – kot zapisano je bilo tam nameščenih le nekaj postojank –, kar je Rdeča armada tudi izkoristila in s severa ter severovzhoda začela bliskovito prodirati proti Murski Soboti. Tkalčevi vojaki so nekaj odpora nudili le pri Prosenjakovcih in Peskovcih, kjer pa so le ranili enega rdečearmejca (Kővágó, 1964, 217–218; Kokolj, 1981, 159).

Perneczkyjevem enotam na jugu je kmalu grozilo, da bodo s padcem Murske Sobote odrezane in verjetno obkoljene. Zato je ukazal umik v Mursko Soboto in od tu takoj na Cankovo, kjer je vzpostavil nov štab. Na Cankovo je prispel tudi Vilmoš, ki se je zatem odpeljal na mejo v Radgono k jugoslovanskemu poročniku in ga skušal prepričati v obstreljevanje Cankove. Ta pa ga je zavrnil, češ da bo Prekmurje tako ali tako kmalu zavzela jugoslovanska vojska. Tkalčevi vojaki, že zbrani na Cankovi, so začeli protestirati, saj obljudljene pomoči ni bilo od nikoder (Vrbnjak, 1999, 42; Kokolj, 1981, 159–160).

27 HIL, 602/11, t. e. 43, Poročilo o situaciji na fronti in skica položajev; glej tudi: Kővágó, 1964, 217.

Pomoč iz Avstrije je resnici na ljubo prišla, vendar prepozno. Avstrijski vojaki, oblečeni v civilna oblačila, so 2. junija v tovornjakih pripeljali orožje in strelivo. Z njimi je prišlo tudi nekaj avstrijskih prostovoljcev. Z orožjem pa so oborožili prebivalstvo Kroga in okoliških vasi (Kővágó, 1964, 219). Že naslednji dan 3. junija ob 8.00 uri zjutraj so v Mursko Soboto vkorakale enote Rdeče armade. Kot prvi je vstopil majhen odred bivših mornarjev pod osebnim vodstvom Füleyja. Murska Sobota je padla in s tem tudi sedež republike, ki je še vztrajala dan – dva. Oboroženi vaščani so se nato pridružili njenim enotam, le-te pa niso več imele stikov s štabom v Cankovi. Tkalčeve enote, okrepljene z zagnanimi vaščani in prostovoljci iz Avstrije, so izvedle še zadnji napad proti rdečarmejcem. Bil je tako silovit, da se je del bataljona moral umakniti nazaj proti Murski Soboti, sicer bi ga »republikanci« obkolili.

Zato so z namenom prestrašiti oborožene kmete v enotah republike rdečarmejci začeli topniško obstreljevanje Kroga, Bakovcev, Murskih Črncev in Tišine. Edina »žrtev« tega je bil en hlev v Krogu. Po topniškem napadu je Rdeča armada prešla v ofenzivo, ki je Vilmoševe enote niso mogle odbiti in so se bile primorane umikati proti Cankovi. Ob tem je prišlo do hudih bojev na področju obstreljevanih vasi. Upor je bil dokončno zadušen 6. junija. Nekaj domačinov v pomoč enotam republike se je predalo, ostali pa so se poskrili po gozdovih ali v svoje domove. Ujete domačine in vojake so rdečarmejci odvedli v meščansko šolo v Murski Soboti in jih po kratkem zaslijanju izpustili na prostost.<sup>28</sup> Ponekod na Goričkem pa so sporadični gverilski boji potekali še naprej, dokler jim ni usahnila finančna pomoč iz Avstrije. V Večeslavcih naj bi potekali še 14 dni po zadušitvi upora (Titl, 1970, 73).

János Czifrák, ki so ga v prvi čistki po komunističnem preobratu odstranili iz soboškega direktorija in sovjeta, in Béla Sandy sta po zatrju Madžarske sovjetske republike od nove »bele« vlade v Budimpešti dobila nalogu poročanja o dogajanju v Prekmurju v obdobju diktature proletariata. Oba sta dobro poznala tako razmere v pokrajini kot tudi takratne ključne osebe. Nova madžarska vlada je zbirala poročila tudi iz drugih pokrajin, saj je z zbranimi podatki hotela nevtralizirati vse komunistične in nasploh progresivne elemente v madžarski družbi. To obdobje neu-smiljenih čistk je znano kot »beli teror«. Kakorkoli že, Czifrák in Sandy sta vojaške operacije Murske republike v svojem poročilu opisala kot neprofesionalne in slabo premišljene. V Murski Soboti in njeni okolici Budimpešta ni imela dosti zaupnikov, ki bi poročali o dogajanju v pokrajini. Zato bi se lahko, po njunem mnenju, Tkalec bolje organiziral kot se je. Prebivalstvo v Zalski in Železni županiji, ki je zaradi vpliva duhovščine in predvsem neizvedene agrarne reforme v veliki meri sovražilo komunistično oblast, bi se skoraj zagotovo pridružilo uporu, če bi jih le-ta uspel pridobiti na svojo stran in oborožiti. Dokaz: primer Kroga in okoliških vasi, kjer so vaščani brezpogojno poprijeli za orožje, dobljeno iz Avstrije, in se mu pridružili v boju proti Rdeči armadi.<sup>29</sup>

28 MNL, VaML, A bolsevizmus a Muraszombati járásban, Muraszombati Járásközigazgatási iratai, 946/1920; *Novine*, 13. 7. 1919: Što je odkrio protirevolucio sobočko?, 4; glej tudi: Titl, 1970, 72.

29 MNL, VaML, A bolsevizmus a Muraszombati járásban, Muraszombati Járásközigazgatási iratai, 946/1920.

Je pa res, da mu je načrte prekrižal ukaz II. armadnega korpusa II. bataljonu 20. brigade o premestitvi v Zalaegerszeg. Tkalcu je ta bataljon predstavljal jedro oboroženih enot za njegov podvig. Zato mu ni preostalo nič drugega kot pohiteti z izvedbo le-tega, čeprav še ni dobil vojaške pomoči iz Avstrije. Brez zagotovila avstrijske pomoči pač ni zmogel pridobiti na svojo stran Klekla, ki pa bi mu lahko zagotovil podporo prebivalstva v dolnjem Prekmurju. Čeprav je to kar dvomljivo, kajti Takalec je tamkajšnjim ljudem ostal v zelo slabem spominu zaradi nasilnega zatrtja novembarskih izgredov (Kokolj, 1981, 152).

Rdeča armada, napotena v Prekmurje, je bila pravzaprav »bela« in po narodnostni sestavi povsem madžarska. Proti Tkalčevi Murski republiki se niso bili pripravljeni boriti zavoljo tukajšnje dejanske kontrarevolucije, temveč ker so – zavedeni – verjeli, da se »Vendi« upirajo proti Madžarski in se hočejo odcepiti. Rdečearmejski poveljniški kader so v večini sestavljeni častniki še iz avstro-ogrške vojske, ki se komunistom niso pridružili zaradi svoje revolucionarnosti, temveč – ob osnovni eksistenčni nujji – z namenom ohraniti teritorialno integriteto Madžarske. Čutili so odpor do komunizma, hkrati pa so v komunistih videli sploh zadnjo možnost za rešitev Madžarske pred razkosanjem. Miselnost, da se borijo za Madžarsko in ne za revolucijo, so prenašali tudi na svoje vojake.<sup>30</sup>

Časnika *Slovenec* in *Slovenski narod* sta med prevratnim obdobjem občasno poročala o Prekmurju. Vendar sta mu namenjala bistveno manj pozornosti kot recimo Koroški. Po zatrtju Murske republike je *Slovenec* recimo le povzel celotno dogajanje v pokrajini vse od komunističnega preobrata na Madžarskem do konca Tkalčevega podviga. Odredbe boljševistične vlade se v Prekmurju dejansko niso v celoti izvajale, je objavil časnik, in nadaljeval, da se je boljševiška oblast v pokrajini vzpostavljala počasi. Tudi novih *Rdečih Novin* Prekmurci niso sprejeli. Zato so ta časnik začeli deliti zastonj. Ljudje pa so ga raje strgali in pokurili. Tkalca je *Slovenec* predstavil v izredno negativni luči: »[...] *Madjarski nacionalec Tkalec je postal pozneje boljševik; ropati se je naučil v Medjimurju; da bi pa tudi na zunaj pokazal svoj boljševiški duh, se je začel česati po boljševiško, to je, pustil si je rasti kar najdaljše lase in jih počesal na levo stran glave (desne strani se boljševiki bojijo).* [...]« je napisal posmehljivo in zaničevalno ter predvideval, enako kot Klekl, da je Tkalec oklical republiko le zato, da bi si rešil lastno kožo pred aretacijo, ki mu je grozila zaradi tihotapstva. Časnik je poročal tudi o prošnjah Prekmurcev za pomoč na Jugoslavijo, ki pa se sploh ni zmenila zanje.<sup>31</sup>

Podobno, vendar brez klerikalnega podtona v *Slovencu*, je poročal tudi *Slovenski narod*, ki je Tkalca prav tako prikazal v negativni luči. Teroriziral da je celotno ljudstvo v Prekmurju in Medmurju ter jih silil k pokoritvi Madžarom, na koncu pa da se je pridružil komunistom, ga je obsodil časnik, in posmehljivo dodal, da jim ni ostal dolgo zvest, saj je z nekaj tisočaki popihal prek meje v Avstrijo.<sup>32</sup>

30 MNL, VaML, A bolsevizmus a Muraszombati járássban, Muraszombati Járásközigazgatási iratai, 946/1920.

31 *Slovenec*, 21. 6. 1919: Boljševizem v Prekmurju, 2.

32 *Slovenski narod*, 1. 7. 1919: Madjaron Tkalec v naših rokah, 2.

Novina, 1919. jun. 15.  
ŠT. 23. ŠTEV.

Proletárje svejta, zdržite se!

# NOVINE

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**Zapóvid.**

Pred štirimi dněvami vyskřičano Môrsko republiko so sami neki žvindlarje napravili, ki so si samo svoje žepe nali.

Tó je že preminolo: tanácnarepublika tó ne trpi; ne trpi na nadale sebično gospodstvo nevalancov, samo želi, ka se in i pravica stromaskoga lüdstra v vsem vospela. Či bi tó poseo v nevoli, nevarnost prišlo tanácnarepublika de i močov brânila. Tó se zgodilo brez znanya i pitanya lüdstra slovenskoga.

Zrok tomi je bio eden nevaláneč, Tkalec Vilmos, ki zapelavši lüdstra, je povrgao v nevoli, na slednje je nejnezamli občinskima na nyega zavúpanimi je odskočo v Austrijo.

Réđ smo nazaj postavili; vsaki naj ostane i nadale na svojem mestu i opravila svoje delo. Odredbi naše se naj zvrši-  
vsko streljivo (municija) i oružje se more notri v kašarno žandarsko prinesi.

Viruppe se sastajati je najostrejše prepovedano. Včer po 9-toj vör si se zdržavali na vulcaj nesmi.

Prepovedano je točenje opojnih pitvin.

• kŕmčaj se slobodno samo jestivna i neopojne pitvine tržijo.

Oropstvo, ka se je nigrdár nej gihalo z misli voditelov držanja proletarskoga, tak od strane soldačlje, od strane civila je ostro zabranjeno.

Tá nezadržavajoče mo z smrtnoj kaštagali.

Ravnitelstvo krajine slovenske smo dnes prejkvzeli; i vsaka naša odredba se more zvršavati.

Môrska Sobota, 1919. junius 3.

**Révész Nándor**  
pol. zavúpnik sold. krajine slovenske.

**Udvaros Stefan**  
Zavúpnik pol. vogrs. tanácnarepublike i kotriga direktoriuma  
Vasvármegyövskoga.

**Füleky József**  
kotriga direktoriuma.

**mld. Puszta József**  
kotriga direktoriuma

**Vörös Jenő**  
kotriga direktoriuma.

**Lübléni Národ!**

Tkalec Vilmos, bivši zavúpnik slovenske krajine je bio samo prosi nevaláneč, eden tolvalj. e vas zapelao i tak zapelavši je na same povrgao. Okradno je od vsega. Z millionami po avoj poti spravleniem je odskočo austrijo.

On i njegovi vernicje so zda v o nesrečo prinesli té slovenski

krej. Vnogo ih prejde, tejm se bole pole naše zapravijo, áton se pa samo smijé, ka si je millione spravo zapelavši vas.

Našo lejpo domovino je odao Austrijo. Vam je nalogao vsefelé. Dobro odredbe vlade naše je vam preobrnoto napok tomáčijo ali ih je niti vó nej dno.

Mi dobro znamo, ka je dosta lüdstra prisiljilo, da naj primejo orožje proti našim bratom vogrskim. Na

znájme vam dám, ka Oni, ki so nikač nej krvi, štere so posili gnali v boj, so dobili obče amnestio, (od-  
pust) ino se slobodno povrnéjo k domi svojemi.

A národi pa poráčamo, ka naj mérno opravila i nadale svoje delo.

Sovjet republika.

Sl. 4: Uradni razglas po zatrtju Murske republike. 22. številka Novin se je zaradi turbulencnih dogodkov med Mursko republiko žal izgubila (»Zapovid«, Novine, 15. 6. 1919).

Vincenc Šeruga je s preostalimi vstajniškimi vojaki pobegnil na avstrijsko stran v Halbenrain. Tam so ga vojaki obtožili izdajalstva, zato je moral poiskati zaščito pri orožnikih, ki so ga aretirali, razorožili in ga hoteli odpeljati v zapor v Feldbach. Z zvijačo mu je uspelo pobegniti v Slovensko Gorico/Windischgoritz. Od tam pa se je odpravil v Radgono, kjer si je pridobil dovoljenje za bivanje kot begunec. Po zatrti vstaji je v Kraljevino SHS pobegnilo mnogo zavednih prekmurskih Slovencev, predvsem duhovnikov, ki sicer niso bili vpleteni vanjo, vendar so se vseeno bali možnih represalij.<sup>33</sup>

## POT DO KRALJEVINE SHS

Po zatrtju Murske republike se je v pokrajino vrnila t. i. diktatura proletariata. Takoj po padcu Murske Sobote se je z avtom, okrašenim z rdečimi zastavami in parolami, tja vrnil novi voditelj soboškega sovjeta Nándor Révész. Z njim so se vrnili tudi posamezniki, ki niso hoteli sodelovati z vstajniki. To so bili József Füleky, Károly Pollák, Jenő Vörös in Károly Ekker. V zraku se je čutila napetost. Številni so pričakovali represalije, pa do le-teh ni prišlo, saj je Révész ocenil, da prebivalcev mesta ni bilo moč okriviti za vstajo. Po zadnjih bojih so razglasili popolno amnestijo za vse, ki so na kakršenkoli način sodelovali s kontrarevolucijo. Amnestija je zajela tudi vse vojake, ki so jih spodbujali k iskanju njihovih bivših voditeljev, predvsem Tkalcu.<sup>34</sup>

Czifrák in Sandy sta v svojem poročilu opisala Révésza kot humanega in prednega svojemu poslanstvu. Prav zaradi humanosti pa se je zameril nekaterim članom soboškega sovjeta, saj so kmalu kritizirali njegovo medlo postopanje z reakcijo. Pritožbe so dosegle Budimpešto, ki je poskrbela, da so Révésza zamenjali z Istvánom Csuvarem. Ta je v ravnanju z »republikanskimi« elementi nastopil odločneje.<sup>35</sup>

Še zadnji omembe vreden dogodek, ki se je zgodil v Murski Soboti pred padcem madžarskega komunističnega režima, je bila ustanovitev komunistične stranke konec julija. Dobila je naziv *Ugarska Staroslovanska socialistička komunistička grupa v Mura Suboti*. Enak napis je bil tudi na njenem uradnem pečatu. 1. avgusta je romunska vojska z vstopom v Budimpešto povzročila padec komunistične vlade Béle Kuna, ki je tako vodila Madžarsko vsega slabe štiri mesece in pol. Revolucija na Madžarskem je bila zatrtta (Repe, 2019, 507). S tem se je – že v drugo, tokrat dokončno – zaključila tudi oblast republike sovjetov v Prekmurju.<sup>36</sup>

Vrhovni svet pariške mirovne konference je 9. julija 1919 določil, da Prekmurje, z izjemo Porabja, pripade Jugoslaviji;<sup>37</sup> vendar je sklep moral ostati v strogi tajnosti vse do konca julija. Po odobritvi konference je jugoslovanska vojska pod poveljstvom

33 PAM, 1691/001/00126, t. e. 3 107/1.

34 PAM, 1691/001/00126, t. e. 3 107/1; MNL, VaML, A bolsevizmus a Muraszombati járásban, Muraszombati Járásközigazgatási iratai, 946/1920.

35 MNL, VaML, A bolsevizmus a Muraszombati járásban, Muraszombati Járásközigazgatási iratai, 946/1920.

36 *Slovenski narod*, 3. 8. 1919: Konec boljševiške vlade na Madžarskem, 3; glej tudi: Kyovsky, 1956, 185–186.

37 Več o diplomatskih prizadevanjih za priključitev Prekmurja h Kraljevini SHS glej v: Rahten, 2018.

generala Krste Smiljanića 12. avgusta iz radgonske smeri zasedla celotno gornje Prekmurje z Mursko Soboto. Iz smeri Ljutomera in Murskega Središča so mu pri zasedbi pomagali člani Prekmurske legije in še nekaj drugih vojakov iz slovenske Primorske in Hrvaške. Madžarska vojska, nastanjena v Murski Soboti, se je morala umakniti; soboška mestna uprava pa je lahko delovala še naprej. Tranzicija oblasti je potekala mirno in brez incidentov. Bivši vodja mariborskega okrožja Srečko Lajnšič je bil imenovan za civilnega komisarja za Prekmurje, čigar naloga je bila organiziranje tukajšnje uprave. 17. avgusta je na veličastnem zborovanju v Beltincih vojaško poveljstvo predalo oblast civilni upravi, na dan, ki ga danes v Sloveniji praznujejo kot praznik združitve prekmurskih Slovencev z matičnim narodom. Po navedbah nekaterih so slovenski Prekmurci vzhičeno pozdravljeni prihod jugoslovanske vojske, medtem ko je bila v dolnjelendavskem okraju, kjer so večino prebivalstva tvorili etnični Madžari, slika bistveno drugačna. Slednji so prihod te vojske pričakali s precejšnjo negotovostjo in napetostjo, ki pa je sčasoma popustila (Göncz, 2001, 164–166).

## SKLEP

Za razumevanje nastanka Murske republike je nujno razumevanje takratnega širšega političnega in zgodovinskega konteksta. Povojne politične in socialne razmere v Evropi so bile po vojni izredno nestabilne. Madžarska kot poraženka je iz vojne izšla ponižana. Postavljena je bila v skrajno nezavidljiv položaj, saj so sosednje države naravnost tekmovali v prisvajanju delov njenega ozemlja. Kot po vsej državi je tudi v Prekmurju vladalo pomanjkanje. Stalno menjavanje vlad in vpadi antantnih vojsk pa so situacijo le še poslabšali. Težke razmere so od posameznikov, ki so hoteli preživeti, zahtevali hitro prilagoditev. Vilmoš Tkalec pri tem ni bil izjema. V njegovem značaju je ob želji po preživetju v ospredje stopila tudi želja po moči. Vilmoš je bil pragmatik in avanturist, človek brez idealov ter brez ideologije. Plašč je obračal po vetrju. Prilagodil se je vsem vladam, tudi komunistični, in ob njenem nastopu takoj postal večji komunist kot vsi drugi; vendar le do takrat, ko mu je to koristilo. Če je v kaj resnično verjel, je verjel v svojo madžarsko domovino in jo je hotel ohraniti, dokler mu je seveda dobro služila. Ko so ga hoteli aretirati, je za rešitev svoje kože hrbet obrnil tudi njej.

Dejstvo je, da nekateri še danes skušajo mitizirati nastanek republike kot neko tvorbo, ki je nastala organsko, iz hotenja prebivalstva po socialni pravičnosti in svobodi. Tudi nekateri zgodovinarji, ki so se v prejšnjem stoletju lotili znanstvenih raziskav nastanka le-te, so se ujeli prav v to past. Pri tem moramo izpostaviti sicer pomembno delo Julija Titla *Murska republika 1919* (1970), saj je s svojim raziskovanjem v madžarskih arhivih postavil v Sloveniji temelje za nadaljnje raziskave. Vendar je prišel do napačnega zaključka pri ugotavljanju vzrokov za nastanek republike. Titl je namreč zatrjeval, da je republika nastala zaradi hotenja prekmurskih Slovencev po avtonomiji, ki jim jo je osrednja oblast obljudljala, vendar je ni nikoli uresničila. Pri tem je šel še dlje in zatrjeval, da je Tkalec razglasil samostojnost z namero rešiti socialni in gospodarski položaj pokrajine. Ob tem se mora omeniti, da je madžarski

zgodovinar László Kővágó (1964) že pred Titlom pravilno ocenil te namere s trditvijo, da je poglaviti razlog za razglasitev tičal v tihotapstvu, v katero se je Tkalec s svojimi sodelavci vpletel za ohranitev svoje ambicije po moči in oblasti.

Osrednja oblast mu je pri tem stopila na rep, grozila mu je aretacija. Da bi se ji izognil, je razglasil republiko. Ko pa je situacija ušla izpod nadzora, je s svojim premičnim premoženjem pobegnil v Avstrijo. Miroslav Kokolj (1981) je zavrgel Titlovo tezo o kakrsni koli revolucionarnosti Murske republike in se približal Kővágójevi analizi dogodkov. Vendar je zašel v drugo skrajnost. Trdil je, da je Murska republika nastala izključno na pobudo madžarske plemiške emigracije v Avstriji, ki je hotela s pomočjo Tkalca zrušiti diktaturo proletariata na Madžarskem. Odkar je postal namestnik ljudskega komisarja za Prekmurje v Murski Soboti, se slednji ni povezoval z le-to emigracijo, dokler mu ni grozila aretacija. Šele takrat je začel iskati stike z njo, vsekakor za rešitev lastne kože in ohranitev pozicije moči.

Po jugoslovanski zasedbi se je z vojsko Kraljevine SHS vrnil v pokrajino z namenom samodokazovanja in preverbe zmožnosti, ali bi se morebiti lahko znova povzpel do neke stopnje moči. Toda poskus se mu je klavrn izneveril – jugoslovanske oblasti so ga nemudoma aretirale in zaprle v dolnjelendavski zapor, iz katerega pa mu je uspelo pobegniti. Po navajanju Göncza bi naj Tkalec preprosto odkorakal iz zapora, saj bi mu naj to omogočila poznanstva s pazniki. Jeseni 1920 se je ustalil v vasi Nagykarácsony na Madžarskem in se tam zaposlil kot učitelj v begunstvu. Nihče na vasi sploh ni posumil, kakšno preteklost je skrival pred njimi (Göncz, 2001, 153). Kmalu je pričel tudi skladati lahkotne melodije/popevke, po katerih je sčasoma postal zelo znan. Nato se je preselil v glavno mesto, ločil, spremenil priimek v Tarcsay in preživel vse vihre do dobe Rákósijevega režima.

Na dlani je primerjava dveh znanih prekmurskih Slovencev, ki sta v prevratni dobi – med začetkom novembra 1918 in avgustom 1919 – z oboroženo silo delovala v pokrajini: Jožef Godina in Vilmoš Tkalec. Generacijsko sta si bila blizu, saj je Godina<sup>38</sup> (roj. 1898 na Dolnji Bistrici) vsega štiri leta mlajši. Tudi glede na rojstni kraj sta bila rojena v sosednjih dolnjeprekmurskih župnijah Turnišče in Črensovci, med Turniščem in Dol. Bistrico je osem/devet kilometrov. Pri obeh je izpričana skupna dejavnost na osnovi do neke mere očitno podobnih osebnih značajev – oborožen upor zoper osrednjo oblast v Budimpešti, zavestno storjen z veliko mero odločnosti za dosego svojih ciljev. Vendar sta bila to in pa hkratno dejstvo uporabe oborožene sile ter osebnega poveljevanja vojaštvu tudi edina dva res konkretna združevalna elementa. Cilje sta imela v osnovi povsem različne. Medtem ko je Godino vodil izrazit cilj priključitve Prekmurja h Kraljevini SHS in s tem končanje osovražene madžarske nacionalistične oblasti ter asimilacije domačega slovenskega življa, je drugi z uporom hotel doseči popolno državnopolitično samostojnost od Budimpešte, ki se mu je tisti hip celo zdela kolikor toliko realna. Drugih – nadaljnjih ali »višjih« ciljev pa Tkalec ni imel, razen da je omenjal možno priključitev republike tako SHS kot tudi

38 Prim. članek Andreja Hozjana o Jožefu Godini v aktualnem letniku (2020) znanstvene revije *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino* (v tisku).

sosednji Avstriji, vendar v zelo nerazvidnem in ohlapnem kontekstu. Medtem ko je pri Godini glede na njegov cilj kristalno jasno razvidno slovensko domoljubje, hkrati pa je svoje dejanje samoumljivo razumeval kot odrekanje dотlej aktualni domovini obeh Madžarski, se Tkalcu ne more pripisati drugega kot vdanost le-tej domovini, kateri pa se je tudi on odrekel v korist osebnih interesov, vendar šele, ko je to bilo nujno potrebno. 17. avgusta 1919 se je Godina, slavljen in občudovan med »svojimi«, veselil izpolnjenega osebnega cilja, ki mu je med drugim omogočil miren zaključek dotedanje življenske poti (izšolanje v Ljubljani) ter pričetek želene nove (vstop v meniški red). Tkalca pa je čakala negotova usoda, v kateri je še naprej iskal osebne koristi, in si jo je – namreč usodo – slednjič prav tako izbral sam.

## RESPUBLIKA MÖRSKA – THE REPUBLIC OF MURA, 1919

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### SUMMARY

*The events in central Europe at the end of the First World War had an important impact on the history of Prekmurje borderland, which had up to that point belonged to the Kingdom of Hungary. The newly created states that sprang up from the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were, with the approval of the Entente, competing for broken parts of the fallen empire, which had an especially painful impact on Hungary – the state turning up on the losing side of the war. The country was surrounded by enemies ambitiously eyeing its territory, in addition to the catastrophic chaos on its domestic front. Towards the end of the war, the rising tide of its citizen's dissatisfaction soon resulted in a relatively bloodless revolution, the end of the monarchy and the founding of the Hungarian Democratic Republic. However, the new regime was powerless when it came to solving looming domestic problems and protecting its borders, which resulted in the resignation of the Prime Minister Mihály Károly. The reins had fallen into the hands of the social democrats, who had allied themselves with the communist party. The communists took power, and the new authorities renamed the state to Hungarian Soviet Republic on March 21, 1919, the new regime being headed by Béla Kun. This dictatorship of the proletariat was the last-ditch effort for Hungary to retain its territorial integrity, which failed because of the pressure from the Entente forces. In August 1919, the Romanian army marched into Budapest, signifying the end of the short era of Hungarian Soviet Republic. From the ruins of the old order, a new one was slowly rising, and the people of Prekmurje found themselves at a crossroads. They could remain a part of the new Hungarian state and eventually gain a level of autonomy, or they could choose to cut themselves off from the centuries long link with the Hungarians, joining the newly established South Slavic state. The intellectual and spiritual leaders in the region, many of the most important of them serving as catholic priests, remained undecided, pragmatically waiting for the resolution of the Paris Peace Conference. Even Jožef Klekl Sr., a priest with strong influence in the region, started campaigning for the integration of Prekmurje with the Slavic state only after the creation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic. With that question still on the table, the situation in the region was volatile due to the shocks and post-war effects, an important one being the new ideas the returning soldiers brought with them. The first signs of unrest and open*

*riots appeared in the region of Medmurje (Medimurje), spreading to the lower Prekmurje region in early November 1918. At this point, the first appearance of Vilmoš Tkalec in the history of Prekmurje and Medmurje can be registered. The Hungarian troops under his command violently suppressed the unrest in the region. After that, he disappeared from the region's history until the establishment of the Hungarian Soviet Republic. His uncle, Béla Obál, who was at that point the highest government official of Vas County, named him his deputy for that region, where he was based out of Murska Sobota. This marks the beginning of his spectacular political ascent and an even swifter fall from power. Vilmoš Tkalec had ambitions of power, which led him to be increasingly more independent in his actions, disregarding official orders and guidelines from Vas and Zala Counties, with the central leadership being too preoccupied with the Romanian and Czech intervention forces to deal with a lone rogue official. At the same time, Béla Obál was convinced that his nephew was trying to establish Mura County, which would bring to life some of his ideas of Prekmurje's regional autonomy. However, the only thing on Tkalec's mind was the consolidation of his own power. With that in mind, he and some of his people became entangled in smuggling operations along the Austrian border in order to raise finances needed to fuel his ambitions, which he then used to fund a mercenary army in the region that in turn now answered to him, not the high command in Budapest. However, his plan to rise to power encountered an issue in the form of a complaint to the central command, which promptly sent auditors to Murska Sobota. These auditors were quickly sent packing by Tkalec's forces, leaving him with two options: he could give up the region and power, giving himself up or he could take a risk and declare Prekmurje's independence from Hungary. He chose the latter and travelled to Austria in search of Hungarian aristocrats in exile, with the intention of acquiring financial and martial support. He was promised both. The aristocrats, however, had a different plan for him and his republic, seeing this as an opportunity, a steppingstone to help start a counter-revolution in Hungary. Tkalec also sought support from the newly established Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, but only got an assurance of the state's neutrality in the event of a Hungarian invasion. Returning to Murska Sobota, he declared independence and the creation of Republic of Mura (Prekmurje) on May 29, 1919. However, the authorities in Budapest could not tolerate such a blow. The day after the establishment of the republic, the Hungarian Red Army started to mobilize for an intervention in the region. The Hungarian authorities were well aware of the possibility of a domino effect this event could bring into motion, the possibility of a counter-revolution and the possibility of the establishment of several more similar secessionist republics on Hungarian soil. At first, the mercenary army Tkalec had put together managed to repel the Red Army but could not hold against a ferocious second offensive. Murska Sobota fell to the Red Army on June 3, 1919, and the promised help from Austria had arrived too late to stop its downfall. On the 6<sup>th</sup> of June, the last vestiges of the Republic of Mura were completely dismantled. Tkalec and some of his people managed to*

*escape to Austria, returning to Prekmurje after the fall of the Hungarian Soviet Republic a few months later. His opportunism knew no bounds, soon he turned his coat and tried to become an officer of the “white army”, which, of course, was unsuccessful. He was imprisoned in Dolnja Lendava, where he managed to escape from the prison with the help of some of the guards, and settled down in a small village near Budapest, where he started a new life as a teacher and a poet. He was known as a strict, but fair teacher, close-mouthed about his past, with the fact that he once used to be the leader of the short-lasting Republic of Mura remaining unknown to his fellow villagers.*

*Keywords: Republic of Mura, 1919, Vilmoš Tkalec, Prekmurje, Hungarian Soviet Republic, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS)*

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## L'INTERVENTO ITALIANO IN CARINZIA DOPO LA PRIMA GUERRA MONDIALE E I BRITANNICI

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### *SINTESI*

*Nell'articolo viene presentano il punto di vista britannico riguardo al ruolo e all'ingerenza dell'Italia nella soluzione della cosiddetta questione carinziana 1918–1920. L'analisi si è basata su fonti primarie britanniche non pubblicate. Gli autori hanno studiato i rapporti tesi del dopoguerra tra l'Italia e il nuovo Regno dei serbi, croati e sloveni e tenendo conto di ciò, hanno evidenziato il problema dei collegamenti ferroviari attraverso Trieste verso l'Europa centrale. Due linee internazionali su tre dovevano attraversare l'attuale territorio sloveno (jugoslavo). L'Italia si è impegnata nell'utilizzare collegamenti fuori dal territorio jugoslavo, il che ha portato al suo sostegno all'Austria e alle sue aspirazioni territoriali. Inoltre, gli autori si sono concentrati sugli scontri militari avvenuti in Carinzia, dove le truppe italiane il 13 giugno 1919 ne occuparono una parte. I britannici si rendevano conto molto bene del sostegno italiano alle aspirazioni territoriali austriache.*

*Parole chiave: Carinzia, Italia, Regno dei serbi, croati e sloveni, Gran Bretagna, plebiscito carinziano, Val Canale, ferrovie*

## THE ITALIAN INTERVENTION IN CARINTHIA AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE BRITISH

### *ABSTRACT*

*The article presents the view of the British considering the role and meddling of Italy, regarding solving the so called Carinthian question 1918–1920. The analysis was based on unpublished British primary sources. The authors studied the tense post-war relations between Italy and the newly established Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Taking this into regard, they highlighted the problem of railway connections from Trieste via Central Europe. Two out of three international lines had to go through the Slovenian (Yugoslavian) territory. Italy strove hard to set up and use lines away from the Yugoslav territory which resulted in her support to Austria and her territorial aspirations. Furthermore, the authors concentrated on military clashes which happened in Carinthia – the Italian military encroached upon it on June 13th, 1919 and consequently occupied part of it. As the British came to find out, the Italian support for Austrian territorial aspirations was obvious.*

*Keywords:* Carinthia, Italy, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Great Britain, Carinthian plebiscite, Val Canale, railways

INTRODUZIONE<sup>1</sup>

Che l'atteggiamento italiano non sarebbe stato amichevole nei confronti dell'idea jugoslava e poi del nascente Stato degli slavi del sud era evidente già durante la Grande guerra e ancor di più dopo la firma del 3 novembre 1918 dell'armistizio tra le potenze alleate e associate (gli americani) da una parte e l'Austria-Ungheria dall'altra. Per la parte italiana, la fine dell'Impero Asburgico aveva rappresentato quell'opportunità tanto attesa per l'espansione verso est, che avrebbe concluso il processo dell'unità nazionale. Contemporaneamente, con la disgregazione della «casa comune» asburgica, che fino ad allora comprendeva tutti gli sloveni (ad eccezione di quelli della Slavia Veneta – la *Beneška Slovenija*, che dal 1866 facevano parte del Regno d'Italia), si ebbe per la prima volta nella storia quella concreta possibilità di riunire tutti gli sloveni in un'unica formazione statale. Due visioni e due speranze totalmente opposte sui futuri confini della Venezia Giulia che hanno caratterizzato in maniera decisiva i rapporti italo-sloveni (jugoslavi). La nascente Jugoslavia rappresentava per Roma un concorrente adriatico, certamente non del tutto inaspettato, ma sicuramente «l'ospite indesiderato». Finita la guerra si ebbero così da subito in varie parti della Venezia Giulia tensioni a livello locale che vennero poi esacerbate dallo stallo nelle trattative alla Conferenza di pace di Parigi. Qui la maggior parte delle attività della delegazione italiana era come ben noto incentrata intorno al futuro assetto nell'Adriatico. Inoltre, la diplomazia italiana era attiva intorno ad altre questioni aperte, tra le quali una era fondamentale per i confini del giovane Stato jugoslavo e in particolare per gli sloveni: la Carinzia.

Dalla fine del conflitto il territorio della disputa austro-jugoslava per la futura delimitazione si era trasformato a livello locale in un terreno di scontri militari che ebbero ovviamente una forte ripercussione a Parigi. Il nodo carinziano, che si concluse infine il 10 ottobre 1920 con il plebiscito in favore dell'Austria, era ed è tuttora un tema ben presente nelle storiografie di confine e ha interessato anche alcuni altri storici, così che abbiamo a disposizione un bel numero di lavori fondamentali, alcuni anche molto recenti (per es. Pleterski, Ude & Zorn, 1970; Kärnten, 1981; Barker, 1984, 111–171; Wutte, 1985; Sienčnik, 1987; Pleterski, 2003; Priestly, 2005; Griesser Pečar, 2010; Reinhard, 2016; Rahten, 2018; Rahten, 2019; Rahten, 2020). Anche riguardo al tema specifico del ruolo italiano in questa parte dell'ex Impero Asburgico nei primi due anni dopo la Prima guerra mondiale

1 Il presente saggio è stato realizzato nell'ambito dei programmi di ricerca *Slovenska identiteta in kulturna zavest v jezikovno in etnično stičnih prostorih v preteklosti in sedanjosti* (raziskovalni program št. P6-0372) e *Preteklost severovzhodne Slovenije med slovenskimi zgodovinskimi deželami in v interakciji z evropskim sosedstvom* (raziskovalni program št. P6-0138) e dei progetti di ricerca *Antifašizem v Julijski krajini v transnacionalni perspektivi, 1919–1954* (raziskovalni projekt št. J6-9356) e *Kultura spominjanja gradnikov slovenskega naroda in države* (raziskovalni projekt št. J6-9354) finanziati dall'Agenzia per le ricerche della Repubblica di Slovenia (Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije – ARRS).

sono a disposizione alcuni lavori che forniscono i dati principali (per es. Fräss Ehrfeld, 1970; Pirjevec, 1981; Caccamo, 2009; Pommier Vincelli, 2010; Di Michele, 2014; vedi anche la sezione bibliografica sul tema in Pupo, 2014, 255–256). Dunque, parecchio interesse, sebbene possiamo rilevare che alcune fonti primarie sono state prese poco in considerazione: tra queste quelle britanniche.

Risulta dunque interessante (ri)presentare in questa sede l'intricato tema da un'altra angolatura – dal punto di vista della diplomazia della Gran Bretagna. Alla fine della guerra essa era tra le potenze vincitrici, riuscendo pur sempre a conservare, insieme alla Francia e ai sempre più influenti Stati Uniti, un ruolo primario nelle decisioni postbelliche; ovviamente alla luce della conservazione dei propri interessi, dunque nel senso più ampio, potremmo dire globale o almeno europeo. Per riuscire in ciò le autorità di Sua Maestà, il personale diplomatico e i vertici militari dovevano essere prontamente aggiornati sui fatti. Ci riuscirono grazie alla presenza sul campo di ufficiali e informatori, che avevano l'obiettivo di seguire gli avvenimenti con molta attenzione, cercando di acquisire informazioni autonome e oggettive. Inoltre, avevano a disposizione – ovviamente per uso interno – parecchi memorandum e studi, messi a punto da vari ministeri per agevolare i lavori della propria delegazione alla Conferenza di pace. Tra questi c'erano i cosiddetti *Handbooks*. Esperti e studiosi avevano incominciato a prepararli nel 1916 e i primi vennero completati nel novembre 1918, la maggioranza poi agli inizi dell'anno successivo e gli ultimi alla fine del mese di settembre 1919; riguardo questi potremmo comunque ritenere che la delegazione britannica a Parigi abbia potuto accedere in anticipo ai materiali preparatori. Si trattava di una serie di 193 studi che riguardavano possibili questioni aperte di molti paesi o regioni a livello globale, oppure potenziali problemi che nel dopoguerra avrebbero potuto mettere a rischio la pace e la stabilità in Europa e nel mondo. Tra questi dieci trattavano in maniera diretta o indiretta il territorio oggetto delle dispute italo-jugoslave e austro-jugoslave<sup>2</sup>. Un tema al quale negli ultimi anni si è data una certa attenzione, in particolar modo per quanto riguarda la questione adriatica (per es. Bajc, 2011; Bajc, 2018) e in parte quella carinziana (Bajc & Osojnik, 2019).

Oltre allo studio dei menzionati *Handbooks*, le pluriennali ricerche della vasta mole documentaria molto ben conservata nell'archivio principale a Londra, il *The National Archives* (TNA), ci permette di analizzare anche la questione

2 TNA FO 373/1/1, *Ethnographical maps of Central and South Eastern Europe and Western Asia*, April 1919; TNA FO 373/1/2, *Maps of Austria-Hungary*, April 1919; TNA FO 373/3/4, *Italy*, March 1919; TNA FO 373/2/7, *Serbia*, December 1918; TNA FO 373/1/11, *Bosnia and Herzegovina*, February 1919; TNA FO 373/1/14, *Dalmatia*, March 1919; TNA FO 373/1/10, *Croatia-Slavonia and Fiume*, March 1919; TNA FO 373/1/13, *The Austrian Littoral*, April 1919; TNA FO 373/1/16, *The Slovenes*, January 1919; TNA FO 373/1/12, *Carniola, Carinthia and Styria*, September 1919; TNA FO 373/1/15, *The Jugo-Slav Movement*, March 1919. Le traduzioni in lingua slovena e le trascrizioni dell'originale degli ultimi quattro *Handbooks* si trovano nella raccolta: Slovenci v očeh imperija, 2007, mentre il volume sul movimento jugoslavo viene proposto anche nella forma di fotoriproduzione in: YPD/1, 3–57.

dell'ingerenza italiana in Carinzia nel primo dopoguerra. In particolare si tratta delle fonti «classiche» del *Foreign Office* spesso utilizzate dagli storici per altre questioni (TNA FO 371). Per quanto riguarda il nostro tema ci siamo poi avvalsi della serie speciale di documenti della delegazione britannica alla Conferenza di pace raggruppati in ben 312 volumi che sono, tranne pochissime eccezioni, molto copiosi (TNA FO 608). Abbiamo inoltre preso in esame alcuni altri fondi archivistici conservati nella capitale britannica. Si tratta di fonti primarie molto importanti, sebbene non sia superfluo aggiungere che riflettono un punto di vista di «terzi», certamente non scevro di alcuni errori o semplificazioni, ma pur sempre meno emotivo di quello delle parti coinvolte direttamente nella disputa sulla appartenenza della Carinzia.

I toponimi menzionati nel presente saggio si riferiscono a luoghi in tre stati diversi –Austria, Slovenia e Italia – e nella maggioranza dei casi venivano storicamente denominati nelle rispettive tre lingue: tedesco, sloveno e italiano. Si è scelto di usare la prima volta tutte le varianti per poi continuare con i nomi dei luoghi nella lingua dell'attuale appartenenza statale, tranne per quanto riguarda quelli già consolidati e più noti, come per es. Lubiana, Belgrado, Trieste, Vienna.

## SITUAZIONE NEL *VACUUM EX ASBURGICO* E GEOPOLITICA DEL BINARIO

Alla fine della Prima guerra mondiale appariva da subito chiaro come nei confronti del neocostituito Stato jugoslavo l'Italia fosse in netto vantaggio. *In primis*, nel 1915, con il *Patto di Londra* (sebbene si trattasse di un *Memorandum*<sup>3</sup>), la Jugoslavia aveva ricevuto, in cambio della sua partecipazione attiva nel conflitto dalla parte dell'Intesa, ampie promesse territoriali, tra l'altro la Venezia Giulia e una parte della Dalmazia. Non possiamo parlare di un accordo formale e vincolante, in quanto non c'è stata per esempio la ratifica al Parlamento italiano. Si trattava, in sostanza, di un documento politico, che tuttavia davanti ai britannici e ai francesi manteneva un peso importante, se non addirittura decisivo. Comunque, come spiega bene Luca Riccardi (1992, 599–614), dagli inizi del 1918 sia a Londra che a Parigi si cominciò a pensare che si sarebbero potute non attendere tutte le promesse, e non solo a quelle relative al territorio giuliano, ma anche quelle inerenti alle divisioni in Asia Minore e gli interessi nella parte occidentale del Mediterraneo.

Stavano emergendo i problemi che caratterizzarono il dietro le quinte nel periodo successivo per poi sfociare nelle dispute postbelliche. A un mese circa

3 TNA FO 93/48/56, Italy No. 56: *Agreement providing for Italian Co-operation in the European War [France and Russia also parties]*, London, April 26, 1915. Nella prima pagina del documento originale in lingua francese, dopo una frase introduttiva, leggiamo «*Mémorandum*», poi il termine si ripete altre cinque volte, tranne che nell'ultima pagina nell'art. 16 una volta «[...] *Le présent arrangement* [...]» e alla fine «[...] *le présent accord* [...]». Per quanto riguarda *Agreement* nel titolo del file dobbiamo precisare che si trattava evidentemente della registrazione a posteriori da parte del protocollo.

dalla fine della guerra poi, negli ambienti britannici c'erano molte discussioni riguardo alle richieste territoriali italiane. Il perno intorno al quale vertevano tutte le diverse opzioni e scenari era il seguente: se da una parte il governo britannico era deciso ad adempiere alle promesse del 1915<sup>4</sup>, dall'altra ci si poneva il quesito di quanto si sarebbero potute limitare le promesse contenute nel *Memorandum di Londra*, dovendo tener conto del fatto che sulla sponda adriatica orientale gli slavi del sud erano riusciti a formare il proprio stato – una realtà ormai imprescindibile – e bisognava dar loro la possibilità di sopravvivere. Nelle prime attente e copiose analisi, supportate da alcune carte geografiche<sup>5</sup>, così come in quelle nei mesi successivi (Bajc, 2011, 337, 339–341), la parte del territorio conteso etnicamente misto italo-sloveno oppure popolato solamente dagli sloveni era in pratica già quasi del tutto «assegnato» all'Italia. I dubbi rimanevano riguardo all'Istria orientale e una parte della Dalmazia, mentre Fiume non faceva parte delle promesse del 1915, essendo stato allora deciso – in maniera molto generica – che avrebbe fatto parte di Montenegro, Serbia e, soprattutto, Croazia<sup>6</sup>. Inoltre, gli esperti britannici erano perlopiù convinti che per le migliori prospettive future dello sviluppo transfrontaliero dell'intera area fosse possibile un'alternativa: Trieste e Fiume sarebbero dovute (ri)diventare città libere o porti franchi (Bajc, 2018, 81–87).

In secondo luogo, le condizioni concrete alla fine della guerra che dovette accettare l'Austria-Ungheria con la firma dell'armistizio (sia per quanto riguardava le clausole militari che quelle navali), davano all'Italia la possibilità di occupare militarmente il territorio e gestirlo in maniera quasi del tutto autonoma rispetto agli altri Alleati i quali in pratica si impegnarono solamente in alcuni centri lungo la costa adriatica. Inoltre, le truppe italiane (e degli altri Alleati) avevano piena libertà di movimento lungo tutto il territorio «ex» austro-ungarico e, se fosse stato necessario, al fine di stabilire e mantenere l'ordine, avrebbero potuto occuparlo ulteriormente<sup>7</sup>.

L'Italia era effettivamente una delle grandi vincitrici della guerra, mentre la Jugoslavia (ovvero il Regno dei serbi, croati e sloveni – SHS) non era nemmeno

4 TNA FO 371/3137/195820, Balfour to Rodd, (Confidential, N. 488), 23. 11. 1918; DDI, 6/I, 145–146, doc. 294: Imperiali, Londra, a Orlando (T. 2554/463), 23. 11. 1918; TNA CAB 23/42/17, Imperial WC 45 (Secret), 23. 12. 1918; cfr. TNA ADM 116/3237/37, Imperial War Cabinet 45: *Draft Minutes of a Meeting*, 23. 12. 1918.

5 TNA FO 371/4356/P.C. 131, Foreign Office: *The Question of Italian Claims* (Confidential), 11. 12. 1918 (lo stesso in TNA CAB 24/72/16); P.C. 149, General Staff, War Office (Secret and Confidential, L 7): *Notes on a Suggested Frontier of Jugo-Slavia*, 10. 12. 1918; P.C. 153, Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office (Secret): *The Claims of Italy*, 10. 12. 1918; TNA FO 608/40/4, 2536 (lo stesso in 3147), Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office (Secret, P.C./016): *The Claims of Italy*, 24. 12. 1918. Alcune carte geografiche in: TNA MPK 1/269/2.

6 TNA FO 93/48/56, Italy No. 56: *Agreement providing for Italian Co-operation in the European War [France and Russia also parties]*, London, April 26, 1915, 2, art. 5.

7 Trieste, Ottobre–Novembre 1918/II, 172, doc. 143: *Protocollo delle Condizioni di Armistizio tra le Potenze Alleate e Associate e l'Austria-Ungheria*, 3. 11. 1918, art. 4.

riconosciuta dalla comunità internazionale. Così, nei primi e i più importanti mesi alla Conferenza di Pace a Parigi, gli jugoslavi erano formalmente rappresentati dal Regno serbo che durante la guerra aveva combattuto dalla parte degli Alleati. Tra i «grandi» furono gli Stati uniti d’America i primi a riconoscere il nuovo stato il 7 febbraio 1919; la Gran Bretagna lo fece il primo giugno, seguita dopo quattro giorni dalla Francia; infine, il 28 del mese, ci fu il riconosciuto da parte di tutti quei Paesi che, insieme agli jugoslavi, avevano firmato a Versailles l’Accordo di pace con la Germania, dunque anche l’Italia (Lederer, 1966, 170, 237, 254; Mitrović, 1969, 61–63); secondo alcune interpretazioni, invece, *de jure* lo fece appena il 12 novembre 1920, col la firma del Trattato di Rapallo (Bucarelli, 2002, 33–34; Caccamo, 2004, 55).

Il nuovo Stato jugoslavo aveva questioni territoriali aperte e dunque problemi con tutti gli stati vicini, tranne che con la Grecia. I diversi punti di vista sui futuri confini erano dunque molti, ma i più intricati riguardavano la Venezia Giulia, in particolare a causa di Fiume che divenne il simbolo principale della controversia italo-jugoslava. Come la storiografia ha già ampiamente trattato (per es. Alatri, 1959; Lederer, 1966, 97–361; Mitrović, 1969, 103–206; Lowe & Marzari, 1975, 160–180; Burgwyn, 1993, 245–312; Micheletta, 1999, 19–261; MacMillan, 2003; Lipušček, 2003, 86–217; Mljač, 2011), la questione si era così intensificata da diventare un complesso problema internazionale. Una situazione che stava diventando esplosiva già negli ultimi mesi del 1918. In una delle prime sintesi della seconda metà di dicembre, di notevole importanza, in quanto si trattava di un rapporto del Quartier generale delle forze armate britanniche, si temeva addirittura lo scoppio di un conflitto italo-jugoslavo<sup>8</sup>. Come vedremo in seguito, il tema era «caldo» anche in Carinzia, sebbene Fiume avesse, almeno per quanto riguarda la documentazione conservata a Londra, quasi monopolizzato tutte la questioni.

I vantaggi jugoslavi erano in sostanza due: la questione del controllo (parziale) delle linee ferroviarie che collegavano Trieste con l’ex Impero e un certo appoggio politico. Per quanto riguarda questo, Parigi e Londra accettarono la creazione della Jugoslavia, sebbene la consapevolezza dell’inevitabile dissoluzione austro-ungarica e della conseguente nascita sulle sue ceneri di nuovi stati divenne attuale appena tra la primavera e l'estate del 1918 (per es. Sretenović, 2011, 238–243; Pavlović, 2015, 288–295, 337–342, 346–353; Bajc & Osojnik, 2019, 468–476). A scompaginare lo scenario diplomatico – cosa che almeno in parte favorì gli jugoslavi – ci pensò il presidente americano Thomas Woodrow Wilson con il suo cosiddetto idealismo. Non volendo riconoscere i trattati segreti e lanciando l’idea dell’autodeterminazione dei popoli arrivò allo scontro con l’Italia (per es. Alatri, 1959; Lederer, 1966, 216–250; Burgwyn, 1993, 134–138, 221–225, 245–286; Lipušček, 2003, 45–50, 63–66, 75–82, 164–194; MacMillan, 2003, 20; Sharp, 2008; Lipušček, 2012; Monzali, 2015, 136, 141–143, 145–146,

8 TNA FO 371/4356/P.C. 159, General Staff, War Office (Secret and Confidential, L 9): *The Relations of the Jugo-Slavs with the Entente*, 18. 12. 1918, 2.

151–152, 160–162). In generale la minaccia delle aspirazioni territoriali italiane aveva però anche rappresentato una importante motivazione per la creazione della Jugoslavia, in quanto solamente uniti con la Serbia gli sloveni, i croati e i serbi dell'Austria-Ungheria avevano potuto difendersi (Pavlović, 2017).

Come prima della guerra anche alla fine delle ostilità erano tre le linee ferroviarie che dal porto di Trieste collegavano le regioni del nord<sup>9</sup>:

- 1) La *Ferrovia Meridionale* (*Južna Železnica, Südbahn*): Trieste – Logatec (Logatico, Loitsch) – Lubiana – Maribor – Vienna – Budapest. Nel periodo anteguerra era la linea principale, a doppio binario. La tratta da Logatec fino a Maribor e un po' oltre verso nord fino alla linea di demarcazione jugoslavo-austriaca attraversava il territorio jugoslavo. Almeno per il territorio di Lubiana, la città principale slovena, non c'erano dubbi sull'appartenenza statale; inoltre, non poche erano le probabilità che la zona di Maribor facesse parte del Regno SHS.
- 2) La *Ferrovia Transalpina* (*Neue Alpenbahnen*, per la prima parte, da Trieste a Jesenice (Aßling o Assling), in sloveno *Bohinjska proga*): Trieste – Gorizia – Podbrdo (Piedicolle, Untereck) – Jesenice – Klagenfurt (Celovec) – Vienna. Per la parte italiana risultava problematica quella breve tratta di 25 chilometri che attraversava una parte di territorio, nella valle del fiume Sava Dolinka, che non era inclusa nelle promesse del 1915 e la parte jugoslava aveva nelle proprie mani. Era comunque più breve e offriva una maggiore capacità di traffico rispetto alla terza linea, la *Pontebbana*.
- 3) La *Pontebbana* (*Pontafelbahn*): Trieste – Gorizia – Udine – Tarvisio (Trbiž, Tarvis) – Villach (Beljak, Villaco). Era in teoria l'unica linea al di fuori del controllo jugoslavo; per l'Italia sarebbe stato quindi cruciale assicurarsi tutta la Val Canale, vale a dire anche il Tarvisiano, cosa non del tutto scontata, anche se molto probabile. A sopperire alle difficoltà con le prime due linee si prospettava di rafforzare il transito attraverso Tarvisio costruendo una congiunzione attraverso il valico del Predil (Rabelj, Raibl) (cosa, tuttavia, di difficile attuazione).

In sostanza, due delle tre linee erano tali che i convogli dovevano per forza attraversare il territorio sloveno/jugoslavo. Conseguentemente questo aveva rappresentato l'altro – e in verità l'unico vero – vantaggio jugoslavo nei confronti dell'Italia: il ricatto economico dell'interruzione delle comunicazioni ferroviarie. In pratica la Jugoslavia poteva permettersi di fare qui ostruzionismo e in alcuni casi, almeno dal punto di vista italiano, lo fece.

9 I dati sulle linee ferroviarie si trovano in: Apih, 1966, 70–71; Haas, 1981a, 50–51; Biondi, 1996, 17–18; Visintin, 2000, 211–212; Apollonio, 2001, 142–143; Marušić, 2008; Klabjan, 2008; Di Michele, 2014, 21–22; Kladnik, 2019, 406, 422.

Non a caso avere il controllo delle reti ferroviarie era uno degli obiettivi *clou* di Roma. Le ragioni principali erano le seguenti: a) l'invio di aiuti all'Austria attraverso Trieste; un fattore importante anche come strumento di riappacificazione e avvicinamento all'ex nemico, essendo stata l'Italia la prima a mandare aiuti agli austriaci, mentre la Francia non aveva mandato nulla (Di Michele, 2014, 15–16); b) il commercio triestino aveva bisogno di riprendere i collegamenti con l'entroterra e ancor di più con l'Europa centrale (Apikh, 1966, 70) e non a caso le autorità principali dell'occupazione militare della Venezia Giulia, con il generale Carlo Petitti di Roreto in testa, erano state da subito molto interessate della situazione carinziana<sup>10</sup>; c) infine, l'Italia preferiva non avere interferenze jugoslave nella linea tra Villach e Maribor per avere libero accesso verso l'Ungheria, da dove poteva, in caso di conflitto con la Jugoslavia, rifornirsi facilmente di grano (Low, 1974, 307–308). In generale, assicurarsi il controllo ferroviario rappresentava quel vantaggio geopolitico per poter estendere la propria influenza politico-economica nel *vacuum* della precedente configurazione dei traffici ex asburgici.

In teoria, nelle clausole d'armistizio la parte italiana avrebbe potuto avere dei vantaggi anche in merito alla «guerra dei binari», difatti: «[...] *Tutto il materiale militare e il materiale delle ferrovie che si trovano sui territori da sgomberare* [da parte dell'esercito austro-ungarico] *devono rimanere sul posto. Cessione di tutto questo materiale, compresa la fornitura di carbone, all'Intesa e agli Stati Uniti* [...] *Gli Alleati avranno il diritto assoluto: a) di libero movimento delle loro truppe su ogni strada e ogni ferrovia o vie fluviali del territorio austro-ungarico e di servirsi dei necessari mezzi di trasporto.* [...]»<sup>11</sup> In pratica però, le clausole risultavano difficile da attuare dappertutto. Se le truppe italiane riuscirono in breve tempo a occupare le posizioni e, in certi casi, come vedremo in seguito, a superare la linea di demarcazione, alcune zone strategiche erano fuori dalla loro portata.

Da tenere conto di come al momento del collasso agli inizi del novembre 1918 il territorio sloveno era uno dei passaggi obbligatori per numerosi soldati dell'esercito sconfitto austro-ungarico. Si calcola che in 200/250.000 mila si ritirarono dalla direzione del Piave e fino a 50.000 provenivano dai fronti balcanici. Per far fronte a questa emergenza le autorità di Lubiana si organizzarono in anticipo

10 Per es. ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 140, fasc. *Notiziario politico-militare* 3a armata, 1918–19, Comando della 3a Armata, Stato Maggiore, Ufficio Informazioni: *Notiziario politico-militare* (Riservatissimo, N. 36), 27. 12. 1918, 12–13; *Notiziario politico-militare* (Riservatissimo, N. 38), 29. 12. 1918, 1–2; *Notiziario* N. 13, *Estratti della stampa relativi alla Zona d'occupazione* (Riservatissimo), 14. 1. 1919, 2; b. 72, *Diario Storico-Militare*, 3 novembre 1918–4 agosto 1919, 5. 2. 1919, allegato 3: Finzi, Regio Governatorato della Venezia Giulia, Stato Maggiore – Ufficio ITO al Comando Supremo – Capo Servizi Informazioni (N. 2040, Riserv.) e allegato 22: Tenente Beniamini Battigelli, R. Governatorato della Venezia Giulia, Dipartimento Tecnico: *Situazione nella Austria tedesca*, 18. 3. 1919; giugno 1919, allegato 64: Petitti al Comando Supremo [et al.] (Telegramma urgente), 25. 6. 1919.

11 Trieste, Ottobre–Novembre 1918/II, 172, doc. 143: *Protocollo delle Condizioni di Armistizio tra le Potenze Alleate e Associate e l'Austria-Ungheria*, 3. 11. 1918, art. 3 e 4.

riuscendo così a prendere il controllo di una buona parte della rete ferroviaria (Bizjak, 2003, 27, 35–36). Possiamo immaginare che gli sloveni non fossero disposti a consegnarle ai «nuovi occupatori».

Come si evince dagli *Handbooks* gli esperti britannici avevano ben presente la rete ferroviaria sul territorio conteso, il suo potenziale, alcune lacune e i progetti per il potenziamento di alcune tratte. Da una parte scrissero che nel secolo precedente, in generale, le autorità austriache e ungheresi (poi austro-ungariche) erano ben consapevoli dell'importanza di mettere in piedi una rete efficiente che potenziasse la propria posizione strategica, ma nel contempo sfruttasse le popolazioni locali (in particolare in altre parti dell'Impero, per esempio in territorio croato)<sup>12</sup>. Dall'altra, i britannici analizzarono in dettaglio questa eredità e dunque le principali caratteristiche del trasporto ferroviario lungo il territorio etnicamente misto e quello sloveno. Per Trieste avevano anche aggiunto dati in forma di tabelle sulla costante crescita del porto negli anni prima della guerra; evidentemente il successo dell'import export dipendeva anche dal buon funzionamento del sistema ferroviario<sup>13</sup>.

Subito dopo l'armistizio l'esercito italiano iniziò ad occupare il territorio e in alcune zone lo fece oltre la linea di demarcazione frutto delle promesse dell'Intesa in seno al *Memorandum di Londra*. Il superamento è ben visibile in alcune carte geografiche pubblicate (per es. Kacin Wohinz, 1972, 71; ZS, 616; Šepić, 1989, 143; Kacin Wohinz, 2000, 171; Kacin Wohinz, 2005, 223; Kacin Wohinz & Pirjevec, 2000, 31) e in maniera ancor più precisa su una mappa del periodo, a colori e di grandi dimensioni, conservata nell'archivio di Londra, che ci mostra un avanzamento leggermente ancora più a est. Per quanto riguarda il territorio etnico sloveno il superamento si era verificato nelle seguenti zone: partendo dal nord, nell'area di Tarvisio fino a Rateče (Racchia, Ratschach), o in altre parole fino al confine italo-sloveno nella Val Canale; proseguendo poi verso sud fino ai monti Ratitovec e Bleguš; quindi la parte più consistente, da Žiri, attraverso il distretto di Logatec (25 chilometri da Lubiana), l'area di Postojna (Postumia, Adelsberg) fino ad abbracciare il monte Snežnik (Monte Nevoso, Krainer Schneeberg), da dove la linea proseguiva verso la regione croata di Kastav (Castua)<sup>14</sup>.

Truppe italiane penetrarono addirittura fino a Vrhnika, cittadina a solamente una ventina di chilometri da Lubiana. La loro avanzata verso la città principale slovena avvenne nella prima metà di novembre 1918 e fu impedita dai soldati del tenente colonnello Stevan Švabić. La parte italiana era allora convinta di trovarsi di

12 TNA FO 373/1/15, *The Jugo-Slav Movement*, March 1919, 13, 33–34; TNA FO 373/1/10, *Croatia-Slavonia and Fiume*, March 1919, 41–44, 65–66.

13 TNA FO 373/1/13, *The Austrian Littoral*, April 1919; TNA FO 373/1/12, *Carniola, Carinthia and Styria*, September 1919.

14 TNA FO 925/33017, *Les revendications italiennes envers l'Austrie qui a combattu pour la Pangermanisme contre l'Entente et le revendications italiennes envers les Yougoslaves qui, étant le rempart contre le Pangermanisme, sont les alliés anturels de l'Entente / The Italian revendications against Austria, which fought for Pangermanism against the Entente and the Italian revendications against the Jugoslavs, who are the bulwark against the Pangermanism and therefore the natural allies of the Entente [1919]*. Una copia, in bianco e nero, di questa mappa, a cui venne aggiunta in rosso la prima linea Wilson, si trova come appendice al volume di Albin Prepeluh dove nella didascalia leggiamo che si trattava di una mappa stampata a Parigi per la delegazione jugoslava (Prepeluh, 1938).

fronte a unità dell'esercito serbo e dunque dell'Intesa, sebbene, in realtà, Švabić e suoi erano ex prigionieri di guerra austro-ungarici che prima di tornare alle proprie case rimasero sul posto in funzione delle autorità lubianiesi (per es. Kacin Wohinz, 1972, 70, 72; Nećak & Repe, 2005, 238–241; Lipušček, 2003, 167–169; Lipušček, 2012, 343–345). La questione dell'avanzata delle truppe italiane in direzione di Lubiana rimbalzò immediatamente a Parigi e dai documenti pubblicati si potrebbe dire che non era stata del tutto casuale. Di fronte ai colleghi alleati i rappresentanti diplomatici di Roma avevano ovviamente cercato di minimizzare «l'incidente»<sup>15</sup> che ebbe però anche alla fine del mese di dicembre un certo risalto sulla stampa britannica «filojugoslava»<sup>16</sup>. Una questione che meriterebbe un'analisi approfondita rimane però il fatto che in conseguenza a ciò le tensioni e le diffidenze da parte slovena/jugoslava non poterono che aumentare.

## LA VAL CANALE – LA PARTE PIÙ OCCIDENTALE DELLA CARINZIA

Tra le occupazioni c'era anche la parte più occidentale della Carinzia, la Val Canale (Kanalska dolina, Kanaltal), che da secoli faceva parte dei territori Asburgici. Si tratta di una zona di modeste dimensioni, circa 23 chilometri in linea orizzontale, tra Pontebba (Tablja, Pontafel) a ovest e passando in direzione est per Tarvisio fino al paesino di Coccau (Kokovo, Goccau). Dal punto di vista della composizione etnica la popolazione era per oltre la metà tedesca, gli altri erano sloveni, pochissimi erano italiani<sup>17</sup>.

Nel *Memorandum di Londra* del 1915 non si ritrova molta precisione rispetto alla Val Canale, riguardo alla quale si può dedurre che all'Italia venne promessa solamente la parte fino a Tarvisio:

[...] *Il confine si dirigerà quindi a sud, attraverserà il monte Dobbiaco e si unirà all'attuale confine delle Alpi Carniche. Seguirà questo confine fino al monte Tarvisio, e dopo il monte Tarvisio la linea delle acque delle Alpi Giulie attraverso il passo del Predil, il monte Mangart, il Tricorno (Terglou) [Triglav, Terglau] e la linea dello spartiacque dei passi Podbrdo, Podlaniscam [Podlanišče, Podlanischam] e Idria [Idrija]. [...]*<sup>18</sup>

15 DDI, 6/I, 94, 112, 227, doc. 181, 220 e 425: Sonnino a Orlando (T. 2883/29), Parigi, 16. 11. 1918, Bonin Longare, Parigi, a Sonnino (T. Gab. 2357/633), 19. 11. 1918 e Orlando a Diaz, 1. 12. 1918.

16 Cfr. riguardo all'articolo di uno dei primi sostenitori dell'idea jugoslava Arthur John Evans sul *Manchester Guardian* del 24. 12. 1918: DDI, 6/I, 349–350, doc. 641: Imperiali a Sonnino (T. 3497/1802), 24. 12. 1918.

17 L'analisi dei vari consimenti riguardo la Val Canale e delle varie interpretazioni ci viene offerta dallo studioso Pavel Stranj (1999, 53–69).

18 «[...] *La frontière ensuite se dirigera vers le sud, traversera le mont Toblach et rejoindra la frontière actuelle des Alpes carniques. Elle suivra cette frontière jusqu'au mont Tarvis, et après le mont Tarvis le ligne de paetage des eaux des Alpes juliennes par le col Predil, le mont Mangart, le Tricorno (Terglou) et la ligne de partage des eaux des cols de Podberdo, de Podlaniscam et d'Idria. [...]»* (TNA FO 93/48/56, Italy No. 56. *Agreement providing for Italian Co-operation in the European War [France and Russia also parties], London, April 26, 1915*, [1], art. 4).

Non ci sono però dubbi che in Italia volevano assicurarsi l'intera regione. In generale c'era la volontà, tra l'altro, di sopperire alle carenze di sicurezza lungo tutto il cosiddetto confine orientale, cosa che influì molto sulle scelte di discesa in guerra (Monzali, 2017); in questo senso potremmo parlare anche dell'area adriatica (Milano, 2017). I vertici dell'Esercito italiano erano anche ben consapevoli dell'importanza strategica della Val Canale: nei piani militari ancor prima della Grande guerra avevano previsto che occupando Pontebba e poi Tarvisio, avrebbero potuto da lì lanciare un'offensiva per proseguire in direzione della Carinzia centrale e oltre, verso l'interno della Duplice Monarchia (Bizjak, 2017, 868, 874). Ovviamente anche a Vienna i capi militari erano consci dell'importanza della regione. Al momento della dichiarazione di guerra italiana del 23 maggio 1915, lo Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito austro-ungarico aveva per esempio previsto nel territorio della Venezia Giulia la difesa su due linee, quella più a nord, Tarvisio – Villach – Klagenfurt, e quella più a sud, Isonzo – Lubiana – Graz (Grafenauer, 2017, 892). Il Capo di Stato Maggiore Austro-Ungarico, Conrad von Hötzendorf, aveva assegnato per la prima linea 2 divisioni, per la seconda invece 8 (Antoličič, 2017, 913). Potremmo dire che gli strateghi di entrambi gli schieramenti erano consapevoli del valore difensivo/offensivo della Val Canale, dove secondo gli austro-ungarici, essendo in montagna, la difesa sarebbe risultata meno difficoltosa.

Comunque, ancora verso la fine del novembre 1918 le autorità di Lubiana avevano sperato di ottenere, oltre alla valle del Gailtal (Ziljska dolina, valle dell'Austria meridionale, tra il Tirolo orientale e la Carinzia), anche il territorio della Val Canale e il comune di Fusine (Bela Peč, Weißfels)<sup>19</sup> che precedentemente faceva parte della regione Kranjska (Carniola).

Potremmo supporre che l'intera Val Canale, con l'aggiunta della frazione di Fusine, fosse stata ipotecata con l'occupazione italiana, la quale però non si concretizzò nell'immediato. Dall'analisi delle fonti britanniche del periodo notiamo che molto probabilmente dal giorno della firma dell'Armistizio, il 3 novembre, fino almeno al giorno 5 del mese, le unità italiane non erano riuscite ancora a conquistare tutta la zona<sup>20</sup>. Il territorio del Tarvisiano era infatti alla fine del conflitto «intasato» dalla concentrazione delle rimanenti truppe dell'esercito austro-ungarico sbandato; appena qui i soldati venivano separati per appartenenza nazionale e quelli «slavi» venivano convogliati in direzione di Lubiana.<sup>21</sup> Nel Distretto di Tarvisio poi il passaggio di consegne dell'amministrazione locale, da quella austriaca a quella italiana, non fu immediata. Il Commissariato Civile

19 Sejni zapisniki/1, 139, doc. 24: *Zapisnik 24. seje Narodne vlade SHS v Ljubljani*, 26. 11. 1918.

20 TNA CAB 25/88, Delme Radcliffe to Wilson (Secret, 10970), 5. 11. 1918; Delme Radcliffe to Wilson (Personal, 10972), 5. 11. 1918; TNA CAB 25/99, Royal Italian Army: *Report by the Comando Supremo on The Battle of Vittorio Veneto (24th October–4th November 1918)*, 30–32 (lo stesso in TNA FO 608/266/2, 2856); cfr. Torkar, 2019, 751.

21 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 140, fasc. Notiziario politico-militare 3a armata, 1918–19, Comando della 3a Armata, Stato Maggiore, Ufficio Informazioni: *Notiziario politico-militare* (Riservatissimo, N. 38), 29. 12. 1918, 1.

locale, istituito il 9 febbraio 1919, aveva per esempio incominciato a funzionare appena il 19 marzo e l'Ufficio postale passò sotto il controllo italiano il primo marzo<sup>22</sup>.

Ancora nella prima metà di dicembre 1918, tra le menzionate previsioni britanniche, si proponeva che il confine italo-jugoslavo potesse passare vicino a Tarvisio. A questo riguardo, nel Quartier generale delle forze armate britanniche aggiunsero la seguente spiegazione:

[...] *La Jugoslavia otterrebbe una buona frontiera settentrionale strategica. D'altra parte, entrambe le linee ferroviarie da Udine e da Trieste a Villach dovrebbero attraversare il territorio jugoslavo. Si suggerisce, quindi, che in questo caso il traffico lungo queste due direttrici venga dichiarato libero dal governo jugoslavo. [...]*<sup>23</sup>

In questo caso l'Italia avrebbe avuto circa la metà della valle e dunque il tratto ferroviario di circa 9 chilometri, da Tarvisio in direzione dell'Austria, sarebbe dovuto passare su suolo jugoslavo. Si trattava solamente di una previsione, che realizzava quasi alla lettera le promesse del 1915; risulta però interessante rilevare come i britannici si rendessero conto che un tale scenario avrebbe richiesto uno status particolare del territorio che comprendeva le linee ferroviarie: in sostanza, una sua internazionalizzazione.

Possiamo immaginare che neanche in questo caso Roma sarebbe disposta ad accettare. Dalle fonti della diplomazia italiana risulta infatti come l'obiettivo (minimo) era che la *Pontebbana* non fosse obbligata a passare attraverso il territorio jugoslavo<sup>24</sup>: in altre parole, che l'intera Val Canale facesse parte dello Stato italiano. Non era però facile convincere gli Alleati a Parigi. Non abbiamo dati sufficienti a disposizione per poter dire se il menzionato punto di vista britannico del dicembre 1918 avesse influito sugli statunitensi, i quali, nel marzo del 1919 si dimostravano contrari al passaggio della regione di Tarvisio sotto l'Italia (Lederer, 1966, 217). In seguito, essi cambiarono idea e l'8 maggio proposero che l'Italia ricevesse i territori previsti dal *Memorandum* 1915 al nord, in più il distretto del Tarvisiano, ma gli americani in cambio volevano che fosse la Jugoslavia ad aggiudicarsi Fiume (Lederer, 1966, 241). Evidentemente

22 Klen, 1977, 177–178, doc. 3: Finzi, Capo Ufficio I.T.O. al R. Governatorato della Venezia Giulia [et al.] (No. 5833): *Riassunto informativo sullo spirito della popolazione nelle [?] Venezia*, 23. 4. 1919.

23 «[...] *Jugo-Slavia would obtain a good strategic northern frontier. On the other hand, both railway-lines from Udine and from Trieste to Villach would have to traverse Jugo-Slav territory. It is suggested, therefore, that in this case traffic along these two lines should be declared free by the Jugo-Slav Government. [...]» (TNA FO 371/4356/P.C. 149, General Staff, War Office (L 7, Secret and Confidential): *Notes on a Suggested Frontier of Jugo-Slavia*, 10. 12. 1918, 2).*

24 DDI, 6/II, 70, 92–95, 173, 315–316, 486–487, doc. 109, 141, 258, 464 e 669: Sonnino al Ministero degli Esteri (T. 52), 26. 1. 1919, Badoglio a Orlando, Sonnino e Barzaghi (N. 219), 28. 1. 1919 e *Promemoria*, 23. 1. 1919, Annotazione di Sonnino a margine del doc. 285, 5. 2. 1919, Sonnino a Avezzana (T. 164), 23. 2. 1919, e Machioro a Sonnino (R. 121), 5. 3. 1919.

risolvere la questione fiumana era un nocciolo ancora troppo duro, invece per la Val Canale i capi governo dei «quattro» riuscirono il 28 maggio a trovare un accordo, favorendo la parte italiana (Rahten, 2020, 313). Fu infine il presidente Wilson il giorno dopo a rendere pubblica la decisione che il confine meridionale dell’Austria fondamentalmente sarebbe stato definito in accordo alla linea del *Memorandum di Londra* 1915, con l’eccezione che l’Italia avrebbe acquistato ulteriormente in Trentino-Alto Adige il comune Sesto (Sexten) e il territorio del Tarvisiano (Low, 1974, 329–330).

Con il Trattato di *Saint-Germain-en-Laye* con l’Austria, firmato il 10 settembre 1919, il confine nella Val Canale venne formalmente stabilito: «[...] circa nove chilometri a nord-ovest di Tarvis [...]»<sup>25</sup>. Quest’area corrisponde quasi del tutto all’attuale zona, inoltre le venne alla fine del 1920 aggiunto il comune di Fusine. Il Trattato di Rapallo del 12 novembre 1920 per il confine italo-jugoslavo in questa zona prevedeva «[...] dal monte Pec (quota 1511), comune alle tre frontiere fra l’Italia, l’Austria e il Regno dei Serbi, Croati e Sloveni, fino al monte Jalovec (quota 2643), una linea da determinare sul terreno con andamento generale nord sud, che passi per la quota 2272 (Ponca) [...]»<sup>26</sup>: vale a dire una linea un po’ approssimativa (entro la quale c’era anche il territorio di Fusine), sebbene non fosse nemmeno l’unica lungo il nuovo confine italo-jugoslavo.

#### LA PRIMA FASE DEGLI SCONTI IN CARINZIA (NOVEMBRE 1918–APRILE 1919) NEL CONTESTO DI UN’AUSTRIA IN DIFFICOLTÀ

I primi scontri in Carinzia si ebbero già nei primi giorni dopo la fine della guerra. Inizialmente, fino al 15 dicembre 1918, le truppe slovene, composte da volontari, ebbero la meglio. La parte austriaca riuscì in seguito a prendere l’iniziativa e il 14 gennaio dell’anno seguente venne raggiunta una prima, seppur fragile, tregua (Ude, 1970, 138, 140–142, 144–158, 160–172; Pleterski, 2003, 14–15; Griesser Pečar, 2010, 139–142). In questa prima fase le autorità britanniche non avevano affrontato in maniera approfondita la questione degli scontri militari, ma ricevettero comunque alcune informazioni riguardo la situazione sul campo.

Anticipando i tempi, il 15 di ottobre 1918, mandarono nei Balcani come osservatore il maggiore Harold William Vazeille Temperley, in seguito uno dei collaboratori del *Foreign Office* e poi autore della prima ricostruzione storica della Conferenza di Parigi. Da Salonicco raggiunse Belgrado e da lì Zagabria,

25 GU RI, No. 241, 12. 10. 1920: *Trattato di Pace tra l’Italia e l’Austria annesso alla legge 26 setembre 1920*, n. 1322, 3152, art. 27; cfr. Biondi, 1996, 35.

26 GU RI, No. 300, 21. 12. 1920: *Trattato di Rapallo*, 12 novembre 1920, 3976, art. 1; cfr. Kacin Wohinz, 1972, 374–375, 377.

Fiume, Trieste e Lubiana (Fair, 1989, 74). Fu lui, dunque, a fornire i primi dati a Londra, avendo svolto insieme all'ufficiale francese Carbonnier tra il 20 e 28 novembre la prima riconoscizione alleata – da alcuni definita, a ragione, come una missione speciale (Fair, 1989, 74) – nel nuovo Stato degli Sloveni, Croati e Serbi (*Država Slovencev, Hrvatov in Srbov*, formatosi il 29 ottobre, e che si unì il primo di dicembre al Regno di Serbia e Montenegro nella prima Jugoslavia ovvero il Regno SHS). Il 25 e 26 novembre i due ufficiali visitarono Lubiana e vennero così direttamente a conoscenza della situazione tra gli sloveni. Tra l'altro il maggiore britannico riferì ai propri superiori che il confine al nord con l'ex Impero Asburgico più appropriato sarebbe dovuto coincidere con il fiume Drava, mentre i rappresentanti sloveni gli fecero presente che intendevano avanzare oltre il fiume per raggiungere la zona tra Villach e Klagenfurt. Temperley scrisse che tali pretese includevano parecchio territorio e, dunque, indirettamente, aveva espresso dubbi sulla loro legittimità. Secondo lui solamente gli sloveni avrebbero potuto provocare nuovi scontri, sebbene dal punto di vista militare la loro sicurezza era messa piuttosto in discussione a causa delle pretese italiane, in particolare dalla direzione di Fiume e dall'area a ovest di Lubiana<sup>27</sup>. Possiamo notare come, rispetto al tema degli sviluppi successivi nell'area, Temperley avesse compreso bene le dinamiche principali, come conferma il fatto che a dare avvio agli scontri nel 1919 erano stati gli sloveni, ovvero la parte jugoslava.

Nelle sue memorie il maggiore britannico aveva anche bocciato come assurda l'idea proposta dal presidente del Governo provvisorio sloveno Josip Pogačnik che 100 soldati britannici venissero in aiuto dell'esercito sloveno contro la parte italiana (Temperley, 2014, 340–341). Senza esito positivo nei primi mesi dopo la guerra i membri del Governo nazionale di Lubiana avevano espresso simili richieste ad altri ufficiali britannici e francesi, chiedendo di mandare almeno una compagnia di soldati<sup>28</sup>. Potremmo affermare che queste richieste erano del tutto ingenue ed irrealizzabili, poiché sia Londra che Parigi non avrebbero mai appoggiato in tal modo gli sloveni, per non rischiare di compromettere ulteriormente i rapporti con Roma; fino ad allora erano alleati ed era comunque già evidente che si prospettavano altri punti di scontro di maggiore rilevanza, per esempio intorno alla questione fiumana. Un dato da tener ben presente era la consapevolezza delle autorità britanniche del numero esiguo delle proprie truppe da mandare in Austria e in seguito anche in tutte le aree di attrito tra l'Italia e il nuovo Stato jugoslavo. Persino nell'epicentro delle tensioni, a Fiume, riuscirono in fondo a mandare pochi uomini e avevano a disposizione solamente alcune navi da guerra. Secondo la documentazione di Londra gli americani e i francesi avevano in questo

27 TNA WO 106/1394, *Fiume, Zagreb and Laibach: Report by Major Temperley*, 29. 11. 1918 (copia in TNA FO 608/16/5, 559). La relazione aveva suscitato molto interesse nel *Foreign Office* (Bajc, 2011, 361).

28 *Sejni zapisniki* 1, 243, doc. 42: *Zapisnik 42. seje Narodne vlade SHS v Ljubljani*, 7. 1. 1919.

senso più risorse<sup>29</sup>, mentre l'esercito italiano, direttamente interessato, ne aveva ovviamente a disposizione; queste questioni come vedremo rappresentavano un *leitmotiv* tra gli Alleati nell'approcciarsi alla questione carinziana.

Lo stesso giorno della stesura del rapporto di Temperley, il 29 novembre 1918, furono gli annalisti del Ministero della guerra britannico (*War Office*) a proporre un memorandum riguardo alle comunicazioni tra l'Italia, l'Austria e la futura Jugoslavia. In tale documento essi proponevano – senza entrare nei dettagli – che Klagenfurt appartenesse all'Austria, mentre Maribor e Eisenkappel-Vellach (Železna Kapla-Bela) agli jugoslavi, inoltre avevano suggerito che Jesenice passasse sotto l'Italia<sup>30</sup>; una tale soluzione per quest'ultima zona avrebbe molto penalizzato gli sloveni. In un altro memorandum del *War Office* del 2 dicembre, che nuovamente trattava la questione delle comunicazioni, si proponeva che allo Stato jugoslavo venisse annesso il paesino Drveša presso Bleiburg (Pliberk), Dragovgrad (Unterdrauburg), Maribor e Lenart, mentre alla parte austriaca Klagenfurt, Völkermarkt (Velikovec), Straß in Steiermark, Radgona (Oberradkersburg) e Ljutomer (Luttenberg in der Steiermark). Il fatto che quest'ultima cittadina dovesse appartenere all'Austria veniva giustificato dal fatto che da quei luoghi si esportavano nelle regioni austriache e tedesche parecchie quantità di vino<sup>31</sup>. Tali proposte sarebbero state per la parte slovena molto sfavorevoli: una buona parte della Carinzia abitata da sloveni sarebbe rimasta nell'altro stato, come pure una parte della Stiria, tra Radgona in Ljutomer, che non faceva neanche parte delle pretese dell'Austria. Interessante rimane comunque il fatto che nel memorandum veniva proposta una spartizione che potremmo definire «di mezzo», poiché la quasi totalità delle proposte successive prevedeva appunto il confine sulla Drava oppure lungo la catena montuosa delle Karavanke (Karawanken, Caravanche).

Risulta chiaro che tra gli esperti del *War Office* si preferiva tener conto degli aspetti economici in favore dello Stato austriaco, il quale nei primi mesi postbellici era in evidente difficoltà. I rappresentanti delle potenze a Parigi ricevettero per esempio rapporti allarmanti, che riferivano carenze di vario genere nel Paese, che la tubercolosi si stava diffondendo, che il tasso di disoccupazione era molto alto, che solamente a Vienna circa 125.000 persone erano senza lavoro: l'Austria era davanti al completo collasso (MacMillan, 2003, 248–248). Si sarebbe dunque

29 Per es. TNA CAB 23/8/27, War Cabinet, 506, *Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet* (Secret), 22. 11. 1918, 3–4; TNA FO 371/3809/61090, War Office to Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office (Secret), 19. 4. 1919; Foreign Office, 24. 4. 1919; TNA FO 608/36/2/19113, to Curzon, Astoria (N. 1375), 25. 9. 1919; Corcoran, War Office, to Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Office (03/4135, (M.O.1)), 30. 9. 1919; TNA FO 371/4891 C 370/308/22, Hugh Watson, Rear Admiral, British Representative on the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control for the Republic of Austria to The Secretary of the Admiralty (Secret): *Report of situation in the Adriatic Sea*, 2. 6. 1920.

30 TNA WO 106/845, *Memorandum on Transportation Aspects of Austro-Italian-Jugo-Slav Frontier*, 29. 11. 1918.

31 TNA WO 106/845, *Memorandum on Transportation Aspects of Jugo Slav-Austrian Frontier*, 2. 12. 1918; per certi aspetti cfr. TNA FO 371/4356/P.C. 149, General Staff, War Office (L 7, Secret and Confidential): *Notes on a Suggested Frontier of Jugo-Slavia*, 10. 12. 1918, 2.

dovuto darle maggiori possibilità di sviluppo e stabilità interna per impedire un suo avvicinamento alla Germania; in effetti stavano diventando sempre più numerosi gli austriaci che si volevano congiungere con i vicini tedeschi. In particolare, la Francia era nettamente contraria, così che il Trattato di pace con la Germania proibiva nettamente l'*Anschluss* (Doer, 1998, 41, 61; MacMillan, 2003, 251–252; cfr. Sharp, 2008, 131, 161; Rahten, 2020, 163). Che si trattasse di una delle questioni principali nell'Europa dopo il primo conflitto mondiale e che già allora gli Alleati avessero cercato di impedire la fusione austro-tedesca risulta ben rappresentato nella documentazione di Londra, dalla quale si evince tra l'altro che si cercava di limitare gli interscambi tra i due paesi<sup>32</sup>. Sebbene all'interno del *Foreign Office*, come pure nell'opinione pubblica britannica, ci furono già durante gli anni bellici alcuni favorevoli all'unione, alla fine prevalse la linea di Parigi (Low, 1974, 231–285).

Un'altra questione molto spinosa strettamente collegata, e che imponeva agli Alleati di dover urgentemente tener conto di non danneggiare gli austriaci, era la minaccia, nel caso di crisi economica, di una rivoluzione bolscevica, la quale rischiava di travolgere diversi stati europei. I britannici stimavano che in Austria la situazione economica fosse precaria al punto da metterla nelle condizioni di aver bisogno di aiuti. La soluzione migliore sarebbe stata fornire una quantità adeguata di materie prime e organizzare una continuità commerciale tra le regioni che nel passato facevano parte dell'Impero Asburgico; inoltre, le potenze vincitrici del conflitto avrebbero dovuto impegnarsi direttamente<sup>33</sup>. Il pericolo rivoluzionario non sarebbe comunque stato presente in Carinzia, dove non c'era-

32 TNA FO 608/220/6, 553, Rumbold, Berne (No. 14 B), 4. 1. 1919; TNA FO 608/9/1, 552, Rumbold, Switzerland (No. 16), 4. 1. 1919; 2882, *Attitude of Allies Towards Proposals for Union between German Austria and Germany*, 25. 2. 1919; 4188, *The Union of German Austria with Germany, The Memorandum of E. L. Dresely*, 3. 3. 1919; TNA FO 608/220/3, 5552, *Trade with German-Austria, Resolution forwarded by Supreme Economic Council to Supreme War Council*, 27. 3. 1919; TNA FO 608/220/16, 9237, *Extract from a Report from Mr. Banistor, British Relief Mission in Vienna, Forwarded with Sir William's Goode Compliments*, 23. 4. 1919; TNA HW 12/2, 000473 (12. 12. 1919) American Mission, Paris, to Lansing, Washington (No. 5342), 21. 11. 1919.

33 TNA FO 608/6/2, 3291, Cunningham, Vienna, to D.M.I. [The Director of Military Intelligence] (No. 117), 22. 2. 1919; Mallet to Balfour (No. 201), 8. 3. 1919; 3877, Cunningham, Vienna, to D.M.I. (No. 127), 28. 2. 1919; TNA FO 608/220/2, 4378, Foreign Office to Derby (No. 452), 13. 3. 1919; Cunningham, Vienna, to D.M.I. (522 X; B. 4942), 4. 3. 1919; Foreign Office to Gosling, Prague (No. 10), 10. 3. 1919; TNA FO 608/220/12, 4922, *Coal Supply in German Austria*, 21. 3. 1919; TNA FO 608/9/5, 6832, Graham to Curzon 7. 4. 1919; 7171, *A Message from Prof. Lammasch to Doctor Herron*, 8. 4. 1919; TNA FO 608/220/16, 437, Inter-Allied Commission on Relief of German Austria: *Interim Report by British Delegate*, 17. 1. 1919; 7302, Wenckebach to Osler, 2. 3. 1919; 10757, *Report by Mr. C. K. Butler on Food Conditions in Wiener Neustadt in German Austria*, 25. 4. 1919; 10831, *Report from Mr. C. K. Butler, Chief of British Mission Trieste, on Food Conditions in Styria*, 26. 4. 1919; TNA HW 12/4, 000983 (27. 1. 1920), Davis, London, to American Embassy, Rome (No. 10), 24. 1. 1920; 001075 (2. 2. 1920), American Embassy, Rome, to Lansing, Washington (No. 28), 18. 1. 1920; 001076 (2. 2. 1920), Wallace, Paris, to Lansing, Washington (No. 181), 19. 1. 1920. Vedi pure DBFP, 1/I, 118–120, 431, 476–479, doc. 13, 37 e 40: *Meeting of Supreme Council*, 17. e 19. 7. e 22. 8. 1919; Hoffmann, 1974, 256.

no grandi mancanze di viveri: ne era convinto Cyril K. Butler<sup>34</sup>, l'ufficiale di Sua Maestà alla guida della Missione alleata per il cibo (*Allied Food Commission*) con sede a Trieste e tra l'altro adetta al trasporto dei rifornimenti per l'Austria e l'Ungheria (Bajc, 2011, 345).

Nelle diverse riflessioni su come prevenire la diffusione del bolscevismo in Austria e contemporaneamente evitare il pericolo dell'unificazione con la Germania possiamo notare parecchio scetticismo tra i britannici riguardo al ruolo che poteva svolgere l'Italia. Alla fine di marzo del 1919 la Sezione d'*intelligence* militare MI3, responsabile tra l'altro per la Germania e l'Austria, propose per esempio di mandare unità militari a Vienna e in alcune altre città. Se fosse stato necessario si sarebbe richiesto anche l'utilizzo di contingenti francesi e statunitensi, in nessun caso però di quelli italiani<sup>35</sup>, sebbene – oppure proprio per questo – la diplomazia italiana si stesse in quel periodo impegnando a dimostrare agli Alleati che un'occupazione interalleata era necessaria<sup>36</sup>.

Possiamo supporre che le autorità britanniche non si fidavano perché in possesso di informazioni su come dagli inizi del 1919 rappresentanti italiani fornissero armi alle cosiddette forze rivoluzionarie ungheresi. Tra questi c'era il principe Luca Livio Borghese, che contemporaneamente si rese protagonista di screzi con Belgrado<sup>37</sup>. Sebbene la Missione interalleata avesse lasciato Budapest il 23 marzo 1919, Borghese, che ne faceva parte, rimase nella capitale ungherese fino a giugno, quando partì per Vienna<sup>38</sup>. In Ungheria rimasero altri rappresentanti italiani, tra i quali il più attivo pareva essere il capo della Missione italiana, il colonello Romanelli, che in seguito intraprese buoni rapporti con l'ammiraglio Miklós Horthy (futuro Reggente d'Ungheria dal 1920 al 1944), dunque con la parte controrivoluzionaria, la quale a sua volta avrebbe acquistato armi italiane. Esempio di giochi torbidi dietro le quinte per i quali i britannici ricevettero informazioni da diverse fonti. Dalla documentazione risulta che anche i francesi ne erano a conoscenza. Le fonti ci offrono anche altri dati interessanti, come per esempio che queste spedizioni segrete partivano da Trieste per giungere fino a Klagenfurt e da lì proseguire verso l'Ungheria, oppure informazioni riguardo ai maneggi segreti degli ambienti italiani nel fomentare il secessionismo nel neonato

34 TNA FO 608/33/10, 10622, C. K. Butler: *Report on Food Conditions in Carinthia (May 1919)*, 9. 5. 1919; *Notes on Recent Operations around Klagenfurt*, 6. 5. 1919.

35 TNA FO 608/9/2, 6318, MI3: *Points which should prevent threatened amalgamation of German-Austria with Germany*, 28. 3. 1919.

36 Per es. DDI, 6/III, 151–153, doc. 143: Imperiali a Balfour, 7. 4. 1919.

37 TNA FO 608/40/3, 5219 (lo stesso in 6334), des Graz, Belgrade, to Curzon (Confidential, No. 48), 16. 3. 1919, e trascrizione dello scambio di lettere tra Borghese e il capo della sezione politica del Ministero degli affari esteri jugoslavo M. Mihailović, 12. e 13. 3. 1919; 5399, des Graz, Belgrade, to Curzon (No. 43), 27. 3. 1919. Vedi pure Lederer, 1966, 191–192; Rahten, 2020, 237–238.

38 Nei *I documenti diplomatici italiani* una nota esplicativa redazionale spiega (DDI, 6/III, 29, nota 2) di come Borghese stabilìsси a Budapest, inizialmente in veste privata, aveva avviato trattative ufficiose con il Governo bolscevico. Dopo che a fine marzo 1919 la Missione interalleata venne allontanata, Borghese assunse qui la funzione di commissario italiano.

Stato jugoslavo<sup>39</sup>: quest'ultimo tema risulta molto presente nei lavori storiografici (per es. Lederer, 1966, 87–90; Kacin Wohinz, 1972, 98–99; Kacin Wohinz, 1999; Kacin Wohinz & Pirjevec, 173–176; Pleterski, 1998, 449–453; Bucarelli, 2002; Caccamo, 2004; Mljač, 2011, 306–307; Monzali, 2015, 158, 186–187). Secondo fonti italiane Borghese era in realtà impegnato nella fornitura di viveri all'Ungheria e questi «affari» avevano irritato «*possibili concorrenti*», che sarebbero perciò ricorsi a diffondere voci mezzo stampa che l'Italia intendeva aiutare il Governo bolscevico. Agli inizi di giugno il capo della Farnesina Sidney Sonnino aveva consigliato di proseguire trattative commerciali e preparare spedizioni di viveri, aspettando però l'instaurazione di un «*Governo ungherese responsabile*», dato che gli Alleati avevano deciso di non mandare rifornimenti finché alla guida del Paese ci fossero stati i bolscevichi<sup>40</sup>. In altre parole, Roma intendeva guadagnare la fiducia di Budapest, anticipando gli altri Alleati.

Dal punto di vista di alcuni britannici al Ministero degli esteri si trattava di una escalation sempre più pericolosa, tale da indurre alla fine del giugno 1919 uno dei principali esponenti del *Foreign Office*, Eyre Crowe, a suggerire al ministro degli esteri Arthur James Balfour di inviare una nota di avvertimento al suo omologo italiano Sonnino. Contrariamente alle aspettative il capo della diplomazia britannica era del parere che al momento un tale intervento non fosse necessario. Crowe, molto dispiacuto, espresse così il proprio disappunto: «*Allora dobbiamo continuare a giocherellarci con le ustioni di Roma!*»<sup>41</sup>

Le voci che l'Italia stesse fornendo armi al governo bolscevico di Budapest ripresero in luglio e raggiunsero Parigi dove però il Presidente del consiglio italiano Vittorio Emanuele Orlando negava tutto. Dalle fonti che abbiamo analizzato risulta che né i francesi né i britannici erano riusciti a trovare prove assolutamente certe che si trattasse di aiuti ai bolscevichi; comunque, le spiegazioni del premier italiano non erano del tutto convincenti<sup>42</sup>. Borghese, per la parte italiana, intanto sosteneva che si trattava di notizie false e che la responsabilità nel diffonderle era probabilmente francese<sup>43</sup>. Nemmeno la sua spiegazione, come quella di Orlando, convinse del tutto Temperley del *Foreign Office*<sup>44</sup>. Poi, sempre in

39 TNA FO 608/40/12, 12005, Temperley: *Italian Policy in Southeast Europe since the Armistice*, 7. 6. 1919, [3]; TNA FO 608/16/1, 9611, des Graz, Belgrade to Balfour (Urgent), 7. 5. 1919; Admiral E. C. T. Troubridge, Interallied Danube Commission (No. 19), 4. 11. 1919; 13327, [Admiral Troubridge], Commandement de la Navigation du Danube, 13. 6. 1919; 13933, M.I. 1.C (Secret, CX 072475): *Italian Hungarian Intrigue*, 18. 6. 1919; [The Director of Military Intelligence] (B/8342. M.I.3), 21. 6. 1919.

40 DDI, 6/III, 710–711, doc. 707: Sonnino al Ministero degli Esteri (T. 1921/653), 5. 6. 1919, cfr. 595, doc. 578: Sonnino a Tacoli (T. 566), 23. 5. 1919.

41 »*Then we are to continue to fiddle with Rome burns!*« (TNA FO 608/16/1, 13327, [citazione] Crowe, 26. 6. 1919, vedi anche commenti di Crowe, 24. 6. 1919, e di AC, 26. 6. 1919).

42 TNA FO 608/16/1, 14369 e 15934, Rodd, Rome, to Curzon (No. 270 e 307), 20. 6. e 12. 7. 1919.

43 TNA FO 608/16/1, 16154, *Note of a conversation between Lt. Col. Sir Th. Cuninghame and Prince Borghese, Italian Minister in Vienna*, [prima metà di luglio 1919]. Il doc., con l'ommissione di un nome, venne pubblicato in: DBFP, 1/VI, 94–95, doc. 62.

44 TNA FO 608/16/1, 16154, commento di Temperley, 26. 7. 1919.

luglio, i britannici ricevettero ulteriori informazioni abbastanza circostanziate da parte dei vertici militari jugoslavi: da informazioni ricevute sia dalla diplomazia norvegese, che da un agente (un ex ufficiale dell'esercito austro-ungarico) e da uno dei comandanti jugoslavi lungo la linea di demarcazione risultava che gli «affari sporchi» degli italiani e la loro «merce proibita» veniva trasportata da Trieste fino a Tarvisio, da lì a Klagenfurt, poi verso l'Ungheria; tra i protagonisti veniva nuovamente menzionato Borghese, mentre l'agente principale sarebbe stato un mercante ungherese, Gabriel Agaton di Fiume, in stretto contatto con un altro agente, un certo Tumar, che aveva la propria residenza presso il Savoia, l'albergo centrale triestino<sup>45</sup>. L'intricato tema meriterebbe ulteriori verifiche, ma risulta già evidente il fatto che c'era tanta reciproca sfiducia e, almeno per quanto riguardava Londra, l'obiettivo principale rimaneva l'unità tra i «grandi quattro», necessaria per continuare i lavori alla Conferenza di pace.

#### DA MAGGIO 1919 FINO ALL'INTERVENTO MILITARE ITALIANO IN GIUGNO 1919

Dunque, negli archivi britannici si trovano parecchie notizie su ciò che prima della fine di aprile 1919 – in un senso più ampio – stava accadendo intorno alla Carinzia, meno invece riguardo alle condizioni all'interno della regione. La maggiore disponibilità di documenti fa intendere che le cose cambiarono per i britannici con l'acuirsi degli scontri militari nella primavera dello stesso anno.

Il colonnello A. Cunningham, all'epoca a Vienna, fece alla fine di aprile 1919 alcuni brevi rapporti sulla situazione al ministro degli esteri britannico Balfour: questi suscitarono parecchio interesse; dalle note interne del *Foreign Office* si evince infatti che vennero fatti recapitare, tutti tranne uno, al *Director of Military Intelligence*, dunque al capo dell'*intelligence* militare. L'ufficiale britannico riferiva di come l'esercito jugoslavo alla fine del mese conquistò Rosenbach (Podrožca) e stava avanzando in prossimità di Völkermarkt in direzione di Klagenfurt e infine riuscì a penetrare fino a sud-est di Villach. Il colonnello riportava che, essendo le unità jugoslave in maggioranza numerica – senza però specificarne l'entità – e avendo a disposizione alcuni pezzi di artiglieria, la parte austriaca temeva per le sorti della città. Secondo Cunningham, l'esercito austriaco aveva invece a disposizione solamente 5.000 soldati ed era sprovvisto di artiglieria. A causa di queste mancanze, il Ministero della Guerra austriaco prese in considerazione l'invio di rinforzi da Vienna, mentre il governo austriaco aveva autorizzato il governo provinciale della Carinzia a

45 TNA FO 608/16/1, 16589, Spears, Mission Militaire Britannique près le gouvernement Français, to Radcliffe, Copy to D.M.I. (Secret, L.S.O. 2400), 28. 7. 1919; General Pechitch, Chief of the Serbian, Croatian and Slovene Military Mission, Paris, to Brigadier-General Spears, Chief of the British Military Mission, Paris, 26. 7. 1919.

raccogliere rinforzi<sup>46</sup>. Se Cuninghame aveva ricevuto queste informazioni – o almeno la maggioranza di esse – dalle autorità austriache, nello stesso periodo il generale Charles Delme Radcliffe, essendo stato Capo della Missione Militare Britannica presso l'Esercito Italiano, ne aveva ricevute dal Comando Supremo italiano. Scrisse che l'attacco jugoslavo aveva avuto luogo lungo l'intera zona di confine ad eccezione di Korensko sedlo (Wurzenpass) e che il suo successo aveva portato la parte austriaca a ritirarsi a Ferlach (Borovlje), sul fiume Krka (Krainer Gurk) e nelle vicinanze di Völkermarkt. L'esercito jugoslavo sarebbe inoltre avanzato in direzione di Arnoldstein (Podklošter, Oristagno), Villach e Rosegg (Rožek). Il generale aveva anche riferito le stime delle forze in campo: gli jugoslavi avrebbero contato su circa 17.000 uomini, mentre gli austriaci solamente su 4.000, motivo per cui il comandante delle unità carinziane aveva presentato richiesta alla parte italiana di occupare Jesenice e le vicinanze di Villach, trovando però nel Comando Supremo poco interesse. Nel rapporto di Delme Radcliffe non si parla di un utilizzo della artiglieria da parte degli jugoslavi, mentre si fa riferimento al fatto che gli austriaci oltre a un numero non specificato di uomini persero 10 cannoni<sup>47</sup>.

Il contrattacco in Carinzia non si fece attendere. Il 2 maggio 1919 soldati austriaci riuscirono a riconquistare la testa di ponte presso Völkermarkt e penetrarono fino sulla riva sinistra della Drava, mentre l'esercito jugoslavo perse il controllo di Rosenbach (Haas, 1981b, 38). Il 6 maggio penetrarono anche attraverso la riva destra della Drava e si fermarono sulla linea Jezersko (Gemeinde Seeland) – Libeliče (Leifling). A seguito di questa avanzata, il capo della Missione italiana a Vienna, il generale Roberto Segre, intervenne presso il ministro della Guerra austriaco il quale rispose che le unità carinziane non davano seguito agli ordini di Vienna e promise di intervenire personalmente<sup>48</sup>. Non vi è certezza rispetto alla sincerità della capitale austriaca nel fornire questa versione al colonello Cuninghame.

Ai fini del nostro saggio risulta interessante soffermarci sui primi dati che i rappresentanti britannici ricevettero dalla parte austriaca e in particolare da quella italiana. Nelle informazioni ricevute da Delme Radcliffe possiamo notare alcune differenze nel rapportare gli stessi eventi. La versione italiana fornita ai britannici riportava infatti che l'attacco jugoslavo sarebbe stato più esteso, inoltre i numeri relativi alla numerosità degli oppositori non corrispondeva. Le ragioni di queste differenze potrebbero essere due: o il governo austriaco e i vertici militari in Italia non erano ben informati riguardo la situazione, oppure dalla parte italiana si voleva far credere che la parte austriaca fosse in una posizione alquanto

46 TNA FO 608/265/3, 8883, 8885, 8898 e 9065, Cuninghame, Vienna, to Balfour (No. 258, 259 e 260), 30. 4. 1919 [4 dispacci].

47 TNA FO 608/265/3, 8900, Delme Radcliffe, Italy, to Balfour (Priority, No. 11157), 30. 4. 1919.

48 TNA FO 608/265/3, 9066, 9067 e 9526, Cuninghame, Vienna, to Balfour (No. 262, 574 X e 0957), 2., 3. e 7. 5. 1919.

subordinata. Errori o esagerazione riguardo al numero dei soldati coinvolti che potrebbero essere stati ipoteticamente funzionali da far sembrare un intervento italiano più credibile?

Rimane il fatto che non era facile ottenere informazioni attendibili. In un rapporto del generale Petitti di Roreto, leggiamo per esempio che due commercianti italiani ex ufficiali, trovandosi al momento degli scontri nelle vicinanze, riferirono di come i carinziani esageravano parlando di 17.000 soldati jugoslavi, ma nel contempo confermavano che questi nella ritirata riuscirono a portare via una decina di cannoni. Interessante risulta il dato che un certo numero dei difensori austriaci, non avendo sufficienti attrezzi, portavano copricapi e elmetti italiani traendo così inizialmente in inganno gli jugoslavi che si ritirarono immediatamente. Il giorno seguente, accertandosi che non si trattava di soldati italiani, ritentarono l'avanzata, ma ormai gli avversari si erano ben organizzati. Nel rapporto si dava anche notizia che la popolazione di Villach richiese aiuti al Governo italiano<sup>49</sup>. Comunque, nei giorni seguenti anche un altro rapporto britannico parla di numeri esagerati in riferimento ai soldati jugoslavi<sup>50</sup>: evidentemente gli uomini di Londra si resero conto che i conti non tornavano.

L'azione militare jugoslava poteva interferire nelle comunicazioni ferroviarie tra l'Italia e l'Austria. Perciò, e per salvaguardare le comunicazioni con Trieste, i vertici italiani subito protestarono davanti agli Alleati. Secondo il generale Segre gli austriaci avevano intanto richiesto che truppe alleate occupassero i centri ferroviari e le città di Villach, Klagenfurt e Sankt Veit an der Glan (Šentvid ob Glini – dunque quasi la metà della Carinzia meridionale); a Segre era ben chiara la preferenza austriaca che fossero soldati italiani. Il 3 maggio Sonnino prese in considerazione, in conformità con le clausole d'Armistizio, di occupare militarmente fino a Sankt Veit an der Glan, ma il giorno seguente il Capo di Stato maggiore, il generale Armando Diaz, ricevute informazioni che gli austriaci erano riusciti a rioccupare tutte le posizioni, ritenne che un intervento militare italiano non fosse più necessario. Nel contempo, per evitare futuri attacchi jugoslavi, propose di tener in allerta forze sufficienti<sup>51</sup>. L'intervento dell'esercito italiano militare avrebbe rappresentato al contempo un vantaggioso *fait accompli* per Vienna e come vedremo in seguito era stato rinviato per circa sei settimane.

Il ruolo di Roma riguardo la crisi carinziana non si era però limitato alla possibilità di intervenire militarmente, ma contemporaneamente ci fu una decisa azione

49 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 72, *Diario Storico-Militare*, 3 novembre 1918–4 agosto 1919, Maggio, 1919, allegato N. 2: Petitti al Comando Supremo, Ufficio Ordinamenti e Mobilitazione, Sezione Armistizio e Confini, 2. 5. 1919.

50 TNA FO 608/43/3, 9352, *Jugo-Slav Advance in Carinthia, Report by Military Section, C'*, 7. 5. 1919.

51 DDI, 6/III, 381, 383, 399–400, 402, 418–419, doc. 362, 364, 379, 381 e 398: Sonnino a De Martino (T. Gab. 1145/96), 1. 5. 1919, Diaz a Sonnino (T. 157/7649 OP), 1. 5. 1919, Bonin Longare a Pichon, 2. 5. 1919, Sonnino a Diaz (T. Gab. 100), 3. 5. 1919, Diaz a Aldrovandi Marescotti (T. Gab. 187/19276 GM), 4. 5. 1919. Cfr. Pirjevec, 1981, 85; Sienčnik, 1987, 319–320.

politico-diplomatica. Oltre al ruolo svolto presso la Conferenza a Parigi (che vedremo di seguito), il due di maggio Sonnino aveva consegnato agli ambasciatori di Francia e Gran Bretagna il punto di vista italiano sui futuri accordi e riguardo alla questione della Carinzia sosteneva: «Debbono altresì essere date precise garanzie che la ferrovia Trieste – Feistritz – Assling – Rosenbach – Klagenfurt sarà tutta, al di là del confine italiano, assicurata all'Austria Tedesca, restando interamente fuori dal territorio jugoslavo nella determinazione del confine tra Jugoslavia e Austria Tedesca.»<sup>52</sup> Dunque un netto appoggio delle richieste austriache che nei giorni seguenti l'ambasciatore a Londra Guglielmo Imperiali di Francavilla aveva ulteriormente specificato in un apposito memorandum consegnato al capo del *Foreign Office*. La motivazione generale era la seguente:

*Considerando l'importanza vitale per l'Italia di possedere comunicazioni ferroviarie indisturbate con il mercato ungherese e l'incertezza dei futuri rapporti tra gli jugoslavi e gli ungheresi, è indispensabile per l'Italia che almeno una delle tre ferrovie che collegano l'Ungheria con i porti italiani sull'Adriatico raggiunga il territorio ungherese senza dover attraversare il territorio jugoslavo.*

Sempre allo scopo di evitare potenziali interferenze nei collegamenti ferroviari, come pure dal punto di vista etnico e per non danneggiare i traffici austriaci, Imperiali suggeriva poi che fosse decisamente meglio se Maribor appartenesse all'Austria. In seguito, spiegava in dettaglio la questione principale: la *Pontebbana* non era in grado di assorbire la mole di traffico prevista e dunque sottolineò la netta contrarietà che passasse sotto la Jugoslavia il cosiddetto triangolo di Jesenice, ovvero quella parte di territorio che avrebbe tagliato l'altra comunicazione ferroviaria, la *Transalpina*. Secondo Imperiali la linea tra Trieste e Villach:

*dovrebbe andare dal territorio austriaco a quello italiano e non essere tagliata da una stretta striscia di territorio jugoslavo [...]. Anche ammesso che questa zona stretta di appena 20 km è popolata da una maggioranza slovena [...] l'interesse che appena 30.000 montanari possono avere per unirsi alla Jugoslavia non può essere paragonato agli enormi interessi di due grandi Stati come l'Italia e l'Austria, per i quali il collegamento diretto attraverso queste linee e specialmente attraverso la Transalpina, che collega l'Europa centrale con il Mediterraneo, è vitale.*

Ai margini del testo Leeper aggiunse dei commenti (non si era firmato, ma la sua calligrafia è facilmente riconoscibile) e alcuni non erano affatto favorevoli alle tesi

52 DDI, 6/III, 393–394, doc. 376: Sonnino a De Martino (T. Bag. 1150/99.25), 2. 5. 1919.

italiane<sup>53</sup>. Non aveva però commentato l'allusione, in fondo razzista, ai «*montanari*». Non era né la prima né l'ultima volta che nel contesto delle dispute territoriali ambienti italiani cercavano davanti agli Alleati di rappresentare gli «slavi» sottostimandoli o etichettandoli come in questo caso. Da aggiungere che una dizione simile, e sempre in merito a Jesenice, si ritrova nel promemoria, datato alcuni giorni dopo, preparato da uno dei consiglieri della diplomazia italiana ed esperto tecnico, il conte Luigi Vannutelli Rey<sup>54</sup> (di lui si parlerà anche in seguito); riteniamo probabile che abbia fornito lui i dati e le espressioni contenute nel memorandum presentato dall'Ambasciatore a Londra.

La situazione in Carinzia, intanto, non si era pacificata e stava aumentando il coinvolgimento italiano. I rappresentanti britannici a Belgrado informavano per esempio Londra delle preoccupazioni jugoslave circa la notevole attività degli austriaci, che sarebbero stati istigati dalla parte italiana. Si sosteneva che addirittura un treno di munizioni era partito da Trieste per il confine austriaco<sup>55</sup>. Seguirono tutta una serie di informazioni provenienti dalla Carinzia e dei tentativi dei rappresentanti italiani di condizionare gli eventi ritenuti dagli jugoslavi come intrighi. Tali valutazioni si trovano spesso anche nei commenti del *Foreign Office*, sebbene non fosse facile stabilire la veridicità delle accuse. In alcuni casi i britannici ci riuscirono, in particolare, erano molto seccati dai tentativi del generale Segre di trasmettere informazioni false, come per esempio quella, fornita a metà maggio 1919, che fosse lui il responsabile per la definizione del confine<sup>56</sup>.

Alla fine di maggio la situazione si stava ulteriormente complicando, avendo l'esercito jugoslavo nuovamente attaccato le posizioni austriache (Ude, 1970, 194–198). Allora la parte austriaca aveva riferito ai britannici che gli jugoslavi avrebbero avuto intenzione di saccheggiare Villach e il governo austriaco si aspettava che la Missione italiana potesse evitarlo<sup>57</sup>. Dopo un paio di giorni e alcuni successi delle truppe del Regno SHS, i paesi leader della Conferenza di pace, compresa l'Italia, chiesero la cessazione delle ostilità e il ritiro jugoslavo sulla linea di demarcazione fissata dalla Conferenza, mentre il controllo del bacino di Klagenfurt sarebbe passato nelle mani

53 «Considering the vital importance for Italy to possess undisturbed railway communications with Hungarian market and the uncertainty of future relations between Jugoslavs and Magyars, it is indispensable for Italy that at least one of the three railways connecting Hungary with Italian ports on the Adriatic should reach Hungarian territory without having to cross Jugoslav territory. [...] should run from Austrian into Italian territory and not be cut by a narrow strip of Jugoslav territory [...]. Even admitted that this narrow zone of barely 20 km. is populated by a Sloveng majority [...] the interest that scarcely 30.000 mountaineers may have to be united to Jugoslavia cannot be compared with the momentous interests of two great states like Italy and Austria, for which direct connection thorough these lines and specially through the Transalpine, connecting Central Europe with the Mediterranean, is vital.» (TNA FO 608/40/4, 9758, [Memorandum], *Communicated by Marquis Imperiali to M. Balfour* [ricevuto 12. 5. 1919], citazioni 1 e 3).

54 DDI, 6/III, 546–548, doc. 525: *Promemoria dell'esperto tecnico, Vannutelli Rey*, 17. 5. 1919. I «*montanari*» si trovano alla p. 546. Cfr. Di Michele, 2014, 22, che non commenta la terminologia.

55 TNA FO 608/16/1, 9611, des Graz, Belgrade to Balfour (Urgent), 7. 5. 1919.

56 TNA FO 608/40/12, 12005, Temperley: *Italian Policy in Southeast Europe since the Armistice*, 7. 6. 1919; e in dettaglio TNA FO 608/42/6, 10308; TNA FO 608/43/3, 11209 e 11399.

57 TNA FO 608/265/3, 11453, Cuninghame, Vienna to Balfour (No. 44), 30. 5. 1919.

degli Alleati per la durata di sei mesi<sup>58</sup>. La soluzione venne ovviamente salutata con favore dalla parte austriaca che aveva a sua volta assicurato il ritiro delle proprie unità immediatamente dopo l'arrivo delle truppe alleate<sup>59</sup>. Anche la parte jugoslava – molto probabilmente a malincuore – assicurò il cessate il fuoco<sup>60</sup>.

La tregua rimaneva labile e nei primi di giugno 1919 il Comando Supremo in Italia avvertì i britannici che truppe jugoslave stavano avanzando verso Villach (e che la conquistarono) e che intanto il governo sloveno aveva predisposto severe misure per mantenere l'ordine pubblico in caso di disordini da parte austriaca o italiana<sup>61</sup>. Il 6 del mese poi uno dei membri della Missione italiana per l'armistizio riferiva dell'accerchiamento di Klagenfurt da parte degli jugoslavi e della richiesta delle autorità carinziane all'esercito italiano di occupare tutto il bacino<sup>62</sup>. Dal Governatorato centrale per la Venezia Giulia giungevano nuove informazioni circa l'occupazione jugoslava di altre zone e previsioni pessimistiche degli austriaci. La azioni jugoslave avrebbero inoltre potuto ostacolare e compromettere gli interessi commerciali di Trieste e in generale del Regno<sup>63</sup>. Il 10 giugno sarebbe intervenuto da Vienna il generale Segre per cercare di sedare gli animi e ottenere un cessate il fuoco. Tentativi che la parte jugoslava aveva bollato come l'ennesimo bluff italiano ovvero intrighi austriaci<sup>64</sup>. Almeno agli occhi della parte italiana, dunque, la situazione in Carinzia era molto preoccupante.

Nei giorni che precedettero l'intervento militare italiano in Carinzia gli jugoslavi avevano informato i britannici di come i Servizi segreti italiani stavano aiutando gli austriaci, fornendo loro molte informazioni di *intelligence*. Si trattava di accuse molto circostanziate che al *Foreign Office* non rigettarono, e che anzi interpretarono come l'ennesima prova della stretta collaborazione italo-austriaca. L'*affaire* fece molto preoccupare Belgrado e il *dossier* arrivò in luglio 1919 addirittura sul tavolo di Clemenceau a Parigi, dove se ne discusse ai massimi livelli. Londra, infine, si convinse della veridicità delle accuse<sup>65</sup>.

58 TNA FO 608/43/3, 11734, *Draft Telegram to Allied Ministers at Belgrade* [senza data]; Balfour to des Graz, Belgrade (No. 7 R), 2. 6. 1919.

59 TNA FO 608/43/3, 11805, *Allied Request for Cessation of Hostilities in Carinthia*, 3. 6. 1919.

60 TNA FO 608/43/3, 11878, Fontenay, Belgrade (No. 254), 4. 6. 1919

61 TNA FO 608/265/3, 11812, Mulnis, G.H.Q. Italy, to Balfour (No. C 71), 4. 6. 1919.

62 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 72, *Diario Storico-Militare, 3 novembre 1918–4 agosto 1919*, 6. 6. 1919, allegato No. 15: De Giorgis, Ragio Esercito Italiano, Comando Supremo, Missione Italiana per l'Armistizio (Precedenza assoluta), 6. 6. 1919.

63 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 72, *Diario Storico-Militare, 3 novembre 1918–4 agosto 1919*, 6. 6. 1919, allegato No. 16: Dalla Favera, Regio Governatorato della Venezia Giulia, 7. 6. 1919.

64 TNA FO 608/265/3, 12259, Mulnis, G.H.Q. Italy, to Balfour (No. C 789), 10. 6. 1919.

65 TNA FO 608/16/1 13231, Ivan Žolger to Eyre Crow, 19. 6. 1919, e commenti di Nicolson, 21. 6. 1919, e Crowe, 21. 6. 1919; TNA FO 608/40/9, 14140, des Graz, Belgrade (No. 233), 20. 6. 1919, e commento Temperley, 3. 7. 1919; 16143, des Graz, Belgrade, to Curzon (No. 105), 21. 6. 1919, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres du Royame des Serbs, Croates et Slovenes, 19. 6. 1919, e traduzioni di alcun doc. delle forze armate SHS, 11. 6. 1919; DBFP, I/I, 81, doc. 10: *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers*, 12. 7. 1919; cfr. TNA FO 608/16/2, 15824; TNA FO 371/3810/102751, Balfour (Personal and Secret, No. 1152), Astoria, Paris, 12. 7. 1919, con l'aggiunta: solo per il re, il Primo ministro e Hankey; Foreign Office to des Graz, Belgrade (Secret, No. 200), 15. 7. 1919; des Graz, Belgrade (Military, No. 233), 20. 6. 1919.

La tensione aumentava e un intervento dei soldati italiani era ormai nell'aria. Il giorno prima dell'intervento vero e proprio, dunque il 12 giugno, Petitti di Roreto informò il Presidente del Consiglio e il rappresentante a Parigi Crespi, che a Trieste approvavano vivamente la decisione dell'imminente intervento delle truppe italiane. Ma l'azione in Carinzia non sarebbe stata sufficiente; il capo del Governo nella Venezia Giulia difatti aggiunse:

[...] sarebbe desiderio generale corrispondente e reale grandissimo interesse di tutta Venezia Giulia che provvedimento analogo fosse preso allo scopo di assicurarci libero transito su intera linea Piedicolle – Assling – Rosenbach che rappresenta più diretta comunicazione con Boemia. [...] ci vorrà molto tempo prima che si possa ottenere libero transito attraverso la linea Longatico – Lubiana – Spielfeld – Gratz – Vienna, sarebbe della massima importanza et urgenza assicurarsi intero controllo linea Piedicolle – Assling – Rosenbach occupandola militarmente<sup>66</sup>.

Petitti, dunque, si immaginava o solamente sperava in un'azione militare in grande stile. L'azione infine ci fu, il 13 giugno, ma «limitata» alla parte della Carinzia che va da ovest fino Sankt Veit an der Glan, dunque, circa la metà della regione. Dalla parte di Pontebba il confine venne varcato da 30.000 soldati che occuparono Villach, Feldkirchen e appunto Sankt Veit an der Glan (Di Michele, 2014, 24; in dettaglio Caccamo, 2009).

Si trattava della 57<sup>a</sup> divisione, che la popolazione locale – secondo i vertici militari italiani – avrebbe accolto con favore, mentre gli jugoslavi potevano solamente osservare. A Roma fecero anche intendere ai britannici che se fosse stato necessario ci sarebbe stato un ulteriore avanzamento. Era evidentemente un avvertimento contro eventuali azioni jugoslave. Intanto al *Foreign Office* i commenti e le analisi sull'azione militare erano negativi: c'era molta preoccupazione perché si rischiava di esacerbare il conflitto; questa occupazione poteva influire sull'esito del plebiscito; c'era il rischio di ritorsioni contro la popolazione filo-jugoslava se ci fosse stato un ritiro completo dell'esercito jugoslavo; ci sarebbe voluto dunque l'ausilio di unità di polizia, ma c'era il problema che solamente la parte italiana avrebbe avuto la possibilità di mandare tali unità, le quali sarebbero potute essere non imparziali. La soluzione migliore sarebbe stata che unità austriache e jugoslave rimanessero, ovviamente in numero ridotto, ciascuna su una parte predeterminata del territorio. Inoltre, il Ministero degli esteri britannico si stava chiedendo se fossero stati i «quattro grandi» a dare l'autorizzazione a intervenire: tra l'altro era una tesi che la stampa stava diffondendo. Scattarono indagini e alla fine il ministro degli esteri Balfour concluse che l'avallo non c'era

66 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 72, Diario Storico-Militare, 3 novembre 1918–4 agosto 1919, 18. 6. 1919, allegato N. 27: Petitti al Comando Supremo [et al.] (Telegramma urgente), 12. 6. 1919.

stato<sup>67</sup>. Inoltre, a Roma si sosteneva che l'intervento fosse in fondo una risposta alle attività jugoslave e nel suo commento Leeper riprese, e anzi sottolineò, la questione principale della mancanza di autorizzazione<sup>68</sup>. Lo stesso valeva per l'avanzamento delle truppe italiane verso la regione Vorarlberg sul confine tra l'Austria e la Svizzera per contribuire a rinforzare il blocco contro la Germania. Nuovamente sembrava che l'Italia cercasse di mostrarsi allineata con altri Alleati, cosa che preoccupava sempre di più il *Foreign Office*. Leeper, senza mezzi termini e con quel pizzico di ironia scrisse che «*l'Italia sta assumendo, senza autorizzazione, un numero sempre maggiore di mandati immaginari da parte della Conferenza, per occupare importanti posizioni militari per sé stessa.*»<sup>69</sup>

Il generale britannico Harold Walker sosteneva in qualche misura la versione italiana, ed in particolare la tesi che l'intervento aveva ricevuto da Parigi il mandato per l'azione<sup>70</sup>. Era lui che trasmetteva le informazioni ricevute dai vertici militari italiani, senza in fondo prenderne le distanze. Non abbiamo dati sufficienti a disposizione per dire se Walker fosse veramente ingenuo oppure faceva consapevolmente il gioco di Roma. Dalle fonti britanniche si evince che i vertici di Londra incominciarono in quel giugno 1919 a essere sempre meno disposti verso i suoi messaggi o rapporti, ai quali puntualmente seguirono commenti con smentite; Temperley, addirittura a margine di una delle relazioni annotò che si trattava di una vera e propria menzogna degli italiani. Il 24 giugno i capi dello Stato Maggiore dell'esercito britannico lo avevano infine avvertito che avrebbe dovuto in seguito attenersi solamente alle loro istruzioni o a quelle del ministro degli Esteri Balfour. La sua sostituzione era ormai nell'aria<sup>71</sup>. Ciò non accadde, perché a metà agosto Walker lasciò Klagenfurt, ma per motivi di salute (infiammazione della pleura)<sup>72</sup> – almeno questa sembra sia stata la versione ufficiale.

A prescindere dalle simpatie di Walker verso l'Italia, si arrivò il 28 luglio ad un accordo sul ritiro militare degli jugoslavi dalla Zona B, con i carabinieri che

67 TNA FO 608/16/2, 12715, Delme Radcliffe, G.H.Q., Italy, to D.M.O., Astoria (No. 11169), 14. 6. 1919; Leeper to Crowe, 16. 6. 1919, e commento di Leeper, 16. 6. 1919; Balfour to Rodd (No. 38 R), 22. 6. 1919; Rodd to Balfour (No. 58), 23. 6. 1919; TNA FO 608/265/3, 12620, commenti di Temperley, 16. 6. 1919, e Leeper, 19. 6. 1919; TNA FO 608/6/1, 13452, *The Military Consequences of the Evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin, memo. by Temperley*, 19. 6. 1919.

68 TNA FO 608/16/2, 12862, Rodd, Rome (No. 414 (R)), 15. 6. 1919, e commento Leeper, 19. 6. 1919.

69 «*Italy is assuming, without authorisation, an increase number of imaginary mandates from the Conference to occupy positions of military importance for her.*» (TNA FO 608/16/2, 13251, commento di Leeper, 22. 6. 1919; cfr. Acton, Berne, to Balfour (No. 181), 20. 6. 1919, e vari commenti nel Foreign Office, 23. e 28. 6. 1919).

70 TNA FO 608/16/2, 13458, Walker to The Director of Military Operation, Paris (Secret, No. K. 30.), 18. 6. 1919, e commento di Temperley, 24. 6. 1919; 13945, Military Section, Italian Peace Delegation to Operations Section (N. 8565), 12. 6. [1919]; Walker, Commission interalliée de Carinthie à Le General Commandant la Quatrième Armée (No. 25. J.), 15. 6. 1919; Badoglio pour Segré (Precedence Assolute, N. 25071), 12. 6. 1919.

71 In dettaglio TNA FO 608/265/3, 13053; TNA FO 608/16/2, 12862 e 13458; TNA FO 608/16/23, 13836; TNA FO 608/265/3, 13164 e 13471; TNA FO 608/43/3, 14303.

72 TNA WO 106/353, Delme Radcliff to D.M.I.: *Establishment of British Mission at Klagenfurt*, 14. 8. 1919.

prendevano il controllo del materiale bellico. Le autorità militari italiane avevano comunque precedentemente insistito che fosse il Consiglio supremo alleato a farne richiesta e che la guarnigione venisse numericamente rafforzata<sup>73</sup>. Dalle fonti britanniche si evince poi che il ritiro jugoslavo non si svolse senza difficoltà (Bajc, 2011, 372). Comunque, almeno per quanto riguarda Londra, evidentemente si trattava di un compromesso, essendo stati i britannici scettici nei confronti delle truppe del cosiddetto esercito popolare (*Volkswehr*) austriaco<sup>74</sup>.

Seguirono nuove e numerose accuse e controaccuse tra gli jugoslavi da una parte e gli austriaci e italiani dall'altra. Anche in questo caso risultava difficile capire la veridicità delle informazioni. Tra le accuse jugoslave c'era per esempio quella del luglio 1919 che l'Italia e l'Austria avrebbero concluso una convenzione segreta – notizia ovviamente smentita a Roma<sup>75</sup>. I rappresentanti austriaci si erano invece spesso lamentati delle violenze provocate dall'esercito jugoslavo nel territorio occupato<sup>76</sup>. Nelle accuse contro presunte violenze dell'esercito jugoslavo la parte austriaca aveva evidentemente trovato nel rappresentante italiano a Vienna Borghese un alleato. Di lui Leeper però non si fidava essendo invece convinto che erano più attendibili le informazioni ricevute dai rappresentanti dell'Intesa a Klagenfurt<sup>77</sup>.

Sebbene nell'autunno 1919 a Parigi (come vedremo in seguito) era ormai deciso il destino della Carinzia, in settembre le autorità italiane avrebbero ricevuto nuove informazioni che la situazione rimaneva sempre tesa e difficile da gestire. Per esempio, c'era il problema nelle forniture di rifornimenti per la zona della Radgona, ma la parte jugoslava stava creando problemi. Nei commenti interni del *Foreign Office* non traspare molta preoccupazione, si era perlopiù convinti che tra le forze militari jugoslave sul campo non erano ancora informati delle decisioni parigine<sup>78</sup>.

Dopo il settembre 1919, le truppe italiane intendevano ritirarsi dalla Carinzia. A ciò si opposero sia il governo di Vienna che quello regionale della Carinzia, che richiesero agli italiani di rimanere in zona. La richiesta venne accolta. In dicembre dello stesso anno il ministro degli esteri Vittorio Scialoja era propenso a un ulteriore invio di truppe in Carinzia, ma alla fine del mese il Consiglio dei Quattro si oppose. Pertanto, nessuna unità militare italiana aggiuntiva venne mandata in Carinzia (Pirjevec, 1981, 88–89; Sienčnik, 1987, 327–328).

73 DBFP, 1/I, 288, Appendix E to doc. 25: *Telegram from the Military Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers at Klagenfurt*, 29. 7. 1919. Vedi anche Bajc, 2011, 371–372.

74 TNA FO 608/43/3, 16791, Delme Radcliffe, Klagenfurt, to Balfour (K 107), 28. 7. 1919.

75 TNA FO 536/2, Rodd, Rome (No. 485), 13. 7. 1919.

76 TNA FO 536/2, Radio-Telegram, 24. 6. 1919; *Note regarding occupation of Carinthia by the Yugoslavs, Communicated by Austrian Delegation*, 16. 7. 1919 (lo stesso in TNA ADM 116/3232/23); Renner, Delegation of the Austro-German Republic, to Clemenceau (No. 776 e 948), 21. 7. e 3. 8. 1919; Bauer, Vienna, 14. 7. 1919.

77 TNA FO 608/6/1, 18335, m. p. to Borghese, 31. 7. 1919; Tittoni to Clemenceau, 22. 8. 1919, e commento di Leeper, 27. 8. 1919.

78 TNA FO 608/40/4, 18900 e 19036, Tittoni, Délégation Italienne à la Conférence de la Paix – Clemenceau (No. 03832 e 03306) 8. e 13. 9. 1919, e commento di Nicolson, 23. 9. 1919.

## LA DIPLOMAZIA ITALIANA E LA QUESTIONE CARINZIANA ALLA CONFERENZA DI PACE A PARIGI

La questione del confine austro-jugoslavo venne affrontata per la prima volta dal Consiglio dei Dieci il 18 febbraio 1919, quando si decise che sarebbe stata istituita una apposita commissione<sup>79</sup>. Bogo Grafenauer, nella finora più completa ricostruzione del tema, scrive invece che la decisione fu presa il 22 del mese, aggiunge però che Sonnino aveva da subito richiesto che ne facessero parte rappresentanti italiani (Grafenauer, 1970, 328). Gli altri Alleati avevano accettato la sua richiesta, sebbene una partecipazione italiana avesse complicato i lavori.

Venne istituita la Commissione territoriale per lo studio delle questioni territoriali della Romania e della Jugoslavia (*Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions relating to Romania and Yugoslavia*). Nel collegio di otto ciascuna potenza aveva due propri membri ai quali vennero aggiunti alcuni altri esperti che presero parte ai lavori: André Tardieu (presidente della Commissione) e Jules Laroche per la Francia, insieme al generale Le Rond, de Martonne, Haumont, Aubert, de Saint-Quentin (segretario generale) e Camerlynck (interprete); Clive Day e Charles Seymour per gli Stati Uniti, inoltre il maggiore Johnson, il capitano L. W. Perrin (segretario) e il tenente Reuben Horchow (segretario); Eyre Crowe e Alan W. A. Leeper per la Gran Bretagna, e inoltre il tenente colonnello J. H. M. Cornwall e C. M. Plairet (segretario); Giacomo de Martino (vicepresidente della Commissione) e Vannutelli-Rey per l'Italia, e inoltre il generale Cavallero, il colonnello Castoldi, il maggiore Mazzolini, il maggiore Rugio e il conte Vinci (segretario). Il 2 marzo venne formata anche una sottocommissione (*Sub-Committee*) alla quale presero parte, tranne per quanto riguarda gli statunitensi, alcuni altri esperti delle rispettive potenze con il compito di proporre in dettaglio i futuri confini rumeni e jugoslavi. Lo stesso giorno avevano incominciato a discutere anche del confine austro-jugoslavo<sup>80</sup>.

Il 6 aprile venne presentata una prima proposta della Commissione territoriale per i confini della Romania<sup>81</sup>, alla quale seguì quella per il Regno SHS. I rappresentanti britannici, americani e francesi vedevano il bacino di Klagenfurt come un'area etnicamente mista, soprattutto a est della città; dal punto di vista geografico consideravano l'area come un insieme delimitata a sud dalle Karavanke; economicamente sarebbe stata più collegata alla zona a nord di essa. I

79 TNAADM 116/3239/45, Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions relating to Rumania and Yugoslavia, Report No. 2 (with Annexes) presented to the Supreme Council of the Allies: *Frontiers of Yugoslavia*, 6. 4. 1919, 2 (lo stesso in TNA FO 608/49/1, 8179); cfr. Lederer, 1966, 186, 199.

80 TNA ADM 116/3239/45, Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions relating to Rumania and Yugoslavia, Report No. 2 (with Annexes) presented to the Supreme Council of the Allies: *Frontiers of Yugoslavia*, 6. 4. 1919, 2–3.

81 TNA FO 608/49/1, 7540, Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions relating to Rumania and Yugoslavia, Report No. 1 (with Annexes) presented to the Supreme Council of the Allies: *Roumanian Frontiers*, 6. 4. 1919.

due rappresentanti italiani avevano invece portato avanti un punto di vista più definito e sostenevano la tesi che il bacino di Klagenfurt fosse geograficamente ed economicamente parte integrante dell'Austria. La Commissione aveva anche proposto che il confine tra l'Austria e il Regno SHS avrebbe dovuto seguire una linea lungo le Karavanke che andasse dalla strada che collega Lubiana e Klagenfurt alla zona a sud-est di Eisenkappel-Villach. I delegati britannici, americani e francesi avevano anche proposto che gli abitanti dell'area ben delimitata del bacino di Klagenfurt avrebbero avuto la possibilità di protestare contro questa decisione. Questo sarebbe stato possibile se ci fosse stata unanimità tra gli alleati, ma la proposta non vide parere favorevole dalla parte italiana<sup>82</sup>. Potremmo dire che si aveva in un certo modo accennato alla possibilità di un plebiscito. L'idea di una consultazione popolare comunque non era del tutto nuova. Da quanto scrive Ivo J. Lederer (1966, 166, 204), uno dei membri della delegazione jugoslava, Ante Trumbić, l'aveva già proposta il 31 gennaio 1919 per definire il confine con la Romania nella regione del Banato. In seguito, il 4 marzo, Josip Smidlaka, un altro dei membri della delegazione jugoslava, aveva »lanciato« l'idea di un »[...] plebiscito per tutte le dispute territoriali con i nostri alleati«. (Lederer, 1966, 190). Tale strumento di risoluzione di questioni spinose era comunque già stato considerato dagli esperti britannici durante la guerra, nella compilazione di uno dei manuali ovvero *Handbooks*<sup>83</sup>.

Dopo circa un mese di stallo, l'8 maggio, alla riunione del Consiglio dei quattro, il Primo ministro britannico Lloyd George mise in evidenza la questione dei confini austriaci. Decisero allora che sarebbe stata trattata al Consiglio dei ministri degli esteri (Grafenauer, 1970, 334–335). Nei tre giorni seguenti si erano occupati in prevalenza del «triangolo» di Jesenice che per ragioni economiche non ritenevano dovesse essere assegnato al Regno SHS, in particolare la parte italiana insisteva sull'importanza dei collegamenti ferroviari e che Klagenfurt e Maribor appartenessero all'Austria, opponendosi anche al plebiscito (Grafenauer, 1970, 335–338; Barker, 1984, 117–120; Rahten, 2020, 265). Il 12 del mese il Consiglio dei Quattro riprese in esame la questione e fu allora che per la prima volta venne ufficialmente nominata la possibilità di un plebiscito. Una commissione internazionale sarebbe stata inviata nel bacino di Klagenfurt per valutare se tra la popolazione locale ci fosse un numero sufficiente di coloro che desideravano entrare a far parte del Regno SHS; nel caso in cui questo presupposto fosse soddisfatto, si sarebbe tenuta qui la consultazione popolare. Nuovamente non venne presa una decisione riguardo alla zona di Jesenice (Grafenauer, 1970, 338). Intanto Sonnino aveva proposto che ci fosse il plebiscito anche per il territorio di Maribor, ma non riuscì a convincere gli altri, mentre Wilson sosteneva che la zona di Jesenice era

82 TNA ADM 116/3239/45, Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions relating to Rumania and Yugoslavia, Report No. 2 (with Annexes) presented to the Supreme Council of the Allies: *Frontiers of Yugoslavia*, 6. 4. 1919, 7–8, 14; cfr. Lederer, 1966, 205, 210–211.

83 TNA FO 373/7/35, *Plebiscites*, March 1919.

etnicamente jugoslava (Barker, 1984, 117–120; Rahten, 2020, 265, 308, 330). Il 27 maggio il presidente americano insisteva sull'integrità economica del bacino di Klagenfurt e che dunque non sarebbe stato utile dividerlo e ci sarebbe voluto un plebiscito. Il giorno dopo Orlando e Vennutelli Rey cercarono di convincere gli altri sulla necessità che il tunnel di Rosenbach passasse all'Austria, sostenendo che fosse molto sconveniente la sua divisione. I «grandi» infine decisero: la sorte della Val Canale, il plebiscito per la Carinzia; per Jesenice tutto rimaneva ancora aperto (Rahten, 2020, 313). Nelle due giornate del 29 e 30 maggio il Consiglio dei Quattro aveva dapprima deciso che sei mesi dopo la firma del Trattato di pace si sarebbe svolto un plebiscito nel bacino di Klagenfurt, poi che 15 giorni dopo la firma del Trattato di pace l'amministrazione della zona sarebbe stata rilevata da una commissione internazionale di cinque membri, infine definirono le linee guida riguardo al diritto di voto (Grafenauer, 1970, 343–347).

La decisione non era in favore del Regno SHS, perciò la delegazione jugoslava cercava di ottenere delle modifiche. Agli inizi di giugno Lloyd George e Clemenceau avevano cambiato idea e proposero di dividere il bacino di Klagenfurt in due zone, trovando dapprima opposizione in Wilson, il quale tuttavia cambiò idea e sostenne successivamente la seguente soluzione: il territorio di Klagenfurt sarebbe stato diviso in due zone e in entrambe, sei mesi dopo la firma del Trattato di pace, si sarebbe svolto un plebiscito (Grafenauer, 1970, 347–352). Nel frattempo, una commissione subordinata alla Società delle Nazioni si sarebbe occupata dell'amministrazione dell'area (Wutte, 1985, 287, 454). In seguito, uno dei delegati jugoslavi Milenko Vesnić mandò al presidente della Conferenza di pace Clemenceau due lettere e altre due alla Commissione Territoriale. Alcune sue proposte vennero accettate<sup>84</sup>.

Alle riunioni del 21 e 23 giugno il Consiglio dei Quattro aveva definito quasi del tutto dove si sarebbe svolto il plebiscito; solamente per alcune aree era previsto che sarebbero state determinate sul campo. Adottarono le seguenti linee guida per lo svolgimento della consultazione popolare: tre mesi dopo l'entrata in vigore del trattato di pace nella Zona A, poi, se necessario, tre settimane dopo nella Zona B; questa sarebbe temporaneamente occupata dall'esercito austriaco, mentre la Zona A dall'esercito jugoslavo; entrambi gli schieramenti sarebbero però stati numericamente limitati, necessari solo per mantenere l'ordine; l'area sarebbe stata sottoposta alla supervisione di una Commissione internazionale, con il compito di organizzare il voto popolare; la base giuridica nella Zona A si sarebbe poggiata sulle normative del Regno SHS, nella Zona B invece su quelle austriache. Infine, venne definito chi avesse il diritto al voto: c'era una differenza con la decisione del 18 giugno, vale a dire chiunque avesse domicilio o il cosiddetto diritto di

84 TNA ADM 116/3239/45, *Vesnitch to Clemenceau, Delegation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes at the Peace Conference*, 7. 6. 1919; *Note Addressed to the Supreme Council of the Allies by the Committee on Rumanian and Yugoslav Affairs*, 18. 6. 1919; cfr. in TNA FO 608/49/1, 13029.

patria (pertinenza) prima del 1° gennaio 1912<sup>85</sup>. La data era quindi più vicina alla proposta italiana. Sonnino al Senato di Roma verso la fine di giugno per quanto riguarda i futuri confini austriaci aveva mostrato soddisfazione rispetto alle decisioni di Parigi (non invece per la questione adriatica e altri problemi aperti)<sup>86</sup>.

Per quanto riguardava Jesenice la parte italiana aveva poi in cambio richiesto una piccola parte della Gorenjska per poter costruirsi una nuova linea ferroviaria che collegasse Trieste con Villach. Gli altri alleati si opposero a ciò e dalla fine di agosto 1919 non ci furono più richieste ufficiali italiane riguardo Jesenice (Grafenauer, 1970, 343, 353, 363). A prescindere da ciò, tra i principali rappresentanti sloveni rimaneva anche dopo il plebiscito dell'ottobre 1920 il timore che le richieste italiane non si fossero del tutto esaurite (Rahten, 2020, 412). In effetti in alcuni ambienti austriaci giravano voci e proposte che Jesenice, per la sua importanza geopolitica nelle comunicazioni con l'Europa centrale, avrebbe potuto essere sottratta agli jugoslavi e annessa allo stato italiano. Le proposte non furono rigettate dai rappresentanti della Francia e della Gran Bretagna; infine però prevalse la *realpolitik* della diplomazia di Vienna che si rese conto di non poter richiedere agli jugoslavi altri sacrifici territoriali, avendo Belgrado, oltre alla sconfitta nel voto popolare in Carinzia, sottoscritto il mese dopo il trattato di Rapallo che agli occhi degli jugoslavi aveva molto penalizzato i croati e ancor di più gli sloveni (Rahten, 2020, 417–420, 426–427, 436).

## LA COMMISSIONE PER IL PLEBISCITO E IL RUOLO DELLE TRUPPE ITALIANE

La Commissione predisposta per organizzare e mettere poi in atto il plebiscito, attiva nel bacino di Klagenfurt tra il 21 luglio<sup>87</sup> e il 18 novembre 1920<sup>88</sup>, era composta da cinque membri: il colonello britannico Sydney Capel Peck (presidente), il conte francese Louis Charles de Chambrun, il principe italiano Livio Borghese, l'Austria era rappresentata dal capitano di fregata Albert Peter-Pirkham, il Regno SHS dapprima dal geografo e antropologo Jovan Cvijić, che venne poi sostituito dal giurista Jovan Jovanović. Gli Stati Uniti non avevano un proprio rappresentante non avendo il Senato americano fino ad allora ratificato il Trattato di Saint Germain (Barker, 1984, 154; Rahten, 2020, 359–360). L'orientamento dei membri della Commissione era sbilanciata in favore dell'Austria. Borghese, che aveva avuto un ruolo importante nelle conclusioni della Commissione, era infatti considerato un politico di orientamento anti-jugoslavo, mentre Peter-Pirkham aveva parecchi contatti con gli ambienti italiani (Pirjevec, 1981, 88–91; Sienčnik,

85 TNA ADM 116/3232/23, André Tardieu: *Klagenfurt Basin* [ricevuto il 30. 6. 1919].

86 TNA FO 608/40/4, 13930, Rodd, Rome (No. 442), 25. 6. 1919.

87 TNA FO 371/4627 C 2136/147/3, Peck, Klagenfurt (No. 1), 22. 7. 1920.

88 TNA FO 895/1, Klagenfurt Plebiscite Commission: *Twentyfifth Meeting of the Inter-Allied Plebiscite Commission*, 18. 11. 1920.

1987, 315, 321, 326, 328, 330; cfr. Rahten, 2020, 384–389, 417) e riusciva a tessere buoni rapporti anche con vari rappresentanti alleati (Rahten, 2020, 170, 178, 227, 389). Nelle fonti di Londra si evince che Borghese era in non pochi casi in sintonia con il britannico Peck, non così invece con il rappresentante francese de Chambrun<sup>89</sup>, il quale comunque non giocò del tutto un ruolo filo-jugoslavo, sebbene tra gli esperti del Regno SHS le aspettative nei suoi riguardi (e in generale dei francesi) erano altre (Rahten, 2020, 249, 360–362, 417).

I rappresentanti britannici erano ben consapevoli delle preoccupazioni jugoslove riguardo la presenza di truppe italiane nell'area dove si sarebbe dovuto svolgere il plebiscito. Così alla fine di agosto 1920 il presidente della Commissione Peck aveva riferito di come due brigate italiane arrivarono nelle vicinanze di Villach, vuol dire nella parte occidentale dell'area del plebiscito. La parte jugoslava temeva quindi che in caso di esito favorevole e conseguentemente l'annessione della Zona A al Regno SHS, queste unità avrebbero invaso la zona, almeno fino al tunnel delle Karavanke. La loro presenza fu interpretata diversamente dagli austriaci che vedevano in esse una garanzia per la propria sicurezza, temendo che nel caso dell'annessione della Zona A all'Austria, l'esercito jugoslavo potesse invaderla. Karl Renner, all'epoca ministro degli esteri austriaco, avrebbe espresso il desiderio che le truppe italiane si ritirassero, ma il governo provinciale della Carinzia non ne voleva sapere. Secondo il rappresentante italiano nella Commissione Borghese la presenza di soldati italiani fino allo svolgimento del plebiscito era probabile. Dunque, una situazione sempre più complicata e Peck avvertiva i superiori che il Regno SHS stava utilizzato l'argomento riguardo le truppe italiane come scusa per poter mantenere le proprie unità nella Zona A e questo anche dopo il 10 settembre, quando i soldati jugoslavi avrebbero dovuto ritirarsi dalla zona. Peck aveva anche menzionato alcuni atti di violenza perpetrati dalle truppe jugoslave e l'operato imparziale della loro polizia, nonché, a differenza della parte austriaca, l'incoerenza jugoslava verso le decisioni della Commissione. Secondo lui, nel caso di vittoria austriaca, la parte jugoslava avrebbe potuto cercare un negoziato intorno ad un confine sulle Karavanke e la parte austriaca probabilmente sarebbe stata disposta ad accettare. Un'altra possibilità avrebbe potuto essere una demarcazione lungo il fiume Drava. In generale veniva notato come la popolazione non avesse preferenze per uno o l'altro stato, era invece prevalentemente concorde che il bacino di Klagenfurt dovesse rimanere unito<sup>90</sup>.

Entro il 4 settembre quasi tutti i carabinieri italiani, che erano a guardia del materiale bellico, si erano ritirati dal bacino di Klagenfurt e il controllo passò nelle mani della Commissione. Fino ad allora anche un battaglione dell'esercito

89 TNA FO 895/1, Klagenfurt Plebiscite Commission: *Fourteenth Meeting of the Inter-Allied Plebiscite Commission*, 28. 8. 1920; TNA FO 371/4628 C 5468/147/3, Peck, Klagenfurt, to Curzon (No. 8), 28. 8. 1920; C 5158/147/3, Peck, Klagenfurt (No. 14), 30. 8. 1920; TNA FO 371/4629 C 6738/147/3, Peck, Klagenfurt, to Leeper, 14. 9. 1920.

90 TNA FO 371/4628 C 5468/147/3, Peck, Klagenfurt, to Curzon (No. 8), 28. 8. 1920.

jugoslavo aveva lasciato la Zona A e l'altro avrebbe dovuto farlo entro il 10 del mese. Peck aveva inoltre riferito che non c'erano intoppi nel commercio alimentare tra le due zone. Il rappresentante jugoslavo aveva intanto espresso il desiderio che il plebiscito si tenesse il prima possibile. Secondo Peck questa fretta era dovuta dalla percezione jugoslava che con il passare del tempo le possibilità di un sua vittoria stavano diminuendo<sup>91</sup>. Secondo uno dei rappresentanti britannici a Roma, a seguito del ritiro jugoslavo dalla Zona A, l'esercito italiano era pronto a ritirare gradualmente le proprie truppe dalle vicinanze di Villach che sarebbero state così sostituite da quelle austriache. Leeper allora non era per niente soddisfatto di queste informazioni, ritenendo che la permanenza delle unità italiane non era per niente giustificata<sup>92</sup>. L'ambasciatore britannico a Parigi Edward George lord Derby aveva intanto presentato il punto di vista della diplomazia francese secondo la quale non si poteva escludere un accordo italo-austriaco che in caso di disordini nella Zona A ci fosse un intervento dell'esercito italiano<sup>93</sup>. Che la tensione stava aumentando era evidente anche da un altro messaggio di Peck verso la fine di settembre: Peck aveva, infatti, previsto che la parte italiana intendeva posticipare la data del plebiscito e per ottenere questo sarebbe stata adirittura pronta a provare qualche incidente. Peck aveva però anche fatto notare la propria impotenza essendo non di competenza della Commissione da lui presieduta poter richiedere il ritiro delle truppe italiane da Villach e dintorni. Intanto la parte austriaca aveva insistito che c'era la necessità della presenza di forze alleate nel bacino di Klagenfurt. Peck riteneva che l'arrivo delle truppe italiane sarebbe stata una cattiva idea, soprattutto se non fossero stati presenti anche soldati francesi e britannici, poiché in una tale situazione probabilmente anche le truppe jugoslave sarebbero ritornate nella Zona A<sup>94</sup>. La questione venne sollevata anche dalla Conferenza degli ambasciatori. Quello di Sua Maestà Derby riferiva di come il rappresentante francese avesse proposto di fornire alcune unità per sorvegliare la polizia durante lo svolgimento del plebiscito. Una possibilità alla quale sia Leeper che Crowe non si erano opposti<sup>95</sup>.

Di lì a poco, Peck richiese l'arrivo di almeno trecento britannici e francesi e una compagnia militare italiana – di cui non aveva però definito il numero – affinché il plebiscito potesse svolgersi entro il 16 ottobre, ultima data possibile secondo il Trattato di Saint Germain. Nella stessa occasione Leeper e Crowe avevano confermato la sfiducia nei confronti delle unità italiane: secondo loro

91 TNA FO 371/4628 C 5980/147/3, Peck, Klagenfurt, to Curzon (No. 11), 4. 9. 1920; Foreign Office to Young, Belgrade (No. 192), 13. 9. 1920.

92 TNA FO 371/4629 C 7106/147/3, Kennard, Rome (No. 430), 23. 9. 1920.

93 TNA FO 371/4629 C 6955/147/3, Derby to Peck (No. 1114), 21. 9. 1920.

94 TNA FO 371/4629 C 7180/147/3, Peck, Klagenfurt (No. 26), 23. 9. 1920.

95 TNA FO 371/4629 C 7294/147/3, Derby to Curzon (No. 1133), 25. 9. 1920; Foreign Office to Derby (No. 1045), 23. 9. 1920.

non era auspicabile la loro presenza nel bacino di Klagenfurt<sup>96</sup>. Molto probabilmente avevano influenzato Peck che aveva cambiato parere e richiese solamente trecento soldati francesi o britannici per poter controllare la polizia<sup>97</sup>. Nei primi giorni di ottobre alla Conferenza degli ambasciatori avevano deciso di non inviare altre truppe. Le unità per il bacino di Klagenfurt sarebbero state intanto fornite dalla Commissione alleata a Vienna (*Commission of Control at Vienna*)<sup>98</sup>. Due giorni prima del plebiscito, Peck riferì di aver ricevuto quotidianamente denunce contro la polizia jugoslava nella Zona A e dintorni. Secondo lui, nel caso in cui questa parte del territorio fosse appartenuta al Regno SHS, Borghese avrebbe potuto approfittarne per denunciare come le violenze jugoslave avessero influito sull'esito del voto popolare<sup>99</sup>. Infine, il 10 ottobre 1920, lo stesso giorno del plebiscito, arrivarono nella Zona A 58 soldati alleati. Erano stati assegnati ai collegi elettorali e lungo i confini della zona<sup>100</sup>.

La votazione si svolse senza particolari incidenti<sup>101</sup>. Già due giorni dopo il rappresentante francese presso la Conferenza degli ambasciatori Jules Cambon era in possesso di dati secondo i quali la Zona A sarebbe appartenuta all'Austria. Allora i membri della Conferenza, riuniti a Parigi, avevano anche invitato il governo austriaco e quello jugoslavo a prevenire disordini dopo la pubblicazione dei risultati del voto<sup>102</sup>. Il 13 ottobre la Commissione per il plebiscito aveva infine annunciato i risultati<sup>103</sup>. Com'è noto per l'Austria avevano votato in 22.025 (59,04%), per il Regno SHS invece 15.279 (41,96%) (Lederer, 1966, 265; Barker, 1984, 165).

Leeper, ricevendo i dati, aveva subito previsto che, data la differenza non schiacciante, gli jugoslavi avrebbero difficilmente accettato l'esito del voto<sup>104</sup>. Difatti già nella notte tra il 13 e il 14 ottobre ci fu l'irruzione dell'esercito jugoslavo nella Zona A. Le autorità jugoslave cercavano di giustificarla, sostenendo che fosse necessaria per aiutare l'amministrazione fino a quando non venisse rilevata dall'Austria. Evidentemente, per le esperienze passate, Peck aveva ancor prima dell'irruzione avvertito che era la parte italiana a volere un qualcosa del genere per avere poi un valido motivo per intervenire nella Zona A con le proprie unità di stanza nelle vicinanze di Villach<sup>105</sup>. Comunque, ancor prima del plebiscito, il ministro degli Esteri austriaco aveva ricevuto informazioni riguardo

96 TNA FO 371/4629 C 7574/147/3, Peck, Klagenfurt (No. 29), 29. 9. 1920, e commenti di Leeper e Crowe.

97 TNA FO 371/4629 C 7578/147/3, Peck, Klagenfurt (No. 30), 29. 9. 1920.

98 TNA FO 371/4629 C 7798/147/3, Derby, Paris, to Peck, Klagenfurt (No. 1155), 3. 10. 1920.

99 TNA FO 371/4630 C 8308/147/3, Peck, Klagenfurt (No. 36), 8. 10. 1920.

100 TNA FO 371/4631 C 9060/147/3, Peck to Curzon (No. 18), 13. 10. 1920.

101 TNA FO 371/4630 C 8516/147/3, Peck, Klagenfurt (No. 37), 11. 10. 1920.

102 TNA FO 893/8/1, *Notes of a Meeting held at Quai d'Orsay*, 13. 10. 1920.

103 TNA FO 895/1, Klagenfurt Plebiscite Commission: *Twentysecond Meeting of the Inter-Allied Plebiscite Commission*, 13. 10. 1920.

104 TNA FO 371/4630 C 8728/147/3, Peck, Klagenfurt (No. 38), 13. 10. 1920, e commento di Leeper.

105 TNA FO 371/4630 C 8810/147/3, Peck, Klagenfurt (No. 41), 14. 10. 1920.

alle intenzioni dell'esercito jugoslavo<sup>106</sup>. Evidentemente erano in molti ad essere consapevoli che la parte jugoslava sarebbe stata difficilmente disposta ad accettare una sconfitta.

La Conferenza degli ambasciatori e la Commissione per il plebiscito richiesero ovviamente l'immediato ritiro jugoslavo<sup>107</sup>. Probabilmente per evitare ulteriori tensioni l'ambasciatore italiano a Parigi aveva anche annunciato che il suo Paese non aveva alcuna intenzione di inviare truppe nell'area del plebiscito<sup>108</sup>. Il governo a Belgrado intanto stava cercando di far apparire da un lato il proprio disappunto per l'intervento, dall'altro invece voleva giustificarlo, sostenendo che si trattava in fondo di un «gesto» per calmare gli sloveni<sup>109</sup>. Dopo dieci giorni, il 23 ottobre, le truppe jugoslave lasciarono la Zona A<sup>110</sup>. La Commissione per il plebiscito come menzionato consluse i lavori il 18 novembre. Dopo quattro giorni, partì da Klagenfurt<sup>111</sup>.

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106 TNA FO 371/4630 C 8101/147/3, Bridgeman, Vienna (No. 381), 5. 10. 1920.

107 TNA, FO 893/8/3, *Notes of a Meeting held at Quai d'Orsay*, 16. 10. 1920; cfr. TNA FO 371/4631 C 8845/147/3, Peck, Klagenfurt (No. 39), 14. 10. 1920.

108 TNA FO 371/4631 C 8852/147/3, Derby, Paris (No. 1214), 16. 10. 1920.

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## ITALIJSKA INTERVENCIJA NA KOROŠKEM PO PRVI SVETOVNI VOJNI IN BRITANCI

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### POVZETEK

Čeprav je bila po koncu prve svetovne vojne Italija osredotočena predvsem na reševanje t. i. jadranskega vprašanja, sta bili njihova diplomacija in vojska dejavni tudi v okviru drugih odprtih ozemeljskih vprašanjih. Med temi je bila še nedoločena avstrijsko-jugoslovanska razmejitev na Koroškem. O obdobju med koncem prve svetovne vojne in izvedbo plebiscita, ki je sporno območje prisodil Avstriji, je izšlo že več del, kakor tudi o italijanski vlogi pri reševanju koroškega vprašanja. Ugotavljamo pa, da so bili v teh delih primarni viri nekaterih tedanjih vodilnih držav manj upoštevani, zaradi česar so se avtorji odločili, da zapleteno tematiko predstavijo z vidika britanske diplomacije. Analizirali so zlasti vrsto neobjavljenih primarnih virov, ki jih hrani Britanski državni arhiv v Londonu. V članku so najprej prikazani napeti povojni odnosi med Italijo in novonastalo Kraljevino Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev. V tem oziru je potrebno izpostaviti problem železniških povezav, ki so iz Trsta vodile v Srednjo Evropo. Izmed treh mednarodnih prog sta dve (Južna Železnica in Bohinjska proga ali Transalpina) morali nujno prečkati slovensko (jugoslovansko) ozemlje. Italija si je zelo prizadevala, da bi železniške proge v čim manjši meri potekale preko jugoslovenskega ozemlja, kar je pomembno vplivalo na njen podporo Avstriji in njenim ozemeljskim težnjam, med drugim glede Maribora, obenem pa je zahtevala, da bi območje t. i. jeseniškega trikotnika prešlo pod Avstrijo. Da bi se vsaj ena izmed železnic (Pontebanno) izognila jugoslovenskega ozemlja, si je morala prisvojiti celotno območje Kanalske doline, kar ji je tudi uspeло. V članku se nato avtorji posvečajo vojaškim bojem na Koroškem, ki so se

*začeli takoj po koncu vojne. Potekali so do začetnih dni junija 1919, ko je jugoslovanska vojska osvojila večino Celovške kotline vključno s Celovcem. Le nekaj dni po zaključku bojev, to je 13. junija 1919, je v dogajanje neposredno posegla italijanska vojska, ki je zasedla del Koroške, kar je med Britanci, ki so razmeram na terenu posvečali veliko pozornosti, izvalo precej nelagodja. Italija je podpirala avstrijske zahteve tudi na mirovni konferenci v Parizu, npr. v okviru posebne teritorialne komisije, ki je pripravljala mejne predloge, pa tudi v Medzavezniški plebiscitni komisiji, ki je sredi julija 1920 prišla v Celovec z nalogom, da izvede ljudsko glasovanje. Britanci so sproti ugotavliali, da je bila italijanska podpora avstrijskim težnjam očitna, bodisi na politično-diplomatskem kot tudi vojaško-obveščevalnem področju.*

*Ključne besede: Koroška, Italija, Kraljevina Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev, Velika Britanija, koroški plebiscit, Kanalska dolina, železnice*

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## VSEBINA / INDICE GENERALE / CONTENTS

<b>Miha Seručnik:</b> Pandemija španske gripe med Kranjsko in Istro – Možnosti in omejitve digitalnih pristopov .....	1
<i>La pandemia dell'influenza spagnola tra la Carniola e l'Istria – Possibilità e limiti degli approcci digitali</i>	
<i>The Spanish Influenza Pandemic Between Carniola and Istria – Possibilities and Limitations of Digital Approaches</i>	
<b>Urška Bratož:</b> Vojna, lakota in bolezen: Po sledeh španske gripe v Kopru .....	21
<i>Guerra, fame e malattia: Sulle tracce dell'influenza spagnola a Capodistria</i>	
<i>War, Famine and Disease: Tracing the Spanish Influenza in Koper</i>	
<b>Katarina Keber:</b> »O španski bolezni, hripi posebne vrste«. Ljubljanska izkušnja s pandemijo španske gripe .....	41
<i>«Sulla malattia spagnola, un'influenza di tipo particolare».</i>	
<i>L'esperienza di Lubiana con la pandemia dell'influenza spagnola</i>	
<i>“On a Spanish Disease, a Specific Type of Flu”.</i>	
<i>Experience with the Spanish Influenza Pandemic in Ljubljana</i>	
<b>Iva Milovan Delić &amp; Marlena Plavšić:</b> Spanish Flu and Mental Disorders in the Margraviate of Istria at the End of WWI .....	59
<i>L'influenza spagnola e i disturbi mentali nel margraviato d'Istria</i>	
<i>alla fine della prima guerra mondiale</i>	
<i>Španska gripe in duševne motnje v markgrofiji Istra</i>	
<i>ob koncu prve svetovne vojne</i>	
<b>Alenka Divjak:</b> Southwestern and Central Slovenia. Nauportus: The Argonautic Legend – the Romans Go East .....	75
<i>Slovenia sudoccidentale e centrale. Nauportus:</i>	
<i>la leggenda degli Argonauti – i Romani vanno verso est</i>	
<i>Jugozahodna in osrednja slovenija. Navport:</i>	
<i>legenda o Argonautih – Rimljani gredo na vzhod</i>	

<b>Izidor Janžekovič:</b> The History of Masculinity in the British Atlantic World .....	99
<i>La storia della mascolinità nel mondo Atlantico Britannico</i>	
<i>Zgodovina moškosti v britanskem Atlantiku</i>	
<b>Neva Makuc:</b> Goriška deželna zavest in identitetne dinamike na habsburško-beneškem obmejnem prostoru v luči (samo) oznak šolajoče se mladine .....	127
<i>La coscienza provinciale Goriziana e le dinamiche identitarie nell'area di confine tra la Repubblica di Venezia e le province degli Asburgo alla luce delle (auto)identificazioni degli studenti</i>	
<i>Provincial Affinity in the Area of Gorizia and Identity Dynamics in the Habsburg-Venetian Borderland in Light of the (Self) Labelling of the School Populations</i>	
<b>Ivan Miškulin &amp; Barbara Riman:</b> Mons. Leopold Jurca i njegovo djelovanje u razdoblju između dvaju svjetskih ratova u hrvatskoj Istri .....	141
<i>Il monsignor Leopold Jurca e il suo ruolo nel periodo tra le due guerre mondiali nell'Istria croata</i>	
<i>The Monsignor Leopold Jurca and His Work in the Period between Two World Wars in Croatian Istria</i>	
<b>Blaž Torkar &amp; Gorazd Bajc:</b> Slovenci v vrstah britanskih komandosov .....	161
<i>Gli sloveni nelle fila dei commandos britannici</i>	
<i>Slovenes in the Ranks of the British Commandos</i>	
<hr/>	
<b>Marko Štuhec:</b> Kulturni transfer: koncept in zgodovinska realnost .....	185
<i>Transfer culturale: il concetto e la realtà storica</i>	
<i>Cultural Transfer: Concept and Historical Reality</i>	
<b>Drago Roksandić:</b> The Imperial Imaginary of the “Loyal Subject”: Lujo Matutinović on a Kingdom of Illyria from the Gulf of Trieste to the Mouth of the Danube (1811) .....	203
<i>L'immaginario imperiale del «suddito fedele»: Lujo Matutinović su un Regno illirico dal golfo di Trieste all'estuario del Danubio (1811)</i>	
<i>Imperialni imaginarij „zvestega podanika“: Lujo Matutinović o Ilirskem kraljestvu od tržaškega zaliva do izliva Donave (1811)</i>	

<b>François Bouchard:</b> Bartolomeo Benincasa, censore generale delle Province Illiriche (1810–1811) ..... <i>Bartolomeo Benincasa, the Chief Censor of the Illyrian Provinces (1810–1811)</i> <i>Bartolomeo Benincasa, glavni cenzor Ilirskih provinc (1810–1811)</i>	225
<b>Luka Vidmar:</b> “Grandi speranze di bene”: Metternich, Wrbna and Lažansky at the Zois Palace in May 1816 ..... “Grandi speranze di bene”: Metternich, Wrbna e Lažanský nel palazzo di Zois nel maggio 1816 “Grandi speranze di bene”: Metternich, Wrbna in Lažanský v Zoisovi palači maja 1816	243
<b>Jean-Jacques Tatin-Gourier:</b> De la gestion française des mines d’Idrija sous l’empire à leur insertion dans les parcours Européens et les études des ingénieurs des mines du début du XIXe siècle ..... <i>Dalla gestione francese delle miniere d’Idria alla loro introduzione nei percorsi europei e negli studi degli ingegneri minerari agli inizi del secolo XIX</i> <i>Idrijski rudnik od francoske uprave do vključitve v potovanja in razprave evropskih rudarskih strokovnjakov na začetku 19. stoletja</i>	269
<b>Ernst Bruckmüller:</b> The Agricultural Society of Vienna and its Connections to Southern and Western Europe between 1812 and 1857 ..... <i>La società agraria di Vienna e le sue connessioni con l’Europa meridionale e occidentale tra il 1812 e il 1857</i> <i>Dunajska kmetijska družba in njene povezave z južno in zahodno Evropo med 1812 in 1857</i>	279
<b>Peter Vodopivec:</b> Les socialistes « utopiques » français dans le <i>Journal des österreichischen Lloyd</i> (1841–1847) et le <i>Laibacher Zeitung</i> (1850) ..... <i>I socialisti «utopici» francesi nel Journal des österreichischen Lloyd (1841–1847) e nel Laibacher Zeitung (1850)</i> <i>Francoski »utopični« socialisti v Jurnalu avstrijskega Loyda (1841–1847) in Laibacher Zeitung (1850)</i>	297
<b>Giulia Delogu:</b> Notizie vere, notizie false: la questione sanitaria nell’Adriatico austriaco e nella Carniola del XVIII secolo tra commercio, politica e «polizia medica» ..... <i>True News, Fake News: Health Issues in Eighteenth-century Austrian Adriatic and Carniola between Commerce, Politics and “Medical Police”</i> <i>Resnične in lažne novice: razmere v zdravstvu na območju avstrijskega Jadrana in Kranjske v 18. stoletju glede na trgovino, politiko in “medicinsko policijo”</i>	311

<b>Maria Bidovec:</b> Eminent sloveni nelle opere di referenza ottocentesche in Italia .....	327
<i>Eminent Slovenes in Nineteenth Century Reference Works in Italy</i>	
<i>Ugledni Slovenci v italijanskih splošnih enciklopedijah 19. stoletja</i>	
<hr/>	
<b>Isabella Mattazzi:</b> Alle radici del mito: figure dell'immaginario e regioni di confine nella trattatistica sui vampiri di matrice illuminista .....	349
<i>At the Roots of the Myth: Imaginary's Figures and Border Regions in Enlightenment Treatises about Vampires</i>	
<i>O izvoru mita: liki iz imaginarija in obmejne regije v traktatih o vampirjih v obdobju razsvetljenstva</i>	
<hr/>	
<b>Rudj Gorian:</b> Note su alcune biblioteche a Gorizia tra Seicento e inizio Ottocento .....	363
<i>Notes on Some Libraries in Gorizia between the Seventeenth and the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century</i>	
<i>Opombe o nekaterih knjižnicah v Gorici med sedemnajstim in začetkom devetnajstega stoletja</i>	
<hr/>	
<b>Massimo Scandola:</b> Une hypothèse sur la bibliothèque de travail d'Armand-Louis-Maurice Séguier, consul français à Trieste (1810–1813) .....	379
<i>Un'ipotesi sulla biblioteca di lavoro di Armand-Louis-Maurice Séguier, console francese a Trieste (1810–1813)</i>	
<i>Hipoteza o delovnem gradivu v knjižnici Armand-Louis-Mauricea Séguiera, francoškega konzula v Trstu (1810–1813)</i>	
<hr/>	
<b>Tanja Žigon:</b> Traduzioni di libri «per il popolo» in sloveno: la leggenda di santa Genoveffa e il suo primo traduttore .....	397
<i>Slovenian Translations of Folk Books: The Legend of St. Genevieve and its First Translator</i>	
<i>Prevodi ljudskih knjig v slovenščino: legenda o sveti Genovefi in njen prvi prevajalec</i>	
<hr/>	
<b>Kristina Lazar:</b> Ruggiero Boscovich e il suo rapporto con diversi ambienti, in particolare quello della penisola balcanica .....	417
<i>Roger Boscovich and His Relationship with Different Environments, in Particular with the Territory of the Balkans</i>	
<i>Ruder Bošković in njegov odnos do različnih okolij, še posebej do balkanskega polotoka</i>	

<b>Irena Prosenc:</b> Stiki med Albertom Fortisom in slovanskim svetom ob vzhodnem Jadranu .....	437
<i>I contatti tra Alberto Fortis e il mondo slavo dell'Adriatico orientale</i> <i>The Contacts between Alberto Fortis and the Eastern Adriatic Slavs</i>	
<b>Patrizia Farinelli:</b> La città mineraria di Idria nel 1812 allo sguardo di G. Cattaneo e G. Scopoli (il giovane).....	459
<i>The Mining Town of Idrija in 1812 as Seen by G. Cattaneo and G. Scopoli (jr.)</i>	
<i>Rudarsko mesto Idrija leta 1812 skozi oči G. Cattanea in G. Scopolija (ml.)</i>	
<b>Marko Štuhec:</b> Un autre regard sur le transfert culturel : les nobles carnioliens en leurs foyers.	
Première moitié du XVIII <sup>e</sup> siècle .....	477
<i>L'ambiente domestico della nobiltà carniolana nella prima metà del secolo XVIII come uno spazio di transfer culturale</i>	
<i>Bivališča kranjskega plemstva v prvi polovici 18. stoletja kot prostor kulturnega transferja</i>	
<b>Antonio Trampus &amp; Michela Messina:</b> Reti intellettuali e relazioni artistiche tra l'Adriatico e Lubiana: da Casanova e Zinzendorf ai ritrattisti Karl Alexander von Schell e Franz Linder .....	495
<i>Intellectual Networks and Artistic Relationships between the Adriatic and Ljubljana: From Casanova and Zinzendorf to the Portraitists Karl Alexander von Schell and Franz Linder</i>	
<i>Intelektualne povezave in umetniški odnosi med Jadranom in Ljubljano: od Casanove in Zinzendorfa do portretistov Karla Alexandra von Schella in Franza Lindra</i>	
<b>Wolfgang Göderle:</b> Postwar: The Social Transformation of Empire in 19 <sup>th</sup> Century Europe. Scientific Knowledge, Hybridity and the Legitimacy of Imperial Rule .....	511
<i>Postwar: trasformazione sociale dell'Impero nell'Europa del XIX secolo.</i>	
<i>Conoscenza scientifica, ibridismo e legittimità del potere imperiale</i>	
<i>Povojna socialna transformacija Habsburške monarhije v 19. stoletju.</i>	
<i>Znanost, hibridnost in zakonitost cesarskih zakonov</i>	

<b>Francesco Toncich:</b> Istria between Purity and Hybridity: The Creation of the Istrian Region through Scientific Research in the 19 <sup>th</sup> Century .....	541
<i>L'Istria tra purezza e ibridismo: la creazione della regione istriana attraverso l'attività scientifica nel XIX secolo</i>	
<i>Istra med čistoča in hibridnostjo: ustvarjanje istrske regije skozi znanstvene raziskave 19. stoletja</i>	
<b>Daniela Simon:</b> The “hybrids” and the Re-ordering of Istria, 1870–1914 .....	577
<i>Gli «ibridi» e il riordino dell'Istria, 1870–1914</i>	
<i>»Hibridi« in reorganizacija Istre, 1870–1914</i>	
<b>Bojan Baskar:</b> A Mixture without Mixing: Fears of Linguistic and Cultural Hybridity in the Slovenian-Italian Borderland .....	605
<i>Una mescolanza non mescolata: paure dell'ibridismo linguistico e culturale al confine italo-sloveno</i>	
<i>Mešanice brez mešanja: bojazni pred jezikovno in kulturno hibridnostjo na slovensko-italijanskem mejnem območju</i>	
<b>Marijan Premović:</b> Politički odnosi komuna Budve i Dubrovnika od 1358. do kraja XIV. stoljeća .....	623
<i>Le relazioni politiche tra il comune di Budva e il comune di Ragusa dal 1358 alla fine del secolo XIV</i>	
<i>Political Relations of Budva and Dubrovnik Communes from 1358 until the End of the 14<sup>th</sup> Century</i>	
<b>Jurij Perovšek:</b> O Dr. Miljanu Jakliču in prvem prevodu Komunističnega manifesta v slovenski jezik.....	645
<i>Dr. Milan Jaklič e la prima traduzione in sloveno del Manifesto comunista</i>	
<i>Dr. Milan Jaklič and the First Translation of the Communist Manifesto into the Slovene Language</i>	
<b>Aleš Maver:</b> Med cesarjem in kraljem: lavantinski knezoškof Mihael Napotnik v letu 1918 in po njem .....	661
<i>Tra l'imperatore e il re: l'arcivescovo di Maribor Mihael Napotnik dal 1918 in poi</i>	
<i>Between an Emperor and a King: The Prince-bishop Mihael Napotnik of Lavant in the Year 1918 and Afterwards</i>	
<b>Darjan Lorenčič &amp; Andrej Hozjan:</b> Republika Mörksa – Murska Republika, 1919 .....	679
<i>Respublika Mörksa – la Repubblica di Mura, 1919</i>	
<i>Respublika Mörksa – The Republic of Mura, 1919</i>	

**Gorazd Bajc, Mateja Matjašič Friš, Janez Osojnik & Darko Friš:**  
L'intervento italiano in Carinzia dopo la Prima guerra  
mondiale e i britannici ..... 711  
*The Italian Intervention in Carinthia after the  
First World War and the British*  
*Italijanska intervencija na Koroškem po  
prvi svetovni vojni in Britanci*

